ON THE PLURALITY
OF CIVILISATIONS

by
FELIKS KONECZNY

Translated from the Polish

Introduction
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PREFACE

by

Arnold Toynbee

Polonica Publications have done a service to the study of human affairs in publishing the recent English translation of Feliks Koneczny’s greatest work. It is one of several mutually independent studies of the structure of human affairs on the largest scale that have appeared in different parts of the Western World within the last two generations. Koneczny published the original Polish edition of this book after he had turned seventy, and he had the leisure to write it because he had been compulsorily retired from his chair as a penalty for having been outspoken in the cause of civic freedom. In short compass, Koneczny has discussed the fundamental questions raised by the study of civilizations, and he arrives at definite and valuable conclusions. After sketching the structure of society, he considers and rejects the thesis that differences in civilization are byproducts of differences in physical race. Indeed, he rejects the suggestion that these physical differences are in any way correlated with the spiritual ones. Turning to language, he does conclude that different languages are of unequal value for serving as vehicles for civilisations, but he refrains from taking these qualitative differences between different languages as being the explanation of the differences that he finds in the spiritual value of different civilizations. Turning to religion, he insists on the mutual independence of the “higher” religions and the civilizations.

Koneczny believed in the possibility, and value, of a general study of human affairs. His own important contribution to this was the crown of his life-work as an historian. He approached his generalisations from the four standpoints of a student of East European and Central Asian history, a Pole, a Roman Catholic Christian, and a Westerner. Since the tenth century, Poland has been one of the eastern marches of the Western World. Koneczny’s specialist studies as an historian worked together with his national heritage as a Pole to make him sensitive to the differences between civilizations, and this inspired him to study the sum of human history from the standpoint of the plurality of civilizations. It also made him an ardent patriot of the Western World. This did not prevent Koneczny from being also a patriotic Pole and a devout Roman Catholic Christian. But, for him, Poland’s national culture has value as one of a number of national versions of a common Western or, as he prefers to call it, Latin culture; and Roman Catholic Christianity has value as being the Western form of Christianity par excellence.

This has made Koneczny generous-minded towards Protestants. He sees in them, not dissenters from the Catholic fold but Western Christians who, in ceasing to be Catholics, have continued to be Western, fortunately for the West and for themselves. The same standpoint has made it difficult for Koneczny to appreciate Eastern Orthodox, Monophysite, and Nestorian Christianity and the non-Christian higher religions. He appreciates Ancient Rome perhaps excessively, to the detriment of Ancient Greece. And he is hard on both the Byzantine
and the Turanian (i.e. the Eurasian nomad) civilization. He classifies the civilization of Muscovite Russia as being Turanian; but, if Russia had been classified by him as being Byzantine, she probably would not have fared much better.

Every student of human affairs, however eminent, is a child of his own social and cultural environment, besides being a unique personality with his own individual outlook on the Universe. He is limited, besides being stimulated, by his own particular historical standing-ground, which has been imposed on him by the accident that he has been born at a particular date in a particular place. Naturally, Koneczny’s highly individual approach to his work is partly conditioned — like for instance, Danilevsky’s and Spengler’s and Vico’s — by his cultural environment. It is fortunate that there should have been a number of thinkers wrestling with the same problem from different standing-grounds in time and space. It is also fortunate that one of these voices should have been a Polish voice, since Poland has a word to say to the present-day West, as Mr. Giertych points out in the Publisher’s Preface to the present English translation of Koneczny’s major work.

Koneczny achieved all that he did achieve in a life that was stormy and tragic yet long. This Polish thinker’s personal history is an epitome of the Polish nation’s history. ‘Indomitable’ is the adjective that the name ‘Poland’ calls up in non-Polish minds.

This foreword can, and should, be brief, because the Publisher’s Preface, together with the illuminating introduction by my friend and colleague Professor Anton Hilckman, are all that is required for introducing Koneczny’s work to the English-reading public.
PUBLISHERS’ PREFACE

by

Jędrzej Giertych

The publishers of “Polonica Series” have decided to publish an English translation of the present book, because they believe that Koneczny’s investigations of the problem of civilisation are important and relevant to the crisis of the Western world: also that his principal work may prove useful and stimulating to the Western reader looking for spiritual and moral orientation.

For two reasons the whole heritage of the Western civilization is now endangered. First at all, the life of the Western world itself has become transformed by becoming more and more materialist. All the traditional spiritual values of the old Western civilization are now put in doubt and the illusory, external brilliance of Western life cannot conceal the restlessness, discontent and even despair of numerous and increasing sections of Western society; they “never had it so good” in a material sense, but are perfectly aware that this is insufficient and is sometimes even destructive to happiness. Clearly, the Western world now treads the path towards disintegration: ultimately it is impossible to live only for material aims, and a hedonistic society no longer aware of its spiritual foundations, cannot last.

Secondly, Western civilisation has taken and is still taking a wrong turn in directing the fate of European expansion throughout the globe. The colonial empires and the political influence of Europe in other parts of the world are rapidly breaking down, and this breeds in many strata of Western public opinion the suspicion that something was wrong with the basic political and cultural ideas of the West: that the comfortable belief of a historical mission and of a cultural superiority was mistaken, and that Europe did not perform the rôle of a civiliser and educator of the world, but on the contrary, only exploited it. This means a breakdown of faith in Western civilisation, its uniqueness and its universal value.

On the other hand, the whole world has been conquered and continues to be conquered by cultural forms which come either from Europe, or from other parts of the world inhabited by descendants of European colonists; though these forms are quite different from what for centuries was considered to be the essence of European civilisation. Throughout the whole world people now use the same or almost the same cars, telephones, television sets, machine guns, watches and fountain pens as are used in Europe. They wear the same clothes, sit and sleep on the same furniture, cook and eat the same food. They read the same news in similar newspapers, read also the same books, see the same plays and films, listen to the same music, paint similar pictures and construct similar buildings. They learn the same subjects in similar schools. They have the same manners and customs and often the same morality. They recognise to some extent the same basic principles of law, order, decency and politics. Often, even such things as the Christian era and calendar, the Christian week, the Christian Sunday are accepted in countries, which are otherwise quite opposed to Christianity. European ideas are thriving throughout the world. Communism is no exception here: this doctrine which is being so widely used as a tool for the destruction of European political and cultural influence is in fact a product of Europe.

But in this cosmopolitan uniformity of material existence, of social life and even of intellectual trends and moral ideas, the separateness of Western civilisation is being effaced. It
is only the superficial side of Western culture, which has spread over the world. In consequence, even the notion of what really is and what in fact is not Western is beginning to be lost. There are many people nowadays who are inclined to consider Ankara and Tel-Aviv as belonging to the West, but at the same time to doubt if a poor and backward, but traditionally moral and orderly mountain village in Calabria or even in Old Castile can really be considered as Western.

For many people — those who speak about the “post-Christian era” and who view mankind in a biologistic manner as an incessant flow of change, in which there is nothing permanent and enduring — the civilisation of old Europe is a thing of me past, or at the best, of a present time which is quickly coming to an end. They have lost faith in Western civilisation; they accept its decline, and even more: they do not regret it. They believe in the advent of a new civilisation, materialist and cosmopolitan, which will be as different from the old civilisation of the Christian West as the Christian West was different from the antique world, or as the civilisations of Arab Islam are different from old Babylonia, Assyria and Egypt.

We do not share their views. And we are sure that millions of people in every country think as we do. We believe that the fundamental values of the Christian West have not lost and will not loose their validity. We believe that the Christian West need not die and we hope that it never will die. We believe that the material achievements of the Western civilisation are not its principal element but are only accessory, and that the real substance of this civilization consists in spiritual and moral principles. We believe that the uniqueness of Western Christian civilisation is not an illusion or a lie, and that this civilisation has truly achieved a height not yet reached by other civilisations; the disintegration, which is now destroying its foundations in many places, does not affect this truth. (Feliks Koneczny said: “do not let us suppose that Latin — or Western Christian — civilisation will fall; we shall fall”). We believe that the Christian West has not lost its historical mission in the world: it still has the duty to spread Christianity among other peoples, to disseminate Christian moral ideals and principles, and to help other civilisations to rise to a higher moral level and to become fundamentally transformed thereby. We believe in all this perhaps more firmly than others — because we are Poles. We did not share in the centuries of Western pride and wealth and we are not guilty of the Western sins towards the rest of the world, which were born from an abandonment of Christian moral principles. We knew only misfortunes, sacrifice and effort. But this allows us to see more acutely the essentials: we are not affected by the disappointment of the present Western political decline; we see nothing new and unusual in disasters and ruins. But we know that life continues to flow after the earthquakes, that moral and cultural values do not cease to be valid, and that we still have to perform our duties. We do not despair of Western Christian civilisation; on the contrary we believe that the West, purified by misfortune and repentant of its sins, will raise its forces for new efforts and will become more faithful than before to its obligations, and will again achieve great things.

Koneczny is a thinker who analyses the merits of existing civilisations and who rates Western Christian civilisation very high: — not in what is accidental in its achievements, but in what essential in its foundations. During his long lifetime he studied the problem of civilisations in all its aspects, and arrived by inductive, objective investigation to conclusions, which allow us to understand better what are the essential elements of the Western Christian, or, as he calls it, the Latin") civilisation: what makes this civilisation to differ, not superficially, but organically from other civilisations, and what is indispensable to its survival, health, and strength. Koneczny’s work is interesting for two reasons. First, he invented a new method of investigating the life of human societies. He is an opponent of a priori judgements

") Latin, because it embraces all the peoples which in the Middle Ages used the Latin language in their liturgies.
about civilisation and believes that problems connected with it should be weighed on the
ground of accumulated facts taken from historical and social experience with the same
impartiality and minuteness as in the problems of natural sciences. By the way, this inductive
method, similar to the methods of investigation in natural sciences, has led him to the
rejection of some social theories drawn by other thinkers by analogy from those sciences.

Secondly, he arrived at the conclusions which we mentioned above. He sees in the
Latin (Western Christian) civilisation the highest achievement so far of the historical
development of humanity; he states what the essential elements of this civilization are and he
teaches us a lot about what we should do to protect this civilisation from disintegration or
decline. His practical lessons — intended by himself for the Polish nation which was and is
permanently endangered by disintegrating influences from alien spiritual and cultural worlds —
are similarly valid and useful for the nations of Western Europe or of America, which are
subject, sometimes in lesser, sometimes even in greater degree, to the same disintegrating
influences and pressures as Poland is.

We hope that English and American readers will find Koneczny’s work interesting and
valuable, and with this hope we hand this book in to them.

We asked a Western European admirer of Feliks Koneczny’s thought, Professor Anton
Hilckman of the Mainz University in Western Germany, to be so kind as to introduce the
present book to the English-speaking reader by evaluating Koneczny’s contribution to modern
thought, and by summarizing his main ideas. We hope that Professor Hilckman’s introduction
will stimulate the reader and attract him to read Koneczny’s book itself — and perhaps in
future also other Koneczny’s books.
INTRODUCTION

by Anton Hilckman

Ph.D. (Milan), Rerum Pol.D. (Freiburg in Br.)
Professor at the University of Mainz (Germany).

One of the great spiritual aims of our time is the endeavour to understand history as a whole; several attempts have been made to achieve a universal historical synthesis, a general survey of universal history. This did not seem so pressing and urgent a task to the people of previous centuries as it does to us, of today. (This “today” we may understand as the period from the beginning of the present century.)

Oswald Spengler’s theory of history and culture was an attempt of this kind: planned on the grand scale and in parts splendid even if in detail it was vulnerable to criticism and if as a whole it was a miscarriage. There was no humanity for Spengler; humanity was for him only an abstract notion, something non-existent, void of reality; and in consequence, neither was there any history of humanity. Not only had there been no such history in the past, but there could not possibly be such a history in the future. All that is historically relevant, says Spengler, has taken place within the compass of eight high civilisations, of which our own, the Western, is the latest; everything else is “non-historical being” and superlatively irrelevant. Spengler, whose historical thought is orientated by the biological sciences, considers the civilisations themselves as a sort of great mysterious organisms. They come to life, they blossom like flowers of the field; they are indeed a species of blossom, great, mysterious and wonderful; they bring their fruits to ripeness, and they wither and die because these miraculous organisms of the highest existing rank, like everything alive also are subject to the laws of life which are in their final aim the laws of death. An air of pessimism breathes through Spengler’s learning. This is undeniable, although Spengler repeatedly and most energetically defends himself against the charge of pessimism.

Today it is the historical doctrine of Toynbee, which stands in the forefront of discussion. Interest has been evoked among the educated public of the whole world by the extensive and deeply solid work of this author; a proof that the effort to understand history as a whole — to seize, one is almost inclined to say, its innermost laws — has become one of the great longings, perhaps even the greatest longing of our day.

Toynbee’s doctrine represents in many respects an advance upon Spengler’s historical picture. We do not find in Toynbee’s work the dogmatic utterances of a speculative thinker who, believing himself to have discovered the essence of historical truth, tolerates no opposition to his theses; but rather the cautious formulations of an empiricist, who tries again and again to elucidate and to strengthen each of his opinions in the light of the facts.

Again, in Toynbee’s doctrine, we find place in history for the element of freedom; again, with him, man learns that in spite of all the powerful determining factors his fate is still put into his own hands, and he can create in liberty the future of his race.

Philosophers of universal history are trying everywhere to comprehend the meaning of this age, to “take the bearings of the present time” (Ortsbestimmung der Gegenwart,” the location of the present, is the title of a work by Alexander Rüstow.) New paths are being explored. All these thinkers share a conviction that by examining historical facts in their
entirety, judgments of general validity may be reached, even if nobody dare nowadays speak about “laws of history” in a strict sense. And this very hesitation seems to us to represent an advance from the attitude of the previous century, when there was so strong a tendency to judge the value of a discipline in the field of the humanities, like one in the field of natural science, by its ability to produce its own system of laws.

The teachings, which emerge from history as a whole, are quite obviously of great practical value. From the experience and the understanding of history, politics take their orientation for good or evil, to be a curse or a blessing to the nations. That the nations could learn from history is generally recognised: whether in fact they have learnt much from history is another question. Can the nations then learn from each other? — can this nation learn from that? We believe it possible. It is quite certainly possible within the sphere of one single civilisation, a circle of nations, which have much in common. Had the Germans known in 1933 a little more of the history of England or of Switzerland, and had they made practical deductions from that knowledge, it would not have been possible for a Hitler to become a dictator of Germany, a demon to Europe and the bringer of such immeasurable sufferings upon Western humanity.

We believe that the doctrine of a Polish thinker of our times, on history and on civilisation, can be of great importance to the general historical thought of the Western European nations as well as in the practical political shaping of their fates; provided, of course, that this doctrine becomes known. This statement of ours should not cause astonishment; Poland is the most easterly portion of Western Europe, the outpost of the West so to speak. For a thousand years the Poles were to the West a protecting wall against the East; against all that swelling flood which threatened Europe from an alien world that was arrayed more than once against our own world in hostility. A sentinel on a wall, a guard on an outpost, acquires an acute perception and recognition of what is foreign, what is alien, menacing and dangerous. It may therefore be of quite particular interest to make the doctrine of a Polish historical thinker accessible to the public of Western Europe.

To the English-speaking public we present in this volume a translation of one of the major works of the Polish historical thinker, Feliks Koneczny. We believe that this historical doctrine can count on their interest, too; because we are fully convinced that this way of seeing history, with the consequent political ideas, is of the utmost importance for the community of Western peoples. Koneczny shares with most of the historical thinkers of our times the fundamental view of the plurality of civilisations. Historically speaking, there is no such thing as “humanity,” or at least it does not yet exist; consequently there is no history of humanity as such, but only historical currents within each of the separate great human circles, which we now call civilisations. And these currents are at least to some extent, if not completely, independent of one another. This idea is not new; we meet with it in Vico, already in all its clarity, and today it is one of the fundamental assumptions of all historical thought. Unfortunately in the course of the history of ideas, this idea has suffered a great but accidental misfortune. The undoubtedly correct perception of the plurality of civilisations has become tied almost always to a completely different idea with which it has intrinsically no connection; that the separate human civilisations are entities comparable with organisms, big creatures of semi-organic character upon which laws of life are binding, analogous to the laws of organic life. Already in Vico this idea is ringing; we find it again and again throughout the more modern study of civilisations, in almost every one of its representatives no matter how they may differ otherwise in their points of departure and in their general views. We find this “biologic” treatment of civilisations in its most radical form represented by Oswald Spengler whom we mentioned above.
We believe that this “biologic” way of seeing the civilizations brings no benefit to universal history; nor does it benefit the study of civilisations, since the association of a correct fundamental perception — that of the plurality of civilisations — with an arbitrary and quite unproved additional assumption can only do harm. Had the study of civilisations held to the doctrine of Francis Bacon, who four hundred years ago created with his inductive method an instrument of progress for the natural sciences, this study would have avoided much error. But it has not done so. Only a very few of the great historical philosophers, who can be counted as precursors of the modern study of civilisations, have resisted the temptation of misusing the speculative method. In fact, besides the great Montesquieu, as forerunner of a science of civilisations based on empiricism and employing the inductive method, we can mention only the Polish thinker Hugo Kołłątaj, whom Koneczny explicitly mentions. Otherwise, it is precisely the “great names” among the philosophers of history who swear allegiance to the speculative method, even in respect of the very problems whose solution by the speculative method is quite impossible.

Feliks Koneczny, so far as it is at all possible in the field of humanities, is a thinker without preconceived ideas. His study of history begins from no postulates, except those, which he expressly mentions as such. We must acknowledge this as rather a great merit in him when we think how many preconceptions, mostly unacknowledged, load the historical philosophy of such a man as Spengler for instance. Koneczny absolutely accepts the principle that in comparing civilisations, and in considering history as a whole, the answers can only be obtained a posteriori; this means a complete renunciation of any a priori treatment. And a science which emerges when one keeps scrupulously and conscientiously to the inductive method is a strict science, at least insofar as in the sphere of humanities there can be such a thing as a strict science.

Koneczny calls his study the science of civilisations. That science which gathers together the whole result of all historical disciplines must necessarily become a science of civilisations, because the civilisations are the final spiritual units and the final moving forces of the course of historical events. Universal history becomes comprehensible only under the aspect of civilisations differing from one another and struggling against one another. We have already arrived at a situation in the history of ideas when the final constitution of a science of civilisations, as a separate discipline with its own foundations, can no longer be postponed. The last century saw the birth of many new scientific disciplines which dealt in part with problems which the science of civilisations must also encounter. Sociology in particular has been, and is, in fashion so to say; many people consider it as a sort of universal discipline, which contains general prescriptions for all other possible scientific disciplines in the sphere of humanities. Koneczny is not of this opinion and we agree with him. If we define sociology as the science of the ways and forms of social life — both of man and of animal — it becomes apparent that this does not embrace the whole complex of culture. There is still a gap in the system of humanistic sciences, which can be filled only by a new and specialised science; and this new science is the science of civilisations, for which no other discipline can be substituted. To this science we believe that Koneczny has made an altogether decisive contribution; and when in the future men will treat scientifically of civilisations, the name of Koneczny will occupy a place of honour. This opinion of ours will be accepted by everybody who tries to gain a closer acquaintance with Koneczny’s science, everybody especially who will follow him to an understanding of the particular way in which the Western civilisation differs from all others.

That a civilisation is a scientifically definable notion and not only a convenient collective denomination for disparate things could be easily proved. Every civilisation is a coherent system of values, and of judgments on values; of moral distinctions and social
precepts, which point to each other and depend upon each other. Putting it briefly, a civilisation is a general way of life. When we say that an Indian is culturally different from us, we mean by this that the relation of man to man, the relation of different social factors to each other, are not the same in India as in Western Europe; different civilisations mean different ways of seeing values, and different ways of resultant behaviour. Differences of civilisation are differences too in personal life-aims, as well as in the consequent differences in attitude and conduct towards others. Clearly these differences are of the utmost importance, since the civilisations are the highest subdivisions of humanity under its spiritual aspects. It is impossible to turn to humanity and to pass silently over the differences of civilisation, as if these did not exist or as if they were of secondary importance. Only in the light of a science of civilisations is it possible to understand the present antinomy of East and West. Only a science of civilisations is able to point out to Western man his highest aims, which at the same time mean a duty towards the whole world. Again and again Koneczny indicates that every political theory and every political praxis which disregards the differences of civilisations within humanity, or which does not reckon with those to a sufficient degree, is doomed to total sterility and in consequence must come to nothing.

The science of civilisations, as thought of by Koneczny — as a science concerning the unfolding of the humanitas within time — must be self-transformed into a central science among the humanities; and it is also easy to see that the insights and conclusions of such a science, embracing the totality of what is human, must be of the utmost practical importance.

We do not hesitate to consider the doctrine of Koneczny to be one of the sharpest weapons which can serve in the struggle for the defence of the West. His view of the differences between the basic forms of civilisations allows him to interpret the history of the Western nations in many respects quite otherwise than has usually been done before. It is not the Imperial idea, of which the Germans felt themselves to be the bearers, which now appears as the truly Western idea; but something quite different, the idea of a federal Europe conceived as a brotherhood of nations, equally free and with equal rights. The Imperial idea, on the other hand, originated much more in the Byzantine world; and during the whole of the Middle Ages the role of the Byzantine world was to the Western world rather that of a temptation. In view of this, the Ghibellinism of the Middle Ages appears in quite a different light. The peculiar phenomenon of Prussianism obtains only thanks to Koneczny’s doctrine of civilisations a true explanation. What is the essence of this extraordinary phenomenon? — Prussia, which was something like a permanent provincial rebellion against all that was generally European? To this question too we find in Koneczny an answer which is basically accurate.

But it is his explanation of Russianism which we consider to be, above all, one of the greatest merits of Koneczny. Exactly in the present situation of the world, a clear comprehension of the spiritual roots of this phenomenon with which we are so ill at ease is of the utmost importance. Unfortunately, even the leading intellectual personages of Western Europe are inclined in a vast childlike innocence to believe that the whole of the present state of affairs in Russia is only transitory, and therefore to underestimate the menacing reality of modern Communist-led Russia. To shock the optimists into wakefulness is not a pleasant duty, but it is a duty none the less, and Koneczny does not evade it. Today Western civilisation stands in face of the gravest and most dangerous crisis in her whole history. She stands confronted by a menace which comes not only from outside but also from within, since for many people within the domain of the Western world itself the traditional values of its civilisation no longer present a living spiritual obligation. In the circumstances, everybody who sharpens our awareness of this obligation is welcome to us.
We believe that Koneczny’s doctrine is the concern of the whole of Western European society. Even if this or that detail of his words will not pass the test of time, the essence of his doctrine seems to us unassailable. Everyone to whom the fate of his own country, as well as that of Western society, is dear, can learn much from Koneczny.

At the request of the Editors of “Polonica Publications”, I give with pleasure my permission to reprint the following abridged and slightly modified English translation of my remarks on Koneczny’s work and importance, which have previously been published in Germany.
FELIKS KONECZNY
AND THE COMPARATIVE SCIENCE OF CIVILISATION

by Anton Hilckman

Whether a name is known or unknown is not always a reliable criterion of the importance of the spiritual facts which it personifies. At the time when Kierkegaard was alive his name too, outside Denmark, was practically unknown, and even in his native country only few people knew him and even fewer recognised him. But in spite of this, what he had to say was of Western and European importance; it is true that decades were needed before it was universally understood. Anyone who knows of the Polish historical thinker Feliks Koneczny and is acquainted even if only superficially with his doctrine, is involuntarily reminded of the destiny of Kierkegaard in spite of all the differences between these two men.

After several decades probably also the name of Feliks Koneczny, although today known to few outside his native country, will be known to every educated European. If official Poland took little or no notice of her most important contemporary thinker, at least he was not unknown there; and there existed circles from the beginning which declared themselves as his followers, notwithstanding the fact that at times also rancorous opposition and malicious abuse were not lacking; again, things which we know already from Kierkegaard’s life.

Koneczny is a historical thinker. We believe we are right in saying that a comparison of his doctrine with all the previous philosophy of history, makes it quite clear that it is only with him that the science of civilisations, a science based on the study of history, becomes a special science — one is almost tempted to say an exact science — of the same level and rank as the other special philosophical disciplines. It is only with Koneczny that this science appears in fact for the first time as a branch of learning with a strictly characterised autonomy, with a sphere of tasks delimited with precision and with an own method which can be verified in every detail and applied generally and from many points of view; thus he is successful in overcoming apriorism and biologism in every form, and at the same time in shaping a new concept of the finality of history. His brand of philosophy of history becomes in consequence at the same time a knowledge and an imperative; and is — in a quite different and much deeper sense than could be expected before — giving a norm for the future in the spheres of thought and of life alike.

THE MODERN ROAD OF PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY

To the phrase “philosophy of history” we are still unaccustomed to give another meaning than that of a more or less speculative interpretation. The historical philosophies of Hegel and Schlegel have in spite of all the difference of their basic conceptions this in common, that they are both wholly speculative. In fact, all the best known representatives of the more recent philosophy of history are entirely speculative thinkers. Spengler likewise does not at all break with the tradition of this course.
There has been, however, another sort of philosophy of history besides the speculative: an empirical or inductive philosophy of history, which has not been so well known, only because its representatives have walked more humbly and their doctrines have appealed less to the existing intellectual fashions.

A historical philosopher should approach history as an empiricist, without any preconceived opinions about the result of historical investigation; nothing can be introduced into it as an assumption or an inclination. This is not to say that a philosopher cannot approach history from the ethical side, having standards of moral values; the comprehending interpretation of historical event must be arrived at purely *à posteriori*, by sifting and ordering the facts. The results of the examination of facts must depend only on the method, and not on any ideological views which he may otherwise have.

It had already become clear to Koneczny, thanks to his specialised investigations as a professional historian, that a deeper understanding of history is possible only when history is seen as a conflict of different civilisations. Already in the nineties — when writing his earlier works on the history of this Eastern European area in which during the centuries three civilisations had clashed — Koneczny came upon the idea which Oswald Spengler proclaimed some two or three decades later. Spengler presented it as an apparently completely new achievement, in opposition to the “tapeworm scheme” of a single historical development of humanity; he too showed that a single straightlined history of humanity did not exist, but only a multitude of isolated developments which went their course separated in time and space. Koneczny, however, as an aposteriorist and empiricist, desisted at any cost from giving a common ruling principle to these separate lines. If such a principle exists, it cannot be laid down in advance, as Spengler did.

The diversity of these civilisations consists in a manifold structure of the social life in the different human groups.

The definition, which Koneczny gives to describe this central and basic notion of his, is that civilisation is a structural method of human common life. This definition is on one hand very wide; it embraces the whole moral, intellectual and material being of man; it embraces family, society, state, nation, art, learning, politics and economy. On the other hand, this sharp and clear definition is intended also to narrow the vague and featureless notions of culture, on the basis of which the philosophy of history has often worked; but this narrowing is indispensable if one will not renounce a solution of the central historical-philosophical problem as Spengler does who in his two volumes never defines what civilisation in fact is.

So there exists, as even a most superficial observation can recognise, not only one structural method of human social life, but an infinite plurality of forms which differ very much among themselves. Ethnology is still discovering new ones. Not every civilisation embraces all spheres of life. Only the so-called great civilisations are of special interest from the point of view of history.

In face of this plurality and diversity of civilisations, two questions emerge:

1. On what is this diversity based and in what does it consist?
2. Where does it come from and by what factors of differentiation has it been brought about?

The reply to the first question consists in a detailed development of the notion of civilisation.

The second question, however, is the true central problem of the philosophy of history.

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*) Koneczny used in Polish the word "metoda". In the English translation of his book the word "system" has been used.
ON WHAT IS CIVILISATION BASED? — THE QUINCUNX OF EXISTENTIAL VALUES

Already his earlier historical investigations had led Koneczny to devote special attention to the comparative study of law; he recognised very early the great importance of the diversity of law for the differentiation of social forms. Seen from outside, the diversity of civilisations, has a root in the diversity of law; the inner aspect consists in the different attitudes of man towards values. Two notions of Koneczny are here of fundamental importance: the “trójprawo”, the “triple law” — and the existential categories or existential values.

The “triple law” embraces three spheres: family law, property law and inheritance law. The structure of the family is of central importance. Monogamy, polygamy, semi-polygamy and other forms of the constitution of the family influence in the deepest way the whole consciousness of society. The form of the family and the whole spiritual attitude of man stand in the closest mutual relationship. Polygamy, as experience teaches, influences in a most unfavourable way the spirit and the character not only of the woman, but also of the man; even the dissolubility of matrimony exercises an influence of a similar sort; it is a fact of great importance that not one polygamous society has been able to overcome the clan system. The spheres of the “triple law” are closely mutually interrelated. To a given family law belong also a corresponding property law and inheritance law. Not everything can be combined here with everything, but strict correspondences are in force, e.g. a mutual connection of monogamous matrimony with private property, and of polygamy with clan despotism.

The “quincunx of existential values” or “categories of being” conducts us into the true, innermost essence of civilisation. These are: health, economic wellbeing, the true, the good and the beautiful. Two of these values belong to the material order, two to the spiritual; the value of beauty belongs at the same time to the two orders.

The attitude towards these values, the valuation of them and the determination of the relation between them can be very different. The understanding of these differences gives a key which opens the riddle of the diversity of civilisations. Humanity, as a whole, has not much in common; but it is true that the common ground increases when we narrow the circles, and limit ourselves to those societies which have risen above the more primitive grades of material cultural possession to what we popularly call higher culture.

A hierarchical order exists among the values; this is a hierarchy of values as well as a hierarchy of sociological importance. Fundamentally, the spiritual categories have precedence over the material. But none of the five spheres is superfluous. Only where all five categories are fully developed is the “wholeness of life” achieved; where this is not the case, the civilisation is incomplete, “defective”. Sociologically the most important is the value of the good, the sphere of morality. But it is in strictest connection with the sphere of truth. Here belong the wide, penetrating and subtle investigations of Koneczny into the relation between religion and morality. — Until today not even one case has been known of a wholly irreligious civilisation. There have existed only societies with particularly great numbers of irreligious individuals (e.g. Japan). No new civilisation has emerged from such societies until today, only cultural chaos. An irreligious or even more an antireligious life leads towards a narrowing of life, towards a mutilation of the categories of being: the civilisation becomes again defective. Historical induction teaches with compelling inevitability that without religion there can be no cultural progress.

Not only the sphere of the beautiful, but also the two spheres of material values are internally strictly connected with the religious and moral order; a neglect of these harms also the physical and moral life. Every insufficiency in one sphere brings necessarily a
corresponding insufficiency in the others. — Also the material spheres have their indestructible place in the hierarchy of values. Neglect of the body and contempt for the things of this earth harm the spirit and morality. “A law in some way inevitable brings it about that man, being composed of body and soul, has only the choice either to strive towards perfection in both spheres, or to sink in both.” A popularisation of asceticism, if going too far, leads unavoidably to caricature. In the dirt even holiness ceases, although some parts of the Eastern Church may sometimes have thought otherwise. — The category of beauty has on its part a closest connection with all the categories of being. Koneczny grants great praise to the Renaissance because it liberated us definitely from the prejudice that moral accomplishment can only find proper expression in a body which is free from external beauty.

All spheres of life without exception should be developed equally and in proper proportion to each other. This is not always the case in fact; often whole categories are lacking; such “sub-developed” societies have a “defective civilisation”. The civilisation is “one-sided” when one category shoots up exuberantly and narrows the others by overgrowing them; primitive societies in particular sometimes form specimens of curious distortion; but also in historical civilisations examples of such a kind of “elephantiasis” could be found. “Fullness of life” is the real ideal. The nearer a society is to the ideal of all-roundness, the higher it stands; not one of the Asiatic civilisations fulfils this demand of completeness completely. In many of them the sphere of natural truth is missing.

A fundamental postulate for every civilisation is the following: between the categories of the triple law and between all the categories of the quincunx a harmony and congruity must reign. This postulate means that a given solution in the sphere of one of the five values provides immanently and necessarily also guiding lines for solutions in all the other spheres.

Civilisation is a “method” und not a chaos. A society whose attitude towards the five values, which are in the closest way interconnected, is not harmonious, is not flowing from one basic principle, is not forming a logical and compact system, but bears in itself the seeds of self-destruction. Only such societies which satisfy this fundamental requirement are capable of life and progress. Old Hellas did not satisfy this demand; this is the innermost reason why she could not survive; old Rome, with her iron compactness was the direct opposite; the Roman world empire was anything but a simple produce of chance; it was a logical consequence of the compactness of the legal and social Roman structure, or, in other words, of the Roman superiority in civilisation over all the other societies of the ancient world.

It follows from this high estimate of material categories that Koneczny does not adhere to a principle of division between the spiritual, and the exteriorly technical culture which is so beloved especially by the German philosophers of history. The one cannot be separated from the other. The same principle of life finds expression in the external, technico-economic-legal organisation of a society, as in the highest spiritual manifestations; the external aspect of a civilisation and its spiritual and moral content are mutually in the most intimate way interdependent. Koneczny’s rejection of this division into two spheres is linked with his conception of the struggle for existence. The previous century, with its predominantly materialistic notion of the struggle for existence, has greatly sinned in this matter. The struggle for existence has a triple character: moral, intellectual and material. Only rather deformed individuals conduct an exclusively material struggle for existence. It would have been possible already for the Darwinists to see — had they wished to see — that even on the most primitive level of culture wars are conducted not only for cattle and for hunting grounds, but also for “prestige”.

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THE CENTRAL PROBLEM OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY: WHERE DOES THE DIFFERENCE OF CIVILISATIONS COME FROM?

What factors caused the spiritual differentiation into these highest groups of fundamentally different attitudes and social self-consciousness which we call civilisations? Very different answers have been given to this question. Koneczny deals with it in his major works extensively and with precision.

NEGATIVE ANSWERS

Not only the materialistic doctrine of history, which became the central dogma of Marxist Socialism, but also other opinions, which merit to be treated more seriously, consider technics and economy as decisive; according to L. H. Morgan and the Marxist school the whole of culture is only a function of given conditions of production, and the different civilisations are only expressions of different degrees of ergological development. Koneczny’s answer is negative; the inductive examination of historical facts proves that technics determines only the cultural grade within one given civilisation, but not the kind of civilisation. Quantitative degrees are something quite different than qualitative, essential differences.

Koneczny rejects also the anthropological view of history as to the decisive importance of race.

He treats much more seriously the view of the dependence of civilisation on language: he agrees that languages differ very much in their usefulness as tools of the expression of the life of the human spirit. There are languages of good and of bad “method”, practical and unpractical languages; languages which are an obstacle or a stimulus to spiritual progress. It is possible to speak of a hierarchy of languages. But language does not compel. So in conclusion, the answer is also here a negative one.

CIVILISATIONS AND RELIGIONS. ARE THE CIVILISATIONS PRODUCTS OF RELIGIONS?

The question concerning the relation between civilisation and religion is of central importance. Are the civilisations created by religions? Is a civilisation a thing, produced somehow by religious collective experiences and living thenceforward its own life and following its puzzling, inner laws of existence? Such was more or less Spengler’s view of the matter.

Koneczny, through his sharp definition of the element of civilisation as something quite distinct from the sphere of religion (in spite of multiple overlappings which make the recognition of the true content of the problems here particularly difficult), has extricated the history of ideas from a deviation which seemed almost inevitable. To this deviation Spengler easily succumbed, although none of his critics to our knowledge has noted this as an error. Koneczny had supplied a solution already, when Spengler’s books were not yet written.

The current linguistic usage speaks without differentiation about Christian, Islamic or Buddhist civilisation. That close relations between religion and civilisation exist is certain; they are manifold and often not without contradictions. The inductive method, with which Koneczny examined the entangled complex of facts and questions, conducted him first to the important distinction between sacral, semi-sacral and non-sacral civilisations. A religion
creates a civilisation when, and only when, the spheres of all five existential categories are embraced by the sacral legislation, and when the religion as such gives normative rules which embrace also hygiene, economy, art and science. There are only two such sacral civilisations: the Jewish and the Braminical. In these two cases religion and civilisation overlap; the problem of relationship between religion and civilisation is solved; in all other cases this relationship has yet to be examined.

CHRISTIANITY AND CIVILISATION

For the Christian part of humanity the thesis of coincidence of religion and civilisation is hardly applicable. The current expression of “Christian civilisation” is in the highest degree misleading; there is neither a unique Christian civilisation whose subdivisions would correspond to the different Christian denominations, nor are there borderlines between civilisations within the Christian sphere, identical with the borderlines of denominations. The Byzantine world, which stands dogmatically very close to Catholicism, is in the sphere of civilisation fundamentally different from the West, and on the other hand Protestantism, which rejects a substantial part of Catholic dogma and does not recognise the Catholic notion of Church, has not transformed in any fundamental way the civilisation which the Protestant nations inherited from their Catholic past. It is so because civilisation and religion are, despite the manifold connection between them, two distinct orders; and a solution of the basic problem of the science of civilisations is not possible without keeping the notions of them strictly apart.

Christianity refused to create a sacral civilisation. It made sacral only one institution of human social life: matrimony. The Gospels deal only with one of the categories of the Quincunx of existential values: with the category of the morally good. But in spite of this, the influence of Christianity, or to speak more strictly, of Catholic Christianity, upon the entire civilisation of the Catholic, or formerly Catholic nations, is an undeniable fact.

At her entry into the cultural world of the antique Mediterranean the young Church found herself in face of a highly developed civilisation. The temptation arose to take a hostile attitude towards this civilisation, which was in the closest way connected with paganism. But the Church did not succumb to this temptation. On the contrary, she took towards the antique civilisation the attitude which has been taken by the Christian mission during the whole of her history towards every civilisation which she meets, the lowest as well as the highest. She approached and approaches every civilisation with four inflexible moral demands. These four moral postulates of Christendom are:

1. the indissolubility of monogamous matrimony;
2. the endeavour to abolish slavery;
3. the abolition of private justice (blood-feud) and the transfer of its functions to public administration;
4. the independence of Church from State.

Koneczny calls these four postulates quite simply the “four wedges” which Christianity drives into every civilisation. The first and fourth postulates are unconditional; with the second and third Christianity allows a gradual state of transition. Everything, which does not oppose any of these four Christian demands, can remain.

By the introduction of the third postulate the Church also became a political educator of nations and sometimes, even the creator of the State.

Thus also was the mutual interpenetration of Christianity and of antique civilisation created. Christianity became impregnated with antique civilisation; this was permissible and possible to Christianity without in the least degree influencing its own religious essence; it was quite enough to dismiss from earthly civilisation everything which contradicted the
morality of the Gospel. And in this way Christian Rome became the preserver and continuator of the old classical civilisation, from which, through long centuries of educative work by the Catholic Church, Western civilisation emerged. The seeming paradox that just this religion which makes nothing sacral excepting matrimony, which does not identify itself with any single civilisation, not even with the one which was formed by it, has exerted the greatest cultural influence and transformed to the greatest extent the whole existence of the peoples which embraced it. Christianity is according to Koneczny the opposite pole to Buddhism; this religion (as also Islam, in part), allows itself to be transformed by civilisation and submits to it, whereas Christianity forms civilisation and conquers it. For Buddhism the world is radically wicked, because every earthly being is to it essentially unholy; in opposition to it. Christianity, in spite of its rejection of sacralisation, teaches that every step in life can and even should be sanctified; the Gospel contains no private law and no public law, but it has transformed the face of the earth.

But not all forms of Christianity have influenced civilisation in an equal way. There is a fundamental difference which separates Western Christendom from Eastern. The difference consists in this: that only Catholicism has treated the fourth basic postulate with complete and uncompromising preemiptoriness. The different forms of Eastern Christendom have done otherwise. Koneczny (to whom his precise knowledge of East-European and Asiatic history in those centuries which correspond to the Western middle ages supplied an enormous store of facts), consecrated very detailed studies also to Byzantine Christianity. He gave similar attention to Nestorianism, which had in Central Asia during long centuries an importance not remotely suspected by the general body of European historians, in spite of a number of special monographs. Koneczny’s works contain collections of an enormous wealth of highly interesting facts, which should lay claim to the highest attention since they throw an unexpectedly clear light not only upon the history of Asia, but also upon the whole history of mankind.

Very few among us know how deeply the Nestorian missionary activity progressed in Central Asia; in fact, a very substantial part of the Ural-Altaic peoples of Central Asia, to which the Turkic group and the Mongols belong, were in early and high middle ages converted to the Nestorian form of Christendom. There was in Mongol history a real Christian period. Koneczny even believes he can rightly speak of “Mongol crusades”. Undertaken with well disciplined super-armies, they had far greater penetrating force than had the European crusades and were much more dangerous to the Islamic states than those; the European expeditions were not in the military sense at all “modern” as was the then highly progressive military force of the Mongols.

All this once vast Nestorian Christendom of Central Asia has ceased to exist; Mongol Christianity has disappeared from history without trace. Kipchak became Moslem, and in Mongolia proper Buddhism became overwhelmingly dominant. It is only with difficulty that we find here and there a few effaced traces of the lost Christian communities in the ruins of old Mongol cities.

The answer to the disquieting question as to how all this could have happened, lies, according to Koneczny, in this: that this Central Asiatic Christianity was only a “defective” form a Christianity which did not dare to change radically a society whose whole structure ignored the most fundamental demands of the Christian religion. The civilisation which Christianity here encountered was the Turanian, with which a conflict of quite other dimensions was necessary than had been the case with the classical-antique. Nestorian Christendom neglected to undertake this conflict; it simplified its task by minimising it and by taking an opportunist attitude. It embarked upon impracticable compromises, it weakened its

1 René Grousset "Bilan de l’histoire", Paris 1946, p. 226, uses the same expression
own fundamental moral demands in adaptation to the non-Christian environment, the Christianisation of which was anything but an easy task. It renounced the radical adoption of its own fundamental postulates and submitted completely to a civilisation which contained quite irreconcilable elements. The result was a self-disintegration of this defective Christianity; in its inconsistent compromise it was right from the beginning doomed to defeat and absorption by the rigorous compactness of the Turanian civilisation.

It seems to be Koneczny’s principal aim to show the Turanian civilisation as the opposite pole of the Western civilisation, moulded by Rome. We consider the introduction of the notion of Turanian civilisation as one of his greatest merits. Spengler did not notice this civilisation at all. Perhaps he did not know it. Perhaps he did not want to see it and neglected it because it did not do him the favour of fitting into his aprioristic scheme of biological cultural developments.

According to Koneczny a low estimate of the element of religion and in general of the spiritual element is typical for the Turanian civilisation; the central value in the sphere of Turanian civilisation is the political element; everything has to be subordinated to it. The religious ingenium is missing in the Turanian civilisation; in essence, the Turanian man is a-religious, what does not necessarily mean that he is hostile towards religion. On the contrary, the Mongol political power was quite tolerant in religious matters. The Mongols established the first real totalitarian state in history; but this state differed from the modern ones in its tolerance in religious matters. This “liberalism” in matters of ideology and almost absolute religious tolerance were very much to its advantage. However, this did not flow from respect for the sphere of conscience, nor for human liberty of thought, but can rather be simply explained by the lack of importance which the religious element had for Turanian man. In fact, all the religions which penetrated into the sphere of Turanian civilisation became degenerated and in part corrupted; and even Christianity did not prove an exception from this.

A quite typical representative of the Turanian civilisation is Temudzhin, the last of the Genghis Khans.²

Byzantine Christianity, again, is according to Koneczny slightly defective; it did not treat seriously the fourth of the fundamental Christian postulates. The consequence was a Church subjected to the State, the using of religion for worldly and political purposes, a stagnation, a stiffening, a decline.

The Western Church, on the contrary, facilitated and supported the development of a “society” whose possibilities of development everywhere in the East were suppressed.

The final result of the investigation of the problem of relation between religion and civilisation is in consequence rather negative: there is no general parallelism between civilisations and religions. The problem of the origin of civilisations is solved only for the sacral civilisations. It still remains open for the non-sacral ones. Only one provisional conclusion has been arrived at, namely that the final solution of the problem can only lie in the spiritual sphere, because the spiritual factors are incomparably more decisive than the material.

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² Koneczny strives to prove that Russia, in spite of her Byzantine Christianity, belongs juridically and sociologically positively to the Turanian world. We know that this opinion of his meets often a strong opposition. We should not forget, however, that Koneczny as a Pole is at the same time a "Westerner on the outpost". He observes the meeting of different civilisations in Poland's "Kresy", the Polish Eastern provinces; he explains it in the most acute terms from the viewpoint of his teaching on civilisations, if only with the aim of sharpening the Latin and Western consciousness of his compatriots. His presentation of the Turanian character of Muscovitism is in the highest grade original; he puts emphasis mainly on political, juridico-historical and sociological arguments.
THE POSITIVE ANSWER: THE PRINCIPAL FACTORS OF DIFFERENTIATION OF CIVILISATIONS

Four factors before all, according to Koneczny, determine the cultural differentiation of humanity:

1. The relation of man towards time: the measuring of time, the reckoning of time and the mastery of time;
2. the relation between public and private law;
3. the sources of law;
4. the existence or non-existence of national consciousness.

1. Everything which is connected with the relation of man towards time has for his whole spiritual development an importance which we only begin to guess. — Whole peoples are without any relationship to time; others have achieved only the knowledge of measuring time. The achievement of a calendar is not necessarily a sufficient criterion of a higher cultural grade; because it does not necessarily lead to the reckoning of time from one era; Egyptians and Chinese did not have an era; the Jews began only in Roman times their dating in years from the creation of the world. The highest grade in the relation of man towards time is the power over time. Contrary to the power over space which develops only the intellect, the progress in having power over time goes hand in hand with a simultaneous moral advance; by establishing and accomplishing aims in time man voluntarily limits his freedom: but this self-limitation is a great step towards an important element of true freedom, which is man’s independence from exterior circumstances; an important condition for the unfolding of social virtues. Of all the civilised peoples of antiquity only the Romans, according to Koneczny, achieved this degree; only they, and the filial cultures of Roman civilisation, possessed what Koneczny calls “historism”, the living tie and awareness of the presence of this tie between present time and the past with all its inheritance, as well as the feeling of responsibility for the future and for those who will follow.

2. The greater part of humanity knows even today no public law fundamentally separated from the private law. The State’s law of large political formations is often nothing but an extended private law; so in the Turanian civilisation, the ruler is owner of the State, of the whole territory of the State with all the inhabitants and their property, and he can exercise his power over them according to his will, or whim; in the Russian world, too, one finds again and again this Turanian notion of law. For the development of a “society” (i.e. a differentiated society: Koneczny employs here the Polish term “społeczność” in opposition to “społeczność”, the ordinary, non-differentiated human aggregate), there are here no conditions, no possibilities of development.

Rome was the first to create a public law sharply and fundamentally separated from private law; only here the conditions for the development of a “society” became present. From Rome, this achievement passed to Western civilisation, in which the inalienable rights of the human person with its inherent dignity thus found a lasting abode.

In Byzantium this sharp division became effaced again; a “society” could unfold itself here only so far as a benevolent slate allowed it. (The society is here underdeveloped: in its place flourish the State-maintained Church; uniformity and standardisation; spiritual stagnation and degeneration; bureaucracy and servility; herd humanity and herd psychology; Asiatic structural elements received in the epoch of the decadence of the Roman Empire, and which had destroyed old Rome.)
3. The difference in the sources of law is in fact the deepest root of differentiation of civilisations. Here again, it was old Rome who for the first time and quite unequivocally considered law as a consequence of morality and as its application to concrete cases. With this recognition of natural law also the first complete release of law from sacrality took place in Rome. Organs of “society”, not of State, issued laws in Rome; during centuries the State as such did not issue in Rome even a single law, but accepted laws born in the citizen’s assemblies of the curiae at comitia.

Unfortunately, the picture of ancient Rome does not stand sufficiently clearly and unequivocally before our eyes, the eyes of posterity; in late antique times the East already influenced the West. Even antiquity knew already the temptation of the East. There was a time when even in Rome one started to declare that quod principi placuit, legis habet vigorem, what pleases the ruler has the force of law. The sources of Roman law which we, posterity, have inherited—the Pandecta and the Codex—reflect the struggle of two different ethics, the Western and the Eastern, a struggle which we can observe very clearly although the Eastern ethic sometimes wears a borrowed Western and Roman cloak.

Thus, a cultural split ran in later times right through the innermost structure of the Roman Empire. Two fundamentally different, two diametrically opposed views struggled with each other, two principles between which there could be no synthesis.

The fundamental achievement of Rome could survive the period of the ruin of the Roman Empire and of the accompanying chaos, thanks to the Catholic Church which introduced this achievement into Western civilisation. The middle ages, in spite of occasional relapses, show the history of a constant penetration into European secular laws of the principles of Catholic morality. At the same time, in the conflicts between sacerdotium and imperium which took such a dramatic aspect from the penetration of certain Byzantine legal views into the West, an increasingly sharp distinction between secular and religious authority took place, with an increasingly clear separation of their spheres of influence. It was quite the other way in the East, where the State attributed to itself the position of the only interpreter of law. The consequence of it was the amorality—which meant in practice the immorality—of public life.

4. The nations are the ethical superstructure of society, of which they form the highest grade of development. For the idea of a nation, the presence of aims exceeding the simple struggle for existence is essential. The nations are not at all something a priori necessary; they are all a posteriori, products of history; they grow together from tribes and peoples. The conditions for the birth of a national consciousness are: the emancipation of the family from the clan, the existence of a public law, as well as a certain level of intellectual development. One can under compulsion belong to a State; but a compulsory belonging to a nation would be a contradiction in itself.

The conditions for the emergence of a national consciousness appeared for the first time not even in Old Hellas, but in Old Italy at the time of the Roman Republic; it was proved there already quite clearly that the nations are not something physiological-racial, but belong to the cultural, i.e. to this moral order.

Nations in this meaning exist only, until now, within the sphere of the Latin civilisation, because only here the conditions for their development have been present. Even peoples of alien cultural spheres, which became embraced by the West and in consequence fell under the

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3 The briefness of this article does not allow, unfortunately, to dwell longer upon Koneczny's critique of the possible objections against this opinion.
4 Koneczny follows the Polish distinctions between the linguistical community, people, nation (naród) and State. The terms mean something different from those used in German. But the dividing lines between the Polish ideas are much sharper also than in the Romanic languages or in English.
influence of the formative forces of Latin civilisation e.g. the Finns and the Hungarians — became nations.

A nation must as a cultural entity belong only to one civilisation; it cannot belong to two different civilisations.

**LAWS OF HISTORY**

We can now define what Koneczny’s doctrine means in comparison with the previous doctrines of philosophy of history. We would be inclined to ascribe to Koneczny the following, merits.

Koneczny’s doctrine means a renunciation of any purely speculative philosophy of history; when the philosophy of history becomes a science of civilisations, it has to be an inductive science founded on the study of facts.

This is perhaps the only possible way to rescue the philosophy of history; to make it a philosophical science of history. Not only to rescue, but also to consolidate, by giving it a strictly defined sphere from which it cannot be expelled, and at the same time by giving it strong foundations. Otherwise, it would be quite a doubtful undertaking, to base the philosophy of history in such a way that its validity and even its right to exist could not be put in question. But it is not our purpose to investigate here whether the eternal question of the sense of history can receive at all a philosophical answer, or whether it is not answerable, or can find an answer only within the limits of a theology of history — if we are prepared to admit the possibility of such a science.

A clear application of the principle of induction involves a break with ominous apriorism; it means before all a decisive overcoming of aprioristic biologism in every form.

An impression became slowly established in the philosophy of history that the recognition of a plurality of civilisations is inseparably connected with a biologic and biologising view on these civilisations. It is Koneczny’s merit to have destroyed this illusion and to have separated from each other the two ideas, which for centuries had been continually treated as interconnected.

At the same time, the refreshing all-sided general examination of civilisations demonstrates the specific character of them as a spiritual domain; put by induction again and again into new light, it proves to be a kingdom of freedom. And in consequence, every possible form of determinism is for the philosophy of history fundamentally overcome.

Hence comes a conclusion that laws of history as previously conceived, laws of history which would somehow be analogous to the laws of nature, to the laws of physics or biological laws of organic life, cannot exist at all.

If there can be laws in history — they must be of a completely different nature.

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5. The word "previous" should be taken "cum grano salis". Koneczny's doctrine, as we already said before, is substantially older than the doctrine of Oswald Spengler. Koneczny conceived the fundamental ideas of his doctrine already in the 1890s. Later, he only formulated it more clearly and verified his inductive method on more and more abundant material of historical facts.

