Battle Space, Technology, And Doctrine

Scimus autem quoniam diligentibus Deum omnia cooperantur in bonum, iis qui secundum propositum vocati sunt sancti. And we know that to them that love God, all things work together unto good, to such as, according to his purpose, are called to be saints.

Security For One
Is Security For All

War is a work of art. At first, a work of art exists interiorly as direct experience of combinations and permutations of sets of motifs — usually not more than three motifs — inside an artists’ intellect and heart, which enjoy natural and direct connectivity with the divine ground, although that connectivity can corrode.

First, the motifs — usually not more than three — become present in an artist’s interior experience. Then, combinations and permutations of these motifs arrange themselves and are arranged by the artist, all still as the artist’s interior experience. Then, when all is satisfactory, and still inside the artist, the artist throws their interior experience into material existence as light, sound, writing, and / or solid material that others can experience. Material existence of an artists’ interior experience is called a creation.

Being an art, war too occurs in this manner and under these procedures. British military thinker and historian B. H. Liddel-Hart puts it this way: The profoundest truth of war is that the issue of battle is usually decided in the minds of the opposing commanders, not in the bodies of their men.

In the statement, And God said, let there be light.,
the important bit is the word God,
not the words said or let there be light.

Prussian Soldier, observer, and developer of military doctrine Carl Philipp Gottfried von Clausewitz (also here) observes three constants in war: Violence, Chance, and Subordination. We could call them Power, Destiny, and Reason. Christopher Bassford discusses Clausewitz’s Trinity Doctrine / concept of Trinitarian Warfare here (also here).

I am neither a Soldier nor a military historian. However, I have temerity to put forward that, whereas Clausewitz describes constants of war which are systemic, I would like to describe constant of war which are operational, and also three in number. They are: Location, Weaponry, and Doctrine — Battle Space, Battle Technology, and Battle Doctrine.

These constants are best described as sets of motifs, themes, three sets of them to be specific. Each set may be likened to a well-tempered scale sounding on different instruments. Just as an almost limitless number of motifs (themes) may be created from the well-tempered scale present on different instruments, Location, Weaponry, and Doctrine, each of them and all together, present opportunities for an almost limitless number of motifs, themes — including their combinations and permutations — to be created for the making or not making of war. Great Captains are adept at picking elegant themes, which definitionally, from their success, win renown for them and the Army they command. Motifs (themes) selected from the sets of opportunity that are Location, Weaponry, and Doctrine, a Great Captain mixes together for effect — combinations and permutations — producing the form, the substance, and the tempo of a war as well as the art of war itself.

Every war is unique, irreplaceable, and non-replicable.

Just as, in von Clausewitz’s analysis, Violence and Chance proceed from Subordination, in my analysis, Location and Weaponry proceed from Doctrine. These terms feel abstract, so let me illumine their corporeality.

An Army sallies forth in answer to a state’s political resolves. The Army acts in subordination to state authority. Violent conditions and chance occasions ensue and propagate.

In the same way, and under these same constants described by von Clausewitz, an army sallies forth to a location with weaponry dictated in advance by war-fighting doctrine. If the doctrine got it right, procurement and lines of march to the battle location get it right, and the army wins. If the doctrine got it wrong, the location is unfavorable, the weapons are unfit for the task, and the army loses — along with the state.

It happens occasionally that a motif raised by himself or his enemy from one of the three sets of motifs available to a commander — Land, Weaponry, Doctrine — forces a commander to reconsider his plans as well as, more systemically, his opportunities for motif development from any or all of the three sets of motifs available to hm.

Today is such a time. Radio communications and rocketry — Weapons — have reduced the number of motifs available in the Location set and increased the number available in the Doctrine set. Also, those Weapons have diminished or dissolved the effectiveness of a huge number of capabilities in an American commander’s extant Weapon set itself.

For example:

American Aircraft Carrier Battle / Strike Groups
American Air Bombardment Wings
American Stealth Aircraft and Ships
American Armor, Artillery, Air Defense, and Electronic Warfare systems
All of the above being technologies obsoleted by American ignorance and arrogance.

Well, that’s the way it seems, and, that seeming is not altogether inaccurate. However, it is not the primary, not the most important war-fighting development today. Russian national Battle Doctrine is. Change in Battle Doctrine at the Kremlin produced decisive developments in rocketry and radio communications. President Putin gave due diligence notice of the fact at Munich in 2007.

Soviet Air Defense (AD) weaponry enjoyed air supremacy over USA air attack vectors already in the 1950s. This was a subtle point of Stanley Kubrick’s movie, Dr. Strangelove. The shoot down of Gary Powers made the point less subtly.
Combined with Electronic Warfare (EW) supremacy, several types of hypersonic and cruise missile supremacy with protected delivery platforms, fighter aircraft with peerless long-range radar and missiles, and very serious naval ship-building to modern standards for sea control, the Russian AD umbrella deploys to corporealize Russian national interest as assessed at the Kremlin and constructed there in the architecture of Russian Battle Doctrine.
Russian Battle Doctrine is visible in the Russian SMO to thwart US / NATO aggression in 404 Ukraine. Moreover, US / NATO are teaching Russians how to defeat US / NATO Battle Doctrine and TOEs.

