On Long-Range Army Planning

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What are the most salient changes to the character of war?

To the character of war itself:

1. *Plus ça change, plus c'est la même chose*. The character of war is constant because it constantly changes. Von Clausewitz's [Trinity Doctrine](). The Infantryman's Creed.
2. Vertical envelopment.
3. OODA loop envelopment.
4. Distributed fighting units/decentralized command and control.
5. Steadily increasing portable weapon lethality.
6. No distinction between civilian and military cohorts.

To *thinking* about the character of war:

1. That it should and can be non-violent. This is ancient ideological piffle meant to dissolve the USA by disarming her.
2. That it can be conducted without Congressional (aka popular) approval.
3. That lawyers rather than soldiers should command it.
4. That its outcome should be negotiated agreements rather than unconditional surrender.
5. That it is limited to small, local (*surgical*) action against kinetic actors. In other words, that war is AGAINST individual combatants rather than FOR accomplishing rational national strategic objectives. Actually, war is comprehensive, full-spectrum attack-to-defeat against

aggressive/hegemonic ideologues, creators (Imams) and field commanders (Khalifa pretenders), with the purpose of relieving them of the will to aggress. Accomplishing a rational national strategic objective (such as removing an aggressor's will to aggress), NOT killing individuals or groups obstructing that accomplishment, is the purpose of war.

6. That religion, war and state interests and functions are separate and do not intersect. In fact they do, constantly, and particularly in the case of a religion which claims to be a state (e.g., Globalism) and *vice-versa* (e.g., Islam) and, logically, practices war as a missionary activity incumbent upon its adherents as state-religious duty.

7. That nations, especially big, strong ones, must renounce sovereignty, especially as regards war-fighting, and submit to restraints imposed by an assembly of small, weak nations by way of obedience to agents and agencies (*global governance practitioners*) created by said assembly.

8. That there are military-grade *non-state actors*. A fiction meant to excuse moral and intellectual impairment and irresponsibility, possibly treasonous. There are military-grade state proxies. There are no military-grade *non-state actors*. Non-state actors are law enforcement customers, not military targets. The Army is a state-on-state asset even when engaged against state proxies.

9. That military action and actors subserve the political goals of a dominant political party.

10. That war may or must be conducted absent a rational national strategic objective. In other words, as a perishing political exercise to benefit a dominant and perishing political party and its leadership.

11. That as national sovereignty is gradually dissolved and displaced by *global governance practitioners*, the Army will

become a Praetorian Guard, so to speak, a private enforcement tool, of said *practitioners*.

12. Items 9, 10 and 11 are, of course, illegal lethal piffle amounting to a demand for national suicide.

Observation:

I can think of more changes — and more dangerous ones — occurring to thinking about the character of war than occurring to the character of war itself. This suggests problems ahead, and thus facing the Army, are more ideological than technological or military.

What critical operational problem(s) will the Army confront over the next 35 years?

1. Freedom of movement.
2. An unfit, alienated, anti-American, anti-military, drugged-out recruiting pool generations deep.
3. Off-shored critical whatever (for example, I'd not contract with any German firm at this point; Germany is Moslem).
4. Religious, cultural and moral differences must be grasped and taught, for example, in Basic Training, then put aside for the good of the country.
5. Ability to penetrate to eliminate what may be called an enemy's *Omega Point*: that point in his feedback loop that generates information density, velocity and distribution. Throttle and eliminate an enemy's net/cell access, business operations and information transmission nodes (servers, people) and the *Omega Point* of his feedback loop is history. Net access is not a *fundamental human right* untouchable by war. Big data can help accomplish this objective without subverting the net's own built-in protection against reducibility through decentralization.

What are the defining attributes of the future Army?

1. Adherence to truth.
2. A culture of honesty.
3. Maintenance of indomitable war-fighting skill.
4. High-level, broad-distribution of classical military and philosophical learning, to include working knowledge of Latin and Greek.
5. Strength to maintain attachment to the details and implications of Von Clausewitz's [Trinity Doctrine](#).
6. Cultural reluctance to do battle under any strategic guidance less than accomplishing a rational national strategic objective accompanied by unconditional surrender by any party obstructing that accomplishment, whoever and wherever he may be.
7. Infantryman's Creed, Soldier's Creed.
8. Cultural allergy to the merest whiff of insinuation that the Army belongs to politicians, political parties, industries, professional firms or associations, schools, NGOs or *global governance practitioners*.

How should the Army make "big bets" for the future?

1. Hound Congress and the White House to get serious about Drugs, Sedition, Jihad and China.
2. Increase unit mobility and anticipate and remove from potential fields of strife obstacles to that mobility. In other words, identify and prep battle spaces ahead of needing them. Navy/ Marines, Air Force and NASA join Army and the usual DoD assets on this one.

3. Stay relatively low-tech or at least do not lose low-tech. Multiple reasons for that, to include not providing spies with tech they turn on us.
4. Be able to deny an enemy high-and low-tech communications/ logistics, especially food, fuel and medicine, very quickly anywhere on the globe.
5. Basic Training should include courses on the religion, culture and morality prevalent in the Army today and in all potentially and actually aggressive countries.

My few thoughts on Third Offset Strategy:

1. http://theological-geography.net/?p=25784

2. http://theological-geography.net/?p=26659

My thoughts on Data-Driven Strategy, Big Data and the Too Complex narrative:

Big data is a tool. That's all. It's main use so far is to induce "consumers" to part with their wealth. In other words, to market things.   If DoD is looking at this, I assume the demos are programmed for sales, which I suppose could benefit SF and Civil Affairs.

To reach battle-ready, big data programming would have to be very different. Meaning, the *purpose* of using the tool would have to be different from the purpose to which it has been put in the civilian orbit.   It would needs shift from marketing to identifying and accomplishing rational national strategic objectives, a very different breed of cat, so to speak. And one not eminently herd-able.

The point is, as with any tool, what's the point? The tool doesn't tell you anything. It's just fancy dirt. Even big data. What's its purpose? In pursuit of what strategic objective and what policy steps to accomplish that objective? What's the goal of having it at all inside DoD? Those are the important questions.

But, men and women get wrapped around the work of their own hands, deliberately avoiding the question, why, to what end? A constant struggle of history. It's called idolatry. Wow, I made something really cool, let's all worship it! We can crunch huge numbers, wow, let's let the machine tell us what to do. Same thing.

Thing is, someone has to write the program to tell the machine how to crunch the numbers, even how to play around with them. Whoever writes that program is creating national strategic objective or strategy or even just tactics … if the machine's output is the *guidance* run with. And that's not yet asking whether said program is *rational* in Von Clausewitz's sense of Reason as one of the three constants of war ([Trinity Doctrine](#): a nation's outlook, strategic objectives and policies are integral with its history, actions and self-awareness).

That way — turning outlook and policy over to computer programming — lies sabotage of authority *per se*. A condition that would not be tolerated. Remember the prophets' and Jesus' attitude and remarks upon idolatry, which, really, is a pretext for denying responsibility: "the machine [— which I made —] made me do it."

Too complex narrative is an iteration of idolatry, which is to say, irresponsibility.   That's a perpetual adolescent's plaint: *Life's too difficult for me to handle, Oh, waaaah, mommy, mommy, mommy!*

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