6. Spengler's civilisations are in a mystical sense, undefined and probably (indefinable, functions of space; they are something grown up from the "mother ground", developed like plants from the earth, inseparable from the space to which they belong; and this forms the men. Koneczny's civilisations, on the contrary, are like spiritual fluids, which rise "over" the spaces and morally keep the men in their power, but without any fatalist or determinist compulsion, because they are created by the men themselves, they are products of human spirit. As spiritual fluids they are also flowing, they are something incomparably more mobile than Spengler's earth-attached civilisations, they are agile like everything which is of the spirit. And these fluids put out tentacles, they are not closed in themselves, separated from each other like those of Spengler; they struggle with each other and they "must" struggle against each other and try to repel each other.
It is true that in consequence of this the tasks of philosophy of history become much more complicated; but historical reality is complicated. It is impossible to say anything about it \textit{a priori}; and in spite of Spengler’s great display of apparent refutation, induction shows undeniably that civilisations have each a different history. There is no compelling reason to believe that a civilisation must die and why she must die; the belief in such a necessity was only a biological apriorism. There is no “rhythm” in history. There are no cycles; there is no foundation for believing in these \textit{a priori}, and induction shows decisively their non-existence. But all these disillusionments clear, a free field for a philosophy of history, consistently conceived as a discipline in humanities.

\textbf{THE ONLY LAW OF HISTORY: CAUSALITY AND FINALITY}

The civilisations struggle against each other. Each tries to dislodge the other. Only the understanding of the conflicts and rivalries between civilisations — and this is Koneczny’s principal thesis — gives a clue to universal history. There is, according to Koneczny, only one law of history in the sense of a general rule concerning historical facts and this is: “every civilisation, so long as it is viable, tries to expand; wherever there meet two civilisations which are able to live, they must struggle against each other. Every civilisation is on the offensive, so long as it is not dying. The struggle lasts until one of the two civilisations is destroyed; the mere occupation of a dominating position by one of the civilisations does not end the struggle”\textsuperscript{7}.

A synthesis of civilisations does not exist and is not possible. The only thing which is possible — and history is rich in examples of it — is only a mechanical mixture of two or more civilisations, but its result is only chaos, barbarity, disintegration and cultural decadence, because such mixtures are a sin against the fundamental condition of the vitality of every civilisation, which is the law of harmony of existential categories. The norms which rule the life of a human group have to form a unity, they cannot contradict each other.

Only syntheses between subdivisions of the same civilisation are possible.

All so-called syntheses of civilisations are illusions. Again and again, from antiquity till the present time, have “syntheses of East and West” been tried in history; they were always unsuccessful, because their success was impossible. Because unavoidably the “law of laws” finds application in which Koneczny gathers together the final result of his studies: “one cannot be civilised in two different ways”.

This is nothing else but the practical application of the principle of harmony: one cannot detach elements from one civilisation and introduce them into a society belonging to a different civilisation. One can be civilised for instance in a Turanian way; but it is impossible to introduce principles and forms of Turanian civilisation into the Latin civilisation; they do not fit in here, in the same way as forms and principles of the West, introduced into the domains of other civilisations, act as elements of decomposition.

\textsuperscript{7} In considering this radical thesis of Koneczny, which may surprise many, we should remember Koneczny’s definition of civilisation. Civilisation is for Koneczny primarily something sociological, a complex of principles and structural forms which form a harmonious whole and from which one cannot take out isolated parts or portions. — We have also to remember to which geographical space Koneczny belonged; his eyes, the eyes of a Pole, of a man from the eastern borderland of the West, were in a particular way open to everything alien, to all which a Westerner meets at the eastern frontier of Poland. He saw there different and often diametrically opposed ethical and juridical principles and sociological mentalities, between which a synthesis is truly impossible. The experience of Polish history seemed to teach him in a particular way to be distrustful of all experiments of synthesis.

It is obvious that there are problems and questions here which need further examination. Let us think about mixtures of styles in art, which appear everywhere two civilisations meet each other; but even here one can ask oneself, if Koneczny’s radical negation does not contain a grain of truth.
There is then also in Koneczny a principle of closedness or self-containedness of civilisations; but this is something quite different from the mechanical, strictly exteriorly considered separateness of the civilisations of Spengler. The compactness of Koneczny’s civilisation is something logical; it expresses the all-embracing character of a civilisation: each civilisation is a sum of forms and principles which are harmoniously combined and which form a system, and which cannot be separated from each other nor appear separately.

The cultural death which is caused by cultural mixture however is not a fatalistically unavoidable fate: there is no such fate for human communities, just as there is no such fate for individual men. There are only consequences of human acts. The decline of a civilisation is always possible, because at any time the causes can appear which bring it about. But even a civilisation’s decline, when already in full progress, can at any time be stopped: sanabiles Deus fecit nationes! Because — and this is the final meaning of Koneczny’s philosophy of history — the laws which rule history are, seen from the point of view of man placed in history, moral imperatives of duty and freedom. And the final solution of the riddle of history lies not in a law of necessity imposed by Nature, but in the law of moral freedom. And so, there is also progress in history; because morality is capable of progress. For the Latin civilisation this progress means a progressive widening of the spheres in which morality finds practical application; further and further new branches of morality become law.

In the light of these fundamental views Koneczny sees history and the present time. The chaotic condition of the humanity of times is for him a consequence of all the syntheses of incompatible civilisations which have been undertaken, in which mixtures were tried of elements of ethics, sociology, politics and spiritual life which were by nature incapable of mixing.

**EAST, WEST, ROME AND BYZANTIUM. TURAN. THE PRESSURE OF THE EAST UPON THE WEST. GERMANY**

The West and Turan are absolute, contrary poles. The deepest root of this opposition is a fundamentally different attitude towards man and towards the position of an individual in the human group. Turan does not know man as a person; it does not know any dignity of a person; the individual has value and importance only is his role of a component part of the State’s organisation. In the Turanian civilisation and in its descendant, Muscovy-Russia, there is, legally, no such a thing as a “society” in existence: the State is everything. The European lives also in the State, the Turanian lives exclusively in it. Koneczny speaks of an “elephantiasis” of politics in the Turanian civilisation. Therein the whole social structure is directed purely towards the military factor.

Such were the Mongolian States of the middle ages; and through such a school Moscow has gone.

On the contrary, in the West, primacy belongs to the spirit, to the spiritual power.

Man as an individual, as a person, has his unalienable dignity. In the dignity of the person lies the root of freedom, and with it the demand for citizen’s freedoms; and correlated with freedom, as its source and as its consequence — both, because in the Western system of values both are organically interwoven — is the feeling of responsibility.

No other civilisation knows the notion of freedom, because no other has this high notion of human dignity. Even the most highly developed subdivision of Arabic civilisation, the one of Cordova, did not arrive as far. This Western principle of primacy of the spiritual element obtained the farthest formulation in the school of Cluny; the Pope as highest guardian of the Christian order, even in the political sphere. He had the right to watch the kings and to remove bad Christians from their thrones.
Such a thesis, in presence of the absolute subordination of the spiritual power below the temporal in the East, shows the whole contrast between Rome and Turan.

The teaching of the *potestas directa in temporalibus* (direct authority in temporal matters) is for the men of other civilisations a revolutionary monstrosity; but its foundation is simply the conviction that there cannot be a double morality and that also public life, the relation between one State to another, and that between every State and its citizens, are not subordinated to other moral commandments as private life; because the State is in the Western view not an aim in itself; it does not stand outside the notions of good and evil, but it is subject to natural law and has to serve the moral aims of humanity.

From all this flows the possibility, present only in the West, of the highest form of cultural progress: namely the possibility of raising from generation to generation the level of ethics in private as well as in public life: according to Koneczny this is the only real and true progress; it consists in this, that more and more portions of morality become transformed into law.

Byzantium stands exactly half way between the West and Turan, but it is nowhere — even if here and there it may show some Turanian features — as extreme as Turan. Also in Byzantium, form has priority over content. The mission of Byzantium was the introduction and spreading of uniformity. And the maintaining of uniformity demands compulsion, an external pressure. To exercise this pressure is the function of the State. The individual, the family, every social institution, is here strangled by the omnipotent state. A “society”, independent from the State and from the sphere of politics, does exist here, but is underdeveloped.

The tendency towards formality and uniformity can be found in Byzantium in all domains of culture, from the rigid rules in art, forbidding any novelties, down to the ceremonies of the court etiquette. Byzantium does not tolerate any individualism; neither does Byzantine Church approve of it.

Byzantium is always uniformist and centralist; because it cannot imagine any other unity except uniformity. That unity can also be articulate and multiform, without thereby losing its compactness and energy, this is according to Koneczny not a Byzantine, but a Western idea; Byzantium, or a State influenced by the Byzantine spirit, would not be able to conceive of it. A political conception such as federalism was unthinkable in Byzantium; whence derives the inability, until to-day, of all Byzantium-trained peoples to see the State otherwise as a centralistic unitarian body; whence also the tendency of the Byzantine Serbs to impose upon the Croats belonging to the Western civilisation, a centralist rule; the Serb wants to assimilate the Croat, and does not understand the desire of the latter to enjoy equality and freedom in a federation.

Byzantium took over from Rome the notion of a public law separate and different from the private one; but the sphere of the private law has become more and more limited because of the encroachments of the State, i.e. of bureaucracy. Byzantium is the home of State socialism, of State taxes and of State omnipotence.

In all that concerns the exterior cultural level, Byzantium stood, it is true, for centuries high above the West: — an admired, envied and imitated model. Paris was only a village when Byzantium glittered with gold and purple and put Western travellers into mute wonder by its splendours. It was the kingdom of elegant etiquette, of fashion and of good taste for the barbarians from the West.

But all this is not the most important; the important thing is that Byzantium is an alien and a substantially different cultural world from ours. Yet precisely the fact that Byzantium was superior to the West in external culture was the source of an immense danger for all the Western European peoples. All of them fell under the spell of the Byzantine temptation — and this temptation meant the danger of a very harmful influence.
For those who know with Koneczny, how in the middle ages Byzantine form-principles and legal views were penetrating into Europe and what far-reaching influence they were exercising, medieval history takes the shape of a dramatic struggle, conducted by the Western, the Roman spirit against the foreign, Byzantine forms and principles which were incessantly infiltrating.

Again, the medieval idea of the *Sacrum Imperium* appears according to Koneczny’s teaching no longer as the final crystallization of medieval Western thinking, but quite on the contrary, as something completely alien, as a “Byzantine” foreign body. Only through liquidating and overcoming the medieval imperial idea could Europe truly find herself.

The question had to emerge in the West again and again, why it was that — at least since Prussia took over the leading role in Germany — Germany represented a permanent, provincial rebellion against the Western world. It is true, it is impossible to say that it was all Germany. But if we think of the most recent history, it was from Germany that the most dangerous inward threats to the Western world came, even if on the other hand on other levels European consciousness of Germany remained quite alert. Whenever we wish to answer this question, we must go back quite far in time; the roots which we seek are to be found in the Middle Ages.

It is a mistake to see in the medieval imperial idea, of which medieval Germany was the bearer, a genuinely Western, or even the supremely Western idea. From the point of view of the history of ideas, this idea is without any doubt of Byzantine origin. It represented the endeavour — never put more than partially into practice — to introduce into the West the imperial idea of Byzantium. Genuinely Western was the self-defence of European peoples against every attempt to organise Europe on the basis of a hegemony.

It was not the imperial idea and the imperial mystique, but their complete opposite, the idea of a family of free and equal nations, which was really Western. At the Council of Constance these two ideas clashed with each other in a dramatic way; and it was there that one of the most genial forerunners of the idea of a federal Europe appeared, Paulus a Vladimiri (Pawel Wlodkowic of Brudzeń). It is Koneczny who notes the permanent importance of this truly epoch-making political thinker.

It meant the end of the political Middle Ages when the Catholic Church dissociated itself in due form from the imperial mystique. It is true; the latter was not yet dead in consequence of the separation; political ideas are able to persist in an amazing way, they may even change their exterior appearance, their motivation and their apparent aims, and yet remain essentially the same. What dangers were brought into Europe by the secularised imperial idea, incorporated in Germany under Prussian leadership, we have all been able to learn sufficiently by now.

In Germany also warning voices were not lacking; unfortunately they were not as well heeded as they merited. I would like to mention here two men who already about forty years ago perceived the general shape of the contrast between a Western and anti-Western Germany: Herman Hefele and Hugo Ball. To-day, a whole chorus of voices can be heard in Germany, who with refreshing clarity utter all that is necessary on the theme Prussia-Germany-Europe-The West; I will only mention the “*Leidensgeschichte des zivilen Geistes in Deutschland*” by Karl Buchheim. It is a pity that all these men did not know the teaching of Feliks Koneczny; they would have found in his works a precise historical analysis and an explanation of what they already discerned in their acute minds for themselves. The teaching of Koneczny puts the importance of the Catholic Church in the whole complex of Western history in a light, which will disperse many prejudices also among non-Catholics. Every Westerner, in whatever ideological or political camp he stands to-day, is obliged to be thankful to the Catholic Church of the Middle Ages for having undertaken a struggle against the all-powerful Empire, and for having conducted this struggle until the end. Nothing is more
typical than the alliance of the Lombard League of cities with Papacy against the Empire of the Hohenstaufen, which was equally menacing to both; religious and civic liberty had to be defended together. If the Catholic Church had not conducted a fight against the all-powerful Empire, which did not tolerate any sphere of liberty, no sphere of spiritual freedom would exist in which “free thought” in the modern sense could unfold itself; “free” thought, in the positive as well as in the slightly suspect sense, would never have been possible if Latin Church of the Middle Ages had not in the fight against the Empire, secured originally at least one sphere, to be in principle free from the grip and control of the State.

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To such thoughts Koneczny conducts us. Even if the science of civilisations, as shaped by him, is yet to a great extent only a programme and a task, we can certainly say at least this: — that what he has already established and said is of such importance that no experiment in a universal historical synthesis, and no explanation of history, undertaken in future will be able to pass it by.  

Koneczny was himself fully conscious that his experiment of a general survey of civilisations was not yet anything final and that it needed in many points completion, widening and correction; notwithstanding his conviction that a universal history has meaning only under the aspect of a history of civilisations struggling with each other. He regretted the decline of humanistic thinking at the transitional period from the 19th to the 20th century; but he saw many signs of a new revival and was convinced that the permeation of the humanities by the ways and methods of thinking of the natural sciences would not be of long duration. In the final words of his principal work he spoke out his strong faith in the revival of humanistic studies. He knew that he himself had penetrated into a new scientific field in humanities, and that he explored paths of which perhaps not all would lead to the end. Every overestimation of self was far from him; he wrote literally: “I console myself with the hope that the question which I put in this book will be studied by Polish scholarship. I shall not only be satisfied, but I shall be happy, if this will be so; without regarding how much of my own work will remain and how much, on the basis of the more accurate studies of my successors, will have to be withdrawn.”
ON THE PLURALITY OF CIVILISATIONS

by

FELIKS KONECZNY

The publishers abridged Koneczny’s work slightly. The Polish original was published a quarter of a century ago — in 1935 — but the publishers resisted the temptation to modernise it.

CHAPTER I

FROM BACON TO MAJEWSKI

I  INTRODUCTION

History grows increasingly general. Events in the Far East produce rapid, and increasingly rapidly felt, effects in the European power system. Even African affairs assume increasing importance in the political and economic balance. Thus the study of, exotic peoples and lands is increasingly necessary for public life not merely in England, but in all the countries of the European continent without exception. These studies are in fact making considerable progress; it is enough to say that there is no lack of authors writing in Polish from whom much can be learned about peoples of other civilisations.

There is also an increasingly conscious objectivity in face of the exotic. The legion of those men who recognise only one civilisation, i.e. their own, and regard people of other civilisations as uncivilised, is visibly diminishing. Acknowledgment that difference does not mean some basic inferiority is increasingly frequently met with. We try to enter into the spirit of these differences; the old Roman *nil humani a me alienum puto* has been extended geographically beyond expectation.

So too textbooks of general history increasingly readily take the whole world into account, thus acquiring whole chapters. A great but laudable enthusiasm is to be remarked in this direction. We are also becoming increasingly aware that this movement is leading to new conceptions of general history as a whole, with its divisions, motives, difficulties, sacrifices and illusions. Against an enormously enlarged background, there is more than one change in perspective, problems assume other forms.

Having increasingly to do with the variety of civilisations, it must seem the more astonishing that we do not ask ourselves whence comes this variety, what is its origin? Why do a Japanese and a Swede, although they telephone in the same way, think and act differently? Why do not all peoples belong to one civilisation?

Why do they differ not only in the stages but in the kinds of their different civilisations?
The naive period of the economic school of historical writing has passed, when social systems and the differences in human ways of thinking were deduced from kinds of food. We have also got rid of the superstition about the omnipotence of geographical conditions, and rejected the hypothesis of the formation of the human spirit exclusively by nature. But what stands in place of them? So far — nothing.

In modern and very recent times there has been no lack of the urge to create great historical syntheses, with a distinct emphasis on humanity in its entirety. The question of the cause of human variety has also appeared from time to time on learned agenda. Is it permissible to attempt a new working-out of the problem, particularly by a new method, without prior conscientious examination of existing attempts at synthesis, and of the methods used to this end?

One’s own novelties should be advanced with the utmost caution: the more original the thought the more nonum premutur in annum! I have, it is true, maintained this caution, but should like to justify trial of my own method by the fact that this is a case where existing methods fail. So I shall precede my own contribution with a summary review (as concise as possible) of historiosophical syntheses based on all the methods so far used.

The inductive method — for history the most appropriate — is the work of an historian. Lord Bacon of Verulam (1561-1626) who worked long on the history of England from the reconciliation of the two Roses to the Union of the Kingdoms under James I, but who reached no further than a history of Henry VII (1621). He did not finish because he was absorbed in the vastness of his Instauratio magna, of which he likewise managed to complete only fragments. He was interested in the problem of synthesis, and as an historian with history as his starting-point covered wide areas of knowledge. His method was to serve equally the humanist and the natural sciences.

In humanist learning there nevertheless came a halt, while the natural sciences began a rapid development, so that it seemed as if the method inaugurated by Bacon was proper to them alone.

Moreover it appeared after a certain time as if only the natural sciences constituted learning. The two delusions thus created grew blatant, but possessed men’s minds to such an extent as finally to pass for indubitable scientific facts.

The order and content of knowledge was encroached upon by two factors least suited to do so — mathematics and literature — alike in this that by the nature of their existence they can determine form only. So that it is strange that it has to be recorded that the first historical work referring to Bacon did not come out until more than a century after his death.

Meanwhile weighing upon the development of history (although not himself engaging in history) was the discoverer of analytical geometry Rene Descartes (1596 1650), younger than Bacon by a generation. He possessed in high degree a feeling for universality. The course of his life presented him with many opportunities for contact with people of varied customs — from which he drew the following conclusion:

“I have noticed how much the same man, with the same intelligence, educated from childhood among the French or Germans, differs from what he would have been if he had always lived among Chinese or cannibals.”

And he admits that “as sensible people may perhaps be found among Persians or Chinese as among us”.

But the Cartesian method itself, requiring everywhere a certain general formula and single-mindedness in the handling of phenomena, was not merely unsuited to the development of history, but became a real drag upon Cartesian historians.

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8 A review of this kind formed the subject of a year's lecture-course. intended as an introduction to the study of civilisation, at Wilno University in 1926/27.

Nicolas Malebranche (1638-1715) thought of himself as a pupil of Descartes. From Malebranche dates that abstract deduction, which appeals not to the facts of history but to a chain of reasoning, and groups and interprets facts in accordance with the bent of the individual’s *apriori* thought. In his chief work *De la recherche de la vérité* (1674), Malebranche discerns in history the operation of Providence, without going more closely into the problem presented by its paths.

The method here consists in reflection itself, in rational meditation. I call it meditative, because in the subsequent development of this branch of deduction its most outstanding representatives themselves appealed simply to meditation. Then in 1793 Condorcet was to define humanist learning as that «*Où les découvertes sont le prix de la seule méditation*» — while in Wronski’s opinion «*le savoir, considéré en lui-même, est d’abord purement contemplatif ou speculatif*».

After Malebranche, the meditative method was continued by the famous “last Father of the Church”, Jacques Bénigne Bossuet (1627-1704) who, in his *Discours sur l’histoire universelle jusqu’à l’empire de Charlemagne* invented so-called Judeocentricity as the axis of the general history of antiquity. The work is regarded as the first attempt at a philosophical treatment of history.

Catholic scholars then carried the meditative method to an historical synthesis. It was only later that the method came to be used against the Church.

Wilhelm Leibnitz (1646-1716) was an historian, co-inventor of the calculus, dreaming in extended meditations how to attain universal knowledge with the help of a universal “logical key”; author of *Monadologia, Systema Theologicum* and of specialised historical treatises, publisher of sources. Not even he returned to induction.

It was left to Gian Battista Vico (1668-1744), opponent of Descartes and admirer of Bacon, to exalt induction. His *Cinque libri de principi di una scienza nuova* (1730) were to uncover the basic law of history. Here are his words:

“Our intention to formulate... a conception of ideal, eternal history which embraces the separate histories of the various nations within given epochs of time”... “This same science simultaneously builds ideal, eternal history across which flow in time the histories of all the nations in their birth, progress, stagnation, decline and ruin... “A science whose purpose is to discover the plan of ideal, eternal history, on whose canvas the histories of all nations unfold in time”... “This science ought to be, if we may express it so, proof of Providence as an historical fact, for it will be the history of the laws which she, without any kind of human cooperation or counsel and often contrary to human expectations, has developed in the great community of human kind.”

It was a question, therefore, of uncovering a scheme of history binding once for all by the will of Providence on all times and all peoples; for abstracting from the external garb of events, the movements of history are basically the same. Vico discerned everywhere three phases of development: the phases of imagination, of will and of intellect — and a succession of States corresponding to this development. Attached to the work is a “chronological table drawn up according to the three epochs of time”. They form the *ricorso*, and when it is exhausted, the *ricorso* begins. Vico is the originator of the theory of recurrent cycles in history, professed even in our days.

Vico covered all branches of humanist learning and served each of them well. Specialists have counted fifteen instances in which later scholars were open to a charge of

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plagiarism committed on Vico’s “New Science”. The study of civilisation also exists in nuce in his writings.

The list of historical discoveries made, by Vico by means of inductive studies would indeed be long, but his synthesis does not satisfy the demands of the method; with him generalisation was premature. Having established the pattern of his “eternal history” repeating itself in cycles, he drew into it facts and whole groups of facts. He is the father of patterns in historical synthesis. At any rate he proclaimed to the learned world a new problem: that of laws of history.\textsuperscript{11}

Vico remained unknown until more or less the middle of the nineteenth century. Without knowing him, in the first half of the eighteen century Montesquieu stepped on to the firm ground of induction, so saving himself from hasty generalisation. Unlike Vico, bitten by the rust of adversity, Charles de Secondat, Baron de la Brède et de Montesquieu (1689-1755) was able to say of himself that in his whole life he never had a worry which could not be blotted out by an hour’s reading. Fulfilling all the demands of his generation, he was both scientist and littérateur; studying kidney glands, the causes of echoes and the conditions for transparency in bodies, and publishing literary works in prose and verse. He became celebrated through the Lettres Persanes (1721), then threw it all up and turned to history, relying not on meditation but on laborious inductive investigation.

Montesquieu wanted to find out why there is so much variety in social and political systems and on what this depends. Having collected materials for thirty years, and realising that a certain part of his intended work was growing too large in relation to the whole, he detached and published it separately in 1734 as Considérations sur les causes de la grandeur et de la décadence des Romains, an outstanding work. Fourteen years later he managed to publish his fundamental Esprit des Lois, which in two years had twenty-two editions. He was already over-worked. He remarked that he had grown grey over the writing of a book which could be read in three hours, and would now have to rest and work no longer. He published no other work of great significance — and seven years after publication of the first edition of the Lois his life, one of the purest and most useful known to history, came to an end.

Montesquieu’s achievement might be summarised in a sentence: the character of a society is decided by three groups of phenomena, social, political and moral, whose differing relationship produces historical diversity and so unavoidable diversity in the arrangements of public life; this diversity is regular, springing from causes, which can be scientifically defined. How near he came to noticing that the question is one of differing methods of collective life! One frequently gets the impression from his expositions that only the appropriate expression is lacking for him to have become aware of the whole essence of the history of civilisation.

Montesquieu discovered the proper method for historical studies, discarding all speculation and search for design, arriving at more general concepts by induction. His work possesses the enormous merit of coupling law and history. He is besides the founder of modern teaching about the State; from him derives the three-fold division of authority and many other truths in the field of the art of government.

He did not found a school. Mathematical-literary rationalism condemned his work, and of the original popularity there soon remained nothing more than the appreciation of true scholars whom nobody listened to, and who, cried down by the “reformers” did not know of each other’s existence. If a Montesquieu school had emerged, would it have been possible for

political history and legal history to have gone their separate ways to confusion? Might not rationalism have produced somewhat fewer will-o’-the-wisps? But chronologically the nearest “pupil” of Montesquieu is Guizot, who’s “History of Civilisation in Europe” appeared seventy-three years after the master’s death. Only then did a whole school of law historians and modern philosophers of history arise on the work of Montesquieu.

When *Esprit des Lois* appeared, a young man of exceptional ability, Anne-Robert Jacques Baron de l’Aulne Turgot (1727-1781), was studying at the Sorbonne. He seemed destined to continue the thread of Montesquieu’s learning, “created” to be his pupil. Turgot turned his back on the ideal of equality, for *la barbarie égale tous les hommes*. In his sketch *On the Advances of the Human Spirit* there are not a few remarks describing distinctly what later came to be known as the influence of environment. He nevertheless asserts that “in exactly the same natural conditions differing peoples are found, while in very dissimilar climates there is often the same character and the same kind of mentality”. And what credit the observation that analogy does not constitute proof reflects on an author then twenty-five years old! In his writing there are many quite astonishing remarks anticipating the triumphs of the inductive method in historical studies.\(^{12}\)

Unfortunately Turgot did not become an historian because he set about making history. He turned away from the writing of history, and afterwards history turned away from him. Perhaps different watchwords would have guided the succeeding generation if Turgot had developed and strengthened Montesquieu’s line of thought?

Meanwhile more and more mathematicians, scientists and literary men were making themselves at home in historiosophy. Never did new ideas in the field of humanist learning come so thick and fast as in the *Encyclopédie*, a monument to the downfall of humanist studies. And there was the thesis of Edmund Burke (1730-1797) according to which there are no discoveries in the moral world.

François Marie Arouet, known under the pseudonym Voltaire (1694-1778), scientist turned literary man and literary man turned historian, was the first to use the expression philosophy of history. In *La Philosophie de l’histoire*, published in 1765, there are, however, exactly two and a half lines at the beginning about philosophy. To present history “philosophically” simply meant working it out in accordance with the unaided reason, on condition that credence was never given to church sources\(^{13}\).

It was not Voltaire, however, who finally took chief place in “philosophy”, but Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778). Iliterate by comparison with the other, he survives precisely because he gives dispensation from learning (for it harms even morality). Perhaps the Wittiest passages in the great fox which was Voltaire are those in which (without ever mentioning him by name) he engages in polemics with Rousseau. But he did not survive the competition. Today who has read Voltaire, and who has not read Rousseau?

Against reason Rousseau advanced the charge that development of the arts and sciences lowered the level of morality and spoiled character. His *Discours sur les sciences et les arts* (1750) ensures the author a truly fairy-tale career, because of the impression made by the novel literary expression “state of nature”. Subsequently when asked to elucidate what it actually was and what it meant it caused him not a little trouble. At the beginning of the eight chapter of the first book of the *Contract social* (1762), Rousseau listed what he meant by “state of nature”, but in such a way as to permit everybody to devise his own interpretation of the author’s words, not against him although in spite of him. The occupation of commentator-


patcher to Rousseau is still open to any who are prepared to put together from his writings something homogeneous, some “system”. A man who saw himself as philosopher and lawgiver, Rousseau was turned in the end into a great politician and guide for humanity itself. Rousseau never distinguished between the natural and the artificial. With him everything was arranged by whim, dream, fancy. But humanist studies went into increasing decline, and Rousseau was taken with a seriousness still operative through inertia.

Meanwhile the meditative method in historiosophy had also arrived in Germany. The pioneer was Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) himself. In his Ideen zur allgemeinen Geschichte in weltbürgerlicher Absicht he starts with freedom of the will which does not prevent its manifestations, and so human actions, from being subject to general laws. The quintessence is in this that “the history of the human race may be regarded in general as the fulfilment of a hidden plan of nature intended to lead up to the perfect State”. A design therefore, and Kant strained history heavily and often. Here also is the beginning of the German deification of the State.

In the same year, 1784, Johann Gottfried von Herder began publishing Ideen zur Philosophie der Geschichte der Menschheit. It is a four-volume collection of prattle. Herder is unable to say anything simply, wallows in platitudes and purple-patches. Kant came out with a cruel review of volume one, the rest he left undisturbed. In fact the Ideen have little in common with learning — they are simply insipid literature. From the first two volumes it appeared that true history is the history of culture, of which the philosophy of history is made, while the latter is concerned with the tradition of what is called Bildung and Menschengeist. Thus the issue is that of the continuity of the intellect. But it gets lost somewhere in the sequel, where we read the following tirade:

“O great mother nature! To what trifles have you attached the fate of our kind! With a change in the shape of the human head and brain, with a small change in the structure of the organism and nerves, in consequence of climate, race and habits, simultaneously the fate of the world is changed, the whole sum of what humanity anywhere on earth does and suffers.”

There is real value in another place. Thus the Hauptgesetz of history is that everything that can happen on earth depends on conditions of place and the circumstance of time, as well as on the character, inborn or acquired, of the people concerned. A pity that Herder barely touched upon the question in passing, paying no further attention to it. At the very end of volume four, he rejoices that in the history of our part of the world das Rittertum und Pfaffentum were not unduly prolonged. A strangely small result of almost twenty years’ work.

Humanistic studies declined yet further. Those who studied seriously were engineers, physicists, some of whom made amateur excursions into generalisations in the humanistic field. In this state of affairs, Voltaire’s dream that somebody would write a history “of the human spirit” was fulfilled.

The author who appeared was a learned mathematician, one of the creators of the integral calculus, creator of a theory of comets, Encyclopaedist, Girondist and President of the Constitutive Assembly of 1792, the Marquis Jean-Antoine de Condorcet (1743-1794). In 1793, during eight months spent in hiding from Robespierre’s thugs, he wrote down almost from memory esquisse d’un tableau historique des progrès de l’esprit humain. In this “sketch” Condorcet always uses the future tense because he was only outlining, intending to work the thing out properly in the future. He did not live to do so. Imprisoned in 1794, he was forthwith poisoned.

15 ibid., pp. 492, 493.
From Condorcet dates blind belief in “progress”. Equality — offered by Rousseau as it were in the rough — he reduced to a system and programme. History was stretched to fit his doctrine. For us today there is interest only in the last chapter of the ‘sketch’, in which he describes what would happen in the period following the French Revolution, in its time therefore a history of the future: inequality between nations would be abolished, and the civilisation of the French and Anglo-Americans — the only civilisation — would embrace all the peoples of the hemisphere. These new students of our civilisation would make more rapid progress than ourselves, not having to gain experience, which they would take over from us — if only from our books. The stronger nations would themselves introduce respect for the rights of the weaker.

Condorcet practised “systematic meditation”. Even so a meditative method for historical synthesis had not been thought out. The Germans hoped to correct this. Exact philosophic thinking was to pave the way for historiosophical meditations. Historiosophy in Germany was included in philosophy, as a department of a fully complete philosophic system. For history there was again no benefit at all; but it is difficult to pass over so many famous names — so we shall glance at them also.

Simultaneously with the printing of Condorcet’s Ésquisse, Johann Gottlieb Fichte (1762-1814) published a fundamental work Grundlage und Grundriss der gesamten Wissenschaftslehre, from which derives the threefold pattern which remains a basic feature of German meditation, and from which present-day German anthroposophy does not depart. Thus in German thinking everything passes through three phases — thesis, antithesis, synthesis. This trichotomy was preserved by Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770-1831), except in the case of history, where he adopted a fourfold division: the East, Hellas, Rome, modern times. His Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte rest on the following assumption:

“The only idea which philosophy brings to historical investigations is the simple idea of reason, that reason rules the world, so that in history things happen reasonably. The Divine Wisdom, that is reason, is one and the same in great as in small things, and God should not be thought too weak to be able to apply his wisdom in great things”, (that is in history).

“Universal history is the revelation of the spirit in time, just as the idea reveals itself in space as nature”. Hence conclusions like: “The German spirit is the spirit of the new world”. The three epochs of the German world (to Charlemagne, to Charles V, from the Reformation to Hegel’s time) “may be distinguished as the realms of the Father, Son and Spirit”. Or “universal history is ... a true theodicy, the justification of God in history ... What happened and happens day by day is not only with God, but in actual fact his work”. But the theodicy must be anti-Catholic, for “no rational State system is possible with the Catholic religion”.

Hegel, without knowing Vico created his own theory of historical cycles. The period of Charlemagne represents a return of the period of the Persian State, the period before Charles V corresponds to the Greek world, the period of great geographical discoveries is a return of the age of Pericles. Socrates was renewed in Luther, etc.

Hegel also confirmed deification of the State, with the German spirit holding first place as a manifestation of Divine wisdom in history, but Catholicism excluded from it — and with the Prussian State as the flowering of this Divine wisdom.

Kari Ludwig Michelet (1801-1893) provides us with a curious example of an historical work both pragmatic and Hegelian. In the years 1859 and 1860 he published a two-volume Geschichte der Menschheit in ihrem Entwicklungsgange seit dem Jahre 1775 bis auf die neuesten Zeiten — with the sub-title Der Entwicklungsgang der Weltgeschichte in beiden

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17 ibid.. pp. 439-441.
Halbkugeln. It is an apotheosis of Frederick II as a “philosopher king” who “in the forefront of the course of history placed thought”, which “has already been accepted more or less in both hemispheres”. And in America they were setting about creating from a mixture of white, black, red and yellow (in Alaska) races the ideal race of the future.\(^{18}\)

Nor did historical synthesis gain anything from the Austrian-Catholic side of German speculation. Friedrich von Schlegel (1772-1829), in his *Philosophie der Geschichte*, in 18 Vorlesungen gehalten zu Wien i. J. 1828 looked for the “return of the lost Divine likeness in man”, because “to demonstrate the course of that return historically in the different periods of the world is the object of the philosophy of history”. In an allusion to Hegelianism, he makes the reservation that such a philosophy “must spring from real historical events”. He too succumbed to a trichotomy — of three words: word, power, light — which “consists entirely in historic experience and is based on reality”. Throughout this work Schlegel is rather the theologian-dilettante than an historiosopher. For him too “Christianity in its basic, strict essence has in general agreed well with the customs and arrangements of the Germanic peoples”\(^{19}\).

German philosophy turned history into a real guessing game.

An author from Poland holds a prominent place among exponents of the speculative method which, with the aid of the French language, he strove in vain to transform from German into European. He was Józef Marya Hoene-Wroński (1778-1853). The historiosophical side of his works is without merit, poorest of all his *Philosophie absolue de l’histoire*, dedicated to Nicholas I and Napoleon III, since in the author’s view Providence had chosen these two to realise his “Messianic idea”. Here too belongs his characteristically fanciful Développement progressif et but final de l’humanité. Humanity passes through seven periods: in the seventh the absolute will be revealed. But he, Wroński, possessed the secret of the absolute, although the fifth period had barely begun. Would the absolute agree to reveal itself and to what extent — that was the problem of his life!

In the second chapter of Part II of the *Développement* there is a review of progress in all branches of learning, and in the third chapter a review of the philosophy of history to the year 1818. Of humanist studies Wroński mentions philosophy, law, aesthetics, pedagogy, grammar, political economy and that is all. There is no history, although the author — a mathematician by profession — had just written a synthesis of the history of mankind viewed from the approach to the absolute so prematurely discovered by himself. In the seventh period autogenia would occur, that is the creation in man of such qualities as would cause as it were a second creation of man by himself. Repositories of the sacred secret of the absolute would be recognised as the lawgivers of mankind, forming a Sacred Council to whose approval and authority all the affairs of Earth would be submitted.\(^{20}\)

Speculative philosophy comes more or less to an end with Wroński. Philosophy became “positive”, although by no means cured of fantasy. Positivist historiography begins with the redoubtable physicist and engineer Claude Henri, comte de Saint-Simon (1760-1825). He threw at the world socio-political plans, taught the art of government, reformed mankind, while systematically studying only physics and physiology. In his view the goal of society is not liberty but activity. He was no enthusiast for constitutions, expecting more from the Holy Alliance, regarding it as a prelude to a European association in perpetual peace. In the

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development of the human spirit he saw a steady progression leading from theology through metaphysics increasingly towards “positive” science, that is based on mathematics or the laboratory. From him derives the “law of the three states”, according to which all manifestations of intellectual life must pass through theological, metaphysical and positive stages. He asserted that as a result of this regular sequence the future could be foreseen in the political field no less well than in the natural, the future being judged by the past.

Saint-Simon founded his own private scientific seminary, in which young adepts performed works indicated by him or under his direction. Among members of this seminary Isidore Marie Auguste François Comte (1798-1857) distinguished himself. He carried forward the work of “positivism” and acquired such fame that the original discoverer of the new theory was forgotten, or remembered only for less successful secondary matters. Moreover Saint Simon suffered much from pupils who reduced points of his teaching to absurdity, twisting them to appear highly revolutionary; whereas Comte, who could be reproached with even more errors and eccentricities, had the good fortune to have a pupil like Littré (the real creator of philosophical positivism), and a long line of other outstanding scholars.

Comte’s dogma is faith in the omnipotence of a science capable of organising society at will, and he worked it into an exact system. Following Condorcet (whom he calls his spiritual father), he too drew up a history of the future — in order to adapt the present to its requirements, changing and reforming as the approaching future demanded. A truly strange intellectual circle!

In Comte’s lecture-courses on positivist philosophy (1826, 1829) there were 52 lectures on mathematics and natural sciences and 15 on natural science and art. In 1830 he began printing Cours de la philosophie positive, publishing in the course of twelve years six large volumes. The arts section was expanded to almost half the whole.

This great work is a classic example of the petrification of youthful ideas. The author gave everything he had in youth afterwards only chewing it over, with added style and reasoning. For Comte ceased to learn, neglected serious reading, and having as a result a relatively decreasing amount of material at his disposal, filled in the gaps with speculation.

Volumes IV, V and VI concern the historian. In the introduction to Volume IV, the author claims that it is based “on first youthful inspirations” augmented “by a long series of methodical meditations”. His object is to provide scientific axioms for political life, to make an exact science of the whole field of social observation. He denies the possibility of unlimited progress, which he sees as limited by both race and geographic conditions. Moreover “civilisation progresses not, strictly speaking, in a straight line, but in a series of unequal and changing movements. In every period a different fundamental condition of progress is more highly developed than the rest and leaves its imprint. Each of the three intellectual stages is matched by a certain type of existence: military in the theological stage, then a transitional social phase “entirely similar to the metaphysical stage in intellectual development”, in which various branches of the law ruled the political scene in everything, followed by the transition to industrial existence. Hence the successive hegemony of warriors, lawyers, industrialists.21

In Volume V the author argues that the history of China, India, etc. is “barren erudition” and “radical confusion”: for only after having first investigated that which concerns the “elite of humanity” is it possible to embark with advantage on the affairs of civilisations “more or less retarded”.22 Comte uses the plural, but considers that the differences which occur are only numerical, of higher and lower levels, that basically there is only one

civilisation at stages differing with local circumstances. This outlook lasted almost into our own time.

Volume VI (1842) is chiefly about “humanity”, the author considering that this idea is a peak in the development of the intellect and morality, that it has done more for the development of morality than the idea of God. In the preface to Volume VI there is evident the psychosis into which he had fallen a second time.

His undiminishing fame Comte owes to his adoption of the expression “sociology”, in consequence of which he passes for founder of that science. But the expression came into being quite by chance during proof-reading, for which the evidence is the footnote on page 185 of Volume IV where the word appears for the first time.

In historiosophical matters, Comte reveals complete arbitrariness, absence of method, a typical chaos of speculative fancy unsupported by professional studies. It was not until later that there emerged a “positivist method” consisting in the application of methods used in the natural sciences to humanist studies, and deriving chiefly from Littré. A common feature of the whole very extensive school was the theory of evolution and a superstitious faith that what contemporary positivists proclaimed was certainly and once for all the last word of science, further advance only being possible with the help of fresh discoveries in the natural sciences.

The triumph of knowledge thunders in the preface to Myśl ogólna fizyologii powszechnej (1860) (General Outline of Elementary Physiology) of Józef Supiński (1804-1890). For him the spiritual world is a part of nature, so that laws of nature and of the spirit are identical, and everything concerning the intellect and senses has a common “physiology”; basing himself on this assumption, he aimed at “general science, learning founded on all the separate individual sciences”, that is he sought fundamental “forces”. He found two: the forces of impulsion and of attraction. In the field of impulsion learning has the highest place.

In social relations, the principle of “exchange” is decisive, with violence as a sometimes unavoidable factor. He rated Peter the Great and Frederick II enormously high; rejoiced that Russia, “gathering and gradually assembling the Slav tribes, saves one from extermination, prepares a new future for another.”

Simultaneously with this spread of “positivist” meditations, however, induction took a step forward when François Pierre Guillaume Guizot (1787-1874) changed the “philosophy of history” into “the history of civilisation”, a conclusion he reached from inductive, specialised studies. A professional historian, he stood at the head of two great source-publications and wrote a number of constructive works before turning to the history of civilisation, where his final achievement is the Histoire générale de la civilisation en Europe depuis la chute de l’Empire romain jusqu’à la révolution française (1828). He was the first carefully to assemble moments decisive in the development “of the interior man”. Both arrangement and interpretation of grouped facts are totally unlike those in earlier meditative syntheses. More than a century old, the work is still one of those which cannot be ignored, despite its obsolescence: a scholar cannot expect greater praise.

The subsequent development of positivist history was influenced less by Comte than by Guizot; although the positivists shrugged him off, inductive work was thenceforth obligatory in historical investigation. Without Guizot, that great discoverer of new themes, there would have been no Buckle (1821-1862). The famous and erudite History of Civilisation in England (1857-61), of which he managed to write only an incomplete introduction, declares in favour of historical determinism and the unchangeability of moral laws, doctrines.

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23 ibid., vol. VI, pp. 573, 589, 590, 621, 670, 760.
which long maintained themselves, and from which we are only recently emancipated. Buckle’s school was very numerous, although not productive of distinctively creative works.

The positivists’ service was to introduce new observation posts into history. The more numerous such points, the more universal the presentation of the subject. But there also may be more points and the same method, and the same author may change his viewpoints. A new outlook on a thing is not yet a new method. Discoverers of such points (e.g. Buckle, Taine) erred in supposing that they had succeeded in discovering some universal observation point, sufficient for ever and for everything, not needing to be supplemented by other points of view, for no such universal method of scientific work is possible. Universality demands precisely that all known points of view should be taken into account.

Two years after Buckle’s death one of the chief works of French positivism, Hypolite Taine’s (1828-1893) Histoire de la littérature anglaise appeared. There followed a number of works on the history of art, and in the end Les origines de la France contemporaine, each volume of which was awaited eagerly throughout Europe. Taine explains every fact by the race of the agent (origin, genealogy, hereditary factors), by contemporary arrangements (private and public relations, education, struggle for survival, etc.), by environment, milieu. Taine excelled in a minute exactitude and conscientiousness, yet Aulard, a recent historian of the French revolution, considers that the conclusions Taine offered are very often at variance with historic truth.

Bucle and Taine fell into one-sidedness despite the inductive method, but their observation points cannot be ignored. A deepened acquaintance with the sources, an increasingly perfected method often produce different results just because of the points of view taken into account (economic, genealogical, environmental), but the very demonstration of such variety of possible observation represents an enrichment of the historical method.

On the other hand, alarming damage was done elsewhere. Positivism shook off speculative meditation, but produced new variants of historiosophy not in the least historical. It was the beginning of the historiosophy of the anthropologists who would like to derive from Kant, but without cause, for the Anthropologie in pragmatischer Hinsicht, on which he had lectured for thirty years, was printed a year before his death and was really psychology, a science for the investigation of what man “as a being with a will of his own, makes, could and ought to make of himself”. Anthropological historiosophy derives from Joseph Arthur Gobineau (1816-1882) who, in his most important work Essai sur l’inégalité des races humaines (1853-55) invented the theory of the hierarchy of races. Civilisation is condemned to decline if races mix. If the highest race, that of long-head blondes, had been settled at one of the poles, the centre of civilisation would have been there. Vacher de Lapouge went even further, asserting that France declined because the short-headed had seized power there. In order to preserve a high level of civilisation, it would not be a bad thing to exterminate “lower” races. Gobineau even considered a caste system desirable.

The learned Adolf Bastian (1826-1905) widened the frame of anthropology to include ethnography and collective psychology. Der Voelkergedanke im Aufbau einer Wissenschaft vom Menschen (1881) was to be a synthesis of the labours of his whole long life. From him derives the thesis that as human intellect, character and emotions are everywhere the same, and the seeds of culture likewise, manifestations of culture would also be everywhere the same were it not for the diversity of living conditions; therefore assimilation of these conditions must assimilate people spiritually also, according to a basic common Voelkergedanke.

Forgotten today, Bastian was the first to begin working out a whole *Weltanschauung* from anthropology. He found thousands of imitators. Typical was the Viennese professor of medicine Karol Rokitansky. Presiding over a gathering of anthropologists in 1870, he used these words: ‘To investigate in what the essence of modern civilisation, its history and principles consist, to understand the reasons for inequality in progress and the causes of local standstill — all these are the tasks of natural anthropological science’.  

For Ludwik Gumplowicz (*Rassenkampf*, 1883) the whole of history was a “natural process”. Man in his essence is unchanging, and the basic content of historical processes always the same, so that there is really neither progress nor decline, only various forms of phenomena against a background of perpetual racial struggle: even different social groups emerge from different racial origins.

The question of the hierarchy of races assumed a dominating position in German science, which finally decided in the name of race to attach leadership in civilisation to Prussia. Anthropological historiography ended in an apotheosis of the Prussian, full of crazy scientific fantasies, to which even otherwise respected investigators like Fritz Lenz and A. Ploetz contributed. The views they proclaimed led inescapably to the conclusion that the whole civilised world would either submit to the Prussian or come to an end. From Oswald Spengler’s famous weighty work *Der Untergang des Abendlandes* we learn that our civilisation must collapse like every other, but there must first be a long period of Prussian imperialist hegemony over the whole world. Other German scholars showed how all the great men of the Renaissance hitherto regarded as Italians were Germans; in general it was impossible to be great without being a little German; Christ the Lord was himself German by origin. It must, however, in fairness be admitted that in Germany there was no lack of scholars who summoned these crackbrains to order.

And so anthropological historiography lost its drive. In his *Synthèse en histoire* Henri Berr justly says: “The anthropological interpretation of history, more dangerous than all the others, should be submitted to exact criticism”, and in his preface to Pittard’s outstanding work *Les races et l’histoire*, he roundly asserts that “history makes race to an incomparably greater degree than race history”.

The most serious contemporary anthropologists confine their science to the somatic-anthropological field. Jacques de Morgan in *Les premières civilisations* (1909), after asserting that all prehistoric ethnography was at the groping stage, remarks that “anthropology ought to be satisfied with its zoological role and not claim for itself a significance which it cannot have”. The best definition of anthropology is Czekanowski’s — a science which “investigates man as the biological base of social phenomena”. With anthropology so restricted, one may agree with the same scholar that an anthropological education makes possible “objective control of frequently very far-reaching judgments on social phenomena”.  

26 Quoted in Ludwik Krzywicki "Ludv. Zarys antropologii etnicznej".Warsaw 1893, p. IV.
31 ibid., p. 39. Czekanowski also had a most fortunate approach to anthropology as an applied science; much more so than Pittard, not to mention German scholars. For example such an observation: "The larger the peasant farm, the taller the recruit although there are fewer sons of land-owning families among them". P. 40.
Sociology hastened towards historical synthesis in the steps of anthropology. It favoured a biological outline of history. Paul Lilienfeld (1829-1903) worked this out in detail. According to him, victory in the battles of history falls as a rule to factors of a lower order. Friedrich Ratzel (1844-1904) in his epoch-making *Anthropogeographie* wrote in the exactly opposite sense. In his view, the human spirit can carry out its designs even despite all geographic conditions.

Then doubts concerning the relationship of sociological subjects to the natural sciences moved into first place. In *De l’histoire considérée comme science*, published in 1894, Lacombe asserted that everything which is general in a man’s activity comes under the laws of nature, and should be treated as such. On the other hand, opposition to the introduction of the methods of the natural sciences into historical investigation was voiced by three leading German scholars: Fredrich Goti in *Die Grenzen der Geschichte* (1904), Heirich Rickert in *Geschichtsphilosophie* (second edition 1907) and W. Dilthey in his chief work *Der Aufbau der geschichtlichen Welt in den Geisteswissenschaften* (1910). An original position was taken up by Paul Barth in a serious, incredibly laborious work *Die Philosophie der Geschichte als Soziologie I. Teil. Grundlegung und kritische Uebersicht* (second edition 1915). He did not consider that the historian must deny himself natural science methods, which are in any case frequently used, but care should be taken not to introduce natural science concepts into historical studies.

Meanwhile other outlines were made in the search for approaches to a synthesis. These culminated in the Catholic school which Frédéric Le Play (1806-1882) founded. His pupil Henri de Tourville distinguished in *Nomenclature ou classification des faits sociaux* twenty-five “grande’s classes de faits qui composent tout l’ordre d’une société”, and set them out systematically as sub-sections of a large table — deceiving himself that with the help of tabulated numbers and signs a symbolic scientific language for all historic and sociological factors would in time emerge. Here and there (in Poland also) Tourville still rouses enthusiasm, but in his thought there is a basic error, since the classification of social factors can never be complete: there would be no history if they did not change.

Edmond Demolins, to whom we owe the discovery of a new observation point, came from the same Le Play school. He showed with great talent that a decisive influence is exercised on any given people by the path their ancestors travelled to their later permanent homes. It is the theory of “historic trails”. Obviously account must be taken of where these travels lay, but as an explanation of the course of history, it is not worth considering.

It would need a large volume to enumerate all the new vantage points of the sociologists and the benefits to historical learning frequently resulting from them. Paul Barth collected quite a long list and set them out very interestingly in the work quoted. He regards sociology as the same as so-called philosophy of history.

The American Franklin H. Giddings (*The Principles of Sociology*, 1896) drew very wide frontiers for sociology, including in it both philosophy of history and political economy and even “comparative philosophy”. And so sociology proved no less predatory than anthropology! Erazm Majewski remarked that: “Synthesizing, philosophic sociology became a skirmishing-ground for the poorest intellects and the least justified ambitions”.

Sociologizing historiosophy was dealt a shrewd blow by the greatest German historian of that generation, Eduard Meyer (born 1855) in his treatise *Zur Theorie und Methodik der*...
Geschichte. Geschichtsphilosophische Untersuchungen (1902). He drew attention to the fact that history is not directly concerned with groups either of people or of facts, but with each fact separately, and on each occasion and for every fact with people specially grouped — in opposition to Barth’s assertion that history was concerned only with associations. According to Meyer a fact becomes historical through the effectiveness of its consequences, and historic importance is proportionate to the range of these consequences.  

Among Polish sociologists, the historical point of view was taken up by Florian Znaniecki in his Introduction to Sociology (Wstep do socjologii, 1922). He recognised the need for a “revision of the philosophical assumptions which humanist studies in general employ”. He also looked with the greatest scepticism on the labours of sociologists hitherto: sociology should renounce imaginary claims to the status of a kind of universal science, and become a “specialised study like linguistics or economy”. It should investigate certain types of assembly and some fields of the phenomena of life. Thus heavily pruned, he recognised as the proper domain of sociology the psychology of social phenomena, “scientific” ethics, criminology, the theory of education and the theory of politics. In the upshot, sociology is a central although not a basic humanist study.  

Thus the search for an historical synthesis with the aid of sociology also failed. There remained the theory of historic cycles producing ever new combinations, ever new ideas about the sequence of periods and their characteristics.  

Karl Lamprecht published three methodological treatises: Was ist Kulturgeschichte? (1896), Kulturhistorische Methode (1900) and Zur universalgeschichtlichen Methodenbildung (1909). He believed in fixed patterns of life both economic and intellectual discerning a parallel between them. This fixed periodic order he called animism, symbolism, “typism”, conventionalism, individualism and subjectivism. He no less than Wronski, forced historical events into fanciful categories. He also devised six economic periods to occur of necessity in a certain order, as if history knew no cataclysms, revolutions, stagnation. History he described as die Wissenschaft von den seelischen Veränderungen der menschlichen Gemeinschaften, distinguishing seelische Gebundenheit, the narrow bounds of the spirit in the middle ages from the freedom of the spirit . . . after the Reformation.  