Today in Moscow:

Every serious Soldier and their supporter must now attend Russian Battle Doctrine, learn it, appreciate it, learn its cultural and technological assists, and decide either to recapitulate — and improve upon, if possible — its capabilities domestically, some or all, OR, learn to get along by, first, throwing off the pretense and lie of superiority in all realms of human nature, morality, and endeavor, and by, second, coming to the table unconditionally, not to bargain, not to compete, not to avenge, not to bluster, not to lecture, but to just talk, appreciate, and make things work for mutual benefit.

The Russian General Staff is older than The USA.
Think about it!

Think about this as well:
Americans have no experience fighting
a serious invader at their own homes, on their own lands.

I maintain here a Reading List for Soldiers and other professionals wanting to understanding the difficult Art of War. Included are translations of primary literature in Soviet / Russian Battle Doctrine and also essays by American appreciators of the same, Grau and Bartles, Glantz and House. A Grau and Bartles anthology of Soviet / Russian Battle Doctrine is here.

Standards of USA statecraft are discussed here. A savings banks of American concepts for investing in happy relations in the modern world, foreign and domestic, is here. Explorations of Three Brothers Doctrine — India Russia USA — are here.

The following is a partial list of phenomena developers of USA Battle Doctrine must face, appreciate, and provide in their deliberations and preparations:

Calculation of Deep, Broad Cultivation of National Engineering Base

Calculation of First Priority Joint Force for Homeland Defense (Home Guard and Home Battle Formations)

Calculation of Second Priority, still Effective, Joint Force for Foreign Punitive Expeditions, to include Whole-of-Government Assets

Calculation of closure of US Foreign Military and Intelligence Bases and Offices, to include Foreign and Domestic Weapon and Dual-Purpose Bio-Chem Labs and other listening and black ops stations

Calculation of Radical Federal Executive Redesign, to include COCOMs

Mobilization Potential and its Calculations

Balance of Power and its Calculations

Calculation of Protection of US Powers at Home rather than Projection of US Powers Overseas

Calculation of TOEs for Home Guard, Home Battle, and Foreign Punitive Formations and their Transitions back and forth

Calculation of Logistics for Home Guard, Home Battle, and Foreign Punitive Formations and their Transitions back and forth

Calculate cultivation in O1s – O10s of Redundant Proficiency (Success: Battles and Wars Won) in Command at Tactical, Operational, and Strategic Depths

Calculate Inter-Branch (Joint Force, Total Theatre, and Strategic Domains) Command Proficiency (Success: Battles and Wars Won) in O1s – O10s

Calculate Redundantly Networked Coordination of Fleet, Land, Air, Space, and Cyber Maneuver Formations and Missions

Calculation to Prioritize Force Destruction over Land Domination

Calculation of Cultural Continuity and Strategic Safety for the Nation, Joint Force, and Engineering-Industrial Base

Calculation of Proficiency (Success: Battles and Wars Won) among O1s – O10s to achieve Firing Solutions for Weapons in a myriad of Battle Spaces: variable tactical, operational, strategic

Calculation of the Effectiveness (Success: Battles and Wars Won) of The Joint Armed Force and its Subordinate Formations

Calculation of Human and Mechanical Intercept Vectors

Calculation of Criteria for the Use Of Nuclear Weapons

A Soldier’s duty is to guide and guard their countrymen, not to enforce on other nations the wills of foreign or native oligarchs, nor to drive to other nations eructions of American Good Idea Fairies, Karens, and Harridans.

Restore Order to the US Border and annihilate Latin American and other foreign and domestic drug cartels along with their US and foreign bankers / investors. Such as them deserve harsh and expeditious treatment as traitors and terrorists.

The Art of War is a Symphony of Calculations

Land and Weapons Calculations
Proceed from Doctrinal Calculations

CODA

Proportionality, not equality, is the way of reality.

Our troops accomplish their missions.
Our Generals and Admirals do not win our wars.
This discrepancy discourages us Americans, The USA.

Principle I

The United States have no authority in the domestic affairs of other countries and expect other countries to reciprocate by not feigning authority in our domestic affairs. The United States have interest in the lines of communication running between The United States and all other countries and expect all other countries to bear fairly the burden of keeping those lines open, safe, reliable, fair, and clean.

Principle II

The United States welcome partnership with our brother nations India and Russia for promulgation, from their perspectives, of the ground of statecraft set forth in Principle I and urge Japan and Egypt to join us for that endeavor and commitment.

Principle III

An order to deploy which lacks or frustrates intent to compel a target to sign a declaration of unconditional surrender is an unlawful order by the Rules of Just War, the Conventions of War, Common Sense, and the Spirit of America. An order to deploy conveys this intent to the Commanding Officer: win this war / battle in a timely manner at the lowest possible cost to yourself and your enemy or do not come back alive.

Ramakatha Rasavahini 1

Bhagavatha Vahini

Ramakatha Rasavahini 2