AUM NAMAH SHIVAYA

When admirals’ ships are crashing about and generals’ fighting formations are losing wars as well as battles, the premise(s) from which their proceedings proceed are false.  Events such as these indicate the presence of more and deeper irresponsibility than can be adduced from an incidental mishap.

In the case of US armed forces in the Indo-Pacific region facing rampant Chinese Imperialism, the irresponsibility, the false premise, is taking the region as a water-based problem set assigned to the Navy/Marines, supported of course by the joint force, rather than as a land-based problem set assigned to the Army, supported of course by the joint force.

A careful look at a map with the thought of neutralizing if not defeating Chinese Imperialism will reveal to one that this is the reality of the Indo-Pacific region.  The command structure of INDOPACOM should reflect reality.  Historical precedent is found in the fact that the Occupation of Japan was assigned to the land force supported by the joint force.  That proceeding proceeded successfully.  In contrast, except during the presence of a strong ground commander, The Korean War, the USA’s first war by committee, a structurally weak one at that, the JCS, proceeded and ended unsuccessfully.

Chinese military doctrine regards military force as army-centered.  Thus we see a PLA Navy and a PLA Air Force.  During World War II, Japan fought with, effectively, a joint force centered on the Japanese Imperial Army.  They were effective in that configuration until their ambition exceeded the powers of their logistical train.

USA thought in recent years develops the concept of a joint force, which is realistic for several reasons, but legacy branch-of-service fiefdoms remain, for several reasons, and so joint force thinking neglects to treat of the entire globe at once as a geographical problem set for USA national sovereignty and grand national strategic objective even though it most emphatically is.  The joint force is still just a committee back home, structurally stronger than formerly, but still just a committee helping or harming COCOMs who operate, in some cases, legacy branch-of-service fiefdoms.

At least in doctrine, contemporary Chinese military force exceeds that of contemporary USA+Allies military force because the Chinese military force has unity of command over the joint force, which is, essentially, and always must be, a land force, army-centered.

Update 1: Contemplating Positions On Chinese Flanks

Update 2: Michael J, Good: Chinese Strategy Of Total War

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