Another step, and the apotheosis of the Prussian appears, renewed and perfected by the theory of cycles, into which it fits very well. Oswald Spengler, author of the two-volume Untergang des Abendlandes, Umriss einer Morphologie der Weltgeschichte (1917), was responsible for this. It would not be an exaggeration to say that nothing in heaven and earth goes unmentioned in his book.  

Spengler treats the expressions “culture” and “civilisation” as signifying phases of the same process: while flowering and developing it is culture: exhausted and no longer creative, it becomes civilisation, which is always accompanied by caesarism. Such is the inevitable Schicksal of history.  

Cultures and civilisations have a homologous course. “Biology describes morphological equivalence as homology of the organs in contradistinction to analogy of the organs which refers to equivalence of functions . . . I am introducing this conception into historical method”. From the law of homology there results an unavoidable homologous order of facts. In the given order such facts are simultaneous, that is they occupy the same successive place — which should be distinguished from contemporaneity.

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38 ibid., vol. I, pp. 159-160.
Examples of homologous equivalence: Greek plastic art and northern instrumental music, the pyramids of the Fourth Dynasty and Gothic cathedrals, Hindu Buddhism and Roman Stoicism, the expeditions of Alexander and of Napoleon, the age of Pericles and the regency of Cardinal Fleury, the times of Plotinus and Dante, the Dionysian trend and the Renaissance, Monophysitism and Puritanism, etc. A particular resemblance appears in the development of the classical and Mexican cultures.  

Of the cultures which are closer to us, Spengler knows only three: the ancient, the Arabic and the Faustian. The Arab begins with Diocletian, who was the first Caliph, and contains not only all so-called Roman law, but the New Testament and Mishna, the Talmud, Koran and revived Mazdaism, the whole of Byzantium and the whole of Islam. Gothic arose from the Arab spirit and so did the doctrine of the Resurrection. We have little in common with so-called classicism; in fact it is more foreign to us than Mexican gods and Hindu buildings.  

Faustian culture is simply Prussian culture. “There is no nation which remains on the heights for centuries on end: the Prussian German did so longer than others, and had mighty moments in 1813, 1870 and in 1914.” ...”In Prussian history the period after every 345 years is significant. Henry the Lion, Luther and Bismarck are one historic line, and Legnano, Worms and Sadowa followed each other at 345-year intervals.”  

At the present time we are embarked upon the transformation of Western European culture into civilisation. Before Faustian culture expires, its civilisation is being produced through imperialism. In Prussia, which will assume hegemony of the world, caesarism is being created. The whole world will accept the Prussian idea. Only now the great future of Prussia really begins. The temporary results of the general war are irrelevant. World hegemony cannot be taken from Prussia, the fatherland of Faustian culture, since every culture is attached to a certain territory, is pflanzenhaft gebunden.  

As for Christianity, it has before it yet a third stage in accordance with St. John’s Gospel. It will be Dostoyevsky’s Christianity to which the next thousand years belong. The quintessence of the work is to be found in the Tafeln zur vergleichenden Morphologie der Weltgeschichte on pages 74 et seqq. picturing homologous simultaneity in the whole of universal history. Shades of Vico and Wroński!  

The theory of cycles has so far appeared five times — in Vico, Hegel, Wroński, Lamprecht and Spengler — attaching itself to various methods. Whence this revival of an old error in new garments? There must be some common base, some common fundamental error.  

It lies in the biological approach to history. If it is accepted that peoples, nations, states and civilisations have their youth, maturity and old age on the pattern of the individual human life, in that case, also on the model of the individual, every civilisation must fall and come to an end simply because it grows old. The devising of a biological pattern common to every civilisation then imposes itself upon the intellect — hence the cyclic theories. Somehow it is overlooked that three very old civilisations — Jewish, Brahmin. Chinese — still exist.

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41 ibid. vol. I, pp. 51, 52, 209.  
44 The reader may be surprised that I have passed over the ten-volume "Voelkerpsychologie" of Wilhelm Wundt (completed 1920). It must sorrowfully be said that this gigantic work, while arousing deepest respect for the author’s person, provides no scientific results at all. His trichotomy of speech, myth (here are found art and religion) and custom (here is the whole of sociology, historiosophy and the philosophy of law) was a pattern thought up in his youth, to which he afterwards sacrificed his whole life. Wundt wanders among contradictions and reaches no synthesis.
The biological approach to history is not the hallmark of the “cyclists”, but is widespread and popular among the generality of the intelligentsia. Monism favours this. Death belongs to the laws of nature; as everything is nature, death is a necessity for everything. Yet nature raises new lives on the death’s ruins of those going before, and in the same way on the ruin of an old civilisation a new will arise. Not spontaneously, obviously, for nature has her laws, which are everlasting, immutable and admit no exceptions. Both death and resurrection always obey these laws — so the theory of cycles is a simple consequence.

That the permanence of a form diminishes with its complication was understood by the Polish monist Erazm Majewski, (1858-1921) in his — by any standards — remarkable *Study of civilisation* (*Nauka o cywilizacji*) (1908-1923). A cell-form may exist millions of years, an organism about one hundred thousand years, but a civilisation at most a few thousand years, perhaps even only a dozen or so, perhaps even only a few generations.\(^{45}\) He bases his theory of civilisation on the biological theory of development; civilisation for him is a “biomechanism”.\(^{46}\) Although he refers the whole subject to the sphere of the natural sciences, he is at the same time a resolute opponent of materialism. Recognising nonmaterial factors, he does not assume that scientifically they must be treated as opposed to the material. Majewski considered that he was filling out and correcting the technique of investigating nature.

The enduringly important bequest left by this great scholar was his discovery that human communities were created thanks to speech. “Man owes his unparalleled riches of ideas not to the development of the brain in the meaning of the theory of evolution, but exclusively to a simplified technique of thought. That simplification he owes to speech.” And in another place Majewski says that through speech man became a social being and then “by writing and print the human individual conquered space and time.”\(^{47}\) The fourth volume of his work, devoted specially to this subject, belongs to the masterpieces of human thought.

According to Majewski, civilisation moves on, that is it must fall in one place and rise again in another. Where and when? It “must be by the same kind of inflexible law of nature, independent of the will of man, as the law governing the movement of the earth round the sun.” But what that law is we do not know. “We do not know what lights and quenches civilisations.”\(^{48}\) If we knew, we should have to create in monism a new theory of cycles. But Majewski did not manage to complete his study of civilisation. Published it in parts and continuing to work on it for fourteen years, he left it far from finished (the last volume is posthumous). If he had reached the goal of his thought, he would then have been forced to subject the whole work to revision. In the course of the years there naturally arose certain inequalities and inconsistencies between the earlier and more recent parts, for the author was constantly working on himself; it seems to me that in any such general revision the monist point of view would have been found wanting — and that Majewski would not have been content with a new version of historic cycles.

We have covered wide fields of human thought from Bacon to Majewski, glancing at different views on historiosophy, on the philosophy of history, on perpetual historical cycles, on the history of civilisation and finally on the study of civilisation which we are to continue in this book. Methods of historical synthesis so far employed have produced no synthesis. Thus it may be allowable to try out one’s own. Treating the subject as strictly as possible historically, I shall begin by looking for the nuclei of all culture. Koliată laboured at this for

\(^{45}\) Erazm Majewski, op. cit., vol. II, p. 244.
\(^{46}\) ibid., vol. I, p. 304.
\(^{48}\) ibid., vol. I, pp. 11, 331.
long years, and his work is the worthier of remark in that he employed the inductive method. He deserves separate mention here — plain *pietas* alone requires it.

**II A NOTE ON KOŁŁĄTAJ**
*(Substantially abridged)*

Tradition is the backbone of all culture, of learning perhaps more than of anything else. Poland’s tradition of learning has been unlucky. Particularly since the Partitions, how often the threads have been broken by contrary winds! Learning has nourished too little among us, because it has little tradition. The greater the duty of the citizen to guard it wherever it is to be found — and if covered with ash from the conflagration of evil times, to bring it out into the light of day.

In this place therefore, mention is made with grateful respect of the man who was first among Poles to devote long years to research into the origins of culture. Father Hugo Kołłątaj. Destined like Turgot for scholarly quiet, he tore himself from the study and plunged into the whirlpool of political life. Like Condorcet, he wrote in prison. With incomparably more scientific method than Condorcet, in thought he is closer to Turgot.

Whereas his contemporary Stanislas Staszic was simply a pupil of the Encyclopedia, Kołłątaj had more of the elements of the Enlightenment. The two stood at the head of public life in Poland, but only because of circumstances: they did what, in the condition of their country, they regarded as their main duty. The disastrous state of Polish affairs impelled them to politics a hundred times more urgently than any Turgot. Had Poland been secure and developing normally, Kołłątaj and Staszic would have been university professors. Their qualifications were such that there was no university in Europe of which they could not have been ornaments.

Father Hugo Kołłątaj (1750-1812), the distinguished reformer of Cracow University and one of the creators of the Constitution of the Third of May, a man of relentless energy (in which Staszic was his equal) and of a warm temperament (Staszic was his superior in control of self and master of circumstance), differed from contemporary scholars in not being a naturalist. He was indeed remarkable among European scholars of his generation in being pre-eminently a humanist who possessed a naturalist’s training but who worked in the field only in so far as it was necessary to enable him to go deeper into historical studies.

Kołłątaj proceeded on the assumption that history rests on geography and chronology, and that it was the more necessary for him to study these subjects as he wished to work on the beginnings of man’s history. For the same reason he devoted himself to research in the field of physical geography, and embarked on geodesies, cosmic geography and latterly astronomy.

The fruit of these extremely extensive studies and an enormous erudition was the relatively disappointing *Critical examination of the principles of history on the beginnings of the human race*.

Attention has been called to the fact that the title does not correspond to the content, since it is not an historical but a geographical work. “Kołłątaj’s book is in essence a great system of general geography, full of fresh and creative thought: suffice it to say that with his clearly defined concept of geological time, and analyses of geological processes in the light of contemporarily active forces he anticipated Lyell, while his analysis of the influence of environment on society provided foundations for the system of anthropogeography, in anticipation of both K. Ritter and Ratzel.”

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49 St. Pawlowski and E. Romer „Geografia i podróżnictwo”. In "Polska w kulturze powszechnej", vol. II, p. 192.
The history really begins only with volume III. Almost all the results of the research of those days are indifferent to us, the interest lies in methods and basic views. Here are Kołłątaj’s:

“It is vain,” he says, “to try to collect and explain the whole of early history from Moses alone”\(^{50}\) the latter is, incidentally, much and often misused.\(^{51}\) In view of this, the exhausting work of recreating prehistory must be undertaken (as we should say today) from other sources and by other means. It is an indispensable task, since “the moral sciences cannot dispense with a search of early history”.\(^{52}\) “For anybody who reflects well on such important material will easily understand that without an improvement in early historical studies, improvement in the moral sciences is very difficult, not to say unlikely; for what natural history is to the physical sciences, human history is to the moral sciences”.

On method Kołłątaj has this to say: “So many philosophers, metaphysicians and legislators have believed that where history failed it was enough to rely on reason alone, that by looking well into the nature of man with its help it would be possible to uncover the whole history of the first beginnings from which man reached his present state. Historical truths, being results of the activities of either man or nature, never of metaphysical speculation, cannot be discovered by any means except patient investigation of the activities of man and nature, and that in those examples in which history shows them.”\(^{53}\)

Written in 1800, the passage explicitly proclaims the inductive method. In another place — arguing that a numerous band of scholars was needed for the task in hand — Kołłątaj says: “Let us begin without concerning ourselves about who will afterwards correct us: for it is time that those who work on the moral sciences ceased to derive their systems from conjectures: that history should take the place of fairy-tales, suppositions and all cosmogonic fancies; that we should make entirely certain by undisputed proofs what can be known and in what measure, and what shall we expect in vain to discover later.”\(^{54}\)

Kołłątaj resists the supposition that humanity at the start of its existence was in a “savage” state: he asserts on the other hand that after the Flood for many people there followed a period of barbarisation which in some cases still endures — and writes a special paragraph “On the causes of man’s lapse into barbarity after the Flood”. Today’s “savages” are not wild because they have not yet raised themselves higher, because they have remained on their original rung but, on the contrary, because as descendants of those who separated themselves from the main stream of humanity, they have continued to be left to themselves and grown savage. In Kołłątaj’s view the enormous differences in the mental state of the various peoples of the world are not otherwise explicable.\(^{55}\) Let it be said that in our time many scholars share this opinion, and many suppose it to be a very recent scientific achievement.

In his work Kołłątaj is never a littérature, in which he stands out among contemporary Europeans. Incomparably closer to Montesquieu than to Voltaire, he had a slight opinion of the learning of the latter because “he had little knowledge in physical matters”.\(^{56}\) Indeed, where in Voltaire are there to be found such specialised, laborious and exact investigations as Kołłątaj conducted into, for example, water, the ebb and flow of the tide, ocean currents, eddies, evaporation: into the atmosphere, winds, air streams and whirlwinds, into fire,

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\(^{51}\) ibid., vol. I, pp. 57-59.

\(^{52}\) ibid., vol. I, p. 60.

\(^{53}\) ibid., vol. I, p. 63-64.

\(^{54}\) ibid., vol. I, p. 85.


\(^{56}\) (49) ibid., vol. II, p. 177.
volcanoes, earthquakes, the case of coal? Kollàtaj has a whole treatise on palaeontology, one of the earliest in existence, and on the sea-bed and a good sketch of oceanography; all with a complete scholarly apparatus, with “notes” more than one of which grew into a separate treatise, for example that on the measurement of height (twenty pages of print), as if the author were more than a specialist in one sector of his subject.

Kollàtaj excels by the precision of his work and his extraordinary erudition. Again the comparison with Turgot suggests itself: both abandoned scientific pursuits for the duties of public life and both failed to reach their goal in the whirlpool of politics. And yet, how much more fortunate was Turgot! How much more fortunate even Condorcet!

One other observation suggests itself. In the years Kollàtaj was writing his Critical Examination the works in which Herder and Condorcet treat of the nuclei of human life were already published, but in the Examination there is not a trace of them. It is probable that Kollàtaj knew and was uninfluenced by these inquiries for reasons not difficult to divine. Opposed to “metaphysical speculation” in historical studies, refusing to countenance “reliance on reason alone” in relation to them, he was an opponent of the meditative method, and inductionist.

We have seen that he had a distinct method, not unlike Montesquieu’s and Turgot’s, but worked out, independently. The way in which he did this may be followed in detail in the scientific apparatus scrupulously offered in his notes, also in a few places in the main text where he explains in detail how he arrived at a conclusion. And he would have achieved more had it not been for unlucky philologising. At any rate he was the first man to examine the subject of prehistory methodically.

Let us look now at the opportunities offered by historical induction 130 years after Kollàtaj.

57 A collection of authors cited has served me as one yardstick. In addition to classical authors and authors of ordinary descriptions of travel, Kollàtaj quotes the following:
In the Critical Examination of the Principles of the History of the Beginnings of the Human Race there are the names of 71 authors.
58 “Ideen zur Philosophie der Geschichte”.
59 With linguistic knowledge in the stage it then was, all argument with a philological basis was wasted. In the legion of such works, including some of outstanding scholarship, there is not one in which a considerable part is not played by philological conclusions all suitable only to be forgotten. Kollàtaj in this followed the habit of his age and with the same result.
CHAPTER II

NUCLEI OF ALL CULTURE

I FIRE

Let us begin with the nuclei of things; for how to examine matters whose beginnings are unknown—inquiries would hang as in a void and we should be raising a building without foundations. Let us therefore enter the sphere of proto-history and prehistory, where numerous issues have been mishandled in the interest of various theories (the meditative method!). Some of these have indeed already been discarded, but smoke still rises from them.

The actual genesis of the human race does not belong to the sphere of knowledge about civilisation. Discussion of the issue of polygeny or monogeny, of one or many cradles of man⁶⁰ lies outside our study. Three Poles have just lately brought weighty evidence of the universality of the tradition of the Flood, and so indirectly for monogeny. In 1923 Christianity reached the Botocudos, regarded as the most savage savages. The first group-baptism was performed there by Father J. Kominek, who was educated at the Lazarist Fathers’ schools at Kleparz in Cracow and subsequently a member of the Wilno house. This priest states that the Botocudos have a tradition about the Flood.⁶¹ In other parts of Brazil fifteen hundred kilometres away, the travellers M. B. Lepecki and Mieczysław Fularski⁶² found the same. But more than one good brain will still pursue this question as now it appears that human stocks differ in the chemical composition of their blood.

The study of civilisation begins with the question whether man was from the beginning a gregarious being, living in groups of some size. More recent study has shaken this belief. Erazm Majewski also dealt it a blow, putting forward at the same time the reasonable suggestion that as there had been no gregariousness there had never been the “herd communism” which the elder Morgan postulated.⁶³

The history of mankind is divided, in our opinion, into two opposed epochs: pre-fire and post-fire. These are the epochs of all epochs. Wherever the discovery of fire reached, it radically transformed conditions of life. Above all feeding improved. Let us remember that so far no report has ever appeared of any people, ancient or contemporary, who ate fresh raw meat. In many countries of the world, and by some tribes in Ruthenia and Serbia, it is dried in wind and sun.⁶⁴ Eskimos and Chukchi eat raw reindeer and fish, but not fresh and only when cut into pieces as a kind of frozen conserve; everything else they cook.⁶⁵ Similarly the Mongols prepared uncooked meat in brine, adding various roots, while the poorer among them use garlic.⁶⁶ And to this day “in Montenegro mutton and goat-meat, cut into pieces and previously kept for some time in a container with salt (just as in Polesie) is then taken out and hung in the hut above the hearth”.⁶⁷ Since primitive man did not know how to organise stores nor to make meat edible, and did not eat raw fresh meat, he did not eat meat at all. He became

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⁶⁰ Wundt declared for polygeny in 1920 (Wilhelm Wundt, "Voelkerpsychologie", vol. X, "Kultur und Geschichte", Leipzig 1920, page 377) in the erroneous belief that the question had been settled in anthropology. To-day monogeny is generally accepted.

⁶¹ “Misje Katolickie”, a monthly in Cracow. 1924, p. 68.


⁶³ Levis Henry Morgan (1818-1881) whom I call the elder as opposed to the contemporary Jacques Morgan.


⁶⁶ "The Travels of Marco Polo". The author quotes the Polish translation by M. Twardowski, Łódź, s.a., p. 122.

⁶⁷ Moszynski, op. cit.. Part I, p. 225.
carnivorous only after discovering the properties of lire. There is even an interesting account of this among the Guayaqui of Eastern Paraguay. 68

Pre-fire man could feed himself only on certain plants and their fruits, edible raw. He was primarily herbivorous. Edible herbs are numerous. 69 Even today, in lean years, pulp, bark and leaves are used as food. Pine-bark and woodland roots represent an improved method of feeding. A classical instance are the kernels of the pinion in the Brazilian jungles, where it is eaten by almost every creature, and the ripening season is one of satiety and abundance for Indians, Caboclos, colonists, wild pigs, racoons, cattle, birds and the most various forest creatures. 70 The Guayaqui of the Paraguayan Chaco eat the pith of the pindo palm which they cut out with a stone hatchet. All Indians have been hunters for centuries, but in addition most have not ceased to be herbivorous. In the Chaco “Indians know very well where and when fruits ripen, and plan their travels so as to arrive at the right time for fruit picking.” 71

Pre-fire man could only get beyond vegetarianism by lapping warm blood. He could not hunt, having no instruments with which to attack animals stronger than himself. He could only watch predatory animals hunt and wait in a hiding-place until the victor went off and he could then enjoy lapping blood from the remains of the defeated animal.

Such feasts were, however, exceptional, and the daily diet was herbivorous. Thus it seems that earliest man was a woodland creature, an inhabitant of forests. Such are even now those most primitive of the primitive, the African pygmies, and such were until lately the Ainu, with an economy recalling “the forest economy of our ancestors”, 72 and still using stone hatchets. The Guayaqui of eastern Paraguay easily climb tall trees and jump like monkeys from branch to branch. 73

But forests too full of beasts of prey were unsuited for habitation by completely defenceless men, and so were swampy forests with their swarms of mosquitoes and other biting and disease-carrying insects. So they fled from them into the mountains, and generally towards temperate areas. It also seems more probable that the cradle of mankind was in a temperate than in a hot zone. In no case could it have been in a cold zone (wherever they then were in the world), for in that event early man would never have become acquainted with fire, which he could only have come to know through nature and a cold zone would not provide.

This is all that can be said of the pre-fire epoch — which was perhaps as long as the post-fire down to our own days. Fire, increasing the sources of nourishment, also increased man’s degree of security, protecting him against marauding beasts which do not approach flames. This beneficial side of fire is universally known and recognised, but there is insufficient realisation of the protection which smoke lent against small enemies more troublesome and dangerous than the large predatory animals. Since this perhaps sounds improbable. I shall give some examples.

The discussion is of mosquitoes, gnats, earth fleas, tsetse flies, the South American polvori, mbarigni, pernilongi, piques, bicho de pe, etc. Now the plague of biting and disease-carrying insects reaches strangely far north. In Northern Norway, in the land of Arctic night, at a fishing-ground relatively distant from the land, “clouds of flies and mosquitoes hung in the air. It was necessary to smoke all the time to save oneself from their bites”. 74 This is still a trifle compared with the case of other inhabitants of the frozen North, the present-day Yakuts,

68 M. Fularski, op. cit., p. 114.
69 Many are listed in Moszyński, op. cit, part I, p. 13.
71 Fularski, op.cit, pp. 112, 146.
73 Fularski, op. cit. p. 112.
who, sometimes with expanses of unclaimed land around them, settle pressed close together and getting in each other’s way, because on fresh land they would not be able to cope with the mosquitoes which would “eat up the cattle”. In the most painful season, from the first days of June to the beginning of July, the Yakuts “avoid going out of the house and sit in rooms full of acrid smoke”. For mosquitoes are “indisputably able to suffocate and eat up a man who loses the ability to kindle a fire in summer”.  

In Central Asia, on the Amu-Darya, in the spring gnats “stick to a man so that one has to sit all the time in thick smoke” — and in summer the huntsmen go into the mountains. Did the original inhabitants not do the same? As soon as born, calves must be wrapped immediately in blankets or rushes. Flies bite through the skin of wild animals and lay their eggs in the wounds, the resulting insects biting into the muscles.

In the African Wasagara country it is impossible even today to keep hens or cattle because of the omnipresence of the tsetse fly. Among the Malagasy “many are so crippled and wounded (by the African ground-flea) that they differ little from lepers”. In Argentina Guarani hunters do not land on the islets of the river Parana “because of the gigantic swarms of mosquitoes and gnats”. Even now in out-of-the-way corners of Polesie cattle die from mosquitoes and gnats, their nostrils, ears and windpipes choked with them. The shirts of reapers grow bloodstained, until “after a few days the bloodstains run together into one whole, and the shirt, because of the dried blood becomes a certain protection”.

Thus we see that it is hardly an exaggeration to claim that the value of smoke as a deterrent against insects is perhaps even greater than that of fire as a protection against wild beasts.

Modern travellers, provided with means of defence, complain of being eaten alive by mosquitoes. Where fire and smoke are insufficient shield, primitive autochthons like the Andaman Negritos go naked and cover their bodies with mud, while the Shilluk on the White Nile use excrement and urine as a protective agent. The once densely populated Roman campagna turned into a desert when drainage was neglected and the land became marshy. And perhaps the reader will not smile incredulously when we say that mosquitoes more than once decided mediaeval German-Italian wars, for armies of Arnulf, Otto II, Otto III, Conrad II, Frederick Barbarossa, Henry VI and Henry VII disintegrated because of an unknown disease — malaria. All this with fire available.

Fire did, however, at least help to limit the plague to proportions not exceeding the endurance of primitive man, thereby preparing habitable lands. It is assumed that man has known how to kindle fire since the beginning of the Palaeolithic period. The words “in general” should be added, for the Andaman islanders (pygmies) do not know how to light a fire and have no expression for it, but “with great care maintain ever-burning hearths and explain the origin of fire by a religious myth”. This was the position in 1922. “The Andaman

80 (Moszyński, op. cit., Part I, p. 609
islanders would thus constitute the single exception now known". 83 (It had been universally assumed that there was no longer a people on earth which did not possess the art of kindling fire.)

It is worth noticing that among primitive peoples there are now nine different ways of making a fire, 84 and it may be that there were other methods the tradition of which has perished. The conclusion would suggest itself from this multiplicity that Prometheuses appeared in more than one place; but that question does not belong to our subject.

A man who kept going a fire (kindled by natural forces) stood high above others. His hearth was safer, more populous and more prosperous. So he guarded his property. And after this property followed immovable property, the property of the space occupied by the hearth. Facts known from the history of Iceland point to this conclusion. In the tenth to twelfth centuries a curious symbolism, worth the notice of ethnologists, was observed when land was taken into possession. The land was surrounded by fire (fara eldi um landit): the boundaries of the whole area taken over were circled by burning fires in such a way that the flames from one were visible at both those adjoining it. The whole boundary of the area was thus marked by fires.

It must be assumed that the proto-historic owner of the fire multiplied it himself, setting up new hearts in the neighbourhood. It is easy to understand that he placed them in such a way as to have a view of his property, so that he could see at least two neighbouring fires from every point. Clearly all were his property and he benefits from all belonging to him, so that the settlers gathering round them were dependent on his permission and on the conditions he imposed. In brief: the areas surrounded by a man’s fires became his property.

Was not the Icelandic custom a survival of this state of affairs? According to this custom, the first man to light a fire on land became its owner. Newly arrived settlers lit fires at the mouths of rivers in the area they proposed to occupy. Later, as usual, the symbol was abbreviated, and the area in question was ridden round, burning torch in hand. 85

Ownership of an area acquired by fire appears to be the seed of the very idea of immovable property. Those not in possession of fire obviously strove to acquire it. Was not violence and fraud used to that end? Were the first attacks and assaults, the first expeditions and battles not for fire, about fire? A man who knew how to kindle a flame by himself was a potentate.

It is known that flames not only give protection against beasts of prey, but attract at the same time a number of animals of more peaceful disposition which tolerate fire. The acquisition of the domestic animal was a result of the possession of a hearth. And when later on various tools were discovered and hunting began, it could be planned and turned to advantage only in conjunction with the hearth. Without fire, hunting would have been futile, since it was only fire which made the hunted animal edible. Nevertheless, the hypothesis about so-called feasting partnerships being the oldest form of association, whence the further hypothesis that all civilisation originates with primitive hunting man, must be rejected. Before the discovery of fire, flesh was not eaten and not hunted. Fire made it possible to keep meat for several days, so that it did not have to be eaten immediately. Moreover the hunter had his own family to help with the eating: feasting partnerships have not been discovered among hunting peoples, not even in the case of those among whom big game are hunted by several men: the flesh of the animal is divided, but communal feasting on the spot is not arranged.


Thus fire became the seed of the kitchen and the larder, and round it food was increasingly good and plentiful. It was also the seed of authority and power. The population round the hearths grew denser, groupings began and the lord of the hearths became ruler of men. The oldest communities took shape, based on a hierarchy, on the inequality between the lord extending shelter and those who sought it in dependence on his favour or disfavour.

Obviously the trend must have been towards every man possessing his own hearth. When social development reached this stage, the hierarchically based communities formed round fires disappeared, the oldest authorities disappeared. Their place was taken by other hearth communities, now based exclusively on the tie of blood, when every father of a family could find his own fireside.

This was the consequence of the spread of discoveries about different means of kindling fire. It was not, however, a development which occurred everywhere. A fireside of one’s own is even today in some places the privilege of superior authority. As Kubary testifies, on the Palau Islands in Micronesia only the obokul or headman may possess his own hearth.86

And so the organisation of collective life begins with fire. Two levels of development emerge: that of knowing how to kindle a flame and that of knowing only how to keep it going. The first led to further development, the other to standstill — as in the case of the Andaman pygmies. Those knowing how to make fire then divided according to whether knowledge remained the privilege of certain persons or became general. And again those peoples who did not succeed in making fire common properly failed to develop. Collective life was further differentiated where it became possible for every man to acquire a hearth as his personal property, with ownership of the land marked out by fire or fires following. Still further differentiation occurred if the fire was made use of to keep domestic animals.

In both periods, whether possession of fire was exceptional or general, these fireside communities were hierarchical. After the hierarchy of fire-ownership came a second hierarchy, that of the clan — of which later. The historical progress of man begins not with communism and equality, but with property and hierarchy.

II DOMESTIC ANIMALS

Let us pass to the question of the taming of animals and their subsequent deliberate rearing. Animals which suffered worst from mosquitoes because of their relative lack of hair or thin skins but who were tolerant of the sight of flame and so suitable for domestication, approached fires of their own accord. A tradition is preserved among the Yakuts according to which the wild horses of the steppes became domesticated because of the mosquitoes. And the present-day Yakuts, when they want to gather in horses grazing free at considerable distances, light a fire.87 Nevertheless, permanent maintenance of animals for rearing required whole centuries, because it could not take place without mastery of the animal by force, and for that suitable tools were needed. And there were (as there are today) various stages before human control over a domestic animal became absolute.

Since this capacity was dependent on the degree of perfection of the tools, domestic animals should in my view be divided into two sections, into two chronological categories. Before man discovered tools suitable for subjugating the stronger animals, his mastery must have been confined to weak animals, defenceless or almost defenceless against him.

I suggest, for the first category, chronologically earlier, the sheep, goat, pig, hen (poultry in general), dog. Only in sub-polar regions are there no sheep or goats. Remarkable

86 Krzywicki, "Ludy", op. cit., p. 222.
87 Sieroszewski. "Dwanaście lat w kraju Jakutów", op. cit., p. 50.
for their exceptional resistance to insect pests, they survive where neither dog nor even hen survives, as for example, among the Wasagara of Central Africa.  

Pigs have been in Australia from the beginning. South America is full of wild herds. The later range of the pig was unfavourably influenced by Islam, but the Chinese keep it on a large scale and abroad, on the western borders of their empire, feed mainly on pork. The hen has a still greater range, but the greatest is the dog’s, although it is not true that he is found everywhere with man. He is not to be found in the Wasagara country, and he was also unknown to the Tasmanians; the pastoral Todas, camping in the Nilgiri Hills 8,000 feet above sea-level do not keep him. On the other hand, there are people whose only domesticated animal he is, for example, the Eskimos and the nomads of tropical Africa, who use him for hunting. Islam also restricted the range of the dog, but there is the known exception — the inhabitants of Wanchu in Central Asia who breed a certain kind of greyhound.

It appears unlikely that the dog is the oldest domesticated animal in the strict meaning of the word, that is, tamed and reared. The attachment of the dog to man may, however, go back even to pre-fire times, on the basis of its attraction to human excrement. This may often be observed, and where the dog does not yet belong to the household it is more marked. In the case of the Yakuts he is still at the stage of attaching himself, allowed to remain in the neighbourhood and have scraps. The Yakut dog does not yet know how to bark (which the dog learnt only among people). The keeping of dogs began when, joining in the hunt, they proved useful companions; only then they became really domesticated, having been preceded by sheep, goats, pigs and hens. To master these animals the dog was unnecessary, and hunting could not begin without suitable instruments: as soon as these were discovered, the taming of the larger domestic animals began. Thus, chronologically, the dog stands between the older and younger ranks of domestic animals. It is a significant fact that Mongol and Chinese shepherds do not use them.

The younger category of domestic animals is made up of the reindeer, camel, bull (buffalo, yak), ass, horse. In order to master any one of these considerably more force, stronger and more efficient tools were needed than in the case of the first, older category. There is no question of any general sequence operative territorially, for this second category depended in high degree on climate: every pan of the earth has its “cattle”. The reindeer is exclusively a polar animal, the zebu only sub-tropical, the yak lives in high mountains, the camel must have the dry air of the deserts, the ass gets lung trouble from too much heat or cold, and attempts to transfer milking strains of cattle to tropical countries have not so far been successful. Only the horse has displayed a capacity for acclimatisation, and is found in almost all countries except the hottest and coldest.

Thus in different countries in the same period different animals were being domesticated. The ass has been with man longer than the horse. We deduce this from the fact

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88 Jakubski, op. cit.
90 Jakubski, op. cit., p. 45.
91 Krzywicki. "Ludy", op. cit., n. 82.
92 ibid., p. 97.
95 Sieroszewski. "Dwanascie lat", op. cit., p. 66. Deniker believes the "dingo" of New Holland, whose portrait is to be found in the second edition of "Les races et peuples de la terre" (1926), p. 239, to be the ancestor of the household dog.
96 Moszyński, op. cit., Part I, p. 66.
that in Asia Minor, in the Sinjar country, where horses arrived only around 2,000 B.C.
(probably from Persia) they were called “mountain assess”. Somewhat similar to the ass is
the half-wild horse called kulon, now living in Mongolia, but never approaching herds of
domesticated horses. During the last war the Russian Trans-Baikal division, formed from
various Mongol tribes, used half-tamed horses. The division appeared in Volynia “on small .
. . shaggy horses, never groomed or stroked, knowing neither stable nor manger, but
permanently tied to trees... They gnawed the bark down to the pith’.
The geographical range of the ass is not large, that of the horse incomparably larger.
The horse and camel live wild today between the rivers Kara-Kash and Kerya-Darya, between
the town of Kerya and the Chira oasis: yaks in north-west Tibet: wild asses in the basin of the
Raskem, in greater numbers closer to the axis of the Himalayas. But these larger domestic
animals are not kept everywhere, and there are countries in which there are more, large or
small. Without fire there, would be no domestic animals; but they are not to be found
everywhere there is fire.

Neither Australians nor autochthonous Brazilians lamed any animals. There are herds
of wild swine in plenty in both places, but the Botocudos either do not try or are unable even
now to domesticate them; Father Kominek was asked for a sow and a dog. The African
pygmies also do not possess domestic animals. Negroes, who have among them the eland
antelope which is as if made to be domesticated, but is not, did not themselves think of
keeping any animals although latterly they have taken over some livestock from the Hamitic
peoples.

It should be remembered that sheep and goats are everywhere, whether domesticated
by local effort or taken over from elsewhere. This taking over must have occurred extremely
early, judging from certain manifestations to the elucidation of which we now pass. It is plain
that peoples who kept domestic animals reached a higher stage of development. Australians,
the Indians of South America, pygmies stood outside the line of development, the negroes
somewhere in between, their advance retarded. The livestock keepers meanwhile moved
ahead.

As man had more to do with animals, he learnt many things from them. From the older
domestic animals, from the sheep and goat, he learnt to suck the udders of the females, to feed
on their milk. He mastered first those animals against which clubs and stones sufficed. It
seems that man did not anywhere immediately overcome the larger animals, but first trained
himself on the older, physically weaker animals. Mastery of the newer domestic animals
required not a little effort, often the complicated joint labour of several persons. Nevertheless
they managed it, and camels, cows and mares — and outside the Arctic Circle reindeer —
were milked as well as goats.

Those peoples who kept domestic animals at first followed them on their journeys. An
animal attracted by a (fire on its departure would itself lead the herd to the human hearth. So
that at certain times of year when, driven by instinct, fleeing from danger or wandering off to
better pasturage, the animals changed their places of abode, the people accompanied their

Anthropologie". Stuttgart 1907.
102 "Misje Katolickie", Cracow, 1924, p. 67.
103 Adametz, op. cit., p. 3.
food supply. Even now paleo-Asiatic peoples, Ural and part of the Tungus in Siberia “make seasonal wanderings in the track of the reindeer herds”. 105

We are as yet too little aware that the economy of the animal world depends entirely on wanderings. Everybody knows about the flights of migratory birds; the wanderings of fish, often linked with a change of shape, are known to all with a secondary education (in recent years the mackerel has found its way to the Polish coast); but huntsmen are almost alone in knowing of the wanderings of four-footed beasts.

For example, Siberian reindeer protect themselves against the worst mosquito period by leaving the forest for the tundra or higher-lying areas where there is a constant wind. 106 All animals wander for food. In autumn tigers in the Alexandrovsk mountains make towards “the caravan routes, along which in autumn year in year out merchants drive hundreds of thousands of rams for sale in from Semirechye to Fergana. 107 In the Pamirs, when fish travel from the lake to the river, bears go 150-200 kilometres to fish. At a certain time of year bears from the Hindu Kush and the Himalayas hunt for whistlers in Little Pamir. 108

Thus man began by sharing the wanderings of those animals on whose milk he fed. With certain peoples whose development was checked, this happens today!

“Until recently the inhabitants of Anadyr followed the herds of wild reindeer as the Chukchi and sometimes follow their herds to this day. When the Chukchi shepherds are forced by fire, flood or a stampede, etc. to catch up with their herds quickly, they abandon tents, weapons, vessels, everything and hasten off armed only with spears, not for a moment allowing the animals out of sight. They sleep where the beasts sleep leaning against them, and nourish themselves on milk which they do not draw off, but suck direct from the females’ udders. To do this several throw themselves upon an animal, pull it to the ground and in turn satisfy hunger and thirst. In such cases their relation to the herd is retrogressive and breathes something primeval, some shared life. In normal conditions, although they follow the herd, they control it and keep it relatively disciplined.” 109

This is not some peculiarity of the north. Let us proceed southwards. The Todas, one of the pastoral peoples of India (in the Nilgiri Hills), do not eat meat, but feed on milk and fruit. The times when milk was sucked by force straight from the udders is long past with them; they are a highly civilised people, but they follow the herd. A bull enjoying particular respect, as it were their god — a bull-guide — leads the way decorated with bells and ribbons, and wherever it stops, there the Toda tribe stays and sets up camp. 110

In a certain part of the French Sahara “herdsmen do not guide their cattle at all, but follow them wherever fancy leads. They spend whole months in this way in the midst of bushwood and scrub, feeding on camels’ milk and confining themselves to obeying the animals’ wandering whims. They are clothed in a few cloth rags and have no shelter: so that they are tanned and burnt by the sun and almost as black as negroes”. 111

Thus we have instances of men following homed cattle, reindeer and camels. There is no reason to make mares and she-asses an exception. Primitive man made his geographical discoveries thanks to animals. It is difficult not to smile at the memory of those German works in which Ur-Germans travelled from Asia to Europe in disciplined order of man and beast. For a doubt must suggest itself about who really led whom.

106 Sieroszewski. "Dwanaście lat", op. cit., p. 49.
110 Krzywicki. "Ludy", op. cit., pp. 93, 97. A correction should be made here, because the name "gohar” does not signify a people, but a caste, the pastoral.
111 Psichari, op. cit., p. 233.
Whole ages passed before man was transferred from wandering parasite into a shepherd and breeder of animals. Before udder-sucking ceased it was necessary for vessels to be invented; pottery marked an epoch. For not all peoples became livestock keepers, not all went through a period of wandering after animals. Moreover some peoples stopped with the older domestic animals. Mongoloids passing through Kamchatka and Alaska to America had only pigs and hens with them. The Indians of eastern Ecuador, the Jivaros, do not know other domestic animals. In the south the Indians allowed the swine to go wild and provide themselves afresh with the domesticated kind from missionaries and Brazilian government administration stations. It is known that the horse only came to America with the Spaniards. The Indians, even in the north, do not keep horned cattle, although they very well know their use. And in the south, although the Jesuits raised horse-breeding to a high standard in their reservations, the Indians did not keep it up. They hunt, but do not keep stock.

The course of history, change of dwelling, transformation of living conditions bring changes in stock-keeping. The Yakuts are a classical instance. Herbivorous at first when far to the south, they came to feed on ass-milk. Travelling northwards, they brought with them horses whose range, constantly diminishing, is now confined to the southern part of Yakut homelands. In the north they became acquainted with reindeer through the Tungus. From China the yak reached them, but did not prosper. From the Russians they received the cow which is increasingly widely kept. This triple stock-rearing distinguishes them from Tungus and Chukchi, whose whole existence is based on the reindeer. To the Yakuts today mare’s milk is a festive drink, men doing the milking. A certain difficulty arises in the simultaneous rearing of cattle and horses, because the Yakut horse, even when hungry, will not eat hay on which a cow has lain, and half-wild horses will not graze on meadows where cows have been pastured shortly before. But cattle graze very well on fields abandoned by horses, and eat not only horse litter but even dung. “Reindeer were formerly in greater supply. Uncounted herds of reindeer “every autumn in their procession from south to north provided food and clothing for the hunters waiting for them at the river fords. … Now wild reindeer wander in small herds of from five to fifteen. In the spring the Yakuts hunt them on skates”.113

The use made of the same animal was and is different in different countries. The Yakuts use deer for haulage, but do not milk them. The Tungus milk, although they do not yet know dairy products and only drink the milk mixed with tea. They also ride on the backs of their reindeer in the mountains and in mud.114 The Anatolian Turk uses cattle only for haulage; he does not eat pork and does not drink cow milk.115

In Brahmin and Buddhist Asia the position is the same. In Angola, where there are no horses at all,116 the ox is saddled and bridled. In China buffaloes are used only for draught. In Peru the lama is harnessed, in Tibet the yak, whose meat is not eaten at all.117

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113 Sieroszewski. "Dwanaście lat", op. cit. Pp. 64, 85, 124, 125, 126, 128, 145, 147, 148, 149, 160, 161, 162. "Łyże", now vulgo "narty" or "ski", from the Norwegian (Danish). The expression "narty" is of FinnoUgrian origin, but in the original it is the shorter "rty". In the Russian "Year Records of the Northern Collection (Letopis Pohnogo Sobranaya)" it may often be read how the warriors of the many Yurgian tribes arrive over the snow on "rty". The Russian neologism arose from the combination of the preposition and noun, and entering Polish, has displaced the native "tyze" and "kosle". There is an interesting passago on skis in Moszyński, op. cit. Part I, pp. 627-8.
114 Sieroszewski. "Dwanaście lat", op. cit., pp. 69, 70.
African negroes drink cows’ and goats’ milk. In Central Africa “the smell and taste of milk is abominable, because in order to save water they wash the vessels in cow urine.” The Shilluk on the White Nile have milk as their main food, and urine is used to wash the vessels. Although owning horned cattle, the Africans nevertheless feed mainly by cultivating plants with the hoe, while numerous cattle-breeders in Northern Asia live mainly on plants growing wild. The Todas, who have already been mentioned, live mainly on milk, and never slaughter cattle. Negroes do so rarely, but only because they have not even enough small cattle to be able to practice systematic slaughtering. The negro, of whom it is said that he “eats as long as he has something to eat”, likes even putrid meat — but besides the negresses grind millet and maize. In the Amirantes Islands, other negroes live on rice and fish. Among the Kaffirs, cows are so respected that they are milked only by men. But among the nomadic Indians of Paraguay mules, oxen and horses are ridden without distinction; the cow is not kept for milk but for slaughtering. Among the Lenguas of Paraguay it is to be recorded that the horse is not ridden, nor are dogs used for hunting, but only for haulage and guarding.

Similarly, the earliest Slavs did not use horses for riding, and later on it was the more prosperous element which did so. Until the nineteenth century, Slav countrymen used cattle for ploughing and carting. The pack-saddle was used more than the riding-saddle. From of old the horse was almost the only draught animal in north-eastern White Ruthenia, in Muscovy, among the Zryrans and in the eastern part of the western Finns’ territory. In the Caucasus, the horse was always used almost entirely for riding, but also as a pack animal (alongside the mule and ass).

When all this is taken into consideration, it is evident that in the ways domestic animals were made use of there was no sequence, no progression from slaughter to draught and the saddle, as German scholars argue, presenting the progression in various ways. There never was any uniformity. Equally baseless are the constructions of German science which put forward in explanation of the diversity of civilisations the keeping by a people (even an entire race) of either cattle or horses. These are somnia vigilantium. And what if neither cattle nor horses were kept? Europeans introduced horses into America, Romans the camel into the Algerian Sahara.

The assertion that there is a close and necessary connection between the keeping of horned cattle and agriculture must also be rejected. In agriculture, use is made of the animals which are available. In Kandzhut in Central Asia, where ploughing is done with a sharpened block of hard wood, cows, yaks, donkeys are harnessed to the plough and frequently aided by men. In Java buffaloes draw the ploughs. In Germany at the end of the fifteenth and in the sixteenth centuries, ploughing was done with horses and oxen as it is today. Among the Kandzhuts the donkey ploughs, and in many areas serves the rider as transport — not only in

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118 Jakubski, op. cit., pp. 80, 261.
120 "Anthropologie", op. cit., p. 527.
121 "Misyje Katolickie", Cracow, p. 363.
122 ibid, 1926, p. 93.
123 Krzywicki, "Ludy", op. cit., p. 122.
126 W. Wundt is still occupied with this in the last volume of his "Völkerpsychologie", op. cit. (e.g. p. 149).
Mediterranean lands and in the Alps, but also in Central Asia and in China. In the suburbs of Peking, hundreds of saddled donkeys stand for hire. Not so long ago, ploughing was done with six donkeys between Ferrara and Bologna.\textsuperscript{130} In Egypt the cow is yoked with the camel which, because of its widely-set legs, cannot make a pair with another camel, but keeps pace with a cow.\textsuperscript{131}

Neither hoe nor plough necessitates the keeping of horned cattle. They are a help and an advance in agricultural technique, but neither ox nor horse are an indispensable condition for agriculture nor are they its necessary consequence — as two schools of German science hold. Dung played no part in this. Even today it is used for fences and for fuel.

Let us trace what else man learnt from animals, apart from the use of milk. The sheep and goat — and later horned cattle also — taught man the use of salt, by licking salty soil and by heading more frequently for salty areas. In the mountains of Central Asia, goat-hunters watch where they come to lick the surface salt deposits.\textsuperscript{132}

Salt tracks count for much in history. Seeking salt Rościsławicze conquered the Lach territory which later became Red Ruthenia.\textsuperscript{133} Even the most long-distance salt transport paid. Near Oued-Tifrirt in the French Sahara a traveller encountered a column of ten camels with barrels of salt from Idjil. They were being taken for sale to Nioro in the heart of the Sudan, a distance of a thousand kilometres, at the rate of at most three kilometres an hour.\textsuperscript{134} In Kashgar, surface salt is collected by a method requiring much labour and expense, although this salt is impure and rather bitter.\textsuperscript{135} In the Congo “river grass is cut, then dried and finally burned. Then the ash is put into sieves and water is poured over it. The ash drains out with the water, leaving a thin layer of dirty salt”.\textsuperscript{136} So much trouble, but it pays.

After fire, salt was the next comer of the kitchen. How prehistoric man cooked may be observed today among primitive peoples. Meat is burnt in hot ash, which is the most primitive method, known everywhere. The Australians and Bushmen know how to roast in pits, placing hot stones between the layers of food; the Patagonians insert them into the body of the dead animal; the Australians bake in a clay covering, the Aleutians between red-hot stones; some peoples of South America and the Californians on hot stone slabs; certain tribes from the islands in the Indian Ocean heat water by throwing hot stones into wooden or skin vessels. The last two methods are also known among Slavs.\textsuperscript{137}

Salt not only introduced variety, but made it possible to cook more at once. The importance of salt is for the preservation of ice helps the accumulation of food stocks. Perhaps in this circumstance lies the explanation of the puzzle of emigration towards the North. The feasibility of stocking-up obviously makes the struggle meat.\textsuperscript{138} The further north and the nearer the Arctic circle, the more for life easier to a great extent, and in all probability the northern lands of the temperate zone enjoyed a higher population than the southern; Salt made it possible for southerners also to hold stocks, and to arrange their lives in such a way as not to live from day to day. The Yakuts and Chukchi do not know salt and have as many

\textsuperscript{130} Paweł Popiel. "Pamiętniki 1807-1892". Cracow 1927. P. 137.
\textsuperscript{131} As in a picture by Aleksander Laszenko shown at Poznań at the beginning of 1927 and bought for the palace of the Khedive d'Abdine in Cairo. I may add in parenthesis that this Egyptian method was forbidden to the Jews in the Pentateuch.
\textsuperscript{133} Feliks Koneczny. "Dzieje Rosji (History of Russia)", vol. I.
\textsuperscript{134} Psichari, op. cit., p. 194.
\textsuperscript{135} Grączewski, op., cit., vol. I, pp. 131, 132.
\textsuperscript{136} Antoni Dębczyński. "Dwa lata w Kongo (1925-1927)". Warsaw 1928, p. 186.
\textsuperscript{137} Moszyński, op. cit., Part I, p. 266.
\textsuperscript{138} In the opinion of Moszyński, op. cit., part I, p. 227, among the Slavs "salting of meat for preservative purposes is undoubtedly of more recent origin than drying and pickling".
refrigerators as they want; put the Botocudos in South America and the Bantus in South Africa are condemned to live from day to day.

Man has salt to thank that he learnt to think of the morrow, because he could think of it. Salt is the mother of thrift, industry, foresight in life — in a word, salt is the original mother of capitalism. The first capitalist was the man who was able to keep food in store.

We have not yet exhausted the material for an answer to the question what earliest man learn from domesticated animals. Who taught man the use of the cereal grasses? Of the older animals, only the hen chooses them. Clumsy in flight, she was taken prisoner in these grasses, and because she presented man with eggs, was already the object of careful rearing at a time when there was as yet no question of domesticating homed animals. Different birds indicated to man which cereal grasses were edible. This was later confirmed in part by horned cattle and in part by the horse among the younger animals. It may be that cereal grasses were tended at once for cattle and horses. Nevertheless whenever other sources of food failed, grain became a kind of substitute food for man in evil hours. Certainly it must have required a very long period before imitation of the hen led to cultivation of these grasses; and another period, before flour was arrived at, probably these periods were longer than the chain of centuries needed for the organisation of systematic herding.

It remains to be recalled that in the older historical periods the number of grasses and herbs cultivated for food was incomparably larger; the further back in time, the more plants were considered edible. And they were all indicated to pre-historic man by animals.

Milk, salt and cereal grasses were lessons in food given man by animals. In some parts of the earth the flesh of domestic animals began to be eaten as well as the flesh of wild animals. All this increased well-being, and made easier the permanent maintenance of a community — at first of quite small groups. In consequence they attained higher levels of development. No community which did not domesticate animals attained a higher level: they remained behind, the road beyond closed to them. The other communities went on from keeping animals and began to differ from one another, a movement in which those without animals took no part. Communities without domestic animals, without salt, growing neither grain nor rice had a harder struggle for material existence and incomparably smaller advantages from it.

III THE OLDEST ASSOCIATIONS

After investigation of the relationship of man to fire and domestic animals, it is time to inquire how, in the dawn of civilisation, man felt towards man.

The life of man as a single unit is hampered by his unceasing sexuality so eminently distinguishing him from the animals, the urge to live permanently with a person of the opposite sex. The basis of all associations is the combination of the human couple: sex meets us on the threshold. Manoylov’s researches have shown that this bisexuality obtains throughout nature. A piece of leaf or flower-petal gives chemical reactions like the blood of a man or woman, in accordance with the sex of a sexually divisible plant. In minerals, rhomboid crystals give a male reaction and sestoid a female. Sex is the seasoning of all material being on earth and at the same time (evidently) an innate organising force. Masses which do not crystallise give no sex reaction — sex is the condition of crystallisation.

139 "Misje Katolickie", Cracow, 1924, pp. 95, 99.
140 Maurizio, op. cit., pp. 4, 7, 20 devotes separate passages to this. The Chukchi still know 23 edible plants. Poestion, op. cit., p. 336, provides a whole list from Iceland alone, together with accounts of how to prepare them. Now the fishermen of Hercegovina know how to make the greatest number of "wild" plants edible. Moszyński, op. cit, part I, p. 12.
141 Let us remember that two-fifth of humanity live on rice.
Sex is thus a highly beneficial factor for human kind. But under one condition — which here does not involve any handicap, since the condition is the same as in the case of every force which may be beneficial to man, of every sense and all manifestations of life, whether within or outside human cognition. It must be controlled, otherwise the beneficial force may become mischievous. All the senses must be controlled, and sex is no exception.

Actually to become aware of a given sense calls for time. A child takes long to learn to look so as to see proper shapes and proportions. Control of hearing takes even longer. Today, around us, there is no lack of people who do not see a drawing, while a “good ear” is a rarity. The sexual instinct is no exception, and man did not at once become aware of it. It has been confirmed that the lowest levels of humanity do not know that *coitus efficit gravitatem*. Only at the stage when man becomes conscious of the consequences can the work of controlling the sexual instinct begin.

It is a fact that at the beginning there was monogamy. It is no longer possible to talk of an alleged original unordered group without exposing oneself to ridicule. Monogamy is the rule among pygmies, representatives of the “oldest culture of the world”, whose existence has been known for almost three and a half thousand years with “a striking identity of physical features”. They are scattered about Central and South Africa, in Southern Asia, in Malacca, the Andaman Islands and the Philippines, and in recent years have been discovered in the New Hebrides and in New Guinea. It has been held that they are physical survivals of the “childhood stage of all mankind”, that every race was at the beginning of low stature; others have taken them for degenerates; but recently conviction has come that there were already small men in paleolithic times. So the oldest culture in the world — and monogamous.

These pygmies know neither sickle nor knife, are armed only with clubs, bones, at most (not all) with bows. The most recent teaching is now almost unanimous that monogamy is typical precisely of truly primitive peoples. Islam has not changed this. Those arch-primitives, the Veda in the mountains of Ceylon who do without clothes, without huts, putting up only wind-breaks, living on roots, hunting, occasionally only using the hoe, adopted Islam but did not abandon monogamy. The Senoi on the Malayan peninsula are also monogamous, although they did not know either how to cultivate the earth or domesticate animals. The Toala on Celebes and the Negritos in the Philippines are likewise monogamous. And on the other hemisphere, monogamy has been established with complete certainty among the “Ge tribes, the oldest ethnic strata of South America”. And with their relatively high level of development, the Riff Muslims also normally live monogamously (agricultural implements found among them date from more than two thousand years ago).

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142 This has long been known, and is difficult to doubt, since the most recent travellers also confirm it. In 1915 Bronisław Malinowski justly observed that "such notions must of necessity exercise a decisive influence on a number of social institutions". (Bronisław Malinowski. "Wierzenia pierwotne i formy ustroju społecznego. Pogląd na genезę religii ze szczególnym uwzględnieniem totemizmu". Cracow 1915. P. 6.) Strange that this fact was not used for the matriarchy hypothesis. In any event adherents of matriarchy might make special investigations about such people, possibly saving this single case for the theory. The question would however grow more involved if it proved that even such peoples possess the sense of property, for there would at once arise the question whose the woman was and whose property the children were. I shall return to the question of matriarchy later (in notes).

143 Father Kosibowicz, SJ., op. cit., pp. 13, 14, 16, 17, 27, 33, 35, 36.

144 "Misje Katolickie". Cracow, 1925, p. 508.


147 Wundt, op. cit, voL VII, p. 205.

148 Father Kosibowicz,op.cit,p.117.
Retreat from the school of Bachofen (1861), Lubbock (1870) and L. Morgan (the elder, 1871), that is from the hypothesis of an original sexual promiscuity, was not rapid but stubborn. The school invented a sequence of forms of marriage, from agamy to monogamy, held to be inescapably binding upon all mankind. As late as 1917 Wundt produced yet another order of his own devising, in which although monogamy is both the beginning and end, there are three other forms in the middle. An unnecessary complication, for pre-history knows no order of marriage forms. Thus instead of accepting with Wundt the compromise that “very probably” monogamy prevails in the world, let us leave on one side the question of what prevailed when, and assert positively that originally monogamy prevailed everywhere. Yet even in 1927 Brifiault came out with a renewed defence of an original promiscuity.

The argument was sometimes oddly superficial. For example, extremely primitive peoples practised intercourse openly in broad daylight — as a check against illicit relations. This was also held to be the explanation of the information passed from book to book since Cook’s ocean voyages, about a certain people of Oceania (do they still survive?) among whom the women all slept together and the men in a group separately. It was truly a strange logic which was long pleased to regard this as evidence of promiscuity.

In more recent times, Kubary looked closely into the matter of Micronesia. In the Palau Islands every adult woman has her own hut. During the day, men are either in their wives’ huts or with the obokul (clan headman), going at night to the communal male hut. Monogamy is thus provided with the safeguard already mentioned, but at higher levels this has come to be regarded as not permissible. Among the Semang pygmies wives may only be visited at night.

Nor is it hard to understand that monogamy must be older than polygamy. The first families must have been endogamous in the only too exact meaning of the term. The proto-family was incestuous. From this developed the legal relation between a man and the children of his sister, with the presumption that the children were his brother’s. There is no need at all to make the forced connection with matriarchy which has unnecessarily caused so much confusion. In the ancient period of Iranian religion, marriage with a mother or daughter was regarded as particularly holy. Among the Yakuts, survivals of incest are found to this day. Among Walachians incest with a daughter is no rarity, and in the Canary Islands no secret is made of it.

When the proto-family became endogamous, as marriages took place between distant and more distant relatives within the same kindred, as the kin grew and endogamy spread to very distant, indifferent degrees of relationship — the family remained monogamous. For polygamy demands a surplus of women, which nature does not supply; such a surplus can arise only from without, and so requires exogamy which, however, only appears later.

Development was in a direction opposed to the inbred family; efforts were very early made to get away from it. With some peoples the form lasted only among the priesthood, for example among the Egyptian pharaohs. Among primitive peoples, deliberate social arrangements were made to prevent inbreeding. The Australians invented divisions unfortunately called in ethnology “classes” out of a mistaken notion that they designated

150 On Kubary, see "Polska w kulturze powszechnej".  
151 Krzywicki, "Ludy", op. cit, pp. 222-224.  
153 Meyer, op. cit, pp. 21, 23. In addition to this the law of family inheritance plays a part, of which below.  
154 Meyer, op. cit, p. 31.  
155 Sieroszewski. "Dwanaście lat", op. cit.  
social strata fixed by caste, and for that reason not allowed to inter-marry. The name is entirely inapplicable. In the Polish language these divisions could be called “odrebnia”, seclusion, for it is a question of differentiation. Such primitive peoples are divided into seclusions and only persons of different seclusions are permitted to enter into matrimony, while the child is included in the seclusion from which the mother comes.

There are only two seclusions between Lake Eyre and the lower course of the river Murray. Since daughters remain in the maternal seclusion, marriages between brothers and sisters are avoided, but not between children of two brothers, or of brother and sister, and moreover the union of a father with his own daughter may occur by a chance of fortune. The more developed Kamilar peoples in Queensland and the western part of New South Wales, therefore, carried their precautions further, introducing four seclusions. Here children belong to the seclusions of their grandmothers and maternal grandfathers. Here only a grandfather could have intercourse with a granddaughter. Among the people of Waramunga there are as many as eight seclusions. In Western Australia, on the other hand, a division into three seclusions has been confirmed. In Victoria a different method was chosen, the children being included in the paternal seclusion. Seclusions have also been found among the Indians of the Brazilian forests, among the Bororos of the Matto Grosso.

All these methods of organisation, appearing to many ethnologists and sociologists a puzzle requiring special ingenuity to solve do not differ from the regulations relating to impediments of consanguinity in our canon and civil marriage law. Islam also forbids marriage within the family (with aunts it is expressly forbidden, but no mention is made of the daughters of aunts), and also simultaneously with two sisters.

Thus we see on a very low level of civilisation resistance to family inbreeding already emerging; but this dislike and the devising of measures against such families may be regarded as evidence that the trend existed at the lowest level. It must have existed until the earliest group (the family) had grown into larger associations (tribe, race) or until exogamy emerged. Until recently it was thought that no people still practised marriage within the family. But at the Congress of religious ethnology held in Luxemburg in 1929, Professor L. Ehrlich of Ljubljana stated that the Itelms in Kamchatka still permit intercourse with a sister. There are barely 2,800 of them. It is the last survival. Peoples who did not condemn incest died out. or at least were unable to develop even in numbers. This part of humanity declined and fell (probably having grown sterile after a time).

As a further indication of the seniority of monogamy, it is a fact that there is no people which does not distinguish between licit and illicit relations, even although the latter are legally tolerated. Everywhere a wife is one thing and a servant, slave or concubine another.

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157 Krzywicki. "Ludy", op. cit., pp. 58, 76, 77, 78. In Krzywicki's old book this question was explained, not entirely correctly it is true, but incomparably better and more clearly than in "Anthropologie", op. cit. (1923) thirty years later. The "classes" were taken up with particular satisfaction by adherents of totemism, and they liked best the Australian Arunta people. What chaos reigns in the matter may be seen from the last account of it. G. Davy and A. Moret (also in 1923 "Des clans aux empires. L'organisation sociale chez les primitifs et dans l'orient ancien". Paris, 1923. "L'évolution de l'humanité" No. 6, pp. 22, 26 and 32) present the seclusions of the Arunta in a most involved manner amidst a labyrinth of classes, brotherhoods, tribes, clans, and totems too. Following (on this occasion) Krzywicki I simplified the division even more and halved the number of "classes", not seeing any reason for artificially differentiating what nature has very well distinguished by sex. To turn each seclusion into two — masculine and feminine — complicates the argument and leads nowhere.

158 Father A. Tonelli, Sal. "La famiglia presso i Bororo-Orari del Matto Grosso". In "Semaine internationale d'éthnologie religieuse" op. cit., pp. 303.


When there is talk of marriage, first place is taken by the question of the descendants. Never the sexual side but the question whose property the children are determines marriage. In a large part of the globe children are to this day the property of the father, in the most literal meaning of the term, not excluding the right to sell or to kill. Not among some “savages” but among the Chinese the law is such. “A Chinese son is in far greater servitude than a serf.” The lot of small Chinese children is such that mission collections for their purchase, are universally familiar. Children are wounded and killed. If a child, particularly a girl, displeases its father, “he kills it immediately or throws it into a canal or bushes”. Sometimes they bring to Sen-mu-yu (the shelter of Polish Franciscan missionary nuns) injured children, poor victims of quarrels between parents. The merciless father, wanting to break the wife’s resistance, torments the child. He beats, burns, wounds until the mother, driven to extremity, does his will”. “If a child does not please the grandmother, the mother must remove it and then very often the couple give it to the nuns”. In China, and also in Japan, a mother-in-law has great authority over her daughter-in-law. By no means infrequently the nuns find victims like “the boy whose grandmother had cut the flesh on his legs and hips through to the bone; or a girl victim of the vengeance of her father on her mother”. The Aztecs stood higher, only permitting the sale of a son into captivity in certain conditions requiring the approval of a judge. In this the Chinese are nearer the very primitive Bororos in the Brazilian Matto Grosso.

In all countries outside Latin civilisation it is accepted that in lean years poor parents may sell their children. It was thus among the Aztecs. Here lies the origin of the sale of daughters to the harems of a richer country. The sale of children by their parents has also been noted among the Yakuts. On much the greater part of the globe one is personally free in fact only after the death of one’s father. Where slavery exists, a son is his father’s slave. Among Hindus, “a son and a slave may not, according to the law, possess anything on their own.” And this is not the exception but the rule with the greater part of mankind.

Various speculations have arisen in connection with the law of property in children. Although the law does not sanction such agreements, in Benares to this day the purchaser of a child pays for his education and in exchange the child later works for his “guardian” for long years. The greater part of the future geishas of Japan is educated in the same way. In Korea girls bought out of “compassion” are brought up to prostitution practised for the owner’s benefit.

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162 Among primitive peoples, this law is often conditional, applicable in exceptional circumstances only, e.g. among Bushmen in the case of mother’s death, injury, collective flight etc. L. Walk. “Die Familie in Südafrika”, in "Semaine internationale d'ethnologie religieuse", op. cit., p. 257.
164 "Misje Katolickie", Cracow 1925, pp. 400, 401, 451, 452.
166 Tonelli, op. cit. p. 310.
171 I do not know where the horrid opinion we have of geishas comes from. The geisha must preserve her virginity, otherwise she loses her right to wear the double fold on the shoulder, the honourable sign of her important guild, and is obliged to wear a red camellia in her hair. Japanese prostitutes are called "joro". Ferdynand Ossendowski. "Cud bogini Kwan-Non. Z życia Japonii." Poznań 1924. P. 53.
It is known that Roman law also proceeds on the assumption of a property right which undoubtedly originally existed. Later a (fictitious) three-fold sale of the son destroyed the father’s property title. Yet the son never became free either personally or in handling property unless his father so permitted; otherwise the son had to wait for the father’s death. But in a society with a high ethical standard a father did not injure his sons, and the law of property existed in principle only because the Romans never abolished a law, contenting themselves with issuing the new one which served to annul what was regarded as outmoded (in this case the three-fold sale).

In the Babylon of Hammurabi it was permissible to pledge wife and children for debts for three years only, among the Jews for half as long again. In Korea, wives and children are still subject to confiscation as part of the property of political offenders or of great criminals condemned to death.

The right of property over a wife is of later date. The endogamous wife, coming from the same tribe as the husband, was by birth her husband’s equal and so could not become his property. This occurred only under exogamy. But from the very beginnings of all culture children have been the property of the father. This property is jealously guarded because children are a fortune, so that it is out of the question that anybody would deny paternity; in primitive conditions it is more likely to be usurped. The Hottentot also becomes owner of his wife’s earlier, pre-marital children. The identification in certain cases of the position of uncle and father was thus based on sound assumptions, for the other father (had he existed) would hardly have agreed to be robbed of a fortune. If nobody applied for possession of a child, it was evidently correct to apply the law of the inbred family. Not only is this not a pointer to matriarchy, it is on the contrary proof that it did not exist, unless one is prepared to argue that woman, as head of the family, would not have wished to possess her own children. Woman never had this right of ownership, and so there never was a matriarchate. Thus if the uncle’s right to the children is sometimes found as a survival, it is a survival not of matriarchy but of the inbred family.

Here is man’s oldest property: his own children. It may be that feeling for this property is older than for the fireside and the area covered by it, representing (as discussed above) the oldest claim to real estate. Both these possessions are individual, strictly personal. In this beginning property was personal, not collective. That the genesis of family and property law was simultaneous, the beginnings of both everywhere identical, is of basic importance. There would be no family without feeling for individual property, and what need for personal property if not to satisfy the needs of the family? The very close link of the one with the other began at once with original monogamy.

Did the division of labour among the sexes begin at once? It is time the view was discarded that there existed a strict division of occupations between the sexes. For example, the view creeps from textbook to textbook that hunting belonged exclusively to men, the gathering of “roots” to women; that the horse everywhere belonged to the man, the cow to the...

174 Walk, op. cit, p. 259.
175 Unless perhaps through lack of realisation of the effects of "coitus", of which I have already spoken. Malinowski assumes such unawareness among inhabitants of the island of Tobrianda and speaks incidentally of the behaviour of the women "from the first moment of pregnancy" ("Mutterrechtliche Famine", op. cit, p. 17). How in that case do they know about that first moment? And besides, a woman points to the father of her child by living with him and, with children, being kept by him. This island of Tobrianda passes for the classical land of matriarchy. It may be said in paranthesis that Malinowski gives its position as north-east of New-Guinea or north-west Melanesia, whereas it lies south-east of New Guinea and in central Melanesia.
woman, on the principle that man performed the heavier work and woman the lighter. What do the men of exclusively vegetarian tribes, for example, certain Californians, do in that case? Grind is harder work than the sowing which fell to the men. In the granary of the nations which was ancient Egypt milling was not known, women ground the grain by hand. The discovery of the mill was a blessing for woman. Later, when tasks multiplied, they were sometimes divided according to certain superstitions connected with the physiological characteristics of the sexes, but never according to whether they were easier or harder.

From the beginning something else was decisive: charged with bringing up the next generation, woman carried out tasks not requiring her presence too far from home. From the start she could not have managed as a solitary individual. Tending of the fire meant one person keeping unceasing watch over the hearth, and that person could not go in search of sources of livelihood. Nobody would have domesticated either horse or ox by himself. Among the negroes, hoe-agriculture requires three people: one ploughs the ground, a second lights a fire and prepares food, and the third must sit on the field to scare birds from seedbeds and harvest. Older women and children spend whole months in this role of scarecrows. All tasks in and near the house, light and heavy, pleasant or less pleasant, fell without exception to the wife in primitive monogamy. Only exogamy could lead to the division of labour among women of unequal standing.

The family, as a union consisting of parents and children, lasted barely one generation. Among the Yakuts, for example, it did not succeed in being perpetuated in tradition, since “the Yakuts have no exact term to signify a family composed exclusively of a married couple and their children”. Ethnology has not investigated the question whether the same fact does not occur elsewhere. In any case it leads to the conclusion that the concept of the family known in historic times did not originate in that primitive family, and is unconnected with it, because its short-lived character doomed it to oblivion in times when tradition was as yet extremely feeble. The concept originates with the next family formation, with the emancipation of the later family from the tribe. Among the Yakuts, this emancipation has not yet taken place, but there are apparently the beginnings of the process.

The family proper was lost when the children concluded marriage ties, and the years of the grandchildren began. Of any splitting-up, of the foundation of new firesides at a distance from the original parental hearth, there was no question when human association began. The clan was formed. Young people remained with the older, because otherwise they would have worsened their own conditions of life. The enormous difficulties of the primeval struggle for a livelihood required the concentration of a large number of working hands. Families which did not succeed in expanding into clans died out; they had to die out.

There arose associations of families descending from a common ancestor and remaining under the common authority of this protoplast. As a rule this development was accompanied by joint husbandry, normally too by joint living quarters. Such was the original clan. The inheritance of two, three generations was collected in one place — but was by no means common property. Since children were the property of the father, they plainly could not possess any goods of their own. If this principle obtained in the later centuries of the splendid Roman civilisation, it is not surprising that it obtains today among the Chinese: “Of the son of a Chinese it cannot be said that he possesses anything”.

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176 On them "Anthropologie", op. cit, p. 526.
177 For example, the division of scythe and sickle. On the femininity of the sickle see Adam Szymański's "Aksinia".
178 Sieroszewski. "Dwanaście lat", op. cit, p. 293.
179 Of the emancipation of the family from the clan there will be more later.
180 Lowell, op. cit., pp. 21, 23.
The original family rested on this principle at the dawn of all civilisation. The principle that while living with the clan neither grandchild nor great-grandchild could possess property was thus only the practical consequence. The owner of their earnings was the great-grandfather, after his death the grandfather, then the father. Each was the owner of his descendants and their property. This relationship was dissolved only by death — or by going outside the clan in order to found a new clan. The creator of a clan was its owner; and as owner, he had unlimited, despotic power. Let us call him the clan headman. The whole clan and all that belonged to it was originally the private, strictly personal property, of the clan headman. The source of this oldest conception of property is the bond of blood. We see how difficult, or rather quite impossible it is to indicate which of the two is the older — family law or property law, which is the basis and which the superstructure. In fact it is one phenomenon, a kind of dual phenomenon of primitive existence.

All societies pass through the clan system, and some have stuck in it. Among the pygmies so far there exist only “groups formed of up to a dozen or so families with one leader at the top” — in other words clans. There are no authorities higher than clan headmen, nor organisations above the clans, hence the “considerable number” of leaders within even a single tribe. In the Brahmin communities of India social organisation also stopped at the clan. In Bengal, families still live in patriarchal fashion, all the married brothers together under the guidance of the father or of the eldest among them. In India peoples until lately known as Dravidian and Aryan still farm in clans. These are all monogamous communities (of others there will be mention in the next chapter).

The original clan did not require any clan hierarchy; the sole hierarch was the living protoplast-owner. This state of affairs could not be long-lasting, since it depended on the life of the protoplast and founder of the clan. After his death each of his sons became owner of his branch of the clan, which introduced diversification into family and property law, and so into forms of the clan. And with diversification — differentiation had begun. The comparatively recently founded clan, with its original creator, oldest ancestor and first headman still -living, belongs to the beginnings of all culture.

IV  NUCLEI OF TRADITION

All discoveries and inventions (which in prehistoric times were no less prolific than in our own) would have been worth nothing had it not been possible to transmit them to later generations. Nothing is worth anything without tradition, which is the backbone of all civilisation. It is thus necessary to consider what are the conditions for the creation of tradition.

Primitive living conditions were not only unfavourable to its emergence, they were destructive. There were no durable relations and durability and stability are the basis of development. Among primitive peoples this matter appears desperate even today.

In Central Africa “roads are not to be recognised even after one year. Settlements are depopulated, new ones arise”. The famous Livingstone travelled for six days through completely deserted countryside where years before he had seen closely-set villages. On the other hand, Cameron found a populous and fertile countryside where Burton and Speck had seen waterless and unpopulated bush. In Nepal, in Barak, in Assam “every few years the village is transferred to another place, when the soil of the old settlement has become exhausted. Then they burn and clear the forest in a new area and a settlement arises nearby for

181 Father Kosibowicz, op. cit, pp.,97, 185.
182 Marcinkowska, op. cit., p. 201.
another few years”. After the passage of a few years a map of the Arab settlements of Mesopotamia was of no use to Sven Hedin. Only a few decades — fifty to sixty years — divides the travels and scientific labours of Bastian from the most recent travel works, but there is no agreement on either ethnological or sociological data relating to these territories. Much depended on the security of life and property. Round the great African lakes and in the basin of the Lualaba “it was sufficient for security to be more or less assured for people to assemble quickly from all sides, while another, less safe place, became depopulated. This process is so rapid that many travellers maintain that African states and towns grow like mushrooms after rain only to disappear again after a brief life”.183

For any community to become an ordered and differentiated society there must be a certain density of population. Yet, thousands of years after fire became generally known, vast areas have sparse populations. The Chukchi, who number 10,000 in the tundra between Kolyma, the Behring Sea and the Arctic Ocean, represent an exceptional rate of density. But the Koryaks in Northern Kamchatka on the shore of the Sea of Okhotsk and in the tundra of the interior numbered only 6,300 after 1920.184 On the average, an area equal to the “Congress Kingdom” in Poland has 2,500 inhabitants. “The Australian lived in the company of only two or three dozen fellow-clansmen, on a few occasions in his life he might be present at a gathering of a few hundred persons, but never saw a crowd of thousands”.185

These primitive peoples have died out and are dying out at an alarming rate. For example, in 1850 the Kurnai people of Australia numbered fifteen hundred, in 1880 barely 140.186 During the First World War, in 1918, “half the nomad population of Turkestan died of starvation”.187 But the danger of complete extinction was much greater in proto-historic times. For primitive man was less hardy, less able to endure, helpless in face of his environment and beyond comparison more susceptible to illness.

Even the nervous diseases are more common at lower levels of civilisation. Among the Yakuts, madness is well known and hysteria widespread. Deniker lists a whole string of these diseases, often infectious. Malayan and Indonesian men suffer from amok, a kind of dementia with epileptic symptoms, while the women, affected by the disease latah, strip naked before the men and throw their children about like balls. The uncontrolled imitation of others’ movements common in many parts of Asia is well known there. Fear of certain expressions (for example, tiger, crocodile) occurs in Malaya, among the Tagalog in the Philippines and the Sikhs in India. Similar illnesses are miritim of the Ostyak and autochthonous Siberians, and the bakchi of the Siamese. At sea Eskimos show a kind of agoraphobia. Charcot’s major hysteria has been reported among negro women in Senegal, among Annamite, Hottentot, and Kaffir women as well as in Abyssinia and Madagascar. Full-scale nervous epidemics are known among the Hurons and Iroquois.188

Diseases known in Europe appear in more dangerous degree among the Yakuts. Ninety per cent of them die of smallpox. Tapeworm is general, there is rarely someone who is not tormented by rheumatism, the terrible illness of the narrowing of the throat is frequent and syphilis is widespread.189 In some parts of Portuguese Angola “apparently 75 per cent of negroes suffer from venereal diseases”.190 When smallpox breaks out among Indians “hundreds of corpses poison the area”. Leprosy is almost universal among primitive peoples

184 Ehrlich, op. cit, pp. 183, 184.
186 ibid. Note p. 76, p. 82.
188 Deniker, op. cit, pp. 146, 147.
190 Chmielewski, op. cit, p. 142.
even in Ecuador. Even under the civilised Belgian Government, the Congo is threatened with depopulation because of disease.  

Peoples whom nobody persecutes also die out. In 1906, a Government Commissioner, D. Francesco Matana, sent to the Government of Ecuador a register of 9,750 Jivaros ("observing that their number was constantly declining"). The Yukagirs, once rulers of all the land between the Lena and Anadir and south to the Verkhoyansk Hills had melted by 1928 to four hundred souls.

Erazm Majewski described all this shortly and pithily: "Let us combine in a single whole scarcity of population, the transitoriness of its centres, the short duration of its families, the poverty and chaos of primitive tongues, the short duration of common experience, whence the level and very restricted range of its ideas — and we have factors which necessarily kept the human race in the proto-social state of existence for a very long time". For the consequences "of the small and short-lived character of social circles was the perpetual wastage of common experience and constant fresh-beginnings. The discovery of bow, boat, weaving, pottery, was made a hundred times in different parts of the globe". The only lever of tradition was speech, the bond of society which made permanent understanding possible. But even the tradition of speech was interrupted and whole ages passed before the effort was made to perfect language. “Poor methods of communication were evolved in the course of generations a hundred times over.”

Fundamental scientific discoveries in the field of the origin and meaning of language as a social bond are continued in the most recent studies of infant prattle. The genesis of speech lies in each smallest human child as in almost every animal. A child makes its own babbling, stuttering, exclamatory language — very varied sounds usually comprehensible to the parents alone. Where one child shouts tilipiti, and another elebele, the third, youngest, learning from its elders, mixes the two languages in an independent, original linguistic creation. If allowed to develop without hindrance, with the years such prattle would develop into a language and . . . every man would speak his own. This is prevented by life in society. At the very beginning of the child’s life parents check the development of an original childish tongue, imposing their own, which their parents once imposed on them and the latters’ parents on them.

There would be too many kinds of speech even if only every family possessed its own. It seems that this was the position in pre-fire times. By language we understand speech which has already become common to a community of some size. Without such grouping there is no language, and in this sense it can be asserted outright that there were no languages without fire. Conversely, fire without speech would not have served much purpose, for its management and manifold uses would not have been known. On the other hand, without fire we should have perished even with the most highly perfected language. But the utilisation and control of fire, the whole long series of discoveries which made possible its conservation, quite apart from the process of kindling, as well as the discoveries relating to its uses — all would have been impossible without the preservation of tradition, and so without the progression from speech to language.

On this basis it may be deducted that the use of fire and the use of speech were developed and perfected simultaneously, although not with the same swiftness. Beyond doubt

191 "Misje Katolickie", Cracow. 1926, pp. 77, 8Z.
192 ibid. 1925, pp. 446-447.
193 Ehrlich, op. cit., p. 183.
195 For the way in which this discovery of Majewski's was beginning to crystallise in Polish science, see Adam Szelałowski. "Wschód i Zachód. Zagadnienia z dziejów cywilizacji". Lwów 1912. Pp. 495, 496.
196 Majewski as above.
the perfecting of speech required an even longer sequence of centuries than the spread of the use of fire. While the discovery of fire acted quickly, radically, the shaping of speech led upwards, but slowly. It was more difficult to perfect speech than to employ fire. The quicker a common tongue evolved in a given group, the more rapid and many-sided was its ability to ensure its members a considerable degree of security was required. Primitive man did not know that he was by nature, mortal.\textsuperscript{197} Death from disease is ascribed by Oceanic tribes to enemies, and every case of natural death provides grounds for a new war of revenge. In Korea the superstition still persists that anybody dying before completion of the cycle (sixty years) dies as the result of the activity of evil spirits.\textsuperscript{198} Thus primitive man organises only for battle and fights without cease. When he grows aware that he is mortal, one of the causes of struggle lapses, as well as an impediment to the uniting of very small groups into somewhat larger ones.

With realisation of his mortality, man felt the need to hand on his experience to his descendants — and he began to create tradition. Only then did the backbone of civilisation begin to form. Fireside, domestic animals, salt, corn growing would all have gone for nothing, availing nothing to create permanent communities had not tradition emerged, with its prerequisites of permanence and stability, (relative) density of population and security. Without these conditions community life can only be short-lived, with insufficient time to develop and method in its system.

\section*{V \hspace{1em} PREHISTORIC ECONOMY}

Density of population, permanence and stability of relations are in great measure dependent on material conditions of existence. At an extremely primitive level, at the very beginning of any kind of civilisation, the struggle for existence was confined to the material, since another was as yet unknown; it was a struggle exclusively for food. The character and possibilities of this struggle depended at the beginning on the same three groups of factors on which they have uniformly depended since, namely on production, on communications and on control of nature, space and time.

Until the end of the nineteenth century prehistoric economy was believed to have been a trichotomy, an immutable sequence of hunting, pastoralism and agriculture. It was assumed at the same time that a certain order occurred in the invention of tools, related to these “economic states”. Attempts to define this inventive order — allegedly everywhere the same — produced a number of many volume works, boldly put together on the meditative principle and, in this branch of knowledge, without value. Each of these attempts may be turned upside down and the meaning remains the same. In different parts of the world the order could differ. Economic trichotomy was called in question in 1896 by E. Hahn in his \textit{Die Haustiere und ihre Beziehungen zur Wirtschaft des Menschen} (it may be noted parenthetically that he deduced instead proto-religious factors in animal-rearing), and may be said to have been overthrown in

\textsuperscript{197} This was noted long ago, but in Polish writings only since 1915, thanks to Bronislaw Malinowski. "Wierzenia pierwotne", op. cit, p. 6.
\textsuperscript{198} Sieroszewski,"Korea",op.cit.,p.46.
1907 when F. Goldstein printed an essay *Die soziale Dreistufentheorie* in the *Zeitschrift für Sozialwissenschaft*. On this occasion German science led the way. Investigation among primitive peoples also shows only too clearly that hunting need not come first. It is possible to pass to hunting from pastoralism and even from agriculture, and also not to have a hunting period in one’s past at all. For example African negroes were never hunters and never engaged in animal-rearing on any scale, but there is no negro country where hoe-agriculture is not practised. On the other hand Indians, the world’s greatest hunters, do not think of keeping cattle. Numerous wild herds take refuge in winter in forests inhabited by Redskins (except on the Brazilian coast), but the Indian draws no conclusions. And those Indian peoples who allowed themselves to be persuaded into agriculture did not pass through a previous pastoral stage. Most curious of all that among some tribes the dendrophagous [eating off trees] tradition was lost, so that the Indians of Nebraska learnt about fruit again from missionaries.

Indians do not want to be herdsmen; Africans on the other hand are largely prevented by the tsetse fly. Thus for example there are no cattle at all in the Lake Rukwa area, among the Wasagara people, among the Wuka, where hens and dogs barely survive. It is not permitted to take a team of horses from the British settlements to the neighbouring “independent” territories, to prevent the reimportation of cattle plague. And what this plague can mean there was shown among the Masai, a pastoral people of proto-Semitic origin, when “dying of hunger on the plains, leaving the weak and the children a prey to fate, they sold themselves into captivity among the neighbouring settled tribes”. They were unable to carry on cattle-breeding and had ceased to be dendrophagous. For negro Africa is becoming deforested. Once felled, the forests do not renew themselves, and negroes do not plant trees, while missionary efforts to re-afforest with European seeds have only local importance. “The time will come when the whole of East and Central Africa, following the example of the South, will be without a scrap of real forest”. Dendrophy has been losing ground for long centuries, and with rare exceptions has ceased to exist.

Moreover negroes know nothing of fishing, of which there is a good deal among Indians. Formerly the Canadians relied on it for their existence, and even now it is a favourite occupation of Brazilians. But the “purest fishing cultures” are to be found in the fjords of North-West America and at the southernmost limit of humanity, in Terra del Fuego. In the Banca Islands, whole tribes live crowded on to boats, not recognising land at all and living exclusively on fish.

Fishing cannot well be linked with pastoralism or agriculture. One of the first Norwegian settlers in Iceland, Floki (about 900 A.D.) found in his bay such a plentitude of fish that his men, absorbed in fishing, forgot about haymaking and in winter their cattle died. Something of the same kind happens to the Yakuts in certain parts of their territories.

While fishing is found at all levels of civilised development from the most primitive to the highest, a low level of development is characteristic of hunting peoples, because hunting does not permit of any great density of population. Thus transition from dendrophy to hunting did not benefit any people. It became tantamount to the spiking of civilisation. The pygmies among whom dendrophy did not die out, but whose chief means of livelihood

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199 Lepecki. "W krainie jaguarów". op. cit, p. 2L
200 "Misje Katolickie", Cracow, 1926, p. 79.
201 Jakubski. op. cit., pp. 31, 32, 45, 152, 225.
203 Lepecki, "W krainie jaguarów", op. cit., p. 83.
207 Sieroszczewski, "Dwanaście lat", op. cit, pp. 73, 74, 140, 143.
became hunting, have retreated everywhere before the negroes, withdrawing into marshy forests on plains.\textsuperscript{208} And the Indians of North America die out in their reservations where nobody disturbs them, because for a growing population they have too little space and too few animals. Hunters need large areas, otherwise they destroy each other.

Agriculture may be adopted at a high level of civilised development. It is an error to ascribe to agriculture some basic superiority in this respect, as if a raising of the level of civilisation automatically followed from it. At very low levels the fruits of herbs are collected, which represents the genesis of agriculture. Flour paste and flat cake have been known since the ancient epochs of pre-history, while bread appeared only some two thousand years ago.\textsuperscript{209} Nor is the agriculturist always settled for good. In warmer lands, cultivation for a single year, or rather for three to four months is known. In difficult years, nomads decide on casual tilling and abandon the ground after the harvest. The Tartars of Southern Russia did not cultivate the same piece of land for longer than two years. Nor does the communal three-strip field “always and necessarily lead to a finally fixed and firmly settled mode of existence”; for example, the Finno-Ugrian tribes round Ula transfer the whole village when the ground is exhausted.\textsuperscript{210} On the highest level of agricultural development, there are among the Germans specialists who are ever wandering through the world after fresh fields, changing their place of residence every few years; and these are excellent agriculturalists. for whom owners of empty spaces compete. Apparently this profession is also beginning to emerge in Poland.

Let us also discard the widespread belief in three basic levels of civilisation corresponding to three basic agricultural implements. hoe, wooden plough and plough. The introduction of English ploughs to Russian villages achieved nothing. In Africa the hoe suffices to produce several dozen kinds of bananas where the plough would fail. Even the primitive Wakami tribes engage in cultivation of the soil, tilling it a little with a hoe of their own manufacture and channelling water from neighbouring streams. In the Konde territory there is noticeably careful cultivation of the banana, as well as of little maize, sweet potatoes and beans.\textsuperscript{211} A favourite dish of the Rhodesian Bantus is a maize gruel with unsalted water, known as \textit{naima}.\textsuperscript{212}

If cultivation with the hoe is to be regarded as something inferior — it nevertheless borders on gardening. It is worth becoming acquainted with accounts of hoe cultivation in China, Japan, even in the southern part of Asia Minor; they reveal miracles of foresight, thrift and at the same time unusual professional intelligence. Are we to refuse the Chinese a high level of civilisation because they have been content until now with the hoe?

In any case among the Slavs, for example, the wooden plough, in the Polish \textit{socha}, was the oldest tool for tilling: the improved plough called \textit{rado} is younger and youngest of all the normal plough (at first a wheel). But there might be no wooden plough at all; it did not exist among the southern Slavs, among the Czechs or Slovaks; in Poland all old wooden tilling tools, even ploughs, are called \textit{socha}; the true wooden plough was known only east of the Vistula.\textsuperscript{213}

It is also a mistake to imagine that corn production was the joyful news of a certain moment in history. In Japan bread-eating was not at all common, even at the end of the

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\textsuperscript{208} Eugen Fischer. “Specielle Anthropologie oder Rassenlehre”. In "Anthropologie". Pp. 184, 185.
\textsuperscript{209} Maurizio, op. cit, pp. 5, 17, 18. From this work a mass of evidence could be cited showing how identical states of pre-agriculture — and of agriculture also — are associated with very dissimilar levels of civilisation, and vice-versa.
\textsuperscript{210} Moszyński, op. cit, part I, p. 143.
\textsuperscript{211} Jakubski. op. cit, pp. 31, 113.
\textsuperscript{212} "Misje Katolickie", 1924, April.
\textsuperscript{213} Moszyński, op. cit. Part I, pp. 166, 167, 174, 175.
\end{flushright}
nineteenth century, although potatoes were already known. Recourse was had to grain only in case of a shortage of other food, in the last resort. Even when the use of grain i.e. the milling, preparing and baking of bread had already been learnt, corn was long a secondary foodstuff, because of the great difficulty of customing the human organism to the diet. Corn is a poison to which one must become accustomed. The northern Yakuts complain of heartburn from flour, while “not long ago large numbers of the southern Yakuts were adversely affected by flour”. Sieroszewski relates that during his twelve years among the Yakuts he did not eat bread for long periods, and that once a “barley loaf, eaten in the absence of other food in large quantities during a journey, acted upon me like poison. Kolyma Cossacs, feeding of necessity on what the post-stages give them, often get terrible pains from bread, so that they fall from their horses”. Yakut dogs cannot be persuaded to eat bread. And a curious thing happened with grain from the Ukraine brought to the Ussuri country for seed. After a few years it produced poisonous wheat, from which so-called “drunken-bread” resulted. Man became accustomed to bread under pressure of necessity. Thus agriculture alone does not raise man, other factors must operate. No agricultural product and no agricultural implement offer a pledge of higher development, which comes from elsewhere, but may be shared by agriculture. The error lies in taking effect for cause. Moreover the entire prehistory of production explains nothing about the emergence of the various methods of communal life. Let us pass to the second factor in economic development. that is to the question of communications.

Every degree of population density, every kind and degree of wellbeing, every stage of communal life has a necessary minimum of communications, below which it cannot subsist. A degree of communications which does not correspond to the given level must hamper development and in the end may cause not merely stagnation but even retreat. It has been generally accepted that the use of waterways is older than that of roads. But to a primitive man, a river of any size represents the limits of the accessible world. When the Sudan tribes pushed southwards, their journey was halted by the Congo. Tribes in the virgin forests of the Amazon basin do not know boats. The hollowing out of the most primitive boat requires efficient and strong tools, and the discovery of the hollowed trunk marked an epoch. It is used on the Brazilian rivers, in Eastern Ecuador, in Central Africa, in Rhodesia, and among the Yakuts and Eskimos. Bark, sealskin may be substituted for wood. And in Lithuania and Ruthenia have we not travelled in the classical tree-trunk, known affectionately as duszogubka (because sailing in her one may easily lose one’s life). Even today it is still possible to sail in a hollowed-out willow log on the lower Wisłok.

The discovery of the raft on floats, that is on inflated skins, was a great advance: they are still used on the Euphrates, on the rivers of Bokhara, Turkestan, Darvaz. What power river shipping gave is shown by two examples: the Varangians conquered the eastern Slavs.

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216 Father Szczepan Mazurek in "Misje Katolickie", 1924, p. 112.
217 Ferdynand Antoni Ossendowski. "W ludzkiej i lesnej kniei". Warsaw 1923. P. 230. This is caused by a special fungus.
218 Jan Czekanowski, "Rasy i Ludy", op. cit., p. 74.
219 ibid., p. 110.
because they possessed sail-boats, and later the Muscovites conquered Siberia thanks to their river-craft, despite its primitiveness. For the Siberian peoples had no idea that it was possible to sail on a river. The Yakuts relate how the first boat they ever saw came with the Russians. Rivers could only serve as landmarks to those travelling alongside the water; but there is no water transport at the beginning of any civilisation.

Moreover, water was an element long neglected by man. It may be said in parenthesis that laundry is older than washing of the body. Various Brazilian Indians, Ainons, Algerian Tuaregs never wash. Yakuts who wash do so rarely, and do not take baths at all. Koreans wear snowy garments on bodies which are perpetually dirty. And the average Slav countryman cares more for the cleanliness of his clothing than of his body.

Let us pass to land locomotion. It began with the riding of all domesticated animals, but only the horse and camel offered speed. But the horse became widespread relatively late, and the range of draught cattle is considerably more extensive to this day. The oldest vehicle is the limber, then the tumbril from which the sledge emerged. Now limbers are known as far as the Philippines, tumbrils in Siam, sledges in Indo-China. Thus they are unconnected with a snowy winter. In the mountains of southern Bulgaria and north-east Serbia there are districts where sledges, not carts, are used for farm-work, even in summer.

The discovery of the wheel marked an epoch. At first they were solid. To this day in Anatolia they are solid and convex like the Greek disc, and revolve with the axis. In Mongolia they are “put together out of six pieces of roughly hewn wood, transfixed by large nails”. Until very recent times, wheels with spokes were unknown in Brazil. Let us add that in Manchuria wheels are very low, while in the Amu-Darya basin they are two metres high. The primitive cart had two wheels. It survives now at the southern and northern ends of Slav territory. In old German and Dutch drawings, two-wheeled carts are to be seen drawn by a single horse: in Norway four wheels make a luxurious equipage; in Italy and Portugal the two-wheeled cart is used almost exclusively for carrying loads. Throughout Asia and in South America the two-wheeled cart still has no rivals. In Parana carts were not known at all before Poles arrived and so the Cracow type was adopted. In the Brazilian Contestado nobody knows about carts, while the Congo negroes learnt about the wheel only from European arrivals and did not have even wheel-barrows of their own. The inhabitants of Sumatra are in similar plight. In the whole of Tibet there is only one cart, the sacred one used on great feasts to transport the god Matray. The Dalai-Lama has no carriage, but is content with a litter.

Among the Buryats the cart was unknown until about 1830. Then at Seleginsk in Transbaikal one of the Byestuzhev brothers, exiled as a Decabrist, began to manufacture carts of his own design, with shafts and two wheels, “which are still in use”.

The more primitive the road and cart, the more numerous the team. In Manchuria five or seven horses or mules draw the cart; in Mesopotamia the so-called carabela is pulled by four horses in a row; in Central Asia the strongest animals, buffaloes and yaks are used for

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224 Moszyński, op. cit., part I, p. 596.

225 ibid, part I, pp. 630-632.

226 ibid, part I, p. 632.

227 For the history of the wheel, see ibid, part I, pp. 634-637.

228 ibid, part I, pp. 637, 638.


230 Julian Talko-Hrynczewicz. "Z przeżytych dni (1850-1903)". Warsaw 1930, p. 239.
haulage; in Central Africa four donkeys; among the Boers, up to forty cows to a cart; in Brazil a dozen or more oxen; in the Argentine, in Ituzaingo the cart is drawn by eight to twelve mules, horses or steers; in the Paraguayan prairie by six to ten oxen;\textsuperscript{231} only in Puerto Rico by a modest pair of powerful Andalusian oxen. Even today in Rhodesia they harness six pairs of oxen to four-wheeled carts, and several pairs of mules in towns; three pairs of oxen is an unusual team.\textsuperscript{232} In Slavonia also, and in Bosnia two to four pairs of oxen are harnessed to one cart.\textsuperscript{233}

Without communications, production is merely the satisfaction of hunger. When the most primitive arba opens the way to the conveyance of goods, exchange of production begins, and from it in time real trade emerges. Societies which achieve good communications quickly turn into differentiated societies. But even very advanced communications do not alter the essential character of a system of communal life, which may remain the same with a six-piece wheel and a locomotive: improved communications merely raise the level of a given civilisation — as do developing production and the inventions required for this. So far in our arguments we have not come upon traces of the causes which bring about the variety of civilisations. What is the position when in the light of these beginnings, we examine the conquest of nature, space and time?

The initial step was fire, frontier fires the first delimitation of space and the measurement of an area the time needed to circle round it, as may be seen in the customs and surviving traditions of old Iceland. There a new settler was allowed to take as much land as he could manage to “consecrate with fire” in one day: a woman, as much as she could encircle on a summer day from sunrise to sunset with a two-year-old and well-fed heifer.\textsuperscript{234} The old Polish \textit{ujazd} indicated the area which could be ridden round in one day. Distance is everywhere measured by time — a day’s travel, two “suns” (among the Indians) — a habit which survives at high levels of civilisation, although dating from its very beginnings. It is necessary to distinguish between awareness of space and its conquest. Man became aware of space as he wandered after animals, leading a parasitical existence of passive submission to their direction and guidance, but it was the herdsman, camping deliberately of his own will, who began the conquest of space. In the beginnings of civilisation there were nevertheless only rudiments of an active relation of man to space.

Without need born of hunger, this relation might never have become active. On this point we have frightful indications from the hot zones. What worried the saintly Father Beyzym in Madagascar was the “Malagasy, seated on the ground, warming himself in the sun and capable of sitting three, four or five hours completely immobile”.\textsuperscript{235} Which pales before Captain Lepecki’s example from Central Brazil:

“I only learned how primitive human life can be in the forests of the Contestado. A Caingang (an Indian), when in possession of stores of food, is able, without moving from the spot, to spend a number of days literally in one place, satisfying all his needs, including natural ones, in the space of a square metre. Only hunger obliges him to leave the spot and think of fresh stores.”\textsuperscript{236}

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\textsuperscript{231}Gerlach, op. cit., p. 178, with an account of large teams; Jakubski, op. cit., pp. 220, 271; Lepecki, ”W krainie jaguarów”, op. cit., p. 99; Sven Hedin, ”Bagdad, Babylon, Ninive, Leipzig 1918, p. 284 sketch; Witold Szyszlo, ”Pod zwrotnikami. Porto-Rico”, (Biblioteka Dzieł Wyborowych, Nr. 679-680, no date, but before 1914), p. 62; Ossendowski, ”Przez kraj ludzi, zwierząt i bogów”, op. cit, p. 73; Fularski, op. cit, p. 129.

\textsuperscript{232}”Misje Katolickie”, 1924, pp. 251, 253, 256, 365, with interesting data on harnessing and driving.

\textsuperscript{233}Moszynski, op. cit., part I, p. 647.

\textsuperscript{234}Poestion, op. cit., p. 296.

\textsuperscript{235}”Letters” of Father Beyzym, op. cit, p. 33.

\textsuperscript{236}Lepecki, „W krainie jaguarów”, op. cit., p. 86.
This is the true “state of nature”. Do not let us be surprised that primitive man is in no hurry to move out into space where so many dangers lie in wait for him. Fortune favours those whom animals lead into the world, under the continuing protection of the instinct by which animals know how to choose their paths purposefully. But man was not everywhere able to join herds with females in milk. And nature herself provides no means for the conquest of space, until man gains some measure of control of nature herself. And nature herself is more hindrance than help. So the mastery of space remains closely linked with the subjugation of nature, which however can only be clearly recognised after the beginnings of civilisation have been experienced; at low levels there are few opportunities to catch expressly this connection.

On the other hand, nature provides clear measurements of time and time was long the only measure of distance. The quarters of the moon so force themselves upon the senses that they were noticed and made use of for the measurement of time even on the lowest levels of community life. The negroes of the Congo not only count months from one full moon to the next, but are able to indicate the time of day from the position of the sun in the sky. And so it is everywhere. But the same negroes are unaware of the number of full moons or of rainy seasons they have seen. “They never give themselves the trouble of counting them when it is a question of the age of a child or of their own”. Awareness of the year is reached by plain, practical empiricism — for example, the Mongols count how often the grass has grown. A man asked how old he is, replies how many grasses he has. Here time and its periods are being counted: which is already a superior level.

If natural phenomena in a given country offer cycles longer than the year, awareness of longer periods also may emerge without intellectual effort, by the most obvious empiricism. In the Brazilian forests live the so-called caboclo, famed among travellers as a mixture of three races, white, red and black, of whom it has been said that “replacement of Indian tribes by the half-civilised caboclo has not advanced the civilisation of those parts one step”. Now they have a cycle reckoning, because nature provides them with it. that is to say, a plant grows there which “flowers once in thirty years and then immediately afterwards dies and withers. Vast areas of forest are then liable to fires during which all undergrowth is burnt up, masses of animals perish and many caboclo plantations are spoiled. The withering of the tacuara is such a great event in the jungle that the elders divide years into periods from one fire to the next. In the forests it is said that this or that happened before the last burning of the tacuara, or the one before that”.

In all this there is nothing which could not be linked with the beginnings of any civilisation. Differentiation between civilisations, their plurality and manifoldness will only become comprehensible when we begin to examine the relation of man not to food nor the manner of its acquisition, not to nature, space, not even to communications — but to man, the relations between men in their communities.

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237 Dębczyński, op. cit., p. 195.
239 Lepecki."W krainie jaguarów", op. cit.
CHAPTER III

THE TRIPLE LAW

I  NOMENCLATURE

A statement of certain facts hitherto unnoticed or, if noticed, not taken into account, will serve as starting-point in our investigation of the relation of man to men. First of all, the manifestations of community life which create family (and marriage), property and inheritance law are always interpenetrating. They remain in ceaseless and close association, dependent on each other in turn at every step, exercising a constant reciprocal influence, explaining each other at the same time. It is impossible to consider one of them in relation to civilisation without touching the others. Because of the exceptionally close connection between these departments of law they may, or rather ought to be considered as a separate group which we shall call the triple law. As we shall see differentiation between civilisations begins with the diversity of the triple law.

The investigation will, in the nature of things, be set primarily against the background of the clan system. It is generally thought that this system was always and everywhere uniform, although the differences are considerable and must cause more than one change in views hitherto obtaining. I distinguish five types of clan system: primitive, despotic, clan partnership, the clan community and groupings which make possible temporary usufructs. These are novelties which I shall explain at once at the beginning of the chapter.

In addition I deny that a matriarchate ever existed. I know that here I am in conflict with all the authorities, that there is no ethnologist who does not appeal to matriarchy. Alleged manifestations of matriarchy will be dealt with directly in the course of discussion. Similarly, I do not recognise totemism. Studying stages in the development of many kinds of civilisation, from the primitive beginnings common to all to the most advanced examples of differentiation on the higher levels, I have nowhere encountered any evidence of totemism or matriarchy, and have accordingly excluded them from the scientific apparatus.

How rooted these errors have become can be seen from the presence in the new edition of Deniker of the “totemist clan” while Fritz Graebner cannot do without “matriarchal culture” although he restricts the seniority of matriarchy over universal patriarchalism to very rare instances. Moret and Davy take a step backwards, apparently unable to proceed without the aid of totemism and matriarchy. The renowned Wilhelm Wundt, in his Voelkerpsychologie, regards totemism as a separate phase in universal development. Only

241 Davy et Moret, op. cit.
242 Similarly in the shortened "Elemente der Völkerpsychologie".
Edward Meyer flatly denies meaning to matriarchy, as well as to all deductions of religion from totemism or the cult of the dead, and every kind of “comparative mythology”.  

I should, however, like to anticipate misunderstandings in another field. For exact presentation of the subject is frustrated at every step by the indeterminate meaning of the expressions denoting human associations. Real anarchy has reigned in the use of the terms family, clan, tribe, generation, stock, horde, people, nation, etc. When reading new scientific works one really does not know whether for example the Lencisi (Leczycanie) are a stock, a people, a tribe or a generation. And richness of language does not consist in speaking and writing chaotically. Things are no better abroad. In the same author on one and the same page confusion may be complete because of a lack of precision in use of the expressions clan, tribe, phratry, class, family, house. Since in scientific discussion vocabulary must be precise if anarchy is to be avoided, without wishing to impose them upon anyone, I shall define the meaning which the following expressions have in my works: family — parents and children together; clan — association of families deriving from a common ancestor; tribe — association of related clans deriving from a common ancestor. From related tribes the people emerge. From peoples the nation may emerge, but only historically. Ethnologically related peoples make up the stock (e.g. Slav stock), regardless of whether history makes a nation or nations of them, which is quite unnecessary for the creation of stocks. Between peoples and the stock there may, but need not be, a rung of nations.

I use the expression generation solely to designate collectively persons bearing the same genealogical degree of relationship to a common ancestor.

Related stocks form races (e.g. the Indo-European). (The author gives also three more terms, but as they are not used in this book we abstain from translating them into English. The Translators.)

II THE FIVE TYPES OF CLAN

The oldest type of organisation based on the clan was described in the section on oldest associations in the previous chapter. But the shortlived primitive clan ended with the death of its protoplast, founder, sole possessor and despotic ruler. Changes must have taken place and a second type arose.

A man whose father died acquired the full rights of fatherhood, becoming possessor and ruler of his descendants and their property. In the language of today, on his father’s death a son became personally and materially free. Each son became with equal right possessor of his descendants, that is of the branch of the family founded by him and of its assets. Whether the branches of the family split up or continued their husbandry in the same way as before the death of their protoplast depended on circumstances, in the first place on the numerical strength of the clan. The collection of persons and property in one place could not, under such primitive conditions, endure for long; a too numerous clan would be under pressure to produce emigrants who would found a new clan. But for a certain time (sometimes very long) all the sons of the protoplast farmed together.

In this period of the history of the clan, its property was divided into as many parts as there were sons of the protoplast. Each of them was the individual owner of his share, as the

243 Meyer, op. cit., p. 96. It is a curious fact that totemism was opposed without quarter (by Goldenweiser in 1910) soon after the publication of Frazer's fundamental work "Totemism and Exogamy", but totemism blossomed again reinforced by Freud. Since the tribes of Central Australia are not exogamous, yet are regarded as the classic example of totemism (Malinowski, "Wierzenia pierwotne", op. cit, p. 7), the totem has evidently nothing to do with endo- or exogamy.
individual owner of everything was their father. In the next generation (as the sons of the protoplast died off and his grandsons became free), there might be a dozen or more of these shares, and conditions and circumstances might incline their owners not to go different ways and not to found separate farms. There then emerges a combine of individual owners, the clan partnership.

Farming in partnership nevertheless required a common head. The joint owners, that is the heads of the different branches, of the clan, handed over their possessions to the management of the oldest brother, who thus became elder among his kin, with; rights restricted by comparison with those of the protoplast, for the elder was only the overseer of everything, not the owner.

I refer here to the discovery made by a Polish scholar, Professor Lotar Dargun, of Cracow, forty-five years ago. Going against generally accepted opinion, he held that private, not collective property was the more primitive. According to him even the Hausgemeinschaften could have been made up of separate properties belonging to families and not to the whole clan, even although all kinsfolk lived together. \(^{244}\) It seems that Wundt accepted Dargun’s view when he wrote that in fact only private property is property in the strict sense of the term, while collective: property is a “transitory product”, arising from economic necessity, but leading again to personal property. \(^{245}\) This was a quite unnecessary complication, as we shall see more plainly below. Put simply, the economic resources shared by the kindred consisted of pooled personal property. This can now be verified by a quite different, independent line of approach — and let us hope that it will not have to be “discovered” a third time.

Since there is no corner of the earth where the clan system does not exist or has not existed, its forms repeat themselves in every part of the world. For instance, the Yugoslav zadruga is none other than a clan partnership. In the land register the property of the “clan of Petar Petrović” would be entered; after his death it would be entered as the property of his sons’ clans, of Zhivko, Lazo and Yovan Petrović who, working together, form a partnership of three owners. \(^{246}\) We find a classic example of the same kind of combination in the Fiji archipelago, where houses owned by brothers are fenced together, forming the wawula. In ancient times the early Romans formed clan partnerships, which long survived among the Georgians (Strabo’s Iberians) in the Caucasus. \(^{247}\) In India these ancient partnerships still exist. \(^{248}\)

The elder, director and overseer of a partnership of kindred, had not a few opportunities to widen and abuse his authority. It would also be impossible to ascribe to ancestors in possession of the power of overseeing a strict distinction between property and management. Many circumstances made it easier for an elder to restore the previous position, so that he became sole possessor of everything. An illegal state of affairs was tolerated, and finally recognised as legal. This return was made easier by the shortness of the average life, the high death-rate, particularly among children and the considerable number of minors with property rights they could not exercise. The more difficult the conditions and fortunes of the clan, the more calculated they were to reinforce the authority of the elder; while the poorer the clan, the more important it was to each individual to be in the elder’s favour. Uncertainty of

\(^{244}\) Lotar Dargun. “Ursprung und Entwicklungsgeschichte des Eigentums”. (“Zeitschrift für vergleichende Rechtswissenschaft”, vol. V, 1884.) P. 1 sq. He also wrote in Polish in the publications of the Cracow Academy.

\(^{245}\) The memory of his nationality has somehow become effaced and Germans regard him as theirs without justification. (I knew him personally in Cracow in youth.)

\(^{246}\) Wundt, op. cit., vol. VIII, p. 75.

\(^{247}\) It is a great mistake to confuse “zadruga” with the Russian “mir”, which is of Turanian origin and not based on kinship.

\(^{248}\) Gustave Le Bon, ”Les civilisations de l’Inde”, op. dt, pp. 653-656.
the morrow increased still further the need for authority, making it the easier for an elder to exploit his kinsfolk and subject them to himself as his property.

Things assuredly happened so with the majority of clans, but not necessarily with all. An elder might be honourable, or it might also happen that a would-be despot and his descendants were sent into enforced emigration. Nevertheless there arrived a third type of clan organisation in which everything was the personal, although illegal, property of the elder. We shall call this type despotism. There are plenty of examples to this day among polygamous Arabs in Asia and Africa; their sheik, oldest in years of the oldest generation of the clan, has absolute power over all.249

Yet another, fourth, type emerged. Clan partners granted each other reciprocal rights to the use of their property. The more numerous clans were particularly inclined to this arrangement.

Such undivided co-ownership is found until today (brothers not sharing out). Only this type deserves the name clan community, which is improperly applied to all kinds of arrangements among kindred. We have them at present in Australia and in the Congo as well as alongside partnerships in India.250

A variant of this clan community permitted the granting of property rights to individuals temporarily and for a restricted space. In Sumatra the lands of the clan (marga) are divided up into such individual temporary usufructs.251 Here also belongs the North-Asian mir, grafted in the eighteenth century on to Muscovy, and truly inviting a newer study than that of Haxthausen (1847-52). This is the fifth type of clan organisation known to me.

How many types were (perhaps are) there that remain unknown? In principle, the number is not limited; those unsuited for development disappear after a brief existence. On the other hand, the greater the variety of clan organisations on a certain territory, the smaller the likelihood of the emergence of a more significant organisation.

I speak of five types of clan organisation, relying in information supplied; I employ the number only for this reason. If other investigators raise it to six or more, I am very ready to take account of the fact.

In so far as the present stage of research makes judgment possible, therefore, the clan was differentiated in five ways. The primitive type constantly renewed itself thanks to voluntary or enforced emigrations arising from over-population, exhaustion of feeding-stuffs or from any of a great variety of circumstances. Anybody settling with his descendants on fresh ground formed a new clan there, based on the primitive principle, on the unrestricted individual ownership of the founder and protoplast. Every such emigrant became a new primogenitor. The clan always remained an association of related families under a common ruler, and all five types remained vital.

Wherever a primogenitor departed this world, the question of the succession arose. Despots ensured it to their sons according to the double principle of primogeniture or minority. Examples of minority are to be found in Europe in our own times. Among the Friesians, older brothers go as labourers to the youngest. It is the same in Brittany in the de Rohan duchy, in Germany in Pfirdt manorlands, in Brabant in the Grimberghe area and in Upper Alsace. In England the custom is known as tenure in borough-English. In other parts of the world, it survives among the Mrus in the hilly country of Arawak and in New Zealand. Among the Mongols, the youngest son is called utdzhgin, i.e. guardian of the hearth, for this reason. Among the Tartars the youngest takes the hut, since his elders have already gone out into the world with their shares of the herds. Among the Brazilian Indians, ownership of the

251 Krzywicki, "Ludy", op. rit, p. 220.
hut falls to the son married first; movable goods are divided equally. The Mongolian custom also exists among the northern Turanians in Siberia, and among the “multi-racial” Yugrians on the westernmost edge of the Turanian world, whence it passed to the Novgorod Russkaya Pravda.

In the clan partnerships and communities things were entirely different. In these a hierarchy of the generations emerged, with authority belonging first to all members of the first generation (sons of the protoplast) in order of birth, then to all members of the second generation (grandsons of the protoplast) in the same order as their fathers; thereafter to all members of the generation of great-grandchildren, again according to the hierarchy of their grand-parents. This is the seniority of the clan, which does not give authority to the oldest in years, as is erroneously supposed.

The hierarchy of the clan partnership and community is a hierarchy of the generations regardless of the age of the individual. The elder’s grandsons by his eldest son are as a rule older than the youngest of his own children, yet the grandsons will be subject to the youngest of their uncles, even if the latter is only a lad. A grown-up nephew might have an uncle a baby in arms, but always the uncle takes precedence over the nephew. For that uncle will, upon the death of his father (the nephew’s grandfather) become a free co-owner of the partnership or community, whereas the nephew will still continue the property of his father (his uncle’s brother).

All members of the clan, including every child, know their place in the hierarchy exactly. When they learned to count, every member of the clan knew what number he held in the order of probability of his becoming elder. The death of any one advanced on rung all those standing below in the clan ladder.

Kubary discovered a curious example of this hierarchy in Micronesia. At the head of the clan (blay) stands the obokul and his wife, followed by all the clansmen in ordered hierarchy so that upon the death of an obokul each goes up a place. Kubary supposed that the order was one of age, but age does not account for the step up: if age were decisive, nothing could ever change, because age relationships remain the same. It is also improbable that the Micronesians know their age in years, when today in Europe in the villages people rarely know their age exactly. On the other hand, the matter is easily explicable as an ordered hierarchy of kindred in which it is enough if each knows who is immediately before and after him for the whole hierarchical chain to be firmly established. In the Palau archipelago the same Kubary found several blay arranged hierarchically.

Among historic examples, very striking is the hierarchy among the Rurik clan, strictly one of generation (Russia was the clandynasty’s common wealth, divided into usufructs allocated hierarchically in accordance with their profitability). Wundt, unable to make anything of this, invoked the “so-called Malayan Verwandschaftssystem”, expressed surprise and explained everything on the grounds that in the Sippe both father and mother were unknown! One of the innumerable instances of how, with the help of learning, a simple thing can be made complicated.

Evidence for a hierarchy of the generations lies in the very wide meaning of the expressions “brother” and “father”. Among peoples who adhered to the clan system for a long period, even today the expression “brother” refers to members of the same generation. Among the Ruriks, it was in this way that “brother” was understood, while members of the older generation (even though younger in years) were called “fathers”. People often undertook by

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252 Bastian, op. cit., pp. XIV, XV, 185.
254 Krzywicki, "Ludy", op. cit., p. 222, 223.
treaty to hold somebody as “father” or “brother”. And in Poland, especially in the east, everybody has numerous “brothers” and “sisters”, which often denotes a distant relationship, not in any way binding (to indicate descent from the same parents, the word “born” must be added). A “brother” is a member of the same generation.

Yakut clansmen (kargen) call an elder and a younger brother differently and divide all their kin into older and younger. Sieroszewski explains this by the longevity of the family, but it is in fact a simple manifestation of the hierarchy of the generations. The “brothers” are merely members of the same generation.257 The inheritance law of the Congo negroes provides a classic example of hierarchy according to generation: upon the death of the father not his descendants, but his brother or the eldest son of his eldest sister inherit,258 just as with the Ruriks. In the Congo, “after the death of a king or chief, his brother or sister’s son inherits, and only in the absence of brothers and sisters does his eldest son inherit.”259 Hierarchy according to generation decides.

Travellers have sometimes been surprised by the fact that peoples at low levels of civilisation distinguish numerous degrees of relationship, of a kind which we disregard. This is to be explained by combinations of older and younger generations not in accordance with age, but according to an accepted hierarchical system. These relationships became looser and finally disappeared as the clan system disintegrated either through disappearance into the tribe or through the emancipation of the family.

Here opens one of the most far-reaching of historico-sociological problems. Between the level of the clan and that of the tribe events follow one of three courses: normal development from smaller to larger associations, an abnormal halt at the clan level or an abnormal, over-rapid advance to the tribe. In Ruthenia, tribes emerged before the clan system was fully formed. Among the Jews of Palestine clans declined before the twelve tribes. But the most significant instance of strict tribal organisation is to be found in the pile settlement communities. Settlements may contain a single dwelling-house raised on piles, but so large that it can accommodate the entire tribe. In New Guinea, for example, such houses have 100-200 inhabitants, and contain a mass of small rooms with separate entrances, although sometimes with a communal hearth.260 Malayans live in houses one hundred feet long and twenty to twenty-five feet wide.261 In Sumatra, the Battak carry the length of their houses to 600 feet. The whole of one side is taken up by the men’s sleeping quarters, from which 40-50 doors lead to the other half, divided onto the same number of little rooms with hearths for the women and children of each couple separately262 (and so monogamy).

Among the Bororo tribes in the Matto Grosso of Brazil there are evidently different systems among the different tribes. A. Tonelli describes on one occasion an extensive structure in which there were as many hearths as families living there. In another place he saw, only men had a communal house during the day; the married men left at night for the huts of their wives, these huts being separate, every man erecting one for his wife.263 How important it would be if it proved possible to ascertain whether one of these systems takes over from the other, whether these tribes achieve a higher organisation, whether and to what extent there is a likelihood of their becoming a people?

258 Dębczyński, op. cit., p. 207; the author sees in this "traces of the matriarchal system".
259 ibid, p. 208.
260 Krzywicki. "Ludy", op. cit, p. 87.
261 ibid, p. 218. From this the author concludes that "the communist principle plays a considerable role in family life". If living in one building is a manifestation of communism, towns are populated entirely by communists!
262 ibid, p. 220.
263 Father Tonelli, op. cit, pp. 300 and 312. Here there is an evident tendency towards emancipation of the family, but Tonelli sees it as an instance of matriarchy.
In the seventeenth century it was remarked that the Canadian Hurons bent and tied together two rows of young trees, and then covered them with oak or spruce bark, so that they formed enormous huts for twenty and more families, each containing a number of hearths. This is premature tribal organisation. In these communities the clan had not fully developed its cultural potentialities when it gave way to tribal organisation.

Normal in type is the blay of the Palau archipelago referred to above, several of which join in one association while preserving their own authorities, each blay its own obokul. The status of the latter reflects the hierarchy of the blays they represent. For all such blays go back to brothers.

The normal development of the tribe from clans can be observed in all parts of the world. For example, Afghan tribes permit clans a wide autonomy. The uledi (tribes) of nomads in the Western Sahara provide a similar example. On the other hand the Paraguayan Lenguas Indians are divided into “clans numbering from twenty to 100 persons”, camping separately under chiefs of their own clan, while above them stands the great chief of the whole tribe.

In the very primitive conditions of the Fijian archipelago there was even a supra-tribal association. From a few yavashi there arose the matagnale, an association of several clans descending from “brothers”, and so a tribe, even if not numerous. Such associations formed the village, kora, which is “all in some degree related”. Sometimes koras unite, which means that a people exists.

Natural settlement took place everywhere according to ties of blood. The family grew into the clan of lineally related families living and working together on lands as extensive as possible. Thus originally settlement and clans were the same thing. But clans were not everywhere able to extend their possessions as need required; some lands were less suitable and there are also kinds of husbandry which require not a large area but more numerous hands. When population increased more rapidly than reserves of land, a division of clans frequently resulted, even within the same settlement.

Something similar to the Fijian yavashi in a single kora is to be observed among the Berber peoples. In Mauretania, the Riffs lead a typical tribal existence. Families produce the dzhara, clan, and a few of these together form the larger grouping of the kabila, tribe. Authority rests with the assembly of all the elders of the different clans. Further to the east in the mountains of Algeria, in the remnants of its former domains, lives a people calling themselves Kabyles, and so simply “co-tribesmen”. There numerous clans are crowded into one settlement; each lives in its karuba or district under its own elder (tamen), and related karubas associated in the taddert form the village or township. All the inhabitants descend from a common ancestor and being of the same descent, are equal to each other; there are no social classes determined by birth. The entire taddert may consist of a single clan only, which is the case in small settlements — and so the taddert cannot be regarded as a tribe, even where it contains two or three clans; while the karubas must be regarded as branches of a larger clan. Only the association of related tadderts forms a tribe, known as a rule by a patronymic. Such tribes sometimes fought each other, and chose leaders for war. Tribes which recognised each

266 ibid, p. 243.
267 Psichari, op. cit., pp. 65, 81. In the Polish translation the confusion in nomenclature is even worse than in the original.
268 Fularski, op. cit, p. 148.
270 "Misje Katolickie", 1925 p. 403.
other as being closer by blood came together in larger communities indicated by separate
names: which is the level at which peoples are organised.  
Further to the south, in the oases of the French Sahara the Mozabite Berbers, extremist
adherents of the Shia sect, have isolated themselves for religious reasons. In their townships
several clans also come under the authority of mokadem the frequent combination of two
clans is headed by the kebar and most commonly there are two kebars in one town. The
townspeople become a tribe, or even two tribes; civil wars are not unknown, with the defeated
tribe quitting its birthplace and founding a new town. On the other hand, there were
alliances between towns and temporary ties, but never anything permanent. Even five
Mozabite towns situated close together have not entered into association. And yet in
antiquity the Berbers created states, and Jughurta was a Berber ruler.

The tribal system is not attained everywhere, and there are cases where the clan
system is so prolonged that the state is formed from it directly. In Central Asia the state of
Kandzut consists of 126 villages “whose inhabitants represent as many distinct clans”. The
clan system also endures undisturbed in China. The Chinese peasant still does not own
personal property while his father lives. “Boundary stones in the fields carry the name of the
clan, not the name of an individual”. “In China the state is a great family, the family a little
state”. It is a patriarchal organisation “unchanged to this day from pre-historic times”. The
clan system lasted a long time in Poland, a strangely short time in Ruthenia; among the
Yugoslavs the zadruga, on which an abundant scientific literature exists, flourished until
recently.

The formation of tribes from clans thus took place in various ways. Sometimes the
clan lost nothing of its compactness, sometimes it melted and disappeared into the tribe. This
neglect of the clan in favour of the tribe obviously proved the worse for the tribe, reducing its
resistance and defences against the outer world. Over-short duration of the clan system
brought in its train results no less undesirable than prolongation of clan rule.

The other way in which the clan system declined was through the emancipation of the
family, which was feasible where there was a considerable density of population and a higher
standard of well-being. The depopulation of Poland after the Mongol invasions and her
extraordinary impoverishment re-established a clan system already disintegrating. In the same
way Yugoslavia, full of its zadrugi, suffered from the Turkish invaders, the south growing
poorer and poorer and steadily declining in population. The family can survive without the
clan only in favourable conditions. It disappeared in ancient times in favour of the clan
because of unfavourable living conditions, reappearing again when conditions improved. But
it did not everywhere become emancipated and when it did, the emancipation assumed
various forms and degrees. Unfortunately, ethnology possesses no materials at all in this field.
History can only say that it is so, but we have as yet nothing to account for the existing state
of things.

In the emancipated family there must have grown up a changed hierarchy of
relationships, and so also a new hierarchy of inheritance. This field is unfortunately totally
neglected by travellers. In the Christian communities of Europe canon law came to exert a
great influence. (A separate aspect of this matter is testamentary law, in principle superior to
the hierarchy of inheritance among relatives.) Emancipation of the family hastened the
development of the law of inheritance everywhere. Also linked with the history of family
emancipation, to which it made an important contribution, is the dowry.

272 ibid, pp. 232-234.
273 ibid, pp. 231, 232.
275 Lowell, op. cit, pp. 21, 23.
History shows that total emancipation of the family only occurs in monogamous communities. Monogamy itself is not decisive, and instances have been given of the clan system and monogamy subsisting together. But only the monogamous are capable of achieving emancipation of the family when conditions favourable for it arise. Theoretically it is not impossible that family emancipation could take place under polygamy — but history does not provide an instance of such general emancipation among polygamists. The polygamous community must first pass over to monogamy. And wherever sporadic emancipation (among the higher classes) of a polygamous family takes place it is usually an indication of advance towards monogamy, as happened, for example, in Turkey.

We are also unable to solve the question which arises whether any differences in the procedures of family emancipation and in the institutions of the emancipated family correspond to the five-fold or, more generally, to the multiple clan system. In general; until a scientific review of all the institutions of the clan — hitherto known in very general terms only — has been successfully undertaken from the point of view of their multiplicity, many questions cannot be discussed.

III FAMILY LAW

It is easy to understand how associations assembled on a basis of varying family law must become in the course of development increasingly dissimilar, that the distance between them in the institutions of daily life must increase; for inheritance and property law will also be different, and there must be considerable differences in relations between people organised in accordance with dissimilar systems. The more highly developed the community, the more complicated the social set-up, the more marked the differences between the various systems of community life — and here is the source of the plurality of civilisations.

There are three systems of family law — monogamous, polygamous and polyandrous. Let us begin with the last, of which we have not much to say since we know least about it. Polyandry differs from monogamy and polygamy incomparably more than the two latter from each other. Therefore if monogamy and polygamy greatly influence the process of differentiation in the other branches of the triple law, and so the whole system of community life, what must the effect of polyandry be!

It is generally believed that polyandry was and is confined to Tibet and a few of the northernmost Indian lands. There is a distinctive, highly sacred Tibetan civilisation, about which we still have too little information. It may be that its range was formerly greater. But if there are indications which suggest that it once reached far into Chinese lands, nobody foresaw survivals as far afield as the Congo.

The case is the institution known as mushishombe. “This is a woman solemnly chosen from among the handsomest girls, who is dedicated to several youths not as yet possessing wives. One of them, recognised as the first, has the privilege of living with the mushishombe who manages all his domestic affairs. The others are as it were her legal lovers. The mushishombe gives herself to them only outside the boundary of her plot, or visits them in the hut where they all live together. Possession of many husbands is a high privilege for a woman, a singling out from among the many.” Polyandry in Tibet is managed similarly.

Since under polyandry two or even more men are grouped round one woman, it is easy for combinations to arise which produce a mistaken impression of matriarchy. The doubt suggests itself whether where matriarchy is discerned, in Nubia or in Abissynia, survivals of polyandry have not been preserved, as in the Congo? On the other hand, over the whole issue

276 Dębczyński, op. cit.
hangs the question: what happens to the majority of women, since only a section are admitted to marriage? Are several times fewer women than men born on the roof of the world? Perhaps polyandry is everywhere only a privilege?

In the present state of research, it is impossible to decide whether polyandry produced a single civilisation only, in which case all traces and survivals of it would be proof of the ancient extent of Tibetan civilisation; or whether there were more polyandrous civilisations, of which one only, the Tibetan, has survived into our epoch of history.

In view of the assumption generally accepted today that at the beginning monogamy prevailed everywhere, which would be an entirely natural state of affairs, how is the transition from monogamy to polyandry to be explained? More than one suggestion could be put forward to hang in the expanse of the imagination, for there is nothing to get hold of here, a complete impossibility of coming to grips with facts. Future investigations by learned travellers will supply them — for the moment it is better to remain silent.

Scholars have devoted great pains and ingenuity to the question of the way in which polygamy emerged from monogamy; here there are several theories to choose from. Nevertheless it seems to me that they are superfluous, because polygamy, like slavery, is adequately accounted for by the taking of prisoners in war. War became general only under tribal conditions, in which are the nuclei of states and from which at the same time, there developed the so-called stronghold system associated with tribal duchies. War produced in turn a series of institutions of which one was the polygamous family.

The female war-captive is the forerunner of polygamy. She became the property of her conqueror, and the servant of his wife. There followed a division of women’s work into more and less honourable through which the superior status of the mistress of the house was underlined. The real mistress rested her dignity on the fact that she was surrounded by captives, slaves; so that nowhere is there found a trace of opposition to the presence of strange women in the house. Among the Nyaneka, the wife herself procures her husband a friend — and herself, a helper — for times of menstruation, illness and pregnancy. The only reservation is that the unfree woman must not dress herself as well as her mistress. Only members of the tribe are permitted to beautify themselves on the model accepted in the given country. For example, only a free Botocudo perforates his lips in order to put the **botoka** (a large wooden ring) into them, and makes three cuts in the right leg of his own free daughters. Among the Karaibs, mistress is distinguished from slave at a distance by her gashed calf. And among the Romans, were not certain garments long reserved solely to legally wedded wives? In Assyria a wife went coiffed; servant and slave were not entitled to do so.

There were not always wars, and neighbours’ women remained a requirement. In order to get them by peaceful means, it was necessary to grant them the position of wife. Ethnology provides a number of formalities devised on this account; a strange woman was legalised in one’s clan and tribe; tribe and clan accepted her as theirs. Exogamy followed, required for the struggle against the inbred family.

The simplest way of obtaining a wife from neighbours by peaceful means was always to buy her from her owner, that is from her father. And what is bought becomes personal property, where lies the origin of the fact that a wife becomes the property of her husband, just as from the beginning the children were his property. This does not merely apply, for

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example, to Kaffirs; wives were bought in Babylon and in America among the Mayan peoples.  

Assuredly as higher levels of civilisation were attained, purchase became increasingly symbolic, and a wife did not, as a result of it, become her husband’s property; but among many peoples — numerous Indian tribes, the Australian aborigines, the autochthons, of North-East Africa — a wife is still emphatically owned “like a thing”, “like a dog”. In investigating this, it is necessary to keep separate the question how the man behaves towards his wife. A husband-owner may treat his wife extremely well, while she may have a bad time even when enjoying equal rights; one has nothing to do with the other.

Where a wife can be purchased, the road is open to polygamy, for the more prosperous. In ancient Mexico the common people had to stop at one wife. The erroneous supposition that polygamy emerged at somewhat higher levels of society, in some obscure connection with the rising level of civilisation, derives from the fact that polygamy appeared at the level of the tribal duchies, organised for the waging of war. There is no lack of instances of primitive peoples falling into polygamy, without in any way diminishing their primitiveness; for example, the Chukchi and Botocudos who, in the matter of primitiveness, can rival the monogamous Vedda. Even after baptism, the negroes of Southern Rhodesia fall back into polygamy. On the other hand, not all warlike communities discard monogamy. The Romans were never polygamists, although a survival of the ownership of wives as chattels (in potestate) continued in sacred marriages to the last.

Wife-purchase demoralised the purchaser. She could be resold, exchanged, even lent, which was the case in ancient Australian cultures, and survives among the negro Wabala people and among the Hottentots and Nyaneka. Even the Koran permitted it. Elsewhere a woman must turn prostitute on her husband’s orders, for example in a certain village between Heliopolis and Cairo and also in a part of Algeria. But purchase alone does not account for this demoralisation, which is not found elsewhere. Moreover, among some peoples, the Chukchi, for instance, only the second wife is purchased.

Where a wife is her husband’s property, she plainly cannot herself own property. This is the case not only among primitive peoples but also in the land which, in the opinion of many, radiates all wisdom — India. Among the Hindus, “a wife, son or slave may not, according to the law, own anything for themselves; everything they are able to acquire becomes the property of him upon whom they depend”. Moreover the laws of Manu clearly prescribe that “a young girl, a young woman, an elderly woman should never do anything in accordance with their own will, not even in their own houses”. Being always in the charge of father, husband, children (in old age) “she may never conduct herself according to her own wishes.”

Polygamy frequently amounts to speculation. A Zulu works hard in the gold-mines of Transvaal or the diamond-mines of Kimberley for a year or two, so as to acquire the number

280 ibid, p. 204. Father Hoeltker S.V.D., op. cit. 325.
282 Westermarck confuses the two.
283 Fr. Hoeltker, op. cit, p. 319.
284 "Misje Katolickie" 1924, p. 68; 1926, p. 92.
286 "Anthropologie", op. cit, p. 543; Fr. Kosibowicz, S.J., op. cit, p. 113; Fr. Tastevin op. cit, p. 277; L. Walk.
287 "Die Familie in Südafrika" In "Semaine internationale d'éthnologie religieuse", op. cit., pp. 258, 262.
288 "The Koran", op. cit, p. 67.
290 Ehrlich, op. cit, p. 186.
of cattle required as a gift by a new father-in-law for a new wife (the strength of the first being exhausted), in order to lead an idle life while laying all work upon the new wife’s shoulders. After a period, having prospered still further, he will allow himself several young women during his later years, while not a few young men must be content with an elderly, withered wife, a widow or released slave. A negro chief at Mhapsia in Northern Rhodesia owned twelve wives. The Herero reckon property by the number of wives, while the Nyaneka acquires more wives in order to be able to cultivate more fields.

Alongside monogamy and polygamy there exists semi-monogamy which might equally well be called semi-polygamy. It is common in communities which demand, unconditionally, male descendants, even if the wife is not regarded as her husband’s property. In primitive economies, lack of sons leads to poverty and the decline of the clan, so that much is to be explained by this although the custom frequently remains when a higher economic level has been reached, for example in China. Either the barren wife, or one who produces only daughters, may be discarded, or another may be taken in addition, by legal bigamy. It was already permissible to get rid of a childless wife in Babylon. Travel literature is full of information about the hardships endured by these women. At the 1925 Vatican missionary exhibition were displayed the horn bells which childlessnegresses must wear at the belt so that young wives are not infected by them.

Desire to possess a son is sometimes carried very far. Among the Mzaba people the husbands leave to make money, but recognise children born during their wanderings as their own: they consider that their wives have, in their own way, increased their property. Childless Yakut women permit their husbands everything, living in agreement with his concubines, while sick husbands look tolerantly at infidelity by their wives — because the position of decrepit, childless old men is frightful; the highest percentage of suicides is among them.

Legal bigamy exists in Korea and in Hindustan. Two wives are legal, but a third cannot be legal. In the Moslem world, divorces notably reduce the cost of polygamy. The Hindus also believe that such double matrimony does not detract from the principle of monogamy.

Chinese conditions and attitudes are interesting. They say of themselves that they are monogamous, intending by this the uniqueness of the head wife, “the first”, true wife. With her the Chinese stops — if he is poor. Chinese law even declares bigamy to be ground for divorce, releasing the second, illegally wedded wife.

But here is meant a case where a man has simultaneously wedded two women as “first” wives. And the second (in the absence of a son by the first) can only be one. And divorces are so easy that it is not even necessary to write a letter of divorce, it is sufficient to make a statement before witnesses. Children by concubines are subject to the authority of the first wife in the home, only the most recent Chinese legislation allows concubines certain rights over their children.

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292 "Misje Katolickie” 1925. P. 478.
293 Walk, op. cit, p. 267.
294 Fr. Tastevin, op. cit, p. 278.
295 "Misje Katolickie” 1925. p. 545.
296 Sieroszewski. "Dwanaście lat” op. cit. P. 298.
297 This is the theme of Carl Gjellerup's "The Pilgrim Kamanita”.
299 It is certainly not easy for a foreigner to distinguish concubine from "second" wife, hence the error evident in de Smedt, op cit., p. 166, to the effect that for the most part the Chinese have only one concubine (as if more would be unseemly).
300 Fr. L. de Smedt, op. cit, p. 164.
301 ibid, p. 166.
There is thus a basic difference between the Chinese and Hindu method of solving the problem, namely an ethical one. The Hindu is, it is true, under obligation (Manu law) to take a second wife if he has only daughters by the first, but he may not take as his second wife a woman whom the first does not wish; the second must have the first’s approbation, and it is not seemly to treat the latter contemptuously; and a wife may on no account be abandoned because of illness. In China, however, in practice it is not even necessary to preserve any appearances, and the taking of a second wife has in fact become an open and tolerated institution, a kind of concubinage unrestricted in numbers. Ku-Hung-Ming states that “in accordance with Chinese law, a man may have only one wife, but he may have as many concubines as he wishes”. Here the Chinese scholar forgot to put between the words “wife” and “but” the phrase “at a time” — since with the necessary sequence of divorces, it is permissible to have as many wives as one wishes. And Ku-Hung-Ming, in his view, pays Chinese women the highest compliment in these words: “The self-denial of the Chinese woman makes possible and permits her husband to take to himself a concubine without offending his wife”, for the true Chinese woman “has no self”. The seven Chinese grounds for divorce include — jealousy shown by the wife. And in her husband’s house a rich girl is at once given by her parents as part of her dowry two serving-girls destined to be concubines. So in China monogamy has become fictitious, all because of the obligation to have a son. But the emancipation of the family from the clan is already beginning and will constitute a revolution with the most far-reaching consequences — as Father de Smedt rightly says.

At advanced levels of culture, another method was devised to meet the lack of a son — adoption. Already known to the law of Sumeria and Babylon, it is very widespread in lands of Chinese civilisation, extending to the Annamites. In Korea a relative is adopted, but only from a younger line than one’s own. Japan recognises no limits, it is permissible to adopt anybody, and most extraordinary, the adoption may be withdrawn. “Somebody is adopted today to be disowned tomorrow, and replaced the day after that by somebody else”. A son-in-law is frequently adopted. He assumes the name of his wife’s family, entering into the rights but also the duties of a son towards his wife’s parents. If the marriage bond is broken, the relationship by adoption also ceases. For example, a student may be adopted and promised the wherewithall to complete his studies on condition he marries a daughter. In case of dissatisfaction, parting is permissible and if the family is in a position to do so, a new student may be adopted who will again enter his wife’s family.

On marriage law depends to a large extent family law — the attitude to children, the division of authority within the home, the unilateral or mutual character of laws and obligations, the extent and gradation of blood ties, etc. Moreover, different marriage laws contribute to the formation of differing ideas about work. A superfluity of women in the house led to laziness. When the men yielded to this vice, and threw the labour on to their wives and concubines, things were worse.

All polygamous societies are materially weak and, in the long run, ruined. Labour becomes a disgrace, idleness becomes the antisocial ideal. Not everywhere; for how to deny

304 “Semaine Internationale d’ethnologie religieuse”, op. cit., pp. 145, 146. It may be said in paranthesis that there are many resemblances between the family law of China and of the ancient Aztecs.
305 de Smedt, op. cit, p. 167.
309 "Anthropologie", op. cit., p. 520; F. Graebner takes refuge here in” matriarchy! 

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the laboriousness of Chinese or Japanese, who live in semi-polygamy? But wherever the woman is not sure of her position, where her marriage can be denounced, in all communities where there is divorce, from the Moslems to the German Protestants, a married woman becomes her husband’s first servant. A Japanese woman is not her husband’s companion and helpmate in life, she does not even sit down with him to table. And in Japan a father or mother-in-law may force a son to divorce his wife, whose position is thus in the highest degree uncertain. Any marriage subject to notice, if the right to give notice applies only to the husband, lowers the position of the woman in their life together. In the whole of the East, wives eat what the husband graciously leaves from his meal. The Yucatan woman of the Maya civilisation did not sit down to eat with her husband.

In China even the first legal wife holds a menial position. KuHung-Ming himself explains that “the Chinese ideal woman has a broom in her hand”. And he further enlightens us: “The Chinese letter for a wife is de facto made up of two elements: the first denotes a woman, the second a broom. In classical Chinese ... a woman is called overseer of the larder, lady of the kitchen”. Speaking plainly, in Chinese woman is written with a broom.

Various devices intended to ensure the wife’s fidelity exist under polygamy and bigamy. The harem system occurs in Korea. Seeing even male relatives is forbidden at opposite ends of the earth, among the Yakuts and the Brazilian Caboclos burdened by their still fresh traditions of polygamy. Penalties for infidelity are also more severe under polygamy. Among the Hittites, there was the death penalty for such women, among the Jews stoning — and among the Kabyle it is so to this day — in Korea she is sold into slavery, in China also, with the reservation that it must not be to her lover. The Koran does, it is true, contain extenuating regulations, but they have nowhere been put into practice. Only the primitive Semang of Malacca permit the woman to ransom herself with a ransom equal to that for murder. Here also belong the various face-veils used in the east not only by Moslems. It should also be added that not all Islamic women veil themselves, but Christians never do. In Mosul Syrian and Chaldean female inhabitants go without veils and entertain male guests.

It is only under monogamy that the resources of society are doubled by the cooperation of woman. Polygamous communities have always constituted the lower rungs in the progress of history, precisely because in them, woman is excluded from joining in the shaping of the triple law, and so has no say in the building up of society. And it is not only materially that polygamists lag behind; do not the categories of Truth and Beauty develop almost exclusively in monogamous societies? The experience of history teaches that under polygamy feminine mind and spirit declines — and male also.

Let us, finally, draw attention to a fact of general historical importance: polygamous societies nowhere rise above the clan system; they have been sunk in it for centuries. It is at first a strange circumstance that the feeling for the clan should not be at all weaker among polygamists: among Arabs the clan system even exists in towns.

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311 Fr. Georg Hoeltker, S.V.D., op. cit, p. 324.
312 Ku Hung Ming. op. cit, p. 63.
316 Hedin, op. cit, p. 348.
blood embrace very many people and the constant influx of new relatives is great, yet solidarity among kindred is preserved in the highest degree. The clan relationship assumes two levels: in a Yakut kargen (clan) a distinction is made between ie-usa, descendants of both common parents, and the wider aga-usa connection — descendants of a common father and all his wives. This differentiation between full and half-brothers and sisters, essential where there are many wives, divides families — yet clan organisation is at its strongest among them. This is explicable on grounds that it is their highest form of social organisation. Polygamists do not reach beyond tribal existence; only semi-polygamists found states of any size, and these based only on the clan system as in China.

Closing these considerations on family law in relation to the multiplicity of systems of community life, I would draw attention to the fact that matriarchy did not develop under polygamy. Although it might have seemed that all the physical conditions for it existed, polygamists have remained under the patriarchic system. A weighty instance of the powerlessness of physical factors if spiritual factors do not direct them.

**IV PROPERTY LAW**

On several occasions, in the preceding pages, property law has been discussed, and that from unavoidable necessity, since all three divisions of the triple law closely interact. Here the earlier remarks must be amplified, chiefly in order to make clear why I insist that from the beginning property was individual, despite the often-quoted four “communisms” — hunting, pastoral, sub-polar and negro. They are to be met with in every text-book; denial of their reality calls for explanation. None of the five varieties of the clan system was communistic. How inaccurate is therefore the widespread confusion of the property law of the clan with communism! With this prefatory comment, I pass to the four “communisms”.

A hunting form of existence leads to stagnation, as we have had occasion to show; thus if the huntsman’s conception of property had originally been communist, it would have been petrified in the hunting way of life. We know that when the Indians hunted bison collectively, they shared the meat according to where each man’s arrow hit it — and that it was only with firearms that the carcases became collective property. A large animal is usually hunted by a group, and even when the animal is small, it needs collective effort to get the most out of a given area, otherwise the animals escape. Today a huntsman cannot well manage alone, and it should be borne in mind that conditions were then such that the inhabitants of a certain area were obliged to satisfy their hunger with what they hunted; would the hunter succeed in feeding himself on his own? The most skilled occasionally return from the chase with nothing, the more often the longer a certain area is hunted. Partnership prevents hunger. Those who hunt together decide to treat the catch as common property, regardless of who hit the target and who missed; all share the carcase. Here is the beginning of so-called hunting “communism”. Fishermen are exposed to even greater risk, since fish fail often and unexpectedly. So fishermen everywhere, whether in Spain or in Poland, or other parts of the world, enter into partnerships.

In a given hunting or fishing settlement there may be more or fewer of these partnerships, or the entire settlement, particularly if not very numerous, may make up a single partnership, in which case everybody would have the right to draw on anybody else’s catch. Thus every Tunguz may take part in a feast arranged by a successful hunter, but on the

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318 Sieroszewski. "Dwanaście lat", op. cit., p. 293.
significant condition that he gives notice of his intention to be present. Thus some record was kept of who took how much and when, which is only to be explained in terms of partnership; we should say that an account was kept for each partner. Similarly among the Aino, in a settlement described by Sieroszewski, each fisherman catches fish for the whole settlement. When a group of fishermen returns from sea, they immediately make a division. Another instance, therefore, of a partnership split into groups, which in this case take turns to go out fishing. There is no communism here.

So-called sub-polar and negro communism is the result of a certain ethical outlook which — by a singular chance — reigns in these opposed spheres. According to this view, the individual should have only as much as he needs, and what he has above his needs he ought to distribute to those poorer than himself; in certain communities it is permissible to take such surplus for oneself if it is not voluntarily given. He who has more must give to others otherwise they will “steal” it from him, as the Christian missionary says. The same source also informs us of the effects of this ethical-property system. Thus on the Mulungussi, every African sows and plants as little as possible.

In the frozen north, among the Yakuts, he who sells hay has his allotment reduced by the clan authorities at the next allocation of meadows, the argument being that since he sells, he evidently has more than he needs. But opposition to such views is growing, and the prosperous “rich” are even beginning to give their daughters dowries in land. In Greenland they avoid an “excess” of the means of production. Anyone possessing tent or boat as his own property cannot inherit a second such object. In both cases, therefore, private property is fully acknowledged, only its growth is restricted in the interest of other, smaller property, also private.

Among the African Negroes, the principle is the same. Communism affects fire and water — and tobacco. “Among the Wadzhgan fire, water and tobacco are regarded as the immediate gift of the heavens, and so are treated as common property, and nobody may refuse these gifts when a stranger asks for them” (And do we refuse fire or water? Or tobacco among work-fellows and neighbours? Is this communism?) And in Terra del Fuego “a piece of material given to one is torn into rags and distributed”. This economic system is also known among Asiatics. We in Poland had ample opportunity to become acquainted with it when the Bolshevik hordes cut up into strips furniture-covers, curtains, carpets, etc. in order to share them “justly”. What was received from the shareout became personal property; there was absolutely no question of any kind of communism. It is the same in Central and Southern Africa. When a crowd of negroes surrounds a European, and one of them receives a present, it is immediately shared among his companions. Normally these are not objects of necessity (according to their ideas) but luxuries, and so possessions beyond their needs, or rather not needed. So that all this “sharing out” always concerns something which does not constitute property, according to the law of the clan, and is indeed restricted to the sector of casual gains outside the clan.

Even in the clan community enjoying reciprocal property rights the tradition of partnership was alive, for on request it was possible to have allocated what belonged to one “from one’s fathers”. It was permissible to leave the community and to withdraw one’s share,

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320 Sieroszewski. "Wśród kosmatych ludzi", op. cit.; "Dwanaście lat". op. cit.
322 Sieroszewski, "Dwanaście lat", op. cit., p. 279.
323 "Anthropologie", op. cit, pp. 542, 543.
324 Jakubski, op. cit, p: 266.
so that the principle of private property was never excluded. In the community the individual owner’s rights were not exercised until the owner requested it.

There often emerges a special property law designed to suit working conditions. It may include completely contrary factors. For example the Turanian and Slav-Turanian peoples keep cattle on the steppes, and trees may not be planted there, not even round a house: but the Indians hunt in the forests, and so protect against nomadism. In such conditions, would private ownership of relatively small areas of steppe or forest be feasible? It would be harmful. Ownership of nomadic territory lies with the whole nomadic tribe, and it is only between tribes that boundaries exist. But the herds and flocks are the property of the clans, and within the clans the property of the elder, or of the clan partners, and so strictly personal. On the other hand, where there is no forest economy, although the forests grow, they may belong to nobody and as a result appear to be communistic property. For example Professor Talko-Hryncewicz, living on the Russian-Mongolian frontier, received wood for nothing, only paying for delivery and sawing-up.326

Joint control of pastureland for the whole community is extended to the land itself, the ground; it would have been strange for one to be distinguished from the other. Moreover, on the steppes individual ownership of land is not allowed. Among the pastoral Yakuts, permission from the clan authority is required to fence in ground round a dwelling. But among the same Yakuts, even families “jointly owning land, jointly gathering hay, living under a single roof, feed their cattle separately” (just as they separately “eat their food, make their clothes and other gear”).327 Among the Todas wandering over the slopes of the Nilgiri Hills in India after their cattle, the herd is the property of the whole tribe, of all five of its clans, but the tents are the property of the fathers of families.328 There cannot, therefore, be any question of the absence of the idea of personal property.

And so there is no necessity to take refuge in the hypothetical survival of a primitive universal communism in order to explain present-day parish ownership of meadows, woods, etc. Mountain pastures are still owned jointly by the descendants of the old clan partners, and certain facts about communal property in the history of England and France are also to be explained by the old clanpastoral law. The matter is as simple as life: farmers keep a few cattle, and with a high density of population each man cannot own his own pasturage so they are communal, although every one of the cattle is somebody’s personal property. In Algeria farming imaziri (“men from the tilled fields”) are organised in karuba, with private ownership of the fields they till, but collective of grazings and pastures. Several karuba make up the taddert (village) which again owns certain lands communally.329

Unlike nomadic pastoralism, agriculture requires private ownership of land. Among all agricultural peoples the principle grew up that the owner of the ground is the man who first tills it: in the Koran, the man who first “sprinkles” and “feeds” it — that is introduces water. Thus actual work on the fields is also the farmer’s title to ownership. In Korea, where there is still ownerless land, the local primus possessidens enjoys a three-year freedom from taxation, and after five years becomes legal owner of the land worked (on the coast after ten years).330

The law of agricultural property has for long centuries been adapted to the types of the clan system and to the relevant features of clan property law. It is known that in over-populated lands — in China, or in Tuscany — agricultural property may be reduced to very

327 Sieroszewski. "Dwanaście lat", op. cit, p. 224.
328 Families — not clans, since there are more than five of them. The Todas are dying out. In 1880 they numbered barely 500; do they still exist? Marriage within the clan was forbidden. Krzywicki, "Ludy", op. cit., pp. 93, 97, 99, with the usual chaos in nomenclature.
tiny holdings. But among the Kabyle also, “apparently a fruit- or an olive-tree sometimes has several owners, each of whom tends and crops the one branch he has inherited.”

Ideas on the law of lease-hold may be regarded as a pointer to private property. In Korea, for example, there now obtains a system which in Polish could be called “smallholding”, that is where the landowners lease their property out in small parcels. It is the same with the Algerian Kabyle, who themselves gladly take leases from the Arabs.

Peoples who were originally pastoral are long unable to accustom themselves to individual ownership of land, even although they become agricultural. Yakuts understand the right of prima occupatio only as a right to temporary use, always with a reservation on the rights of the clan to which the first farmer belongs. “Even fields which have been cleared out of forest become clan property.” And “kindred watch vigilantly to make sure that the land is not appropriated by separate families”, because “according to Yakut ideas, land can never become private property”. There is a sharp struggle going on for and against the emancipation of the family. They are also unwilling to recognise leases. Regarding letting of land as evidence that its owner does not need it, they believe that it should be taken from him. In the same way the Arab shepherds in Algeria are passing over to agriculture, but complete individual ownership of land is unacceptable to them, despite the strong pressure of the French authorities. They hold to clan ownership — which is certainly not communism.

Similarly in Palestine the Jews — originally nomadic herdsmen — only had the use of a limited area of agricultural ground. The Zionist Congress held in Vienna in 1925 resolved that the land regained in Palestine must be the property of the Keren Hayemet (national fund), while the owner of the land was to be only a user. But forthwith with utmost lack of logic, these users lease their land to Arabs!

The institution of boundaries and marks followed from the fact of property in land. Among the Chinese, frontier posts and stones carried the mark of the clan; if kept up by tradition, it became the historical mark of the clan. It could be a linear mark, of straight or crooked lines, or a stylised drawing signifying a plant or animal. And here lies the origin of the “totem”, one of learning’s worst mistakes. Weird indeed is the connection between a property mark and so-called totemistic religion. Similar signs are in use to this day, the arms not only of clans, but of countries and states and nations have been made from them. Clearly a sign common to an entire clan was respected by the clan, the tribal mark by all members of the tribe; just as in our time the national flag is everywhere surrounded with respect. Nobody argues from this for the existence of a “totemistic-religious” cult of the white eagle. In the chosen mark there often lies the source of a later surname, since the clan was called after the mark it used. In Poland there is a multitude of names from mammals and birds, fish and insects, fruit trees and ordinary trees, bushes, herbs and flowers, offering plenty of opportunity for totemists!

Property law, adapted to family law, creates inheritance law. It enters so deeply into all relationships that of necessity it has already been discussed in all the earlier sections of this

331 Rostafiński, op. cit, p. 172.
334 Sieroszewski "Dwanaście lat", op. cit, p. 280.
335 ibid, p. 279.
336 ibid., p. 279.
337 Rostafiński, op. cit., p. 273.
338 Adherents of totemism recognise that these signs are property marks: “They also use it as their arms, paint, sculpt and draw it on their houses, on objects of use, and tattoo it on their persons” we read in Malinowski, “Wierzenia pierwotne i formy ustroju społecznego”, op. cit., p. 10. But not content with the factual side of the subject, a large superstructure, crowned by a totemistic religion, has been created by the meditative method.
chapter, beginning with the remarks on the clan system. For ethnologists ignorant of the variety of clan institutions, often too having false ideas about it, even the simplest manifestations become incomprehensible, and hence the invention of theories into which the facts are fitted. Unfortunately, in the process it is rare for reference to be made to a certain mental category with which the scholar should constantly reckon, namely common sense.

The variety of inheritance laws is great because there are no uniform combinations of descendants, ancestors, parents and coevals, relations and relatives, apart from the quantity of combinations in the law of inheritance affecting the widowed. What great variety was until recently contained in German laws of inheritance, different in each Land! Were missionaries and travellers to interest themselves in inheritance law there might perhaps appear to be no little variety among the primitive peoples also. This sector is, however, ignored, to the great loss of learning. The norms of inheritance are, in fact, the most significant sector in the methods of a system of communal life and the most instructive, throwing into simultaneous relief issues of both family and inheritance law. If we knew the laws of inheritance, we should dispense with more than one hypothesis which cripples scientific investigation.

V CLAN LAW AND THE TRIPLE LAW

Every clan had to arrange its affairs in such a way that clan property was not reduced but increased with every generation, since otherwise the clan must have ceased to exist. Since the capacity to grow richer was dependent on the number of male descendants, the clan had to

339 Here I am attacking matriarchy, and in its main fortress, in that island of Tobrianda, where the uncle is "head of matriarchal grouping", and his heir is not his own son, but his nephew, his sister's son (Malinowski, "Mutterrechtliche Familie und Oedipus-Komplex", op. cit., pp. 9. 31). Then who inherits from the father? Again children of his sister? Combinations the more singular in that this uncle "head under matriarchy", lives elsewhere, in another settlement (Malinowski, ibid, p. 32) — for in Tobrianda exogamy is the rule, and a wife follows her husband (Malinowski, ibid, p. 10). How are the two ideas to be reconciled?

None of the propounders of avuncular matriarchy has considered that a man with several sisters would be burdened by duties towards twenty or thirty children not his own and living in various parts of the island. All these nephews are his heirs, but if a man were to have no sisters, he would have no heirs. And what happens if a woman has no brother? But if she has several brothers, her matriarchal grouping would have several "heads", and her sons would inherit all over the island.

All this belongs to the realm of fairy-tales. Instead, the question should be asked: whose property are children in Tobrianda? How are fathers there persuaded to accept loss in favour of their wives' brothers? But as decision on a daughter's marriage is nevertheless the father's (Malinowski, ibid, p. 50), patently the father owns his daughter; the less likely is it that he would allow sons to be taken from him.

I mention all this in footnotes only, treating the matter as occasion offers, since the question of matriarchy has no basic importance for this book; I should not have to alter anything of its content were matriarchy to be proved a fact. On Freudianism there is nothing to be said. The "Oedipus-complex" and the rot are together worth as much as was once the "plica polonica" [tangled hair prevented from cutting by superstition] in medicine, also with a serious and ample literature of its own.

I draw attention to one further argument. Ethnologists are wont to inquire whether a young wife preserves her former name — i.e. of her clan — or whether she adopts her husband's and they pronounce accordingly for matriarchy or patriarchy. This is a strange error, for to this day there are no surnames anywhere in the world outside Latin civilisation and its field of influence. There are only names or nicknames. It is the same in Turkey, in Persia, in China and among the Bushmen, where a child is frequently given the name of a grandfather (and in Europe?). (Semaine internationale d'ethnologie, op. cit., p. 289.) A wife keeps her forename with us, not only in Korea or New Irelend. (Fr. A. Eckhardt, O.S.B., op. cit, t». 172. Semaine internationale, op.. cit. p. 238.) And as for "surnames" at low levels of civilisation, the learned are misled either by the mark ("totem") of a clan or tribe used for indicating boundaries and property, or by the tribal war-cry, unfortunately ignored by ethnology. A wife married into another clan, and the more so if into another tribe, may be known by her old maiden forename, but the goods which belong to her are henceforth indicated by the mark of her husband's clan, and she regards herself as part and parcel of that clan.
combat childlessness, particularly the absence of a son. A family without a son became in course of time parasitic on the clan. Only the emancipated family, economically self-sufficient and responsible only for itself — and so only after a long period of development — could break with the views obtaining in the clan on this matter.

If the question of descendants is always basic to marriage, in the clan system it must have been the more prominent, even glaring. Primarily the issue is whose property the children are to be. It was a simple matter under endogamy, but doubts could arise under exogamy, particularly in a marriage by purchase. The notion of a wife as property remained even among those peoples who turned from polygamy to monogamy, among the majority of Jews and some Turanians for example.

How many are the problems where, as among the Kaffirs, a wife may be bought on credit? Hire purchase is also not unknown. Strict accounts are kept with the father-in-law: on the Gold Coast descendants remain the father-in-law’s property until the son-in-law completes all the payments. A wife may also be obtained by working for her father, as is known from the Old Testament, and as can be observed today among the autochthons in Siberia (among the Yukagir to the father-in-law’s death), among the Hottentots, Bushmen and the Bergdama people in South Africa. In Indonesia the son-in-law pays by working for his father-in-law, but until he has cleared the entire debt any children born in the meantime belong to the father-in-law. In Indochina a higher stage has been reached, and marriage servitude ends with the arrival of a child. It is difficult not to regard labour of this son as a kind of purchase, although some do not wish to admit this.

It is a universal principle, under the clan system, that if a widow wishes to return to the clan of her birth, she may not take her children with her. This most valuable property must remain in the father’s clan.

The wife’s dowry also remains with the husband’s clan. In China a widow retains the use of property brought to her husband, but loses everything in the event of a second marriage. Since it is not permitted to any member of the clan to hold separate personal property to the disadvantage of the clan, it is not permitted to a wife to do so. The property of the clan is indivisible, remaining under the management of the clan elder. As we see in China there obtains (or at least in that part of China observed by Father de Smedt) a typical clan community. And if clans split up, property is divided among descendants to the exclusion of women. If a wife wants to appropriate something from the property of the clan (even, therefore, from her own dowry) it is permissible to leave or get rid of her.

Where a woman is regarded as her husband’s property, even adultery is looked upon primarily as interference with another’s property. Among the Indian Kandha, if a wife leaves her husband, the father-in-law should return the purchase-price to his son-in-law. Logically, also, the wife becomes inheritable property, and passes after her husband’s death to his nearest heir. The right of inheritance varies. Among many peoples, a brother is his brother’s heir, with the dead man’s father in second place and, in the absence of the father, an uncle. Widows are commonly inherited in this way in India, among the Iroquois and other American Indians, among the Congo Africans, the Melanesians, Chukchi and Koryaks and among the

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341 ibid., pp. 258, 267.
342 Deniker, op. cit., p. 294.
343 E.g. L. Ehrlich, op. cit., p. 185.
344 The father’s property right to children is strongly indicated in primitive societies organised in seclusions: a child’s membership of a seclusion is determined by his father’s membership. This is the case even among the Arunta of Central Australia, among the people whose institutions constitute a pillar of the doctrine of matriarchy. Malinowski, “Wierzenia pierwotne”, op. cit., p. 7, did not notice the illogicality.
345 Fr. de Smedt, op. cit. pp. 162, 166, 167.
Hassidim Jews in Poland; it was also the case in Egypt. Among the Chukchi not an elder but a younger brother always takes a widow.\(^{347}\) But the question arises whether the term “brother” does not here bear a wider meaning.

In the thirteenth century among the Mongols, a son could take all his father’s wives (except his own mother), and a brother all his brother’s.\(^{348}\) A quite different form of inheritance existed among the Hittites, probably also in Assyria, and has been preserved among the Russian people, where it is known under the old name *snochachestvo*. Whereas among the Jews only a childless widow was inheritable, in Assyria this restriction did not exist and inheritance was two-sided, since a sister-in-law was also under obligation to accept a widower brother-in-law. But where there were no other relatives, the father received his widowed daughter-in-law. (In Babylon, widows were not inheritable).\(^{349}\) All these various ways in which widows were inherited are known by the word leviratc. This passes for a survival of polyandry even in Deniker,\(^{350}\) but groundlessly. I suggest that the following explanation is simpler, closer to actual conditions and more general. Among the Jews children conceived as a result of the levirate were legally the children of the dead husband, and in the Bible the purpose of the levirate is even explained as being to enable the brother to save his brother’s seed from perishing. This is, therefore, no simple inheritance, not merely a legal but a moral obligation, of an abstract kind, for the leviratic husband often harmful, since with the arrival of a child he himself ceased to be his brother’s heir. This is easy to explain in terms of intellectual and moral evolution, as progress; but how to explain it by polyandry?

Whether variations in the levirate have their origin in differing orders of inheritance, in differences in hierarchies of inheritance, special investigations will finally decide; now one can only point the problem. If ethnology takes an adequate interest in inheritance laws among primitive peoples, our successors will be enabled to form an exact view of a matter to which I have already drawn attention in this chapter — at the end of the second section — namely the effect of the clan system on the triple law (in the two subsequent sections more than one detail confirms the relationship between them). Different clan systems reveal themselves in different norms of the triple law, which last for long centuries on end, even after the disappearance of the clan organisation which produced them. Here I should like to amplify these reflections, using examples unconnected with the preceding arguments.

Strong insistence on primogeniture, characteristic of so many peoples, calls for investigation whether it does not in fact originate with ancestral observance of primogeniture in the clan. And we meet this arrangement in ethnic fields as distant as possible from even the most distant influence of Roman law. Among the Annamites, for example, the father’s house passes to the first-born and the elder of the clan is the first-born of the previous elder by the head wife (so-called “first”); authority is thus retained by the oldest branch of the clan. It presumably rarely happens that this elder is simultaneously the oldest in years among the kindred; as a rule it is not so, and it may happen that the *primogenitus* is a child.\(^{351}\) There is nothing strange here with the history of European dynasties before us.

In the inheritance law of certain peoples we find exceptional privileges for the first-born, who receive a double share. This was known from the Jewish law of the Old Testament, and has recently been discovered in ancient Assyrian law.\(^{352}\) In the Congo, on the other hand, among the Ngbandi, brothers of a deceased man inherit before his first-born son. We shall call

\(^{348}\) Marco Polo, op. cit, p. 25.
\(^{350}\) Deniker, op. cit, p. 294.
\(^{351}\) Cadière. op. cit.. pp. 221, 222.
this law of inheritance by generation, because it is adapted to hierarchy by generation (which has already been discussed).\textsuperscript{353} In this case also it happens that the youngest member of the elder (previous) generation may be considerably younger than the oldest members of the younger, succeeding generation.

With hierarchy by generation goes on occasion — how often is not known — a curious provision in family law, namely that marriage may not be contracted between people of the same branch of a clan, which is easily explained as a manifestation of struggle against the inbred family; but in addition persons belonging to two different generations of two different branches may not marry. It is a question of not spoiling the hierarchy of the generations. This is the practice in China.\textsuperscript{354} The instances quoted nevertheless permit clan endogamy, provided the inbreeding family is not allowed to emerge. And here again it is necessary to clarify the terms used. In this book the inbreeding family derives not only directly from the same family, but in addition from the same branch of the clan, and while the tradition of a not far-distant common ancestor is still living; when this is effaced, I consider the union belongs to clan endogamy, like unions between persons of various branches of the same clan; and only unions outside the clan, between persons of different clans, should be regarded as true exogamy. It would seem that conscientious differentiation between these three degrees would be helpful in ethnological research.

Indications are not lacking that it is in this way that clans and tribes differentiate in these matters. In Korea people with the same clan battle-cry may not marry unless they can show that their ancestors have lived from time immemorial in different places.\textsuperscript{355} All peoples, more or less primitive, recognise legal impediments to marriage, although not all fortify themselves with seclusions: and there is much variety in detail. In “pre-Columbian” America the Aztecs had one set of impediments, the Mayan peoples another (even views on incest differed).\textsuperscript{356} And contemporary primitive peoples reveal much variety which on closer study would certainly throw light on more than one dark corner of ethnology.

Let us now return to the question whether the exogamous wife was her husband’s property, and consider it in relation to the variety of clan systems. In the primitive clan comprising on the average three generations, while the founder of the clan, known to all from babyhood as the father and grandfather who has brought them all up, is still alive and exercising authority, it is no offence to anybody that grandfather is owner of all and everything. But when this same authority later appears in the form of clan despotism, if all the women are to be the property of the elder, who among the younger generation would buy a wife? Perhaps it is for this reason that among certain peoples parents exert themselves to obtain daughters-in-law? It may or may not be so; in some clan-despotisms property in children and their wives may be exacted with absolute consistency, whereas elsewhere the germ of the future emancipation of the family may lie in ownership of his descendants’ wives not by the elder but by their husbands even in their elder-father’s lifetime. It would be the only property permissible to them before the splitting-up of the clan.

Absolute consistency on ownership of wives is found among some peoples organised into clan communities. Two cases are known. When the Chukchi found a new clan community, several (from two to ten) men of more or less the same age, not brothers, nor from the same tent, meet and grant each other the right to reciprocal use of their shares of the property, including their wives. The children of such a grouping are regarded as brothers and

\textsuperscript{353} de Jonghe, op. cit, p. 244. I do not understand how he could, on the preceding page, mention primogeniture in this connection.

\textsuperscript{354} Fr. de Smedt, op. cit, p. 155.

\textsuperscript{355} Fr. Andreas Eckardt O.S.B. "Die Familie in Japan und Korea" — in "Semaine internationale d'ethnologie religieuse", op. cit, p. 172; does the author not speak too hastily of "surnames" here?

\textsuperscript{356} Fr. Hoeltker S.V.D., op. cit, pp. 323, 324.
sisters and may not inter-marry. This does not, however, amount to the introduction of “sexual promiscuity”, since from the first choice of the men to the restrictions on the children, precautions are taken against the inbred family, even endogamy being rejected. All that happens is the foundation of a new clan centre, which is intended to become a clan community: this interpretation may also be deduced from the fact that the centre takes upon itself the duty of revenge for its members.\textsuperscript{357} Whether all communities among the Chukchi order their relation to women in this way, whether it is one which is generally accepted or only permitted — and whether it occurs with increasing or decreasing frequency — is not known. Precisely the same arrangement is met under an entirely different sky, among the African Hereros where it is called \textit{upanga}.

Since it is not ethnology I am writing, such partial use of the sources must suffice, although many other variations could be discovered. And let us always bear in mind that under the clan system either monogamy or polygamy may obtain, apart altogether from the very varied status — elevated or debased — of women. Thus clan law (itself so varied) enters by innumerable roads and paths into the spheres of marriage, family, property and inheritance law, opening before us enormous departments of ethnology and prehistory.

I was only concerned to show that on these levels people’s ideas and conceptions diverge; here is the genesis of the plurality of even primitive civilisations.

\textsuperscript{357} For example in New Ireland, an island in Oceania ("New Mecklemburg" between 1885-1919), "Semaine internationale", op. cit, p. 231; it was the same with the Mayan Peoples, Fr. Hoeltker, S.V.D., p. 322.
CHAPTER IV

ASSOCIATIONS AND SYSTEMS

I

SYSTEM IN THE QUINCUNX OF SOCIETY

We have traced what is common to the beginnings of all civilisations and how far these common elements extend. They prove to be extremely few in number. Not everybody even knows how to kindle fire, and the keeping of domestic cattle is not general. And from the beginning people have differed under differing clan systems and differing systems of the triple law. Are there, therefore, not more resemblances than differences?

Only when one gives up trying to include the whole of humanity does the number of differences decline and more common features appear. Thus in our considerations we may confine “humanity” to those societies which know how to kindle fire and keep domestic animals; we may make a still smaller sector of humanity the object of research, confining ourselves for instance to societies which have passed from clan communities to clan despotisms, from polygamy to quasi monogamy, from pastoralism to agriculture — when the number of points of development in common increases considerably. Similarly, the generalisation could be made that in every culture without exception a tradition and an ethic — some kind of tradition, some kind of ethic — must emerge, but when one begins to describe them, not similarities but differences appear. It might be said that the resemblances are algebraic, and after the value has been stated differences appear, that only in narrower groupings does humanity reveal more concrete community.

Those who do not know how to kindle fire are exceptional and already so few that we may leave them out without committing any serious falsification of reality. Those who have not domesticated any animal are it is true quite numerous, but are off the main tracks to any kind of higher development, so that they may in any classification be treated as people from another world. Confining ourselves to kindlers of fire and keepers of domestic animals, we may assert that differentiation in their communal life began with differentiation in the clan system and the triple law. These are the two fundamental things in any kind of historical development; on these bases in fact everything which is human rests.

There are thousands of questions and thousands of complications, increasingly involved as development proceeds. At innumerable and most varied levels the triple law continues a development which appears to be without limit, but alongside it, numerous other departments of law appear. On the bases which have been described in the preceding chapters a structure has arisen resembling both a pyramid seeking the sky and a labyrinth. How to count and how to include all that is human? In what abbreviation can the material and moral heritage of thousands of years be represented to the mind? What formula will embody all the possibilities of communal life of all countries and all times?

It is impossible to follow stage by stage from the emancipation of the family from the clan to the Improvisation in Mickiewicz’s “Forefathers” and aeroplane flight. One must observe the organisation of human things as a whole, seize hold of some leading thread,
examine lines making for understanding of the composition and ordering of things and affairs, collect observation points offering refuge from chaos. In a word, our argument must be generalized.

No broader or more many-sided generalisation of human affairs exists than that in the small catechism for children which teaches that man consists of soul and body. Let us take this as a starting point for our conclusions and discussions.

Body and soul make up man and all that is human and bears any kind of relation to man; all this possesses form and content, an internal and an external side. Fullness of life requires both, for the failure of one leads to dislocation of the whole. To the internal, spiritual side of life belong the concepts of Good (morality) and Truth; to the bodily, health and prosperity; in addition there exists the category of Beauty common to body and soul. There is no manifestation of life which does not bear some relation to one of these categories, often to two or more. Here every fact and every opinion belongs.

There thus exist five categories of human being. Unceasing reciprocal relations make up as it were their organisation. And where there is organisation, there is hierarchy. Now for a Christian the hierarchy in this our quincunx is of course straightforward, since first place obviously belongs to morality and the spiritual categories in general have priority over the bodily — but in life it is only exceptionally that exclusive choice occurs between one and the other, since reality joins them in the unity of earthly being.

It is only exceptionally a duty to neglect the body. In periods when the exception becomes the rule (even if in the name of the loftiest motives) great disadvantages rapidly ensue, not only in physical categories, but in spiritual categories as well. Such generations occur, but history shows that characters are spoiled. Neglect of the body leads commonly to lowering of the spirit. Is it possible to imagine sanctity in dirt? As a rule the principle of a healthy soul in a healthy body is binding, and Buckle’s statement has not lost its force: “The pleasures of the body are, in our actual condition, as essential a part of the great scheme of life, and are as necessary to human affairs as are the pleasures of the mind”.358

The whole point is that the pleasures of the body should be of such a kind as not to stand in the way of the pleasures of the spirit. In the spiritualised man, the man who is properly developed, this happens of itself, as it were automatically.

It is a fact that in life these five categories ceaselessly mingle, constantly impinging one upon the other. There are exceptions who arrive at spiritual heights by torturing their own bodies, but they are the exception confirming the rule. It is only too easy to see that excessive popularisation of asceticism leads to caricature. The state of health affects the mental state; the healthy man will as a rule soar higher in spirit than the sick man — and as important — can remain longer on the heights of the spirit. And correspondingly, a lofty mental state is the most powerful lever for lifting a burden of physical misery. He who needs illness in order to think of eternal things is not normal; it may be said indulgently of such a one that better ill than never. Naive minds and incompletely-instructed heads confuse prosperity with materialism. Yet it is possible to be a high idealist in considerable comfort, and for the generality what more desirable than that idealists should dispose of considerable funds to realise their ideals. If I were to write a treatise on morality, I should devote a separate section to showing that to strive for prosperity is a moral duty, a raising of morality. The extent to which prosperity favours development of spiritual resources was already very well known to Nicholas Copernicus. He was the first to remark that base money brings with it a shortage of artists, scholars and even good artisans.359

Thus bodily categories are not to be treated exclusively as opposites of the spiritual categories. They complement each other very well, and it is just this that normal life demands. If body and soul stand opposed to each other, if health and prosperity weaken the spirit, there is patently dislocation, derangement, perhaps even degeneration. The view that mutual exclusiveness between soul and body is something natural in the earthly life of man is entirely mistaken. On the contrary, such a formulation of the antithesis is abnormal. Wherever we meet it, we know that an unnatural, sickly condition exists.

Let us look at the monasteries on Mount Athos: they may serve to witness that a man cannot cultivate the categories of the spirit alone, disregarding the bodily. On Mount Athos priests have never engaged in agriculture, mining, building or kindred occupations of Western European monks. On Mount Athos only supernatural Truth and spiritual Good are cultivated. What caricatures have resulted from this, and what caricatures of religious orders have spread thence throughout Orthodoxy!\(^{360}\) Apparently Chinese philosophy refuses discussion of bodily categories, yet no country has less of the spirit than China.

Some unyielding law requires that man, composed of body and soul, must perfect himself in both parts of his being or decline in both. Any perfecting of one category of life leads to the establishment of connections with other categories; if this does not happen, a standoff ensues even in the category in which excellence is desired. How deeply, for example, Beauty enters into all categories! The aesthetic of daily life is no slight aid to hygiene, and every applied art is also a source of earnings. Beauty enters no less into the categories of the spirit. Why should Truth or Good be ugly or boring? The Renaissance cured us of the superstition that virtue could only be expressed by an ugly body, emaciated with fasting, withered and if possible tormented. Since the Renaissance there has been an obligation to give the categories of Good and Truth a beautiful exterior. These two spiritual categories are harnessed together, morality, mother of duty, contributing to the cult of Truth and in return, love of Truth elevating morality.

The perfection of man thus demands solicitude for all the categories of life. But life does not everywhere and always possess all five categories. They become articulate in only a small fraction of humanity, so that it is only rarely that there exists the fullness of life, or more accurately the possibility of reaching that plenitude. Even in fortunate lands and times only a minority of the population attains it.

Let us only glance at the Orient, how foreign to it as a whole is the scientific way of looking at things, of judging life’s problems from a scientific point of view. Investigation of natural truth does not exist for Asiatics; but they like to deceive themselves that morality can develop without devotion to the discovery of truth. The Hindu thinker is prepared to consider the whole of our science as a manifestation of materialism because he has no understanding of scientific discovery, accepting only inventions and seeing only the practical results of applied science. He knows steam and electric machinery, but not physics. The Hindu, the Korean, the Chinese boast that their thought is directed more to the spiritual side of life, cares less for earthly prosperity. But they are empty words, for in the field of morals their thought, unexercised in the abstract, has halted at formulae without living content. The whole secret of the history of Asia lies in this failure to reach fullness of life, and “the renaissance of Asia” will remain an empty phrase until Asiatics possess all five categories of life.

In any case, life complete on all sides is extremely rare. As a rule one or other category is made less of, and the perfecting of life does not take place in all directions uniformly. Universality is the more difficult because the degrees of developing life are unlimited. Many complicated tangles are involved for each category of life is composed of numerous divisions, and the more highly developed the category the more numerous these

\(^{360}\) Fr. Marcin Czermiński. "Na górze Athos, wśród mniszej republiki". objaśniony 57 rycinami i mapą Athosu”. Cracow 1908.
divisions are. While they add to the complexity of life, the loftier mind masters them the more easily, and employs them in greater quantity.

In the absence of universality, development of life is determined by the many-sidedness of its possibilities, and the nearer these come to universality the more perfect the pattern of life.

This perfecting process grows more complex as it increasingly affects each of the five categories of life. The higher the level of existence, the more categories go to its composition and the more involved their impingement upon each other.

In the best regulated life there is harmony of all five categories; in a well regulated life harmony of those of which the given life consists. The ideal of universality with nothing left out remains a dream. A man must limit himself. It is better to leave out some part of this or that category, some fraction of the human quincunx, even to make one’s existence defective by almost entirely leaving out one of the four categories (the Good excepted) than to permit disharmony in that complex of categories against which we propose, are able or perhaps even obliged to live out our lives. Order and organisation are the condition of a sound pattern of life, private and public, whether for family, community or State.

But it is never possible completely to leave out both bodily categories or both spiritual categories from a pattern of life. Rejection of both health and prosperity turns life into an experiment in empty phraseology; while rejection of truth and morality is tantamount to bestialisation. Hence the plain conclusion that communal life stands higher the more categories and, within these, the more divisions it embraces; and the greater the harmony reigning among them.

When the rules of the quincunx of humanity are set forth in this way — in exclusive reliance on historical experience and so on the inductive method — we see that the categories of life may arrange themselves in very various relations, orders and proportions. “Humanity” harbours the most various opinions and fantasies about Truth, morality and Beauty, even about prosperity and (most curious) even about health. With this fact in mind, let us now move to the next link in our chain of inquiry.

II NATURAL ETHICS

Having defined the five categories of the quincunx of mankind we can in the further course of our investigations draw upon every kind of manifestation of communal life. In the first place let us put the category of morality, if only because ethics accompany man from his primitive beginnings, as passing references in earlier chapters indicate, and also exercises a great influence, often decisive, on other categories of being.

There are ethics and ethics, however, and this diversity must therefore be considered. Every type of clan association had institutions proper to it alone and unknown or at least not recognised in others. A thin which was considered proper somewhere from generation to generation acquired binding force. But in the name of ethics or of law?

Ethics consists in the voluntary fulfilment of duties, in consent to them without compulsion from outside. Could the oldest associations have arisen otherwise than voluntarily? Power to compel was required only in more numerous associations embracing several generations. Then those who were dissatisfied with the norms of the triple law accepted in their clan, and wanted to base the clan on other standards which they considered superior, had the road of emigration open to them. They could found a new clan of their own preference; but if they did not wish to emigrate, could one and the same clan be governed by differing norms? Such a clan would either collapse and perish, passing from disorder to powerlessness, or both sides would have to resort to compulsion, and so to force.
Thus ethics are older than law, and law rests on the sanctions of compulsion for the recalcitrant. Only in this way do the ethical obligations recognised in an association change into obligations before the law. Law which emerged in this way was empirical and lent sanction to ethical postulates already recognised. *A posteriori* law is also for the most part derived from, and intended to uphold ethics. This is ethical law.

But in prehistory there already existed the law *fas et nefas* formulated not merely without but in direct opposition to ethics. This was, therefore, an artificial law not resulting from actual normal conditions but designed to change them, and to order the association in accordance with ideas not so far known to it or at least not recognised by it. In this case the idea came first and then the law derived from it to create artificially binding conditions. Thus *a priori* law comes into existence to give sanction to projected conditions, not to those already existing.

Partnerships and clan communities arose by force of the circumstances of life itself, and in them law developed from ethics, from a conviction of the correctness and necessity of certain regulations in given conditions. There would have been no communities or partnerships if the first generations had not voluntarily submitted to certain standards. The institutions of these associations were empirical, elaborated out of experience, ethics based on tradition, law on ethics.

But clan despotism arose from violation of tradition and ethics, despite the ethic of the association, resting from the first on compulsion. There would have been no clan despotisms if physical force had not brought them in; they were the creation of somebody’s will setting itself against conditions. Whereas associations arose as it were of themselves, brought about by the circumstances of life, despotisms were devised and determined from above. These were *a priori* institutions.

Primitive-clan-ethics bind only in the case of one’s own people. The highest commandment is clan solidarity; and so it has remained. In Korea one does not summon a kinsman before the courts, so that there is “almost no possibility of getting back from a kinsman a loan or even something which has been stolen” unless this is done voluntarily, on grounds of ethics alone. So that in the clan the ethical may be carried to unethical absurdity. Ethics condemns theft and ethics condemns suing for theft! Here the clan authorities had lost their validity, while the State had not yet acquired any. Among the Yakuts a deliberately unjust verdict to the advantage of a kinsman is taken for granted. Twelve respected householders committed perjury in court, but regarded themselves as justified because the case concerned a kinsman. On the other hand, when a man finds himself outside this organisation he is by the same token outside society and as if exempted from the law. A certain Circassian put this very well: “I don’t know anybody, sir. My brothers were killed in the war. My kindred have gone to Turkey. I am left like a lone wolf and nobody troubles about me”.

Because of this unbounded solidarity, revenge is indispensable to the clan system, lying in its very nature, its highest duty. Revenge is, however, undoubtedly an institution of ethical origin. It arose in the name of right, in order that justice might be done, and crime not go unpunished. But there is no law which would be capable of making certain that a man does everything in his power to take revenge. Here legal compulsion is impossible of exercise. And yet there is no place where revenge has not flourished. All European communities have passed through a period of vendetta, which in Corsica and in the Balkans endured until recent times. Among coloured peoples it is almost everywhere still operative (in China curiously transformed into suicide by the injured party, whereafter the offender is boycotted). Today we

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know of revenge among the Kabyls, among all the Semites, Yakuts, Indians, Australians, Syrians, in Korea, in China, in Mauretania, in Oceania.

In Japan revenge was officially regulated: “The avenger had to observe certain written procedures and directives. There was a separate official who was to be informed of the decision taken, and the term one set oneself for carrying out revenge. The method of exterminating the enemy was a matter of indifference; but murder was considered something blameworthy”. Clearly revenge was regarded not only as a law but also as a duty, since an office of the State was drawn into the matter.

The ethical obligation of revenge comes through Sieroszewski’s remarks on the Yakuts: “Members of a clan on whom there weighed unavenged blood suffered and withered like people in an inner conflict. Legends paint for us immensely tragic pictures of these clans, infected in the very marrow of their being, sick and harrassed, blossoming only after satisfaction has been exacted. A clan which had no avengers perished in those times as a not very brave individual perishes among beasts of prey”.

And in Western Australia, when a man is called upon to avenge the death of a very near relative “until he carries out this task he is mocked without respite by the old women; if he is married, his wives immediately leave him; if he is a bachelor no young woman will exchange a word with him. His mother will shed tears over such an unworthy son and his father will despise him. There will be no end to the reproaches”.

The unceasing upheavals of revenge made it easier for Europeans to conquer the coloured peoples. Everywhere the white man appeared his help was sought by tribe against tribe, sometimes by clan against clan. “In the story of the first Yakut hunters who reached the watershed of the Kolyma it is said that the clan decided to avenge itself for the murder of one of its members but did not feel strong enough, so called in the Russians to help”. And from his memories of Sahara-Mauretania a French officer relates how at the outpost “chiefs would arrive, telling us of their time-honoured quarrels, each begging for help against his enemies”.

The extent to which revenge lies within the very nature of the clan system is witnessed by the experience which an Apostolic Vicar, Mgr Costamagna, had with the converted Jivaros. On November 2, 1902, they promised that they would desist from taking revenge, and by the end of the month “new quarrels and butcheries broke out”. Do not let us imagine that revenge is now weaker than formerly. Among the Arabs it has actually increased in cruelty in the last generation.

It is the experience of all countries that in the end vengeance degenerates into general banditry and unceasing anarchy, in face of which public security and stable conditions lapse. So that until a State organisation is created and the State takes upon itself the duty of revenge, systems of a higher type are out of the question. It would lead us too far afield to enumerate the difficulties involved, which cannot everywhere be overcome.

Clan revenge must with time pass to the tribe, and tribal revenge “develops” into war. And so it is that primitive warfare is of ethical origin, undertaken to avenge crimes. And then, as in the case of clan revenge, it becomes impossible to discover among the details and complexities on whose side justice lies. In the dawn of history war was a chronic state:

364 It was found among the “Assanides” by Adam Grabowski. "Wśród gór i pustyń Colesyrii". Bytom 1924. P. 171.
368 ibid.
369 Psichari, op. cit, p. 93.
abandoning the backward glance at ethics, on the model of its parent revenge it became universal banditry, but on an incomparably larger scale. And peoples inadequately armed for aggression perished among the aggressors. These are the gifts of natural ethics — for the whole of this ethic is natural, with revenge as the crown of its development.

Let us pass to family law. Natural ethics were incapable of devising a suitable system for marriage, but performed its task by abasing women — the Romans only excepted. Are we not struck by that exclusive concern for heirs? Marriages, unless they are religious, know no other purpose. And hitherto sacred marriage is still unknown in Turkey, in China, in Japan. But in Rome a wife was her husband’s companion and helpmate in life exactly as, it must be admitted, she is under Christianity. Under Roman civilisation man achieved by natural reason the discovery of ethical truth consonant with ethics of a supernatural order. The Roman virgin, wife and matron have no cause to feel shame in the presence of Christian women, even by the most severe standards. But outside Rome the ethical side of marriage presents a sad picture, reflected in the drastic examples quoted above. Everything rested upon the supremacy of the man, even the very concern for purity of the marriage-bed.

Passing to property law, we find once more — the Romans again apart — ugly instances of abuse grounded in ownership of children and wife. I have already drawn attention to the fact that ethical views are the basis of variety in property law; in all probability property law would be uniform if ethical views were uniform. Differentiation in ethics contributed to differentiation in very many other manifestations of communal life throughout the categories of our quincunx.

In property matters, ethical views are split. Natural protoethics recognises, for example, work as a source of property (he who first “feeds” the land, etc.), but does not favour harder work: why own more than one needs, when there may not be enough for somebody else? The result is that fresh needs do not develop and a whole community is sunk in poverty for centuries. If every man is to be deprived of what he possesses above the normal needs of the community, the ideal of equality in property must result, and this can only be realised by maintaining the lowest material level. It is regulation of consumption in the name of ethics by suppression of production.

The principle that property is to be derived from labour is as it were smashed in two, since the fruits of labour may become the property of the labourer only on condition that he does not work overmuch, that his work does not become more productive. The absurd ban on work beyond the level of actual need is by no means a discovery of our days: known in prehistoric times, it has the longest possible history behind it. The value of the system can be observed among negro tribes. Where here and there a system was created which allowed each man to collect the fruits of his labour in unrestricted quantity, entirely different systems of communal life developed, producing the historic societies, active and capable of cultivating the whole quincunx of human life.

Such are the paths of natural ethics in their most important directions. For the greater part they are properly not paths but bye-ways. Natural ethics does not lead mankind upwards. “It prevents a community raising itself to the rank of a society because by cultivating poverty it leaves no room for differentiation in property and occupation; it prevents the emergence of States of a higher type because revenge buries communities and even societies in lasting anarchy.

Primary importance, however, attaches to the fact that from the very beginnings to the peaks of development, spiritual factors guide even concepts of the material. Here again we discover that abstractions govern matter. Ethical phenomena cannot, therefore, be regarded as a kind of sanctions for advantages which are gained the more safely because under the protection of ethical slogans. In revenge the avenger exposes himself to great danger, while
the practice of “negro communism” involves loss. In these matters there is not, and cannot be an infallible penal sanction. It is all done in the name of duty.\footnote{Compare “The dependence of economic life on ethics” by Feliks Koneczny in the collective “Życie gospodarcze a ekonomika społeczna” (vol. II “Biblioteka Polskiego Towarzystwa Ekonomicznego we Lwowie”). Lwów 1933.}

Having stated above that all five categories of being by their very involvement produce immensely lavish differentiation, let us adduce by way of example the mutual interaction of the categories of morality and prosperity. The relation of concepts belonging to these two categories has more than once shaken the world, and shakes it today. Perhaps this is after all the most important of the axes on which communal life rests. They are ridiculous who imagine themselves among the first makers of this axis which is as old as the world.

Since the number of possible combinations in the quincunx of being is unlimited, upon what condition do these combinations arrange themselves so as to create a stable association, capable of development?

\section{III \ THE CONDITION OF COMMENSURABILITY}

Let us suppose that in a certain clan a section of the members want to remain in partnership, while part set up a community, and still others organise themselves into a despotism, and let us assume that some recognise the succession of the clan elder and so also the general right of inheritance by primogeniture, others, however, by minorate, let us add that one lot lives in monogamy, the other in polygamy; one recognises as property all earnings from labour, while the others take away everything over and above necessities — and all this in one and the same clan. Far from surviving under a joint economy, such a clan would clearly disintegrate at once.

It cannot be claimed that any of the institutions referred to is unsuited to organisation of the clan; they are all potentially equal to it. An adherent of any of them could found and organise a prosperous clan — provided it was on its own, provided all the standards did not meet in a single association. It is clear that some kind of law must be introduced into every association which is to hold together. But laws cannot be selected haphazard. Laws inconsistent with one another cannot exist side by side at the same time, for in that case also nothing will endure.

An association governed in accordance with two or more systems of the triple law cannot exist; in any one association only one system of the triple law can be in force. The standards of this triple law must be so chosen that they are all commensurate, composing one system of the triple law. For how can a system be evolved where nothing is commensurate — a clan community, for example, be organised under polygamy? For this standard of marriage law, clan despotism is the answer, otherwise branches of the same family would fly apart, to say nothing of branches of the clan. On the other hand, would monogamy have survived without personal property? Here each father acquires personal and hereditable property for himself. The triple law must, therefore be consistent, and only those societies have developed which have fulfilled this basic law of history.

But does keeping to a system of the triple law suffice? What order would reign in a clan each branch of which held to a different measure of time? And in such case would not the difference insinuate itself even among members of the same branch?

And what would happen when it came to regulating time? Those knowing how to save time and to observe dates would be let down by associates to whom time was indifferent, and after a time the latter would become parasites upon the former. Yet it is unlikely that men
would long allow themselves to be exploited in this way — such a clan would rapidly split in two.

Even so, a common system of the triple law together with a uniform measurement of time and a uniform method of regulating it is not enough. There remains the attitude to the five categories of being. Could an association develop and flourish in which contrary and mutually exclusive views obtained on morality, with consequent emergence of differing views on justice, on the education of children, on egoism and altruism, and finally on the mutual relation of the sexes and the very essence of the family? Where there is divergence in such fundamental matters, what kind of association could there be, unless for the purpose of mutual extermination? Thus for an association to endure and develop, ideas on the five categories of being, or on as many of these categories as exist in a given association, must be commensurate. Systems of approach to the quincunx of human being are also decisive for the association. Conflicting systems lead to hostility, often waking an urge to mutual extermination.

It is the rule that a struggle between associations occurs when conflicting systems of the quincunx and triple law find themselves in immediate proximity. On the other hand, the drawing together of small associations with the same system or with similar commensurate systems leads to the formation of larger associations. In this way tribes emerge from clans and peoples from tribes. All the questions we asked ourselves a short time ago when examining the problem whether people of varied outlook who bring with them to the clan different incompatible institutions can nevertheless create permanent common clan associations — all these questions arise again when it comes to the problem of the conditions in which a tribe emerges. Exactly the same considerations apply here as to the creation and establishment of the clan, and again when it comes to the possibility of tribes coming together into peoples.

If communal life is to be enduring and effective, there must be commensurateness in the structure of the association, which means that the success of an association is the greater the more uniform the system to which members hold in the management of their lives. When in a given association there is only partial commensurateness of system, when system encroaches upon system, then life is all confusion, since one category of being may be governed in accordance with one system and a second category with another. In such an association culture of action must fall ever lower, until it reaches the point when the associated members are unable to bring themselves to a single reasonable action. There can be no system without order in thought and action, and the absence of it must in the end be strikingly apparent and lead to equally striking tensions within the association; the greater they are, the more violent must be the symptoms of disorder.

Study of the old but hitherto unutilised ethnological treasury of Bastian provides interesting and highly instructive examples. The Asiatic and African countries described by him were inhabited by groups of clans rarely reaching the level of the tribe. Material he assembled in the third quarter of the last century reveals most varied forms of the triple law and of the (defective) quincunx among neighbouring, sometimes even among related associations. In tracts of hundreds of miles there existed virtually nothing but insignificant associations. Bastian simply described the state of things without being able to draw the conclusions which, in my view, simply impose themselves. These associations did not unite because they could not do so voluntarily, their opposed organisation of family life, opposed economic institutions, etc., inclining them at best to avoid one another. There was an absence of openings for understanding, but a great many for misunderstanding. Thus among these swarms of clans and tiny tribes a state of war reigned.

373 Bastian, op. cit., mainly pp. XV, XVI, 175-182.
Associations remain primitive for centuries, until one system of organisation gains control over a larger area, having repulsed other systems. It is only by a common system of association that a larger association can be created out of throngs. For in a single community can there be more than one social structure?

The process of rendering a system of communal life uniform is not necessarily a voluntary one. If during the struggles between neighbouring little tribes of differing structure one of them defeats its neighbours and is able to maintain its overlordship permanently, the institutions of the defeated clans are extirpated and the triple law and social institutions of the victors imposed.

The defeated decline constantly in numbers and territory, succumb to pressure, and if they do not become extinct or emigrate, either form a despised, inferior class or adapt themselves and copy the victors. We shall never know how many kinds of different social institutions perished without rising above the primitive stage, only to disappear in a different kind of primitiveness. Institutions and opinions which are able to gain control of larger areas and a more numerous population acquire the possibility of reaching higher levels of development after centuries.

This possibility of course exists only in those cases where institutions of a lower order have succumbed to higher, that is to those better suited to development or already more highly developed. But this is not always the case. History shows how frequently victory in an armed struggle goes to the element of inferior order; we have no reason to suppose that in prehistory and among primitive tribes things were or are better. More than one victory has had the effect of petrifying the primitive, with likelihood of the attainment of a higher level of development declining from century to century.

Through the victory of a certain form of the clan organisation over differing adjacent forms there arrived in course of time an association of higher type, for while a tribe might emerge from the clans, the tribal institutions would not always represent progress over all those of the clans. In other words, there is no progress in social development without the coming together of clans into the tribe, but not every tribe represents an advance.

Many factors decide progress, but even should all combine most favourably, they will be of no avail if the more consistent system does not prevail. The history of ancient Greece provides us with a highly instructive example. How high the categories of natural Truth and Beauty, learning and art stood in Hellas! In these fields the Athenians succeeded in imposing their work and ideas on the whole of Greece and far outside Greece. But attitudes to the three other categories of humanity remained different in almost every corner of the country. Youth was educated and trained in Athens in one way, in Sparta in another, and the views of Athens on health differed from those of Sybaris. Prosperity assumed utterly different guises in Lacedemonia and in Corinth. What was moral in Thebes caused scandal in Argos. Greek attitudes to the five categories of the quincunx were various to the point of being so full of contradictions that there can be no question of any commensurability. Even methods of regulating time differed. The whole country suffered from the indecisiveness of the triple law, particularly the property law.” And so in Greece only one thing was constant — the constancy of revolution. The country passed from system to system, until general chaos resulted. Not even the Hellenistic expansion of Alexander the Great could save Greece. Not learning, art, or the most successful military expeditions can substitute for the triple law as the basis of association.

Greece remained divided into as many cantons as there were in her territories systems of the triple law, time-regulation and attitudes to the quincunx. These cantons did not join together in one larger State, because their systems did not become uniform, and without

uniformity it was not possible to create any larger association. It was the Romans who imposed the Roman triple law by force.

Incommensurate basic conditions for association made it inevitable that the Greeks should not rise above small States. An association cannot spread beyond the area within which there is compatibility in type of institutions and outlook. Since such type was accepted by the whole of Greece, no all-Greek association could emerge. Moreover it should be said that the necessary consistency in the systems of association, was nowhere found in Greece, even in the small area in which any given system obtained. Everywhere, in consequence, the social bond was weak. The unceasing wars of the Greek city-states were caused precisely because of the existence in near neighbourhood of often mutually contradictory systems of the quincunx and the triple law.

Thus the history of Greece in antiquity provides us with evidence that the rule of commensurability binds associations of all kinds, both lower and higher at every level of development. The more consistently commensurate institutions and outlook are, the stronger the social bond and also the tendency to turn the association into the nucleus of an even larger one. But there is one condition: the commensurateness must be the result of voluntary consent; it must rest not on law alone, but necessarily on ethical convictions. Otherwise everything will disintegrate.

Proceeding on these assumptions, we shall understand the growth of Rome, that antithesis of Hellas in more than one respect. Among the Romans consistency and logic permeated the entire system of communal life — so that in the whole vast territory of Rome there was in force the same concept of the State and society, the same attitude to the categories of being and the same triple law for everybody who wanted to be civis romanus. For a long period there was no slightest blemish on this harmony. Peoples begged to be made subject to Roman law.

An ideally harmonious combination of thought and act in the sphere of the five categories of being would produce a harmony of unparalleled excellence, as well as a culture of action of unexampled power and endurance, an ideal and powerful society. But excellence is not a thing of this world; always and everywhere something is lacking and something in excess. We often move ahead, but almost always while moving we stumble.

With an enormous variety of imperfections, there are also not a few assets. For the incalculable potential variations and shades in the life of the individual are even greater in the association; nobody could begin to work out all the combinations possible as a result of the not quite exact coincidence of our views on the quincunx of humanity. There is no need to attempt it; here there is variety richer than the greatest ability to grasp and understand phenomena.

There is a resemblance between the object of these discussions and crystallography. Pure crystal is the rarest of exceptions, but without crystallography realities which are sometimes oddly confused would be incomprehensible. Science observes phenomena in order to classify them regardless of the fact that the perfect pattern is impossible in reality.

In a given community newly-arrived, previously unknown, complications in communal life are a test of the degree of systematisation and so of development. A new department of life which constitutes a foreign body in the organism will turn against that organism. A new department of life must be assimilated, and so call forth a fresh application of the accepted system. If, however, a breach in the system results, it brings disintegration with it. If an association acquires novelties which it cannot reduce to a common denominator or which cannot be harmonised, it begins to fall apart. Things which are incommensurate, which cannot be coordinated, may not be combined with impunity. Anything contrary to the system by which the association is ordered must prove hostile to that association.
It follows from the above considerations that **system is the basis of association**. System is simply the combination of commensurateness and consistency, and since this combination is needed for development, it follows that only those associations develop which are based on some system.

**Degree of development depends on appropriateness and consistency of system.**

**IV WHAT IS CIVILISATION?**

The above rule is in the nature of an extreme generalisation, for we shall not find a corner in the whole range of manifestations of human intelligence where it would not apply. In everything there must be some system, for otherwise anarchy or incompetence supervenes; in one way or the other the result is always the same, well expressed in the common phrase about everything “coming to pieces in one’s hand”. If we cared more for suitable and consistent system in our undertakings there would be in us and around us more “culture of action” (that is established capacity for intelligent actions). And the rule with which we ended the preceding section may be applied to absolutely every human undertaking from the most primitive craft to the most complicated political convolutions.

In our present investigations we are concerned with the development of associations and so with the systems in them, with the systems in family, clan and tribal organisations, and consequently in the social structure, in the organisation of nation and State. All these levels of association may be expressed in the single phrase — communal life. This is of two kinds — private (family) and public; and thus includes everything which is not life in isolation, in opposition to the family and public associations. I include in communal life the solitary room of the scholar, whose isolation is to be a means of increasing the resources and differentiating the kinds of that communal life which is the object of his reflections. Montesquieu’s study, for example, was a real forge of public life, and there are hundreds of similar examples. It is thus not to private but to public life that scientific and also artistic activity belongs.

Let us mentally add together all possible elements of change in family and public life in all the countries of the world and we shall understand what vastness we embrace with the expression “communal life”. From the first hearths to our own days is an immensity of time; from the pygmies to the streets of New York an immense scale of different human attributes. Everywhere and always some kind of communal existence is evident — almost everywhere and always different.

The difference results from the variety of systems applied in communal life. We have gone through enough material — from pre-fire blood-drinkers to the splendid beauty of Hellas — to recognise that peoples differ in accordance with the system by which their communal life is organised. The great differentiating factors in the world are systems. If all peoples held to the same system the only differences in the organisation of communal life would be of level, not of kind; there would be a single kind at different levels of a development possible only along one line common to all ages and countries. But there is no such common axis for the whole of humanity, and so far never has been. For “humanity” has never existed either historically or sociologically, it may be called a literary phantom. In reality there exist only certain associations, fragments of humanity, of which only a few have something in common. There does not exist any organisation of communal life, common to all humanity, and there is also no system common to all humanity.

Let us rather consider which are in reality the **largest** extant fractions of humanity. Nations do not by any means exist everywhere, and even States not everywhere. But where they exist there is a constant search for some supra-national, supra-State association. While the searching, inventing and patching together of various novelties go on, not always with
advantage for the health of “humanity”, there have existed and always exist natural associations on the largest scale, and so powerful that they are more powerful than all powers and armies.

These are civilisations. They resist every attempt at the artificial creation of large-scale associations which take no account of differences in civilisation. Often civilisations — as the highest forces of mankind — overturn and undo all that has been artificially created without reckoning with them. Civilisation is the sum of everything which is common to a certain fragment of humanity; and at the same time the sum of everything by which that fragment differs from others. And since, as we have shown above, everything without exception is included in communal life, civilisation includes no more. The concepts of communal life and of civilisation are therefore close to each other, to such an extent as to give the impression of being co-extensive.

The supra-national association should be sought through investigation whether a given system of communal life does not go beyond the limits of the nation; and into the extent to which people regard the quincunx of life in the same way or similarly but commensurately. Societies holding to essentially the same system of communal life create the same civilisation. Here three kinds of attitude emerge. There are societies which look at all five categories of being in the same way; there are those which, while looking in the same way at certain categories differ on others or on only one category, the degree of difference also varying; there is sometimes uniformity or similarity in fundamental matters and variety in secondary features — but the opposite also happens; there is also complete opposition in everything. In interpreting different systems it is a question of the sum of the whole and of the attitude of man to the whole and to each part separately. Systems of communal life vary with civilisations; or in other words:

Civilisation is the system on which communal life is organised.

Civilisation is simply system. This definition is wide enough to include art and science, ethics and law, economics, education, communications, for all these belong to communal life. For every manifestation of civilisation in any field belongs at the same time to communal life. The isolated man does not create civilisation but the sociable man among men.

The number of systems for the organisation of communal life is clearly unlimited, that is the number of civilisations is unlimited. From the point of view of civilisation, mankind is differentiated to such an extent that only by looking at things from this highest point of the association do we see with entire exactness and certainty that historically and sociologically there is no such thing as mankind. How many civilisations there have been, how many there are cannot be expressed in numbers in the present state of knowledge. We are far from knowing historically all the systems for the organisation of communal life which have existed until now; nor can anyone even count how many there are in the world at present. Not infrequently we possess too little material to describe the systems of lost civilisations, whose memorials are dug up; undoubted memorials are also dug up of communal life which cannot be assigned to a particular civilisation. Among primitive peoples time and again discoveries are made of systems for the organisation of communal life differing from all others hitherto known. And there is a long way to go before all peoples are studied from this angle.

Civilisation of some kind exists everywhere communal life exists. But this life does not necessarily embrace all five categories of being; the organisation of communal life may be incomplete. For there exist incomplete, defective, fragmentary civilisations which are, however, entirely logical in what they do embrace. Not embracing all the categories, they may also not embrace all the divisions of any given category. In this respect there is a great variety of defectiveness. Moreover, the system of organising communal life accepted in a certain society may give one category considerable preponderance over another, and inside a
category, to a certain division of it; this preponderance may be disproportionate, and the insignificance of other categories also disproportionate. Here there arises an unlimited number of all kinds of combinations. Civilisations may be complete and incomplete, one-sided, many-sided and universal, uniform and more or less mixed, original and derivative in whole or part.

The plenitude of civilisation consists in possession by society of an organisation of communal life — private (that is family) and public, social and State — of material institutions and a moral-intellectual system such that all departments of life, feeling, thought and action are harmoniously and logically coordinated.

Many will certainly feel doubt about the use of the expression “civilisation” to signify absolutely every kind of manifestation of life, since it has already been agreed to divide these latter into material and spiritual and to call only one of them civilisation. How typical it is that some authors use the expression to signify development of the material side of life, and others the exact opposite, using the name for the spiritual side. It is the best proof of the extent to which terminology is still mobile, doubtful. The opposite of civilisation is said to be culture signifying now this, now that side of life in different authors.

The division into culture and civilisations stems from W. Humboldt. For him civilisation is “die Vermenschlichung der Völker in ihren äußeren Einrichtungen und Gebräuchen und der darauf Bezug habenden inneren Gesinnung”, to which culture adds learning and art. Guizot did not oppose civilisation and culture, but frequently used the expression “culture” in a more specific sense, e.g. bourgeois culture. Like Humboldt, Kant put learning and art in culture and called civilisation the outward polish; the sphere of morality constituted for him a third factor alongside the other two. Wilhelm Wundt includes under culture “spiritual goods”, and calls civilisation the “external political and social forms of life”; he assumes that “culture is connected with nationality, and civilisation attached to the idea of mankind as a whole united under the leadership of cultured peoples”. H. S. Chamberlain says of the Chinese that they possess much civilisation, a full mead of pietas and courtesy, but little culture, and that for lack of techniques. In another place he says that the cynics had much civilisation, being distinguished by their moral severity, but because they despised learning and economic goods they had very little culture. And the last century of the Roman Republic could in his view be called an age of culture but not of civilisation, since as a result of the civil wars there was much inhumanity and immorality. From these examples it is evident that even in the same author there is no precision in the use of the two expressions.

On the whole, however, among German and French writers inner life is generally termed civilisation and external life culture, whereas among Polish writers the opposite is true of the use of these terms. Why, I am unable to say, but conclude that the present general position is unimportant, that no scientific developments have occurred to settle once for all this corner of terminology, since there is nothing fixed in it.

Moreover the actual setting of the material and spiritual sides of life over against each other appears to me no more than a literary formula. It never happens in reality and never was in history. I have already drawn attention to the way in which the corporal and spiritual categories of life impinge upon one another, how they are sometimes in such close harness that it is hard to distinguish between them; thousands of ties bind them without cease, often indivisibly. In historical research I have never found the material and spiritual development of any people taking place in even the slightest degree of detachment.

Historical treatment of the material side of life as an alleged inevitable opposition to
the spiritual led to the so-called materialist view of history, which would explain all historical
phenomena by the struggle for material existence. With it there spread a strangely false view
of the actual struggle itself. A truly unparalleled onesi...Software error
Such exclusiveness is surely found in reality only among degenerates. The struggle for existence is
three-fold, three times more difficult than the adherents of historical materialism suppose, but
also three times higher, more worthy of man: normal men struggle for moral and intellectual
as well as material existence, but never for the material alone. The whole impulse of life
consists in keeping afloat or rising as an individual who is respected and considered worthy of
human friendship; in developing one’s intellect to the utmost, in addition to assuring one’s
daily bread and the comforts of life. It would surely be an exceptional kind of man who would
agree to be rich on condition of becoming at the same time an object of general contempt and
mockery; human ambition normally reaches higher than money-bags, and prosperity is rather
regarded as a means to make the moral and intellectual struggle for existence easier.
Moreover even the cannibal chieftain makes war on his neighbours not only for the next-door
sheep but also for the importance of his tribe (in European terms, for “prestige”). War
frequently breaks out among semi-savages for “honour”, with material advantages falling to
the victors thereafter, as it were by force of inertia, although when embarking on hostilities
they have had no thought of material advantages and often may have no conception of them at
all. Among completely primitive peoples moral hardship, humiliation, scorn are felt more
painfully than material hardship.

In the course of the material struggle for existence an ethical question constantly
presents itself: what is worthy and what is unworthy in the struggle for prosperity. And a
higher level of intellect contributes to a higher level of ethics. For although it is the particular
property of the intellectual struggle for existence that it may be conducted in isolation from
the material and moral, and although in the course of strictly intellectual development ethical
questions are less in evidence than in the struggle for prosperity — nevertheless intellectual
development at a certain stage comes to be concerned with criticism of both material and
moral issues, and as it were absorbs the whole of ethics, which becomes an inseparable part of
it.

This is perhaps the most complicated puzzle of the whole of human existence. We
know very little about maintaining harmony in simultaneous moral, intellectual and practical
education, about how to harmonise these three main departments of social life. Nevertheless
we see increasingly clearly how entangled they are, how it is only exceptionally possible to
isolate one kind of struggle for existence. For communal life to lean to one side of the
struggle, to the material, for instance, passing over the other two, would mean a disturbance
whose over-long continuance would necessarily end in popular anarchy and the decline of
civilisation, or at least of the local culture or the given social class, according to the area and
sphere affected by the morbid one-sidedness. Moreover, lop-sidedness in the struggle for
existence weakens it, curtails possible results, reduces efficiency. This is, of course, a direct
consequence of the reciprocal relations between the five categories of being and their
harmony, as already shown.

The indissoluble knot of the threefold struggle for existence makes it impossible for
the historian to treat material and spiritual civilisation separately. Eduard Meyer is also right
not to acknowledge a division between political and cultural history, because history must
present the whole of life. By the history of culture he understands the history of both material
and cultural development; and so here in his view belong ethics, literature, art, economy. In
Polish nineteenth century history as well as in the opening phase of the new Polish State a
strangely (almost fantastically) close tie may be observed between politics and literature,
popularity of a literary education alongside unparalleled economic ignorance. There is no room here for talk of separate historical treatment for material and spiritual affairs, but indeed the historian may manage without separate terms for them.

For the historian, qualitative distinction between civilisation and culture is superfluous. Everything that has been written on the point is at best worthless for historical studies, if not actually disadvantageous for historical research, introducing fictions in place of realities.

On the other hand, sufficient account has not so far been taken of another factor which is without a name. It is well known that every civilisation may contain certain variants distributed geographically, ethnographically or according to class. Let us consider, for example, the mediaeval system of organising communal life in Catholic Europe. That there was one common civilisation will not be denied, but nor can the differences existing against that background: in the West, the feudal system, in Poland no feudal system; alongside the dynastic States of the fourteenth century, in Poland the emergent idea of the national State; one system of collective life in the towns, another among the knighthood; the differences in civilisation between the milieu of the troubadours and the Hansa cities. The long list of such differences in the Catholic Middle Ages was no shorter in other epochs, and in our own days it is considerable. From the Neapolitan fisherman to the English miner, the Spanish bullfighter to the Swedish engineer, what variety! The differences stand out while the similarities are evident only to a practised eye, trained to look at things scientifically.

For the sum of resemblances during the period from the beginnings of Monte Cassino to our own days determines the unity and continuity of our Latin civilisation, in all its variants. These variants are departments of our civilisation. The relationship is that of the part to the whole, and is similar in other civilisations.

The historian is constantly dealing with these component parts of civilisation, but he does not do so systematically, methodically. We are faced with a basic category of historical research which has hitherto been treated occasionally and superficially, as the fact that there are as yet no names to describe these variants eloquently testifies. We do not know how to designate something which it is essential to distinguish and which forces itself upon us at every step. What expression should be used to describe, for example, the relationship between Latin civilisation in Poland and in Western Europe, as a relationship of part to whole? If we describe more than one thing by the same name we lose the feeling of this relationship, the relationship of part to whole.

In this book these parts will be called cultures. To all charges of the unsuitability of this designation, I reply in advance that I will begin to employ another expression immediately one is indicated to me. Somehow these variants of civilisation must be named, and I have taken an expression which is free, because not required for the use hitherto made of it — an improper use, as I have pointed out. Thus there is Arab civilisation and Moorish culture, Latin, civilisation and Polish culture, Turanian civilisation and Uighur and Afghan cultures.

On the other hand I reject terminology for the separate designation of the spiritual and material: civilisation may be material and spiritual, culture may also be spiritual and material. To distinguish one side from the other, I add an adjective. But since such distinction does not exist historically, it will only exceptionally be proper to employ these concepts. By thus establishing nomenclature, we shall avoid all doubts and inaccuracies. With accurate description of the object of investigation we emerge from chaos to science.

There should be a warning against mixing science of civilisation with history of civilisation. When there is talk of the history of civilisation it is necessary to ask which, for every civilisation has its separate history, whereas the science of civilisation must be concerned with all civilisations. It seems to me that there cannot be a scientific history of any
civilisation until there has first been a certain development in the science of civilisation; for it is first necessary to decide certain general questions — above all the problem of the causes and genesis of civilisations.

The heart of all scientific investigations in the field of civilisations lies in the problem: **Whence the plurality and variety of civilisations?** This problem is the knot in which all the threads of all the looms of History are tangled. It cannot be cut, but must be patiently undone.

## V  HOMO FABER

The plurality and variety of civilisation has, it is true, engaged scholars, but with a strange restriction to the past. Calculations are made of how many civilisations there have been, and their multiplicity today goes as it were unseen. There is no general admission of this contemporary plurality. Tacito consensu it is assumed that there is really only one civilisation, the so-called European, others representing only lower levels of the one, which is in any case spreading over the world, as witnessed by the acceptance of our inventions, the introduction of standing armies under European instructors, imports of cotton for naked Africans, etc. Only the rungs leading to Europeanisation are seen, and the same point of view is applied in research into the past. Although “European” civilisation has not always existed, the stages through which it had to pass can still be seen among “savages” representing an historical collection in space. All endeavours in historical research have been directed to discovery of the plan of these stages, **allegedly of universal validity**, in the progress from cannibal to Prussian lieutenant.

It is not easy to get rid of learned superstitions. Since I must therefore, be prepared for this book to be held in disrepute because of the absence in it of primitive communism, matriarchy and totemism, I do not stand to lose if I add yet another heresy, deny that *homo faber* created civilisation, and limit his role to an auxiliary position in the making of the stages of civilisation, whose kind does not in the least depend on technical discoveries.

At present the authority of ergology is perhaps at its height. The genesis of the ergological method lies in the old trichotomy, in the old view of prehistoric evolution according to the main elements in the struggle for existence — fishing and hunting, pastoralism, agriculture. This plan dates from the eighteenth century, and was improved upon until the end of the nineteenth. E. List, for example, distinguished five economic epochs: hunting, pastoral, agricultural, agricultural manufacturing, and, finally, agricultural, manufacturing and trading simultaneously. Patterns of this kind have, it is true, been abandoned, but in their place we have ergoist patterns.

For from these first patterns it was only a step to others, namely to the fixing of periods by the most important invention-aids in the struggle for existence. The first attempts are to be found in L. H. Morgan’s *Ancient Society* (1877) a work which was long a real codex for an uncounted mass of scholars of all languages; but the author gave warning that his was a temporary division, since periods would be established for certain only when the whole history of the acquisition of the means of existence had been properly examined.

After a time establishment of the periods of different techniques was tackled directly. Morgan had already said that social systems were closely dependent on techniques. He distinguished three periods of the savage state: a low pre-fire period, a middle period beginning with the use of fire and having for tools cudgel, flint — up to the bow-and-arrow

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377 Ergology, a term invented by the German philosopher Georg Eduard Burckhart (born 1881), meaning the science of labour. (Note of the translators).
stage, and a superior level disposing of wooden vessels, twig baskets, log-boats and knowledge of hand-weaving. With pottery begins the barbaric stage — first the bow and club, then the domestication of animals and finally, at a more developed stage of barbarism, the beginnings of metal-working and settled agriculture. The epoch of civilisation follows, its essential feature (according to Morgan) being the manufactures which come more and more to the fore. Morgan supposed that it was only thanks to agriculture that private property emerged, and through it the monogamous family, this in turn leading on to the State, etc. The periods of the development of property were in his view more or less the same as those of the various kinds of struggle for existence, which depended on tools, so that everything finally depended on technique. Although he admitted that in more than one respect the most important department of man’s spiritual development is also embedded in the history of property, however in the upshot, his arguments inconsistently make this spiritual development depend on progress in pottery, weaving, etc.

Limiting myself to the most outstanding scholars, I shall draw attention to the way in which E. du Bois Reymond later divided history into three epochs: the first characterised by building, smelting, casting and stone-quarrying, the second by the three discoveries: compass, gunpowder and printing; and the third by machines driven by heat. According to him, one of the most important causes of the decline of the classical world was its failure to rise above the first level of technique. Paul Barth justly replied that the Germanic tribes did not have techniques superior to those of the Romans, who were in any case always improving theirs. He also drew attention to the fact that primitive peoples sometimes die out at the very time they acquire better tools.378

The French and Catholic school of prehistory and ethnology founded by the famous sociologist Frederic Le Play, introduced a kind of synthesis of the development of the family organisation and the development of technical skill. Its outstanding exponent J. R. Maurice Vignes divided his main work La science sociale d’après les principes de le Play et de ses continuateurs (1897) into sections: I L’âge des productions spontanées, l’âge des machines; II L’âge des machines (fin), l’âge de la houille, dela vapeur et de l’électricité. The organisation of family life depended on the mode of the struggle for existence and on manufacturing technique. Vignes distinguished in the latter three historical periods: hand-tools, machinery, coal. Since agriculture was carried out not with hand-tools alone, it already belongs to the machine period. The acquisition of food began, however, with hunting and fishing, and with these forms of economy the family (in Vignes’s view) was loose, and paternal authority weak; personal property consisted in the bow and tools, while the hut was family property and woods or grazings belonged to the clan. As a result of the keeping of live prey, huntsmen came in time to keep cattle on the steppes, with a patriarchal family life and the land, undivided. In agriculture, slavery, etc. developed. (Sometimes it is not easy to follow Vignes’s arguments because of his indeterminate nomenclature.)

Obviously it is impossible to belittle tools and techniques as a whole — Erazm Majewski made the point well when he said: “Only by artificial tools does man create a balance between his physical side, unequal to action corresponding to his will, and the physical side, finding expression in that will”.379 But it is a far cry from this to regarding tools as the chief movers of history. Lacombe and Weber (Le rythme du progrès) limited the overriding importance of tools to the first phase of humanity, which was stated to have been technical and not theological, as Comte had claimed.380 Are these not “modernistic” somnia vigilantium?

378 Barth, op. cit, p. 580.
380 According to Meyer, op. cit., p. XV.
Ergotism became the basis of all proto-historic synthesis to such an extent that even the greatest opponents of the school of the elder Morgan did not dare cast doubt on it. In Bonn Professor Graebner tried the same thing as Morgan and Du Roy-Reymond, making the single reservation that the limits of the periods could not be fixed with complete accuracy, since they overlapped. The German Catholic school of ethnology devised the Kultur-Kreise, whose number was finally fixed at seven (alternatively at eight) by Father Wilhelm Schmidt, one of the most eminent of all ethnologists, a monk at St. Gabriel outside Moedling in Austria, author of numerous works, who in 1925 began publication of his monumental synthesis *Voelker und Kulturen* (with the cooperation of Father Wilhelm Koppers). This school also links a certain level of technical ability with a certain level of social and spiritual development. For example, the first circle: club, bone, bow, with traces of animism and monogamy; second circle: stone, cudgel, pike, reed, flute, the beginnings of drawing, and in addition, animism and magic. The way in which the family and its institutions were established are among the essential features of every “circle”. Unfortunately this is all still confused with “sexual totemism” and similar unnecessary intrusions. With all respect for this school from Graebner to Father Schmidt, I am more convinced by K. Buecher when he writes in *Arbeit und Rhytmus*: “There can be nothing less correct than those learned constructions linking new cultural epochs with the appearance of pottery or ironwork, with the invention of the plough or the hand-mill. Peoples who know very well how to make axes and even pipes from iron, still use wooden pikes and arrows, or cultivate the ground with a wooden spade although they have no lack of cattle which could draw the plough for them”. Truly it would be hard to find a stronger argument against the classification of civilisation by work.

It is not possible to keep to any kind of chronology of work, since in different parts of the world inventions did not follow in the same order. Ethnology knows tribes which have ceramics and fight with pikes. The extent to which material civilisation defeats all systematic arrangement is very well illustrated by the fact that there was no bronze age on Polish territory. In negro Africa also the iron age immediately followed upon the stone age, in the same way as in Australia and Oceania, in the greater part of America and Northern Asia. This alone would mean at least two systems. If classification by work is unsuited to indicate the sequence of phases alleged to be inevitable and the same for all civilisations, it will be even less use in differentiating between civilisations. Is there even one discovery which could not be passed from one civilisation to another, or indeed anywhere even one discovery which has influenced the essence of a particular civilisation?

Can the human race be divided according to any kind of classification by work, even indirectly, for instance by use of the razor? The mediaeval Orthodox, regarding shaving as a sin, would come near the Ainons and the English of Dickens’s time; whereas the AngloSaxons of today would then be closer in civilisation to the Mongols. Aid from ergoism must once for all he given up in issues basic to the science of civilisation.

The passage of a certain object from country to country may sometimes be an indication of the roads by which civilising influences entered — but not necessarily. For example, the universally-known case of the Maria Teresa thalars in Abyssinia and the Sudan. The range of wine and olives is not a bad indication of the range of influence of the old Roman civilisation, whereas the range of tea is very different from the range of Chinese civilisation, and tea-drinking no longer has anything in common with the spread of the teachings of Confucius. Curiously, Korea, so close to China, is not tea-drinking.

How much of America wanders the world with potatoes? But enough of this.

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381 According to Barth, op. cit., p. 579.
382 On the other hand the history of civilisation cannot do without ergology. What an enormous mass of material is contained in Moszyński’s "Kultury ludowe u Słowian".
383 Fr. de Smedt, op. cit, p. 169.
Inventions — from the club to the aeroplane — may determine the levels of civilisation in each civilisation separately; in each the question calls for special investigations. For example, the railways changed the tempo of life in Western Europe — but in Russia not at all. The pot, the well and the mill, those three epochs of classification by work, were not everywhere of help to women; in many lands they reinforced the servitude of wives. But the well made possible regular communications in desert lands, with important consequences for civilisation. Every invention must be judged separately in differing lands and times.

It is a strange thing that we do not understand the question of classification by work, which is generally regarded as something specifically “archaeological”. It nevertheless exists equally in our days, eternally young and always producing new fruit. The telephone belongs to it, the radio and everything which is to be discovered tomorrow. But has Brahmin civilisation altered a jot since Hindus became railway officials? Has there been some change in Japanese ideas as a result of the motor-car? And more important, have all our inventions changed anything in us? **Change around us does not mean change in us.**

On the other hand, humanist “inventions” like the will and hereditary names have changed the world. The application of mathematics to physical products is truly imposing in its results, but much more important is its application in the humanist field. Social institutions based on calculation of probability change communal life more than electrification, and the discovery of amortisable credit (unfortunately wasted and suppressed in Poland) has accomplished incomparably more than all technical discoveries together. *Homo faber* did not establish civilisation, nor did he make civilisations different. He has only contributed to the attainment, of higher levels.

Let us pass to other conditions for the differentiation of civilisations, looking for factors of a higher order. Let us first consider whether and to what extent civilisation depends on race, language and religion.
CHAPTER V

CIVILISATION AND RACE

I  RACIAL MIXTURE

The problem of civilisation and race can be summed up in the question whether there is any permanent relation between the variety of civilisation and the variety of race.

If race determined civilisation, there would be as many civilisations as races, which is not the case; but if there were no connection at all between the two, the widespread conviction of the dependance of civilisation on race could not have arisen. Evidently the matter is not simple — and to settle it, more than one tangle will have first to be unravelled.

The tangles begin with the very definition of race. The sentimental Herder once condemned this expression as _inedel_ [ignoble], offensive to the dignity of man. He was indignant with those who invented “some five divisions according to the parts of the world, or even according to colour”, and dared to call this variety races. Such sensitivity to degradation passed, but there arose doubts about the reality or unreality of a species, strongly reminiscent of the mediaeval disputes between realists and nominalists. One set concentrated on the question of species as a strictly abstract concept, regarding it as exclusively a product of human thought, necessary for classification, constituting an indispensable aid for the intellect (Buffon, Bonnet, Lamarck, Naegeli, Wundt, Lehmann); others, however, treated species as a real entity (Linné, Cuvier, Agassiz, Wigand, Wassman S. J., Lotsy). Darwin’s views that species undergo unceasing and farreaching transformation, and that there are no fixed bounds between them, had a great effect on research and opinion.

Jussieu defined race as a fixed variety within the species. Buffon noted that the establishment of race is relative, since race disappears when environment is changed. Naegeli emphasised that races may be formed quickly and as quickly disappear, whereas varieties (according to his terminology) are formed extremely slowly, but last for centuries. The generality of natural scientists has after all always linked the concept of race with the “concept of relationship and hereditary stability”. 384 Races may thus be long-lived and short-lived. More of them emerge than can survive, and of course only those which are able to establish themselves come to the knowledge of science.

Having taken all this into account, it is possible to agree with the definition that race is a variety of a zoological species. A species may not contain within itself any races, constituting as it were one race, but it may also embrace many races differing in details not decisive as far as the essence of the species is concerned. And so alongside the essential

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features of man — upright stance, absence of tail, capability for thought outside instinct — everything else may decide racial allegiance, e.g. colour of the skin, kind of hair, shape of skull, etc.

In any case it is a matter of corporal features only. In my view, an exact definition of race would be: Race is a somatic variety of a zoological species. The term race will be used in this book exclusively in this sense.

Is civilisation to be dependant on race so understood? With this assumption another is unavoidably linked — the presumption that pure races exist. The persistence of this error, abandoned by science two generations ago, into the present time, may serve as a classical example of the truly tortoise speed (in the age of radio and electricity) at which scientific truths spread. In Krzywicki’s old handbook dating from 1897, we may read that “there is no pure race. . . . Even the smallest little tribes living in the remotest parts reveal traces of racial mixture”. Erasm Majewski expressed himself forcibly, guaranteeing that “there was no racial unity among the troglodytes”. Edward Meyer noted in 1907 that there should be no assumption of protohuman conditions either in New Guinea or Australia. In 1921, Fritz Lenz emphasised that peoples living in isolation, for example, the Vedaas and related peoples in Ceylon, also die out. Eugen Fischer drew attention to the facts that the Tasmanians have died out, and that the Australian aborigines, Bushmen, North American Indians and peoples of Tierra del Fuego are dying out.

Where life pulsates, there race persecutes race. The variegated mixture of India has long exercised scholars. Mantegazza put it in this way: “India was at one time, in a very distant epoch, inhabited by hundreds of races, even by some thousand”. He exaggerated perhaps — but there is in any case a very great number of them. The most varied mixtures resulted from Mongol, Turanian, proto-Dravidian, Tibetan and Aryan invasions. But the Aryans are the race of an hypothesis, and nothing can be said of them for certain. There is no connection between the Hindus Aryans and Dravids of today, and the classical “Aryans” of the linguists, geographers and historians. How to undo the anthropological tangle of a vast country which was densely populated even in the Quaternary Age?

In Polynesia, since we came to know it, there has been the greatest “disorderly mixture of black, yellow and white types”. Discovered in 1772, the islands were found to be inhabited by white, black and brown peoples simultaneously. Russia also presents no small somatic tangle. The learned Zograf found in Rostov such a mixture (and without characteristic features!) that an anthropologist “would waste his time studying them in vain”. Even the gypsies, with their Hindu element, are mixtures of the most varied European origins. The Hottentots are the product of a Hamitic-Bushman mixture, but this limited mixture is only to be found in Nama land; in Cape Province other elements have been added. Perhaps in that case the Ainios? They have much of the Europi in them (as the Polynesians have) and are not Mongols. Their ancestors were once to be found all over present-day Japan, living in caves; the Japanese, arriving from the direction of the continent, defeated and almost

387 Pittard, op. cit, pp. 476, 478.
388 Krzywicki, "Kurs systematyczny antropologii", op. cit, p. 70.
389 Ibid., p. 101.
exterminated them. In the process a good deal of Aino blood mingled with Japanese. On the island of Jessō (now Hokkaido) this mixture survives in the neighbourhood of Mororanu and Uso, even Japanese quarteroons; traces of the Ainos are to be found as far as Formosa. Once the Scandinavian Lapps were pure “Mongols”, today they are a mixture: similarly with the Finns, Karelians, Samoyeds, Zyrians, Voguls, Ostyaks and further to the west the eastern Slavs. The inhabitants of the Andaman Islands and the Esquimos pass as racially purest.

Among the intelligentsia there is a widespread superstition that the Jews are outstanding for purity of race. But it was Renan who said that there is no Jewish type, only types, while in Krzywicki’s old handbook we read that the “racial composition of the Jews is eightfold”. More recently Fischer has declared that there is no Jewish race to discuss, that they possess a “most extensive range of somatic features”. In Palestine they were a racial mixture from the beginning.

Racial mixtures are being produced in our days in all parts of the world, as the result both of armed invasion and peaceful immigration. For instance, in Central Africa “Arabs settling among the negroes, usually on hills, surround themselves with a palisade, rob the black population and take wives from among them”. Arabs are also scattered throughout the whole of Mauretania, among the Moors in northern Morocco, the Berbers in the east and the negroes in the south.

Moreover, somatic changes in man are in a constant state of flux, with new races emerging from the mixture of the old. Mixture on a large scale does not, however, happen always, all the time, but only sporadically; so that the purity of a race which, although coming into existence as a mixture, does not go on receiving admixture, at least on any scale, may be maintained. Stagnation in inter-breeding may maintain the purity of an older mixture from which a new race arose. This is precisely the case with the Jews: for a long period the Palestinian mixture ceased to mix in the diaspora.

The question is whether every crossing produced a new race. The answer is in the negative — new races may, but need not emerge from inter-mingling. The first condition for a new race is permanence of the features inherited by a considerable number of generations, in other words, continuity of inheritance. On this point, there is already unanimity among scholars: there is no heredity other than that according to the laws of Mendel, which includes the law of the consequences of crossing. For instance, a race of low stature will always remain short until it crosses itself with a taller, when the stature of offspring will conform to “Mendelianism”.

Among men, experience confirms a thousand-fold that the brunette passes on his features more strongly than the blonde, and the negro twice as strongly as the white. Wernick showed how children of a Japanese woman and a German tend to be delicate, while the offspring of a Japanese woman and a Frenchman may be healthier than those of two Japanese parents.

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391 Klecki, op. cit., p. 154.
393 Pittard, op, cit., pp. 413-415, 418.
394 Ignacy Judt. Żydzi jako rasa fizyczna”. Warsaw 1902.
395 Pittard, op. cit. p. 44.
396 The history of these discoveries is very significant for the history of science in general. Mendel published his discoveries himself in 1864. The fruit of patient experiment on the pea and bean during thirty years, they were utterly ignored. Only when thirty-six years later, in 1900, three scientists at the same time discovered the same thing did the “discovery” of Mendel follow, revealing that the newest discovery was superfluous and that a whole generation of scientists had been wasted.
There are crossings which are infertile or productive of weaklings. Schwalbe asserts that no damage is done by blood exchanges between mouse and rat, rabbit and hare, animals close to each other, but they are very harmful between more distant animals, for example the cat and guinea-pig. Adametz, the biggest name in the field of scientific research on cattle-rearing, asserts that bastard species are usually sterile.

Breeding problems require time for settlement. Breeders long thought that crossing reinforced parental characteristics, with preponderance of good points over faults. They were misled by the evident vigour of such mixtures, which recent investigation only confirms, adding interesting details. Bastards of lion and tiger are larger and heavier than either parent. Offspring of guinea fowl and hen of a fighting breed reveal exceptional aggressiveness. Cramp’s rats, deliberately inbred, were famous. Mixtures are considerably more resilient under all kinds of hardship, especially where the bloodmixture is less than half. But when the experiments have a little time behind them, it proves that the vigour lasts barely a generation and then ends, and is even succeeded by enfeeblement. Moreover, bastards prove infertile, sometimes totally, as in the case of mules. Mules live a hundred years, but never produce another mule. It has also been discovered that bastards often go wild. Pig-bastards are known for this. In Patagonia bastards of the sheep-dog went wild and seized the sheep they were supposed to guard.

Among people more or less the same mixture sometimes produces different results. For example, cross-breeding of Norwegians and Lapps does not lead to any improvement of the race, but on the contrary: “In truth, it is rare for anything good to come of it; most commonly this mixed blood brings to the surface only negative features”. Apparently in Brazil, a certain section of those of mixed Portuguese and coloured blood, the so-called caboclos, constitute a truly lamentable type. “Today in the neighbourhood of Horretes or Paranagua there are no Indians at all, but there are very few people who do not have in their veins a certain percentage of Red Indian blood. Round Horretes and in the whole coastal area the caboclos are physically miserable, tormented by venereal diseases (inherited from the Indians?) and unfitted for life”. But we know from other sources that there is no lack of physically highly successful Spanish-Indian crossings (the Mexicans, for instance). Nor is there any lack of healthy mestizos in Brazil. Indian blood may be recognised by the “straight, hard, blue-black hair, broad face and melancholy glance of the passerby in the streets of the port of Paranagua.”

Mendelianism strictly defines the hereditary bounds of features, of various kinds, but it does not answer the question what the conditions are either for fertility, lasting or of short-duration, or for sterility. Presumably the case is the same as with animals: related racial types produce for the greater part good results from crossing; distant types on the other hand, for the greater part give unfortunate results.

Julian Talko-Hryncewicz found that this was the position in the Turanian East, on whose peoples he was the greatest expert. Crosses between Chinese men and Mongolian women produce excellent results, creating for example in Úrda “a handsome . . . intelligent type”. Children from unions between Chinese men and Buryat women, but “particularly”

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400 Ibid., p. 209.
403 Ibid., p. 120.
Mongolian women, resemble Spaniards. On the other hand, unfavourable results follow the union of Chinese men and Russian women, who “stand racially at a greater distance”.

In any case of what are races formed, if not of related anthropological types? We repeat with Czekanowski that “only a considerable number of types fairly close to each other form a race. Race is a creation of anthropological analysis, and not an entity already given to us directly in nature. The anthropology of races in fact presents a classification of human kind”. Thus not belonging among direct natural phenomena, races emerge with time, in time and for a time, as products of cross-breeding.

But the mingling of races to form a new race is an extremely slow process, to such an extent that the same races (let us say the same products of racial mixtures) are peculiar to whole epochs. Czekanowski himself mentions the detail that “the population round Lwów has undergone no change since the middle of the seventeenth century” — but “in the population of the Black Sea steppes there is, despite everything, continuity reaching back to the nomadic Iranian population”, for “the broad noses of the people of the Ukraine indicate the survival of the old population of the steppe territory in considerable strength”. But weighing most heavily in the scale is the fact that it is possible to verify “continuity in the development of European relationships. . . . From the Bronze Age to the present time the population of Europe has been composed of the same racial elements, and the extreme long-headed and Nordic types reach back far into the later Paleolithic. Even more strikingly evident is… the continuity in the spheres investigated by prehistory and ethnography”.

“From the Ice Age to the present time we have to deal with racial elements found among the population living at the present time”. And so it is legitimate for the historian to assert that our epoch has its races (even although obviously resulting from a previous mixture) and it is permissible within these limits to talk of races. Even so for the historian these limits are extremely wide — wider we do not need!

II WHAT RACES ARE THERE?

The canon of racial features is still an open question; for there is no agreement on which somatic variations are to be considered indications of racial difference. At one time (from Cuvier 17691832) the canon was colour of skin, but Cuvier recognised only three races: white, black and yellow, treating Indians as a variant of yellow, in opposition to Linnaeus and Blumenbach who recognised the separateness of the “red-skinned” races. But then more and more “colours” were discovered and described. To avoid misunderstandings, shade-tables of these colours were compiled. The best of them, drawn up by the Frenchman Paul Broca (1824-1880) and accepted almost everywhere, enumerates thirty-four shades, indicated by the numbers used to designate them. The English anthropological institute prepared an edition with the shades simplified to ten, according to the suggestions of Topinard.

Soon, however, colour of the skin came to be regarded as only a secondary racial feature, and first place was taken by variety of skull, of the head as a whole and of certain facial details and even hair. In 1843 the Swede A. Retzuis introduced the division into long

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404 Talko-Hryncewicz, op. cit, pp. 259, 299.
407 Czekanowski, "Rasy i ludzie", op. cit., p. 144.
and short-headed, and Paul Broca, having reduced to order all that we call anthropometric measurement, added a third division — the medium-headed.

Max Mueller’s idea of seeking in linguistic relationships, in combination with somatic features, a means of indicating racial affiliations and kinship was rejected. After all race is a zoological matter, and language social. It was easy also to discover that different races sometimes speak the same tongue, or a similar one, and people of the same race different tongues. Nor are “present-day linguistic areas identical with anthropological areas”.

On the other hand, there was increasing readiness to accept the view of Huxley, who in 1870 defined races by hair, although Haeckel’s suggestion in 1879 that this should be adopted as a basic feature did not survive. In the end, science adopted a combination of the features of hair, “colour” and anthropometric measurements.

As somatological differences became better known, more races appeared for the anthropologists. Adding “secondary” races to “chief” races, in 1860 Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire obtained thirteen, ten years later Huxley fourteen, while in 1879 Haeckel got to 34: Topinard in 1885 counted nineteen races, Quatrefages in 1889 one less.

Now the most recent expression of scientific opinion is the table (fruit of thirty years’ work) drawn up by J. Deniker, enumerating 29 races and dozens of “sub-races” grouped in “categories”. The basic division is into five categories (A — F) according to hair, account being taken of colour of eyes (and in one case shape of nose), while the sub-divisions come from combinations of all the features and are even in two stages. The population of Europe is not fitted into a single category, but divided between two. On a special map of Europe Deniker indicates six “principal” races: Nordic, coastal or Atlantic-Mediterranean, eastern. Adriatic or Dinaric, insular-Iberian, western or Cevennole — and four “secondary”: sub-Nordic, north-western, Vistulan and sub-Adriatic.

Jan Czekanowski treats these matters in more or less the same way. In the “European” anthropological team he includes the Finnish peoples and some of the names he uses are different, which is to be accounted for by his researches into the anthropology of Polish territories. According to him, the basic outline of the matter is as follows:

In the later Paleolithic age it may be assumed that Lapponoids were the main constituent of the population of Poland. This is the same element which “constitutes the basic component of the Ugro-Finnish and Turkic peoples” (the Cevennole race in Deniker). In the Neolithic period there is already an admixture. “The old Neolithic population, the pre-Slavonic type (in Deniker race orientale), constituting the basis of population throughout the whole of our territory and in the neighbouring European territories” . . . “is a mixture of Lapponoidal with Mediterranean (insular-Iberian)”. An increasingly important place and in the end first place was taken by the Nordic race and by the sub-Nordic type composed of “various mixtures of the Nordic type”. We also have here and there the “Alpine combination”, which is a mixture of Nordic and Armenoid”. The “steppe population was formerly Iranian. ... It is this and not the Dinaric type which is the essence of the anthropological separateness of the Ukraine”.

This was a victory for Niederle’s thesis, once regarded as bold, that the original Slavs were of Nordic type, and that Slavonic expansion was undoubtedly, from an anthropological point of view, expansion by the Nordic race. By the end of the first millenium, the predominant type among Slavs was long-headed, as it was among the ancient southern Germans. Adequate attention was at length paid to the fact that ancient authors (notably the

408 Czekanowski, "Zarys antropologii Polski", op. cit., p. 90.
410 Deniker, op. cit, pp. 359, 360; one and a half pages of large octavo.
411 Ibid., p. 408 and text 409-414.
Byzantines and Arabs) describe the Slavs as light-haired. It was also at last realised that the present zone of short-headed Slavs is an inconsiderable part of Slav territory, and includes for the most part lands which became Slav only in historic times, as for instance everything south of the Carpathians.\footnote{Czekanowski, "Wstęp do historii Słowian", op. cit, pp. 251, 273, 276.}

Czekanowski finally recognises in Europe four basic races ("types") and six mixed ones, whose genesis and relations he defines thus: basic are the Nordic, Mediterranean. Armenoid and Lapponoid types; from a mixture of Nordic and Lapponoid there developed the sub-Nordic type, from Nordic and Armenoid the Dinaric, from Nordic and Mediterranean the north-western;

Armenoid mixed with Mediterranean produced a Littoral type, and with Lapponoid the Alpine; finally the crossing of Mediterranean and Lapponoid produced the pre-Slav type.\footnote{Czekanowski, "Rasy i ludy", op. cit, p; 139.} But the same scholar immediately gives warning that "isolation of the pre-Slav type presents considerable difficulties".\footnote{Ibid., p. 142.}

There is no lack of doubts, which is not strange, since progress in science is born of doubt. The leading German authority on these matters, Eugen Fischer, complicates the issue still further by collecting features drawn from archaeology (considering for example that line graves are a Nordic feature) lists seven "anthropological circles", and these are divided into races, geographically extremely mixed (chiefly as a result of wanderings). All German scholars are particularly intent on following up the range of the long-headed blond, in the mistaken opinion that these features are indubitable indications of German or at least Germanic blood. But it has already been established that they are by no means racial features of the mass of Germanic peoples today,\footnote{Pittard, op. cit., pp. 232, 242.} while Scandinavia itself reveals quite a number of the short-headed.

After all this, the state of anthropology invites pessimistic comment. Eugen Fischer has said that at present not anthropology but only anthropography i.e. simple description is possible. There are plenty of contradictions revealing the inadequate consolidation of the science. For example on the pygmies, Fischer himself says in one place that their original relations with the negroes cannot be defined, and that it cannot be stated whether both are autochthons of Africa — in another he regards them as the older race, once settled throughout Africa and also in the Mediterranean area of Europe.\footnote{Fischer, "Spezielle Anthropologie", op. cit., pp. 142, 143, 182.} But even on the southern Europeans views differ to such an extent that while some see in them an admixture of negro blood, Fritz Lenz emphasises that what all white in all their varieties have in common, is the significant drop of Nordic blood and the absence of negro.\footnote{"Grundriss", op. cit., vol. II, p. 183.} Fischer, on the other hand, points not only to the Turkish admixture in south-eastern Europe, but to the Arabic and also the Berber in Spain "and through their intermediary to the negro clearly evident here and there in Spain and Portugal".\footnote{Fischer, op. cit., p. 168.}

In Czekanowski’s most recent work it is said that “the appearance of dark-skinned components is a significant feature of the population” (of Europe) in the Paleolithic epoch,\footnote{Czekanowski, "Rasy i ludy", op. cit, p. 139.} and the so-called Neanderthal race is “hypothetically” linked to the Austro-African type, that is the type which was settled mainly in the forest zone of Central Africa. But two other types of black race are linked with the Europe of earlier epochs: the negroid type is directly identical with the European negroids, while the Nigritian or Sudanese is linguistically related
to the Basques (monosyllabic roots, absence of grammatical genders and forms for the plural). All this may be a trace of the former connection between Europe and Africa.421

Despite the still widely divergent judgments of anthropological scholars, justice demands recognition that the science has got rid of a quantity of old errors. For example it has been established that the Indo-European is a matter of language, and not genetics, since there are no similar morphological features.422 No serious scholar still speaks of the “Aryan race”, since the Aryan is only a linguistic relationship, in no way deciding the question of common blood. In the same way the until recently dominant Celtic-Slav theory has also proved to be fantasy.

Gone beyond recovery is the alleged tribal unity of both German and Slav. And Pittard emphatically denies that the northern and southern Slavs could be of common origin. Balkan Slavs are in no way ethnically related to the Russians, and on the other hand the features of the Slavs of the Abruzzi, alleged descendants of the Dalmatians, are very far removed from those of the Dinaric race.423

At one time the Nordic race alone reigned in Northern Europe and stretched deep into Central Europe. Anthropologically, Celts and Germans represent “two immediately successive waves of the expansion of the Nordic type”.424 Germans, Celts and Slavs were originally anthropologically “completely identical”, and the differences emerged later as a result of the influx of foreign blood. The Celts melted into the population they found in their new homes. The Slavs mingled with the Mongols, the influence of whose blood is also found deep into Germany. The Alpine race, on the other hand, pushed as far as Scandinavia, and the Lapps southwards.425

And there is no such thing as a “Latin race”. Among the peoples using one of the Romance tongues there are as many as five races: Nordic, Atlantic-Mediterranean, Adriatic, insular-Iberian and Cevennole.426

The difficulties mount when it comes to parts of the world whose anthropological material is incomparably less thoroughly investigated, and the lack of established nomenclature too often bears witness to ideas which are still fluid. The whole question of the genealogy and affiliation of races is completely uncertain, a true groping in the dark. And will it ever be settled, since the vast bulk of the materials for prehistoric anthropology is lost?

And yet across the gaps and mists of doubt there is the glimmering of an attempted synthesis (with Polish scholars leading the way):

Asia represents the oldest element in the human race (with the “oldest centre” in Mesopotamia). In Asia also the territories of the yellow and white races meet in an indented line through the Turan, Pamir and Himalaya.427 The population flowed into Eastern Europe from Asia (Finno-Ugrians), while in the west the oldest, black element came from Africa. The original population of Africa. Australia (Oceania) and America arrived from Asia. “In the East Indies lies the hub of this common link” with Australia and Africa. To America (where there is no trace of Quaternary man428) there certainly existed a land bridge (instead of the Behring Strait) which kept out the cold currents from the Arctic Ocean.429 Two SouthWest

421 ibid., pp. 67, 68, 149. Association of the Basque and Caucasian tongues has proved mistaken, since the latter have the plural form. And the ancient Iberians are now considered to have been an Hamitic people related to the Berbers.
422 Pittard. op. cit., pp. 538, 540.
423 Ibid., pp. 177, 322, 323, 359.
424 Czekanowski, "Wstęp do historii Słowian", op. cit, p. 251.
426 Pitard, p. 60.
427 Czekanowski, "Rasy i ludy", op. cit, p. 123.
428 Ibid., p. 100.
429 Ibid., pp. 99, 100, 118.
Asian types are also to be found in Africa and in Oceania and “are linked to the black race by a number of features”. In Abyssinia and the Somali peninsula “the great wealth of Asiatic elements is striking”. The African Hamites are arrivals from Asia.

But this prehistory of proto-population stumbles when it comes to the subsequent history of the human race; only a few things can be linked, and hypothetical bridges erected. Thus in Northern Asia, for example, the Paleo-Asiatic type is singled out as a bridge between the yellow and white races (ampler hair, and the Mongolian fold a rarity), but this “singling-out presents considerable difficulties”. And the hypothetical proto-Hamites depend for their existence on speculation alone: “put forward as a theoretical necessity by the linguistic experts”.

The canon of racial features may itself likewise undergo complete change as a result of the new bio-chemical discoveries. Signs of blood differences have long been known, and much can be read about them in the old text-books. A separate department of medicine, so-called missionary medicine, has grown up in response not only to the different diseases, but also to the different effects of these diseases in the missionary countries of Africa and Australia — an observation which in recent years should be broadened to include India. Step by step the thread has led to the clue, to the discovery that racial differentiation exists even in the blood of man, and in a way not unconnected with the colour of his skin.

The most recent studies have concerned themselves with precisely this question of blood. Biochemistry has grown out of serology. I repeat the words of the most competent of Polish race-experts: “These serological investigations are directed to establishing similarities and differences in the various forms of animals on the basis of the properties of their plasma, their blood and other liquids, secretions, or components of albumen, which reveal themselves by the animals’ way of reacting to foreign elements (cells and their products, solutions of foreign albumen) which have entered their system by injection”. “Here it is a matter of defining, on the basis of similarities and differences in the bio-chemical nature of their plasma or their albumen, the similarities and differences arising between organisms, and manifesting themselves in various biochemical reactions”.

The method of biochemical research not only “makes possible the uncovering of racial differences”, but has already reached such excellence that “if the biochemical structure of the red blood corpuscles of mother and child are known, in a given case by investigating the blood it is possible to recognise among a given number of men who is the father of the child”. In other words, the two kinds of isoagglutinates in the serum of human blood correspond to two biochemical structures in the red corpuscles of human blood: A and B. Four serological human types or races are distinguished, namely A, B, non-A, non-B. When the characteristics A and B appear in one individual, the result is type AB; when the characteristics non-A and non-B meet, type 0 results. “The said biochemical characteristics are permanent, inherited, according to the laws of Mendel and entirely independent of the state of health of the individuals concerned; they also occur, entirely independently of morphological anthropological features”.

“Characteristic” for the European is the relatively frequent appearance of the A feature — in more than 40% of individuals — and the relatively rare appearance of the B feature — in between 10 and 20% of individuals. Contrariwise, among Asian and African nations A is rarer, below 30%, and B more common, among Hindus even reaching 50%.

430 Ibid., p. 122.  
431 Ibid., p. 78.  
432 Ibid., p. 82.  
433 Ibid., pp. 122, 142.  
434 Ibid., p. 81.  
435 Klecki, op. cit, p. 166, 13
The source of feature or type A is Europe, the source of B Asia. Nations inhabiting the shores of the Mediterranean Sea, as well as Russians and Jews who, from a serological point of view have similar blood, represent a middle type between the European and Asiatic. Considered in relation to feature A, Poles are of European type, in relation to feature B they belong to a middle type (influence of the east). Serologically, Ruthenian blood is Asiatic.

Jan Mydlarski worked independently in this field, and Czekanowski has said of him: “The link between anthropology and serology is one of the very great achievements, for it creates completely new bases for research into the past of human kind.”

Since A and B do not always appear pure, Czekanowski distinguishes AA and AO, BB and BO, bearing in mind primarily “coagulation and non-coagulation of blood-cells” between kinds of blood. The biochemical distribution of blood on Polish territory is of such a kind that “we cannot reconcile the result with our information on the proportions of the morphological components”.

In any case, races exist, only in speaking of them we must add: races of our epoch. But is this addition not as a rule self-understood, does it not usually follow logically from the context?

Thus all the doubts raised by the fact of “racial chaos” have served to teach us about the genesis and nature of races, but have certainly not disposed of their existence. And here let us repeat after Czekanowski: “Considering the results of genetic research it is to be assumed that types and by the same token races are no mere definitions, but possess real existence”.

And now one further point: have races according to “colour” really dissolved into nothing? In all the races, racial types and circles of Deniker and Fischer is there any bicoloured race? It has merely been demonstrated to us that for every colour there are several races!

So what is happening is a modest retreat to Cuvier! In the most recent (1930-1932) anthropological works we read: “If the results of our morphological research hitherto are correct, and in the human race we have six racial elements and fifteen variants on them, it would be highly probable that linking up originally with Cuvier’s three races, the three biological components of blood, together with their three mixtures constituted the basis of the six morphological racial elements.” Czekanowski had already spoken (incidentally) in 1927 of the yellow and black race. The Pole Poniatowski finally included the “Redskins” in the yellow race.

The three “colours” are thus something above race, something more, something wider than race. Let us call them “racial stocks”. This is not in any way to detract from the knowledge that colour of skin is dependent on conditions to which the pigment is exposed; we are not disputing the view that if negroes were exposed for long enough to the action of the crooked Polish sun they would grow much paler. But before the requisite length of time had elapsed, a new epoch would have arrived.

I consider, therefore, that the supplementary question “when?” makes it permissible to reply positively to the question “what races are there?” — every epoch has its own;

Let us pass now to the question of the psychical consequences of crossing, which will bring us nearer to our fundamental problem: What is the relation between the variety of civilisations and the variety of races?

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436 Ibid., pp. 166, 178, 183-185. As for the Ruthenians, they absorbed during the Middle Ages no small quantities of Polovtsian, Pecheneg, Berendey and later, Tartar blood.
438 Ibid., pp. 422-427.
439 Czekanowski, "Wstęp do historii Słowian", op. cit., p. 22.
440 Czekanowski, "Zarys antropologii Polski", op. cit., p. 431.
441 Czekanowski, "Wstęp do historii Słowian", op. cit., p. 17.
III THE SO-CALLED SOCIOLOGICAL RACES

Scepticism in the matter of race reached the point when its very existence was questioned. In our scientific literature this doubt was most forcibly expressed by Professor Michal Sobeski: “Race has only psychological meaning. Thanks to a certain resemblance between people in certain conditions, the illusion of race is created”.  

From psychological it is only a step to the sociological race; this term is used by Professor Floryan Znaniecki, who asserts that as a rule “anthropological race and sociological race are entirely incommensurable”, and “the limits of civilisations have never coincided with racial limits”, since the “reciprocal influences among civilisations and among the inter-mingling races never kept step”. The expression “historical races” is also increasingly used — first, it seems, by Le Bon in the sentence: “The majority of the historical races of Europe are still at the formative stage, and it is necessary to know this in order to understand their history”.

Still other “races” may be invented, depending on the standpoint adopted towards them. And was the ancient division into fishing, pastoral and agricultural peoples not the classical classification of “sociological races”?

The employment by science of the same expression in different meaning is dangerous, because it leads to confusion. For my part I shall continue to use the expression “race” exclusively in the somatic meaning, without regard to the spiritual side of man. I also judge that for the expression of what Le Bon and all his successors have in mind, the expressions: people, nation State, races which created States, would be entirely adequate. If historical, sociological and all psychological manifestations are put together, what is the result if not a system for the organisation of communal life, and so a civilisation? And is not this what scholars have in mind when they use these expressions? If the expressions “psychological race” or “sociological race” were replaced by the word “civilisation” the meaning of their arguments would not be altered a jot. In fact they themselves often use the word as an alternative to the other expressions.

Application of the nomenclature proposed by me to the just observations of Professor Znaniecki, gives the same result in more precise form, namely that race and civilisation are entirely incommensurate. But this is still not exact and precise enough, because there is some commensurability between them; so that the thesis should run: race and civilisation are not entirely commensurable, and the degree of commensurability may vary from extremely slight to extremely high.

It is certain that there is no permanent relation between race and civilisation. And a quite primitive knowledge of history is sufficient to bring realisation that within one civilisation there may be different races — and in one race different civilisations.

At this point it is necessary to deal with the problem whether and to what extent psychological racial features exist. Czekanowski rightly says: “Reckoning with the racial factor in the history of humanity is only a consequence of reckoning with the fact that racial differentiation is not confined to the sphere of morphology”. But we shall not now return to those strange views (long since overthrown) that anthropology should marshal history;

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444 Gustave Le Bon. "Lois psychologiques de l'évolution des peuples". Second edition, Paris 1895. Pp. 16, 48. In other words, not all peoples have succeeded in reaching the level of the historic nations.
445 Czekanowski, "Zarys antropologii Polski", op. cit., p. 419.
particularly on the issue of “psychological races” and all “communal psychology”, history has a considerable store of information of its own.

Let us consider the relation of communal psychology to race in the light of various anthropological arguments, but also of historic experience.

We know from experience that Alpine, Dinaric, Iberian and other psychologies are undoubtedly distinguishable, so that racial psychologies exist — they hit one in the eye! A Berliner makes a quite different impression from a Viennese, an inhabitant of Mecklenburg from an inhabitant of the Tyrol, even if somebody has placed them in the same “historical race”. In the same way a Silesian and a Kuyavian are psychologically distinct. The more external (and so superficial) these features are, the plainer they are, so that the generality of people judge the psychology of a given ethnic group by them.

But going deeper into the matter, we notice that these are differences affecting only disposition — differences of temperament, movement, diction. They may really depend on some secondary somatic differences even within the same race. The matter has not yet been investigated. Probably disposition is made up of the manifestations of a certain middle area between the body and soul of man — primitive, very low-level manifestations where the dependence of spirit on the body is still greatest. Perhaps psychology will one day take up this part of life, and develop a new branch of psychology from it, a new specialised science. Then we may be able to account for the “briskness” of the Cracow man and the “phlegm” of the Silesian.

To this field of phenomena and research surely belong such questions as the facts discovered by L. Jaxa Bykowski, that children remain “childish” longer in Great Poland, and are also unresponsive to competition. Jan Czekanowski, writing of the application of anthropology in pedagogy, drew attention to the fact that even such small racial differences as those between Great Poland and the south-eastern provinces call for different pedagogical handling. He concluded that differences arise in the nervous system, and from them derive the different dispositions, the “constitutional” differences of individuals. Here also belongs fascinating research into the conditions for maximum effort (with their first pull on the ergometer the Nordic team produced the maximum effort). Here would also belong inquiries into whether superior or inferior abilities follow upon anthropological differentiation, and the different directions taken by these abilities (towards mathematics and science or towards the arts), provided views appearing on this matter were based on a less loose (almost arbitrary) creation of morphological groups. These too are matters of disposition, although already more complicated. They do not affect character, still less attain the heights of the great problems of civilisation.

Disposition and character are mutually independent. Disposition may derive from somatic or psychical factors, whereas character is based on psyche alone. There may be different characters with the same disposition, and the same character may reveal itself in different dispositions. Nevertheless the question of disposition has absolutely nothing to do with civilisation.

In the problem of the existence of psychical racial features the issue is character, at least character, as well as views on good and evil, beauty and ugliness, benefit and harm; for upon them systems of communal life grow up. Do such fundamental psychical features have any connection with race — here is our question. It is a question which splits into two: may

447 "Nauka Polska", V.
448 Czekanowski, "Zarys antropologii Polski", p. 441.
449 Czekanowski, "Wstęp do historii Słowian", p. 446. No account has been taken of the social group of those investigated!
they have a connection, or must they have one, i.e. they cannot not have it. In other words, may the psyche accompany race, or is it dependent on it through some inevitable tie directly resulting from the difference of race itself; is then psychological variety the result of race?

For a dozen or more years before the North American Civil War (1861-1865) over the maintenance or abolition of slavery, there was a controversy about precisely these questions. It was argued directly from polyphiletism that the negro must have a psyche lower than the European planter. Types of Mankind (1854), a famous book by joint authors Nott and Gliddon, advanced scientific arguments against negro emancipation, while the renowned Agassiz, declared: “It would be vain for us to seek relationship between eagle and owl, ass and horse”, by which he meant between black and white. In rejecting arguments of this kind, it is also necessary to reject the diametrically opposed view of our contemporary, Sageret Finot to the effect that if negroes had lived for a sufficiently long period of time under the same conditions as white peoples, they would have achieved relatively quickly our intellectual and moral level. But what certainty is there that they would use their abilities to make themselves like us, and not in precisely the opposite direction?

We are led out of these tangles by awareness of the circumstance that no psyche can be formed on anything but the five categories of being, on our “quincunx”. Now if characters and views on the “quincunx” depended on race we should have dolichocephalic intellects, civilisations of blonds and brunettes, prognathous views, etc., in other words we should immediately jump into the depths of absurdity. Let who will work out 29 civilisations for Deniker’s table; but Alpine, Dinaric, Vistulan and other types of psyche exist only in the field of phenomena of a lower order, and are not distinguishable in the phenomena which create civilisations. There is no Vistulan, Cevenole, Lapponoid, Nordic, sub-Nordic or similar civilisation, on the other hand there is a difference in civilisation between Croat and Serb, although there is no racial difference between them. And another fact confirmed by history is that a given ethnic element may change civilisation without changing racially (the Finns and Magyars).

It follows that the psyche (going deeper than disposition) is in no way a racial matter, and not in the least dependent on somatic circumstances.

The next question presents itself: is the communal psyche constant or changing? History reveals the changeable spirit of associations. Before the sixteenth century the English were not sailors. The greatest pacifists of today, the Swiss, lived mainly by soldiering for money before they became a society of hotel-keepers. The Swedes were the extreme militarists of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, expanding into countries with which they had nothing to do. Between the middle of the fourteenth and the middle of the sixteenth centuries, Poles were becoming more and more of a bourgeois society. Under King Sigismund the Old there were complaints that almost the whole Cracow province had been bought up by townsmen; the majority of Polish aristocratic families come from towns. And what happened to our towns afterwards?! The Germans too were changeable: until the middle of the eighteenth century they were famous as drunkards, and afterwards for lack of practicability. And how the psychology of the ancient Romans changed!

Peoples of short stature always remain short — but kinds and levels of communal psyche are emphatically changeable. The immutability of psychical racial features was first advanced by Gobineau, and the popularising of this view dates from Le Bon. From him derives the thesis that every people has une constitution mentale aussi fixe que ses caractères anatomiques. As he also states in another place that l’histoire d’un peuple dérive toujours

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450 Pittard mistakenly advances as a sign of militarism the fact that during the World War thousands of Swiss served voluntarily in the French army; which was a result of their French national feeling.
de sa constitution mentale," which he regards as unchanging — the history of every historic society would be predetermined! But Le Bon did not see this consequence.

The example put forward by him and since repeated a thousand times in all languages, according to which there is rooted in French mentality an urge towards centralisation and the destruction of private initiative in favour of etatism (with the great Revolution carrying on the programme of the old monarchy) does not bear inspection, for French centralism emerged only in time — and up to Louis XI it would be hard to point to any sign of it. Le Bon was altogether unable to develop his ideas logically. Once he identifies race and mentality, saying plainly L’histoire d’un peuple ne dépend pas de ses institutions mais de son caractère, c’est à dire de sa race." On another occasion, however, he says that “psychical types are no more lasting than anatomical” — so distinguishing the one from the other.

Friedrich von Hellwald in Kulturgeschichte in ihrer natürlichen Entwicklung bis zur Gegenwart (third edition 1884) also regards psychical racial features as permanent, and claims that every people has a certain inborn psychological racial character, determining the course of its thought and activity. A spokesman of the most recent science, Pittard, does not admit this unchangeability. In his view at a given time some races may be, for example, more warlike, others more peaceable, but this changes. He says there are peoples who die of hunger in a place without attempting to expand out of it, but he does not say that such a people could not change.

Thus if something permanent is discernible in the mentality of a race, it does not derive from somatics and has only a circumstantial, not a causal connection with race. There is a highly significant example: what is there that is permanent in the race to which the ancient Egyptians belonged and to which today the Nubians, their rightful descendants, belong? Le Bon himself, an advocate of the unconditional dependence of psyche on race, drew attention to this particular racial identity; he was convinced that none of her conquerors had left their blood in Egypt (which indeed must have required a miracle). Why then has the level of the Egyptian psyche fallen to the Nubian level, and why is it of not at all the same kind?

Equally popular is the case of those other descendants of the creators of a great civilisation, the nomadic Arabs. But not all are nomadic. In Arabia itself, the Arabs form three strata — nomads, farmers and town-dwellers. Where then is the psychical stability? In the Tiemsen country “every year there is a growing number of Arab and Berber farmers, even of nomads drawn here from distant southern camping-grounds or the steep slopes of the Atlas. New vineyards, cornfields, orchards, modern cattle-farms are always appearing; the Arab is foresaking his time-honoured wooden plough and replacing it with French or American agricultural implements, increasingly forgetful of nomadic life”. On the road between Tiemsen and the western frontier of Algeria “the nomads, inspired by the example and success of whites, are evidently beginning to settle and work the land, for in a few places we saw small Arab plantations with vines, olives and pomegranates”.

In the second half of the nineteenth century, the Trans-Baikal Buryats began to adopt settled ways of life. In the summer they have their old transportable yourts, in winter they put

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452 Ibid., p. 99;
453 Ibid., p. 117.
454 Ibid., p. 159.
455 Pittard, op. cit., pp. 577, 579.
456 Ibid., p. 505).
457 “n’y ont jamais laissé de traces de leur sang”. Le Bon, "Lois psychologiques", op. cit., p. 48.
458 Pittard. op. cit., p. 433.
459 Ossendowski, "Przez kraj ludzi, zwierzząt i bogów”, op. cit, pp. 70, 86. It is necessary to exercise great caution in speaking of "Arabs". In many countries of Asia and Africa, in Barbary for example, invading populations, ethnically non-Arab, are called "Arabs". Pp. 433, 438.
up little three-windowed houses for themselves, even although they often still live in yourts alongside the houses.\textsuperscript{460}

Or another matter. There is a general belief that the Chinese was the worst bureaucracy in the world. Yet it depends when, for that bureaucracy dates only from the Mongol invasion.

What, in face of all this is to be regarded as permanent and unchanging in the character of a given society? Here too the supplementary question when? must be posed. One may speak of the psychology of a given society at a given time, but not in general, without reference to time. Thus race brings nothing psychologically unchanging to history, and communal psychology is not in itself unchanging.

\textbf{At a given time certain psychological features of certain races exist, without, however, being a consequence of race.} It is all that can be said on this subject.

The illusion of the identity of race and civilisation arose because civilisation can only spread by proximity; it cannot strengthen and establish itself except by conquering an area of some size with a compact population. It spreads to neighbours and on to the neighbours of those neighbours; there is no other way. A Japanese could not, for example, acquire the civilisation born in Monte Cassino, nor the soldiers of Mieszkos and Boleslases [Polish Xth and XIth c. kings] become acquainted with samurai civilisation. This geographical consideration is unconditionally binding. Individuals who by travel acquire a civilisation new to them are able to graft it on to their home country only if they form and live as a group.

Modern shipping improvements have produced the idea of “oversea neighbours”.

\textbf{Civilisation cannot emerge without its own territory.} Even the humblest beginnings require some territory on which the given system of communal life may be applied. And since as a rule in a given area the resident population is compact and ethnically uniform the illusion is created of a causal connection between civilisation and race. But for civilisation territory is only scaffolding. In the same area different civilisations may develop chronologically and contemporaneously. Northern Africa once belonged to Roman civilisation, Spain was Arab territory. On Polish territory four civilisations (Latin, Byzantine, Turanian and Jewish) exist at present, and in India there are even six (Brahmin, Turanian, Arab, Latin, Jewish, Chinese).

Civilisation embraces peoples of a given race in a given territory, but is not itself causally related to any race or any territory.\textsuperscript{461} Mass emigration may transfer a given civilisation to new territory. In this way Latin civilisation, and Jewish also, have spread all over the world. Immigration may even change the civilisation of a given area. If the immigrants arrive with a strong consciousness of possessing a high-level civilisation of their own; immigrants whose civilisation is slight after a certain time adopt the civilisation of the new country.

\section*{IV PSYCHOLOGICAL RESULTS OF CROSSING}

In an investigation of the relation of race to civilisation, the question of the psychological consequences of crossing cannot be avoided. Opinions were and are divided. Among enthusiasts for cross-breeding the Hegelian Michelet, mentioned earlier, has gone

\textsuperscript{460} TaIko-Hryncewicz, op. cit., p. 296.
\textsuperscript{461} Spengler in "Untergang des Abendlandes" says that civilisation is "pflanzenhaft gebunden" to a certain territory. This is contrary to elementary historical knowledge and incidentally to phytogeography which describes the wanderings of plants.
furthest. According to him humanity is tending to the recovery of its primordial racial unity, which will occur through the melting of all existing races into one “middle” race, as is happening in America; with the brotherhood of all mankind to follow. Similar optimists were Bastian, Bodichon and Krzywicki, with Oberziner among the younger men. A. Reibmayr and 0. Lorenz restricted the advantage of cross-breeding to elements ethnically close to each other. Lenz also limits crossing, considering it a condition of any advantage that the parties should be suited to each other, and not very different in spiritual qualities. Eduard Meyer advocated cross-breeding, but with the reservation that the influences on both sides must melt into internal unity.\textsuperscript{462} If they had also asked themselves the question which influences lent themselves to this kind of fusion and which did not, they would have been on the right track for an investigation of the crossing of civilisations; but this step was not taken.

The opponents of crossing are headed by Gobineau (1816-1882). For him everything in history which is positive derives from racial purity, from cross-breeding everything which is evil. While a race is pure it has one way of thinking and one logic, so that institutions correspond with desires and are fixed, permanent, unchanging. In a heavily mixed society “first there is maximum disturbance, then unhealthy stagnation, in the end death”. When even the noblest race dissolves into the flood of the ignoble, the disappearance of civilisation must be the consequence. Whether the pure white race found itself at pole or equator, the spiritual centre of the world would be there. The “Aryan race” must, therefore, be protected against mixed blood. The Aryans of southern and eastern Europe have enormously lowered their own level by mixing their blood; this can be seen, among other things in the egalitarian tendencies of the democracy which has developed among them. For although in ethnically mixed elements the superior race provides the unifying civilising factors, over a period this superior race degenerates, while the lower race by no means rises to the other’s original level. The hierarchy of race is obscured and we approach equality, then degeneration in ethnic relations. Higher values disappear in the mixture. The superficial spread of civilisation goes for nothing, since “inevitable laws drive humanity towards ethnic unity which is a foretaste of decline and a portent of unavoidable death”. Even the Semitic race, in the hierarchy of races coming immediately after the Aryan, when mixed with the latter brings about Aryan degeneration. The Anglo-Saxon and Scandinavian peoples, standing for the purity of “Aryan” blood, have kept their superiority — so argues Gobineau.\textsuperscript{463} Le Bon expressed the same ideas even more emphatically. In his view “man is always and before all else, a representative of his race”. He proclaimed that “historic races” decline and perish through cross-breeding. He was the first to declare that in former times the Aryans in India and then the English in their colonies preserved unity and strength because they did not inter-marry. He also first drew attention to the flooding of the United States of North America by foreigners, and to the fact that France faces the same threat. He feared that as a result the United States might one day fall into civil wars which must end with the country’s disintegration into several hostile states. He told France that a third of her population would be Italian, and another third German, which would be “worse than the severest military defeat”. And so the racial problem towers above everything in history. Rome fell through such “peaceful invasions”, although the barbarians tried to continue Roman civilisation, deceiving themselves with the idea even under the last Merovingians, so that all Charlemagne’s acts were conceived with it in mind. This Roman civilisation was never overthrown (renversée), but came into the hands of different races who formed a “new historical race”, and so a new civilisation. The most dangerous things are revolutions, which affect a nation’s way of


thinking. The basic reason for the fall of the Persians and Romans was the change in their mental make-up (*constitution mentale*) following a decline of character — here crossbreeding is always highly dangerous. For this reason half-caste countries must be ruled with an iron hand, otherwise they will be in perpetual anarchy. The danger of cross-breeding can be neutralised only on three conditions: the inter-breeding races must not differ overmuch in numbers or psyche, and must have lived over a long period in identical environmental conditions; only then may a new race emerge.  

It is evident from this line of thought that Le Don, like Cobineau, succumbed to the illusion of the identity of civilisation and race, as a result of which both confused a mixture of civilisations with a mixture of races. They correctly invoke the psyche and wrongly connect it with race; the *ad hoc* notion of “historic race” is no way out of the confusion.

Lapouge, that advocate of caste society, went even further. In his view the mental inequality of races is basically irremediable, and all crossing brings degeneration and reduces fertility. Friedrich von Hellwald forecasts disintegration of both blood and spirit with regeneration precluded; for the lower do not rise through cross-breeding, while the higher decline.

Pittard has lately brought up very seriously the question of the future of the United States, where there are about 8,000,000 negroes and 2,000,000 mulattoes who multiply twice as fast as the negroes and are worth even less. In face of all this the worthy anthropologist inquired what would be the ethnic appearance of the States in 100-150 years’ time.

Today complaints about the offspring of mixed unions are commonplace. But Eugen Fischer is of another opinion. Having investigated the offspring of Boers and lawfully-wed Hottentot wives in Rehoboth, he discovered that these descendents are superior to Hottentots in intellect and character, but show less ability than their fathers. Yet would it not be as well to wait for one more generation of this “experiment”? For experience shows that one cross is not the same as another. After all, two famous anthropologists have been of Indian origin: Iroquois in the case of Hervitt and the Omaha tribe in the case of La Fleche. Pittard expresses the view that inter-breeding between, for example, Scandinavians and Germans of Nordic race may be advantageous, but the “amalgamation” of two highly different races is “extremely dangerous” — and he even goes as far as to inquire whether, in view of these anthropological facts, the struggle against marriage between relatives is necessary. In all these examples it is necessary to reflect whether crossing of races or of civilisations is in question. In India which is the greater gulf, of race (and which? — there are not a few) or of civilisation, where the father is of Latin civilisation and the mother of Brahmin?

It must thus be borne in mind that mixture of races does not always bring with it mixture of civilisations, since several races may belong to the same civilisation, and normally they are races somatically close to each other (neighbours). The conclusion suggests itself that **crossing may take place with advantage inside the frame of the same civilisation, while the mating of individuals of different civilisations is dangerous.** Was Gobineau not close to this discovery when he wrote of a “single logic” inside the frame of one pure race? What is

464 Le Bon, "Lois psychologiques de l’évolution des peuples", op. cit., pp 12, 117. 114 footnote, 124, 125, 118, 119, 120, 121, 141, 160, 44, 45. On the question of the relation of Roman civilisation to the Barbarians he rightly appeals to Fustel de Coulanges. In parenthesis it may be said that Le Bon was not only the first to consider the ideology of equality nonsense, but he was also the first to proclaim that socialism will be the end of civilisation in the West, with communism as the most perfect form of socialism. Le Bon, op. cit, pp. 170, 172.
467 Wundt, op. cit. vol VIII. pp. 27, 171.
468 Pittard, op. cit., pp. 27, 171.
it he calls “way of thinking”, if not system? With his eyes on race, he was thinking of
civilisation but he wrote “race”.

If it were really a question of race, a mixture of civilisations must always have
accompanied a mixture of races. There would also never be a pure civilisation, since history
knows no pure races. In any case we know from ordinary experience that somatic inferiority
or superiority (sickness or health) does not bring with it a similar spiritual state, but very often
the opposite. In view of this, psychological differences represent not a racial problem but
simply one of civilisation.

It has happened that racial expansion has taken place in inverse proportion to that of a
civilisation. Sometimes a race which has been successful in expanding simultaneously suffers
the decline or even loss of its own civilisation, adopting a new one from the vanquished. In
such cases, the physically weaker complete the expansion of civilisation. But even in inter-
breeding between individuals belonging not only to different races but at the same time to
different civilisations, there is no inevitable crossing of civilisations. Is there any lack of those
whose contact with civilisation of any kind is nil? Such a person passively submits to the
civilisation of another so that on one side nothing is offered towards a crossing of
civilisations, on neither side, when both are passive.

Those entering into the details of this problem are subjected to the danger of
exaggeration because of an inclination to consider all psychical differences between parents
and children as results of cross-breeding — whereas children are rarely on exactly the same
level as their parents, but normally higher or lower. This is common-place and it is not
necessary to wander through the world and its races to discover.

Experience also shows that civilisations may cross without any anthropological
crossing at all. The whole of Europe is today a testing-ground for exactly such a mixture of
civilisations. For civilisations spread by their own roads, without needing racial cross-
breeding to clear the way for them.

V THE SO-CALLED HIERARCHY OF RACES

From the superstition of the unalterable permanence of psychical features in races
there emerged the problem of racial ability. Gobineau ascribed to the yellow race strength of
will and considered it on the whole practical, a masculine race, whereas the black is feminine,
sensual and weak-willed but with outstandingly high (sic) artistic gifts. The Hegelian
Michelet “philosophised” on racial themes thus: negroes constitute a “peaceful, childish
pleasure — loving unity with nature”; Malayans, with their “mania for destruction”, stand for
die Aufhebung des blossnatursichen Seins; Mongols, on the other hand, den Gegensatz des
Insichgekehrtheins des Geistes und des Sichhingebens an die Natur, from which it would
really be necessary to conclude that these races had adapted themselves to Hegelianism.

But in every fairy-tale there is some truth. Different peoples do indeed have different
abilities and preferences. In his Antropogeographie Ratzel quotes examples to show that
“racial particularities or social relations make one people more, another less capable of
exploiting geographical conditions”. He says that the Japanese once maintained active

469 Carl Ludwig Michelet "Die Geschichte der Menschheit in ihrem Entwicklungsgange seit dem Jahre 1775 bis
auf die neuesten Zeiten. Der Entwicklungsgang der Weltgeschichte in beiden Halbkugeln". VoL I. Berlin, 1859.
VoL II. 1860.
shipping traffic in all directions, but from about the time of the persecution of the Christians (about 1630), they ceased to make use of favourable conditions. The Irish, although they reached Ireland by sea, and live on very good coasts, hardly fish at all. The Celts, unlike the Germans, never went far to sea, even when they were surrounded by it, as in the British Isles. When Malayans and Papuans live together, the former always make for the shore, the others for the interior.

Ratzel could have added other instances, how the ancient Peruvians, with their long sea-board, nevertheless did not use ships; how the peoples of the ancient world domesticated cattle whereas the original inhabitants of America did not succeed in doing so; how the elephant became a useful domestic animal in India and remained for the African negroes a monster inspiring terror, although earlier inhabitants of Africa, such as Carthaginians and Numidians, had known how to subdue and domesticate the African elephant.

But what is there strange in the fact that abilities take varied directions and nobody is capable of everything? The Irish, although a littoral people, are not outstanding sailors, but they were good farmers. Malays have ability as fishermen, Papuans as hunters. American Indians were and are outstanding hunters, Peruvians warriors. Every people is normally good at something. And it should be borne in mind that the more primitive the civilisation of a people, the less opportunity it has to reveal abilities, since the categories of being are correspondingly restricted.

What method will provide us with an indicator of general ability? How to solve the question whether the Malayans heading for the shore, or the Papuans for the interior have the greater ability?

On the other hand, history provides an excellent — and negative — answer to the question of the permanence of a given level of civilisation. Societies rise and fall, and the degree of civilisation of a given “race” is by no means constant. Since it is not to be denied that the kind of psyche depends among other things on the level of civilisation, we have come upon new evidence that the communal psyche is changeable and not dependent on race. Nothing can be concluded about abilities from the variety of levels of a given civilisation, the less so in that it is possible to stand on a low level despite great abilities. And can it be said for certain that one of the peoples now primitive was never on a higher level of civilisation?

In estimating “ability” much confusion has been and is caused by the naive view that a society somehow stands higher from the point of view of civilisation the more closely it approaches “European” civilisation. How many misunderstandings are removed if we approach questions of communal psychology bearing in mind the distinctness of civilisations! There may be a very high level of some civilisation quite unconnected with our own; for it is possible to be very gifted without approaching our civilisation.

Despite this, the fundamental error has been made of drawing up a formal spiritual hierarchy of races according to degree of imitation of “European” civilisation. First to do so was the German Corns, author of a work significantly entitled *Ueber die ungleiche Befähigung der Menschheitsstämmme zur geistigen Entwicklung*. Then Gobineau elaborated an exhaustive hierarchy of races in the work already quoted, which was ignored in the author’s life-time but has at least won him great posthumous fame.

Gobineau, an excellent writer but always a dilettante scholar, was also in his own eyes the greatest aristocrat of his generation. For him the “Aryan race” is the aristocracy of

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470 The biography of this highly sympathetic man is absorbing. We have a first-rate study of his life and work by Michal Sobeski: “Kwiat złoty, Gobineau redivivus”. (Poznań 1925). His chief literary work is “La Renaissance, Scènes historiques”, one of the finest books of the nineteenth century, published in 1877, but without scientific commentaries. A complete edition came out as late as 1923 under the title “La fleur d’or”. A Polish translation by Adolf Strzelecki was published (Warsaw 1908-1911) in “Książki dla wszystkich”. A number of his short stories with exotic backgrounds have also been translated into Polish.
humanity, because only Aryans are of pure white blood: other varieties of the white race have secondary importance, while the non-white are fundamentally lower, destined for subsidiary roles in the history and economy of the world. Among the Aryans themselves, in Gobineau’s hierarchy the Scandinavians and Anglo-Saxons occupy first place, along with the Franks (from whom he derived the gentry of Northern France). These are the true Germanic peoples, the strongest section of Aryans; the Germans have no place here at all, because they are a Celtic-Slav mixture who are not worth much even physically. The causes of the inequality of races do not lie in geography or history, but exclusively in race itself as such: the purer Aryan, the higher the type. Outside the white race there would be no civilisation at all if it were not for inter-breeding with whites, which he describes at length, and almost always erroneously, for he had at his disposal material still incomparably less adequate than we have today. Even the Chinese have to thank Aryan colonisation from India for their civilisation of a kind.

Gobineau energetically denies the idea that racial inequalities can be redressed with the aid of institutions. He devotes to the matter the fifth chapter of volume I: *Les inégalités ethniques ne sont pas le résultat des institutions*. Inferiority and superiority are inborn, and so an inferior people cannot by the very fact possess institutions of a higher order. It is not possible to ascribe essentially identical intellect to the Englishman and the Huron Indian, and explain the differences by the “irresistible force of environment” (*des milieux*). And he insists, “barbarism and civilisation have flourished in turn on the same soil”. Institutions, therefore, are “results not causes”. Those inconsistent with the spirit of a people do not endure, because they must come from the society itself and be adapted to its “instincts and needs”. So institutions do not create peoples, but derive from them. And colonising States have never succeeded in imposing European institutions on the natives.

“Actually there are (i.e. in 1853) in the world two governments created by peoples foreign to our race, but according to patterns provided by us: one functions in the Sandwich Islands, the other in St. Domingo. An estimate of them must finally show the powsrlessness of all attempts to give a people institutions not deriving from its own mentality”. In Paraguay the chances appeared to be greater, for the institutions were based on religion. But the belief that barbarism is only the childhood of nations proved mistaken.472

Gobineau’s teaching could be called the Calvinism of raceology, real predestination. Some, as he himself puts it, are destined by nature to rule, others to serve; some are simply born to be heroes, others must be content with roles of common mediocrity. Are they then to have identical laws and duties? One further logical step, and the question arises whether the same ethic is to be binding on both?473

There is no point in polemics with the scientific apparatus of 1853, but specialists discover at almost every stage in his chief work that Gobineau did not even have the scientific training which it was possible to acquire in his day. And yet Gobineau’s arguments do not lack either truth or just observations. He discarded the superstition of equality and consequently sometimes came to correct conclusions. But he errs in accounting for even the truest observations by race.

471 He imagined that he was descended from Scandinavians (whom he regarded as the "purest Aryans"), and wrote the alleged history of his kin (as he supposed, scientifically): "Histoire d'Ottar-Jarl, pirate norvégien, conquérant du pays de Bray en Normandie et de sa déscendance" (1878). He believed himself to be the last descendant of this Ottar. The matter has been investigated recently and it has been discovered that his most remote ancestor, historically verifiable, was a stocking-maker in Bordeaux in the sixteenth century. It is curious that Montesquieu also regarded himself as a descendant of the Germanic conquerors — see Sorel, "Montesquieu", Paris 1887, pages 48, 103.


473 On this there are three characteristic passages in Gobineau, "La Renaissance". Polish translation by Adolf Strzelecki, Książki dla wszystkich, Warsaw 1908-1911, pp. 52, 131, 195.
The error has weighed on science to our day. Gobineau’s thesis was rediscovered afresh on several occasions by various scholars entirely independently. Thirty years after Gobineau, and not knowing him at all (for he was entirely forgotten) the French anthropologist Penka, drawing up a “social chemistry”, treated races in ethnology like elements in chemistry. Decrease of the Aryan-Germanic element he too regarded as a cause of decline.  

A few years later, before the beginnings of interest in Gobineau in France, the same discovery was made for a third time by the Le Bon already known to us. Each of his serious works was a real scientific event, and, as can already be appreciated, of no passing significance. In the book which he himself declared to be a synthesis of his numerous works, *Lois psychologiques de l’évolution des peuples*, we read views which are as if taken straight from Gobineau, and a whole separate section is devoted to showing comment les institutions dérivent de l’âme des peuples, with the accent still on race; he employs almost the same arguments to prove the matter as his predecessor.  

Le Bon did, in fact, make more than one discovery witnessing his greatness. He proclaimed hierarchy as a system of civilisation, a system for the organisation of communal life, but he hastened on unnecessarily to a “psychological hierarchy” of races, incidentally committing the error of establishing this hierarchy on a basis of proximity to or distance from our civilisation, or the “Indo-European” psychology. He adopted, therefore, a non-existant criterion (but let us remember one disproved only yesterday). A second error was his conviction of the basic inferiority of everybody as compared with ourselves, and his failure to take account of the lower and higher levels to be found in every civilisation — a failure which remains common to this day. It is these mistakes which explain his erroneous interpretation of facts which he had observed entirely correctly, a field in which he too excels.  

He says, for example, that a negro or Japanese may possess every European diploma, but will not act in a European way in the varying circumstances of life. Why? Because the lower races have a greater or lesser incapacity for reasoning (*incapacité de raisonner*), while peoples of higher civilisation have not succeeded in transferring this power to those of lower precisely because of the gulf in the mentality of different races. Instruction does not achieve it. Intrinsingly lower elements are incapable of assimilating civilisations basically too high for them.  

The anthropologist G. Vacher de Lapouge developed this theory of hierarchy. Long-headed blonds are in his view the nerves and brain of mankind, for only they are true Aryans. All cross-breeding lowers the level and there is no way of raising less-gifted races. Even further on the extremist wing stood E. J. Dillon, unable to find his way out of the labyrinth of anthropological errors. According to him, “human races exist which are without capacity for any more useful part in human progress than that played by the proletariat. It cannot be denied that there are in the world races which are incapable of accepting higher forms of civilisation, which can nevertheless provide valuable service in its lower forms, without being thereby wronged, and without demoralising others. It appears entirely possible that one day they will be mobilised and used in accordance with the principle that the good of every collectivity requires occupations to be allotted in such a way that every organ may perform the activities for which it is most suited”.  

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474 “Origines ariaceae”, 1883.  
476 Ibid. pp. 27, 32, 33, 122.  
477 Chief works: "Les sélections sociales". 1896; "Race et milieu social", 1909; "L’Aryen et son rôle social", 1889.  
All these scholars err in identifying race with civilisation, confusing one with the other. Having proclaimed a hierarchy of race, they were obliged to place some somatic features at the top, and so it came about that the long-headed blond was crowned and Scandinavia made into his eyrie and reserve country. Meanwhile, science has overthrown both the assumption and the results of the hierarchical theory in raceography. Above all it has been shown how weak are the Scandinavian foundations of the entire Nordic race and its long-headedness.

In 1902 Anton Nystrom published a treatise *Ueber die Formenveränderungen des menschlichen Schädels und deren Ursachen* in which he stated that in Sweden barely one fifth of the population is dolichocephalic, another fifth is brachycephalic, and three-fifths mezzocephalic; but more important, that most long-heads were found among the less-educated strata. There was a higher proportion of long-heads among old Germanic and Slav skulls. Nystroem does not even explain this by cross-breeding but by changes in the way of life. And when the famous Virchow expressed the view that skulls grow shorter with the advance of culture, the spiritual superiority of the long-heads was undermined.

Pittard recently posed a question which has pinned adherents of the hierarchy of races to the wall: why does it not occur to some sociologist that the enormous growth of the sciences in the second half of the nineteenth century and in the twentieth century is to be attributed to a decline in the number of long-heads and the multiplication of short-heads? The French anthropologist is right. If the development of science (for which history knows no parallel) were to be used as a basis on which to advance a theory of the superiority of short-heads, it would at least be based on something concrete.

Gobineau’s mistake only applied to the whole of humanity what in social stratification is called aristocracy, because he was under the erroneous impression that aristocracy excelled in purity of blood. And yet exactly the opposite is the case: the higher socially and economically a class the more anthropologically mixed it becomes; the more prosperous a land, the larger the influx of strangers its inhabitants have to meet: “ce sont les pauvres diables, qui ont la plus grande noblesse ethnique”

The idea that higher development of civilisation accompanies (relative) purity of race cannot be maintained. It has already been mentioned that the purest of the known “historic” races are the Nubians, true descendants of the ancient Egyptians. Nor can the hierarchy of race be sustained. Then how is it that its adherents make so many just observations — is there truth at the back of the fairy-tale?

The puzzle clears up if here too we ask the question when? It is possible to speak of a hierarchy of communal mentalities in a certain historical period. For instance, there is no doubt that in Latin civilisation today, the Englishman is ahead of the Portuguese; but it was not always so. It is possible to investigate and define the hierarchy of levels reached within a certain civilisation in a certain period by various lands and peoples — but the hierarchy changes and is therefore no hierarchy of race. The Pole of the Saxon period is the undoubted descendant of the Pole of King Sigismund’s time, but one was in the depths, the other on the heights. The historical transformation of whole societies, by disposing of the notion of a psychical stability of race, demolishes the theory of a hierarchy of race.482

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479 In "Archiv für Anthropologie". Band 27.
480 Pittard, op. cit., p. 29.
481 Ibid., p. 16.
482 The attractiveness of the theory of a racial hierarchy still assures it adherents: as may be seen from material in Professor Jan Czekanowski’s "Zarys antropologii Polski" (1930), there are quite a number in Poland. They have discovered that Lapponoids are inferior in understanding (barely suited to the arts, but not to the natural sciences!); that Poles of Nordic type lead the way in ability (it is foreseen [fortunately] that this type will prevail among the intelligentsia of the future); and now they have advanced as far as "psychopathological and criminological differentiation" according to anthropological factors. "Zarys antropologii Polski", pp. 441, 445,
VI RESULTS

The unnecessary and unlucky confusion of the bodily element with the spiritual, of race with civilisation, has explained nothing, but led anthropology astray and bogged down many issues. It gave birth to an error with serious consequences: the erroneous supposition that man is bound to lie within the fetters of the mentality imposed on him by racial conditions, that is by bodily and entirely external natural factors. Henri Berr justly argues that external conditions possessed enormous influence in pre-history, but in historic times it has become progressively weaker. More accurately the importance of external conditions may be said to decline with the attainment of higher levels of civilisation.

No civilisation is the property of any race, and no race is confined to a certain civilisation, still less to one level of it. Between race and the five categories of life there is no permanent and inevitable relation taking a different form in every race. African and American negroes have an entirely different struggle for existence, despite their identity of race. How much more is this true of spiritual categories! The study of Aristotle passed from the descendants of the Hellenes to the Arabs, then to the Latin peoples. And does not Christianity reach all races?

It is not in the variety of races that the cause of the variety of civilisations lies. The Jew, living among us for centuries, differs from us spiritually because he is of another civilisation, even although racially he be largely assimilated. The Muscovite differs from us in spirit not less than the Jew; although somatically nearer, he is of a quite different civilisation. The Magyar is of an entirely different race, but spiritually incomparably closer to us than the Russian, for he belongs to the same civilisation as we.

A certain analogy does occur between races and civilisations, on the issue of crossing. Just as only branches of races which are close to one another make successful crosses, in the same way advantageous crossing can only take place between cultures of the same civilisation — as the whole course of history witnesses. Despite the analogy, the real difference is that race need not be pure, but civilisation must be pure.

The issue of civilisation — the psychical issue — is not dependent on the bodily, the racial. We see that here the spirit is stronger than the body.

The independence of civilisation from race is a valuable contribution to the problem of the superiority of the soul over matter.  

446, 449, 464, 525, 526. The hierarchy of races is contained within this "in nuce"; but is it not a premature generalisation based on material still of the slightest?

Professor Czekanowski himself writes for example: "We know that social strata differ in their racial composition" (ibid., 471), and that "in France the Revolution was an anthropological change of the ruling class" (ibid., 527). This thesis derives from Vacher de Lapouge, who very logically also considered desirable the introduction of castes. The theory of the racial character of social groups had been developed by Ludwig Gumplowicz.

463 In "Avant-propos" to Pittard, op. cit., p. XVII.

484 I should not like this chapter to be regarded as a claim on my part to skill in anthropology. I have studied it incompletely, to the extent required by the problem of the relation of civilisation to race; I am an historian. The same reservation applies to the next chapter.
CHAPTER VI

CIVILISATION AND LANGUAGE

I NOMENCLATURE

Not having found the explanation of the variety of civilisations in the material element of race, let us turn to spiritual elements. Let us begin with something which was long considered the same as race — with language, and ask ourselves the question whether linguistic associations lead to the creation of distinct civilisations?

It is not easy to get one’s bearings in the vast amount of linguistic material. The state of linguistic research is such that it is fully developed only in the case of a section of the Indo-European languages, that is to say, of the European branch, whereas in the case of Hindi we are unable even to describe its families with any degree of accuracy, not to mention divisions further from us linguistically and geographically. It is not a good thing when one reads of a Hamitic linguistic group which means ethnic factors are being confused with linguistic, since the Hamitic peoples employ quite unrelated languages.

It has not yet been decided whether the Indo-European languages, the Semitic and the Iranian are to be considered as three distinct divisions or to be counted as one, with the group of Armenian languages regarded as a bridge between them.

Of such divisions and sub-divisions there is no end, for the terminology of linguists is still less orderly than that of the ethnologists and prehistorians. Some divide families into branches, others branches into families. Clearly it is indifferent which word is used, but each must always be used in the same sense. Forced to take my own counsel, I have drawn up the following order of expressions: the Polish language, French language, etc., each belongs to some family, Slav, Romance, etc., families make up the branch, e.g. the European, constituting part of the Indo-European stock. Related linguistic stocks keep to the same system of linguistic organisation (I use this expression advisedly). Research hitherto has discovered four such systems — inflective, agglutinative, monosyllabic and incorporative. These are divisions of the highest order.

In addition, it would be desirable to establish theoretically the factors at work in every language and which explain its features. I call them the elements of language, and there are three of them: phonology, vocabulary and grammar.

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487 Obviously this is not binding on any one, and I shall adapt myself to the philologists’ pronouncements as soon as they deal with the matter.
488 This also "salvis iuribus" of the philologists!
May there not be more than four ways of organising language? As the discovery of the “incorporative” system was in its time a revelation, more than one surprise may be in store. Scientific knowledge of the vast majority of languages is only superficial, in the case of many extending to a fraction of the vocabulary; an unknown number of languages still remains to be discovered — while those that have perished leaving no written traces behind were, in all probability, more numerous than those which have survived.

Let us begin by registering the uncounted number of languages now extant which are at a primitive or at least under-developed level. In Asia, in Assam on the banks of the Brahmaputra, “the population employs so many different languages that I am certain” — a missionary relates — “that I shall not err if I say that from the point of view of linguistic riches, it is the first country in the world, for the 8,000,000 people who live there use, according to the official statistics of 1921, as many as 167 languages”.

In the southern mountains of Assam among the Naga, “it seems as if every settlement has its own dialect”. Among the Karens in the same country “eleven Karen tribes have been distinguished, each speaking in a dialect incomprehensible to the rest”.

In Africa, in Morocco there are up to thirty Berber tribes some of which already number no more than 2,000 heads — and these tribes frequently do not understand one another.

In the Sudan, missionaries speak of a real Tower of Babel, and it is the same in the basin of the Mulungushi in Rhodesia, in one of the groups of the Bantu language. There are said to be 182 Bantu agglutinative languages and 114 dialects, and 264 Sudanese languages, with 110 dialects.

In North America alone, in the last generation they still counted over 70 “different Indian linguistic families” — not languages. Even Indian peoples who are friendly with each other do not always know each other’s languages, and communicate with the help of a sign-language worked out in detail. Today Graebner reckons the number of known Indian languages at 150, emphasising that not even their relationships have been examined.

The black population of the Andaman archipelago, numbering about 10-15,000 souls, is divided into nine distinct peoples, and the differences in their languages are such that “an inhabitant of southern Andaman understands his fellow of the same race from the north of the island as well as the English countryman does a Russian”.

Curr gave samples and short vocabularies of more than 200 Australian languages in a multi-volume work, but he covered barely half the field; he himself put the number of languages there at 500. Each of the tiny islands of Melanesia has its own tongue.

Will all the languages which exist today survive? The answer may be found in certain present facts. “In Central America or in the depths of Africa, a dictionary drawn up by a missionary has proved worthless after twenty years”. Too short a time for the same language to have changed so much — clearly it has vanished and been replaced by another, one of the neighbouring tongues.

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489 "Misje Katolickie", op. cit., 1926, p. 16.
491 Ibid., p. 242.
493 Czekanowski, "Rasy i ludy", op. cit., p. 72.
494 Krzywicki, "Ludy", op. cit., pp. 187, 188.
496 Krzywicki, "Ludy", op. cit, p. 70.
497 Ibid., p. 72.
499 Ibid.
There are not a few examples of the disappearance of languages in our own day. For example, the very name Berber is really a linguistic notion, but Semitic expressions make up almost one third of Berber languages. Adopting Islam, the Berbers lost their own alphabet and today use Arabic script. They are also losing their languages: those who still speak one of the Berber tongues number barely 27 per cent — and those who have forgotten are no longer called Berbers, and must be anthropologically “reclaimed”.

The Arab flood is such that for example the “Kabyle are a Berber island in a surrounding Arab sea”. The majority of Kabyle do not know the Arabic language, and although “some more exposed Berber areas are still being Arabicised today, there are also cases of the Arab population being linguistically assimilated: here Kabylia shows very great attractive power, but “Eastern Kabylia has long been Arabicised”. It is true that the Mozabites speak Berber, but they only write in Arabic. Only the Tuaregs still use the Berber language for writing.

In Mexico only a few Indians have preserved their languages. The negroes of Central and South America lost their languages for Spanish and Portuguese. In an account of a journey to Puerto Rico we hear of them always speaking Spanish among themselves, and there is no sign that they still know what their native language was. The negroes of North America have adopted English not in addition to but instead of their native tongues. The Brazilians also do not use their languages.

All over the earth it is possible to find evidence of how among many languages a few take the upper hand, sometimes even only one — the remainder withdrawing into the background and gradually disappearing. Today in Europe there are still traces of the Slavonic Polabian language near Berlin, in Hanover and Luneberg. The Prussian language of the Baltic group was already in extremity in the fourteenth century, and the last traces disappeared in the late seventeenth. The last old woman who could speak Cornish died in 1777, but as late as 1875 there were old men who knew how to count to twenty in Cornish, although their descendants cannot do even that.

The many tongues of India up to the Ganges are not dialects, but languages in the full meaning of the word, which have to be learnt separately. Le Bon put their number at 240, adding that they often are more different from one another than Greek and French. Different languages have at different periods won this upper hand. In 1895 the most widespread, Hindustani, had barely three centuries of existence behind it, having arisen from the combination of three tongues — Persian, Arab and Hindi — and is thus a jargon.

Today, however, the matter appears differently in Northern and Southern India. Let us hear an opinion based on autopsy:

“English has not been adopted in Bengal, so that all the white inhabitants, not only officials, but everybody without exception, must and do speak Bengali or Hindustani. In this respect the position in the south, in Madras province, differs, and English has become to some extent the language of the more educated. The reason is twofold: in the first place, the southern province possesses, without counting lesser dialects, three equally important main languages, Tamil, Telugu and Malayalam while the western border is the beginning of the territory of a fourth, the Kanarese language. In face of this variety, English plays an

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500 Rostafinski. op. cit., pp. 139, 181.
502 Szyszlo. op. cit., p. 223 and in many other places.
503 Lepecki. "W krainic jaguarów", op. cit, p. 121.
504 Vendryes. op. cit., p. 334.
505 Le Bon, "Lois psychologiques", op. cit., p. 73.
intermediary role”. “In Bengal on the other hand, Bengali is dominant along with Hindustani, and generally understood in the whole of Northern and Central India”. 506

We may thus see by the living example of India how a hierarchy of languages is created.

Which among primitive languages takes the upper hand over the neighbours may depend on the most varied circumstances: whose elucidation must be left to the imagination. Only the present state of the problem is accessible to science. It is a fact that more than one language will have Christian missionaries to thank for its preservation and development. I give a handful of examples.

In that Rhodesian Tower of Babel, the Mulungushi basin, which is the southern part of the Bantu languages area, “in general when one uses the local esperanto, that is Chi-Nyanja, they understand. They also confess in that language, and we speak to them in Chi-Nyanja in school and in church, although their own dialect is Chi-Lala. The question was more difficult in Kasisi, where three languages — Chi-Wemba, Chi-Renje and Chi-Nyanja have equal rights and in the neighbourhood there are still Chi-Ni and Chi-Ramba. But in Chingombe I have also noticed on several occasions a boy not understanding any question put to him in Chi-Nyanja, since at home only Chi-Lala was used”. But the elders already understand Chi-Nyanja. It is “the future literary language of Northern Rhodesia, unless this turns out to be Shakespeare’s language”. 507

Let us note further, that Chi-Nyanja is related to the second great negro language of Central Africa, Swahili, as well as to the Chikunda language.

We Poles have a special sentimental interest that Chi-Nyanja may become the literary language of the widest possible area of the negro world, even that it may one day wage a successful battle with Swahili, for in Northern Rhodesia a whole hymn-book translated from Polish by Father St. Hankiewicz S.J. circulates and is sung to Polish melodies in the “language of the Great Lakes” i.e. Chi-Nyanja. 508 Faced with the great abundance of negro tongues it is, however not easy to say which will become “literary”.

But beginning at home, I note that in 1926 Cracow presses undertook to print elementary readers in Chi-Nyanja and Chi-Renji. 509 In the Belgian Congo, missionaries began to study the barambo and zande languages in 1914, and in 1919, “the third language of the country, mangban”. 510 In Marianhill in Natal a Catholic Zulu weekly Tsinelda Zabantu 511 is published. In the Philippines, the Divine Word Fathers have a printing-press in Manilla and in 1924 published 40,000 calendars in three languages — Spanish, Tagalog and Ilokano. Since the beginning of 1925 they have been publishing a monthly in Tagalog and Ilokano with an English supplement. In the fifth month of the paper’s existence there were 3,000 recipients, “more than the national papers”. They also published a children’s prayerbook in the Ilokano language. 512 In 1926, in the largest leper-hospital on Kulion island in the Philippines, the Spanish Jesuit Filip Millan and companion heard confessions in Spanish, English, Tagalog, Visayan. Ilokano; retreats for the lepers were conducted in Visayan and Tagalog. 513

Michael Gebra, a half-caste Portuguese Monophysite who afterwards embraced Catholicism, drew up a vocabulary and grammar of the Abyssinian literary language known as Ge-ez. 514 In Ceylon a Singhalese fortnightly Nanardka Pradipaga has been coming out in

506 Marcinowska, op. cit., pp. 182, 183.
507 "Misje Katolickie", 1924, pp. 77, 78.
509 Ibid., 1926, pp. X, 476.
511 Ibid., 1925, pp. V, 239.
513 Ibid.. 1927, pp. III. 142.
514 Ibid., 1926, pp. XI, 510.
Colombo since 1883. Missionaries write and publish Singhalese and Tamil books. The Franciscan Father Hugo Mense “has filled in more than one gap in the Munduruk language” in Brazil. In Dutch Guiana “after ten years of laborious study of the Carib language a Dutch Redemptorist, Fr. Ahlbirck, drew up a large dictionary running to about 3,000 pages of manuscript, which when printed gives about 1,500 pages of small print”. He provides at the same time a grammar of the language of the Caribs and an account of their life.

In 1875 in the Gilbert Islands, Mgr Janssen, Vicar Apostolic of Tahiti, drew up a small catechism in the local language and translated the New Testament. This translation was lost during a storm at sea, but a few copies of the catechism were saved. A certain merchant in San Francisco had it reprinted in 500 copies and sold them to the inhabitants. Father Remy, S.M. drew up a grammar and dictionary of the Gilbert language.

On the island of New Guinea there are autochthonous nuns, Daughters of the Immaculate Conception, “granddaughters of cannibals”. “They do not take strict vows, but only promise poverty, chastity and obedience. This caution is indicated by the instability of character of the inhabitants. Every nun has the rules and an ascetic handbook written in the native language and printed on the nuns’ press”. Similarly eloquent examples could be quoted for pages on end.

A Bengali Catholic, Ambrose Siroshchandra, has translated the Ordo Missae into Sanscrit; it will be a basis for a translation into the vernacular. The Imitation of Christ and the Bible have already been translated into the Bengali vernacular. And in Madras they are thinking of founding a university where the lectures would be in Tamil. Will not these languages advance further as a result?

Of course it cannot always be known whether missionaries were the first to raise the status of a given language, or whether they adopted one already recognised and comparatively widespread. There are certainly cases of both, depending on circumstances which sometimes may possibly even be of secondary importance but are never philological. It will not, however, be denied that missionary intervention has been epoch-making in the history of such languages, which have been provided with vocabulary, grammar, alphabet, written works and even printing presses. Let us suppose that this good fortune comes to a language which is not widespread but rather confined to one area, will not this language in a relatively short time overtake a more widespread speech that has not been given literate shape by the missionaries?

Let us consider above all the extraordinary abundance of these languages, which obliges missionaries in the same area to learn two or three. In the above short selection of examples, ten newly-literate tongues have been mentioned in “black” Africa alone. How many are still to emerge — must emerge. And for every new “literary” language, how many are there which are not written down and are condemned to disappear?

Having considered all this, we see that there are more languages at the lower levels of civilisation — incomparably more than at high levels of civilisation: the number of languages diminishes with the progress of civilisation.

This rule is, however, only valid up to a certain level of civilisation. It is clear that a considerable number of the languages of an ethnic group must perish in order that a supra-tribal association may emerge and a people with a common language result: not to speak of associations higher than the people. The death of languages is absolutely necessary in order that from tribes a people may emerge. Larger associations

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515 Ibid., p. 187.
517 Ibid., p. 382.
518 Ibid., 1926. p. 249 and 251.
519 Ibid., 1925, pp. V, 240.
520 Ibid., 1927, pp. IV, 187, 188.
cannot arise except on the grave of defeated languages. The higher the development of a society, the fewer the languages; fewest where States and nations are most settled.

Research into how many languages have perished in Europe would be vain, for our peoples were already at a high stage of development when they became known to those who first described them; here, with few exceptions, languages died in pre-historic times. In historic times only eight known languages have perished — Punic, East Gothic, Visigotic, Lombard, Franco-nian, Cornish and Prussian\textsuperscript{521} (for understandable reasons I do not include here Latin, Greek nor ancient Persian).

At the beginning there was an “immense multitude of inconvenient languages, short-lived and necessarily dissimilar”,\textsuperscript{522} They perished although the tribes which originally used them survived. Other languages perished with their tribes. An interesting contribution to this question could be made if it were possible to investigate the ethnic side of those Indian languages, today already extinct, whose formulae for the administration of the sacraments could be seen at the Vatican Exhibition of 1925.\textsuperscript{523}

It is hard to doubt that originally a given language served only one tribe, that each had its own. Alongside written languages common to a whole nation are there not alive today dialects, even one-village dialects? In Silesia, in Pomerania and in White Ruthenia villages have their own idiom. Neither Belarus, nor Polish. In the next village they speak “in their way”, but here “plainly”.\textsuperscript{524} It is the same in other European countries.

Wherever several tribes used the same language, this could only have happened as a result of the fact that one neighbouring language had come to dominate others until finally it remained alone. We have seen how in our own day tribes on low levels of civilisation know two and even three languages, which may represent a transitional stage to the exclusive use of one of them. Thus originally language was a racial matter, very closely linked with clan origin. Facts teach that it is not so now, or at least rarely so.

We even have instances of the language of the same association changing radically. The Romanians (Walachians) have in them at least as much Slav as Latin blood, and until the middle of the nineteenth century they used the Russian alphabet; now however they use the Latin. It is a curious example of the fact that linguistic relationship is not the same as racial, since the same ethnic element could have had a written language either Slavonic or Romance. And on the other hand what a minimal drop of Hellenic blood remains in the veins of the present-day Greeks, whose language is after all derived from Hellenic and Byzantine sources. In the same way, Asiatic Greeks are in large measure Graecised autochtons.\textsuperscript{525} And the undoubted linguistic relationship of the Slavs is strikingly opposed to their variety from the point of view of ethnology and civilisation.

Comparative grammar also sometimes uncovers relationship where anthropology and ethnography do not recognise any. For instance, Eskimos and Aleutians belong to the same linguistic family (of the Ural-Altai branch), but anthropologically are quite different.\textsuperscript{526}

Le Bon erred in supposing that conquerors adopting the language of a defeated population change it because they are of different race, and different races may not long use the same language.\textsuperscript{527} The ethnic differences between conquerors and conquered are not

\textsuperscript{521} The author has forgotten Polabian. (The editors.)
\textsuperscript{522} "Misje Katolickie", 1927, p. IV, p. 151.
\textsuperscript{523} Ibid., 1925, p. 504.
\textsuperscript{525} Pittard, op. cit., p. 399.
\textsuperscript{526} Czekanowski. "Rasy i ludy", op. cit., p. 106.
\textsuperscript{527} Le Bon, "Lois psychologiques", op. cit, p. 72.
always so great that it is possible to speak of racial differences, but certain changes in language always occur when there is an influx of foreigners (not necessarily conquerors) on any scale at any one time. Here it is a matter not of the influence of race on race but simply of language on language — and languages have their own laws, not subject to laws of race. In the case of conquerors and conquered, it must be borne in mind that when the language of the conquered undergoes change, the change comes from the indigenous population.

The fate of languages does not depend on anthropological factors. **There is no parallel between two anthropological groups and two linguistic groups.** Vendryes says: “Ethnic features, which go by blood, should not be confused with institutions — with language, religion, culture — which are eminently transitory goods, communicate themselves and are exchangeable.”

They are exchangeable: that is the heart of the matter. A language may pass from race to race. This happens in various ways; but an examination of the question would exceed the scope of the present book. Here we can only broadly consider certain factors in the strength of a language and its capacity for development and for expansion — thanks to which it may pass from race to race, and even more readily from people to people.

Attention must be given primarily to the so-called linguistic richness generally considered the chief strength of a language and the best witness to its capacity. Since there are three elements of language, each language may be rich or poor in phonology, vocabulary or grammar.

### III WEALTH AND POVERTY

The wealth or poverty of a language must be considered in the case of each of the three elements separately.

The question of phonology can be subdivided into two — sounds and accent. Since we Poles have an exceptional wealth of sounds, let us put on record that our ć, cz, ś, sz, ź, ż, are to be found in the Basque tongue which is still a puzzle to scholars; l, ź, ś in Mongol and Chinese; a not only in French but also in Korean and Botocudo. The Japanese language possesses the consonants ć, cz, ś, dz, dź, dż, l; on the other hand there is neither w nor l. In different parts of the world different consonants are regarded as special, and although Japanese has as many as seven of the special Polish sounds, it is in fact “very simple and poor in sounds”. The Chinese do not have the sounds r, d and t, and the Yakuts have no w — they substitute b or w. The Bushmen possess a quite different order of sounds: between six and eight labials, not identical in the various tribes. “They are made by the intake of breath by tongue, palate and side teeth”. And how many sounds are still unknown to European ears and await discoveries!

In Europe, accent is confined to the fixed and movable (in the Russian and Slovenian languages). Outside Europe, its scope is wider. In the African *peul* language, negation is indicated by accent. In the Chinese languages, in which accent gives a monosyllabic word

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528 Vendryes, op. cit, pp. 279, 280.
529 Examples of sound "transcription" from Polish and French into Japanese: Paul Claudel is written in Japanese: Po-ru Ku-ro-de-ru; Stanislaw Wyspianski Su.ta-ni-su-ra-u-su U-i-su-pi-an-su-ki; Poland in Japanese is Porando.
533 Vendryes, op. cit., p. 91.
various meanings. Sinologists reckon the number of these accents variously at between four and twelve. The expression *tshen*, for example, in accordance with one of its eight accents may mean ship, loquacity, arrow, basin, fire, shaft, a particular fish and a particular plant.\(^{533}\)

Richness of vocabulary is of various kinds. Basically it is a question whether and to what extent new expressions are forthcoming as people acquire ideas. We have abandoned Latin as the universal language of learning, because it was increasingly difficult for its vocabulary to keep pace with the excess of new concepts. It was long artificially kept up to the mental level of the new Europe; from St. Thomas Aquinas to Bacon of Verulam Latin was in large measure, as far as vocabulary is concerned, an artificial language — until in the end the constantly increasing artificiality became impossible. Put simply — we have grown out of Latin. It was a case of concepts multiplying quicker than words; vocabulary lagged behind mentality.

In a very primitive language, however, vocabulary may be rich, and in a language of a high degree of excellence, relatively scanty. In certain matters, peoples on a low level of development make more distinctions than highly civilised ones. The Yakuts, for example, indicate by separate terms various degrees of relationship and connection which we lump together under one and the same term, or ignore altogether, insensitive to such detailed gradation and definition. And the slenderness of Chinese dictionaries arouses surprise. For example in the dialect of the Peking mandarins a total of 420-460 monosyllables have been counted, in Cantonese 707, and in the richest, that of the Amoy district, 846.\(^{534}\)

The German and Chinese languages, each in a different way, add to their vocabulary by composite expressions. The German expresses the idea rzeczpospolita (commonwealth) by the term Freistaat, while the Chinese puts together three terms signifying to debate, mildness, government.\(^{535}\)

The most primitive languages excel beyond expectation in richness of vocabulary. The Botocudos stand on the lowest rung of civilisation, but in 1924, when collecting materials for a dictionary, Edouardo de Lima managed to write down about 3,000 expressions\(^{536}\) that is as many as suffice the average European of middle intelligence. But among the natives of Terra del Fuego 30,000 expressions have apparently been counted,\(^{537}\) even if the error were tenfold, it would still be a lot.

Primitive languages also frequently offend “by excessive wealth of words, and over-great accuracy. The Eskimo from Hudson Bay has not one expression to signify washing, but as many as there are objects which may be washed. He uses one when he means washing a table, another for washing his face, for washing other people, for washing a spoon, a pot, etc. His talk must be extremely precise” .\(^{538}\)

The heights of lexicographical wealth are reached with the existence of a separate male and female language\(^{539}\) so that although women understand the male language, they may not speak it to them. Every object then has two names, according to the sex of the speaker. Among the Caribs men speak Carib, and the women “Arowak”. Obviously both sexes understand both languages, for conversation would otherwise be impossible. Even stranger (for us) is the fact that sometimes different social positions involve the use of differing

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\(^{533}\) Krzywicki, "Ludy", op. cit., p 153.

\(^{534}\) Ibid., p. 153.

\(^{535}\) Ibid.

\(^{536}\) Misje Katolickie, 1924, p. 67.

\(^{537}\) Szelągowski, op. cit., p. 55.


\(^{539}\) And surely it was the height of learned error to consider this an expression of matriarchy! See Father Tonelli, op. cit., p. 200.
tongues. Among the autochthonous Javans, the superior addresses the inferior in the ngoko language, while the inferior replies in the kromo language.  

Science knows no name for linguistic riches of this kind; we shall call it the manifoldness of language. It is generally supposed that manifoldness only occurs among "savages". Few know that the same thing — but on a still larger scale — occurs among the Japanese. “Japanese of the educated class use in letters a separate literary language”  

And Sister Hiacynia Zaborowska, of the Polish Franciscan missionaries, reports as follows:

“Please do not be surprised that I do not know Japanese well. Experts say that in three years even very gifted persons may with difficulty learn Japanese. The thing is complicated by the fact that there are really several Japanese languages. There is a religious and liturgical language, and a colloquial language. Some expressions are fitting for men, and very different ones for women. Moreover I, as superior, cannot use the same expressions as my subordinates. There are some twenty methods of reckoning alone! It would be an unforgivable linguistic sin to count in the same way persons and animals, or flat and round objects; even the counting of full and empty cups is different”.  

Let us pass to the most complicated element. Here we find differences which at first sight appear improbable. Let us imagine Polish grammar relieved of the plural number, gender of nouns, personal and relative pronouns, temporal conjunctions, and we lose the ability to imagine the Polish language. Japanese gets on without any of these, and instead possesses many riches of a kind quite inconceivable to a Polish head. Relative pronouns are replaced by skilful description of the person where need arises. Conjunctions are used only to indicate spatial, never temporal relationship. “It is permissible to link objects standing alongside each other, it is not permissible to link events succeeding each other”. Plural number is indicated only by the numeral, definite or indefinite. “Two men” is expressed in Japanese as “man two individuals”, or by the Chinese in his pidgin English (which is simply Chinese spoken with English words) a “two pieces man”.  

At first sight, it would seem that we have to deal with linguistic poverty. But this is by no means the case. For example “nouns are declined in a simple way, the cases being expressed in suffixes. On the other hand the declension of adjectives is extraordinarily complicated, with derivative forms as long, as they are numerous, representing not only states but times”. It is not easy for us to understand how an adjective may also express time.  

Grammar pays no heed to logic, as witness, the grammatical genders to be found in the most highly developed languages and in hottentot. They do not derive from the opposition of sex, for in that case why the neuter gender?  

All Indo-European, Semitic and Hamitic languages possess genders; in the incorporative American languages there is “weak development of the masculine and feminine article”, but they are not known in the Far East nor in the language of the Basques. It is incidentally truly miserably superficial to look for the source of grammatical genders in lust!  

There are interesting observations as to how a change of language comes about. “Different vocabularies may be ground in the same grammatical mill”. Normally, when a new

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540 Vendryes, op. cit, p. 302.  
541 Talko-Hrynccwicz, op. cit, p. 120.  
542 "Misje Katolickie", 1926, p. 68.  
544 Ibid, p. 57.  
545 Ibid., p. 58.  
547 Czekanowski, "Rasy i ludy", op. cit., p. 102.  
548 Now this language is found to be related to the Sudanese group. Iberian belonged to the Hamitic languages. Czekanowski, "Wstęp do historii Słowian", op. cit., p. 64.
language is accepted, accentuation continues according to the old — but evidently not always, otherwise the Gauls would not have been sending teachers of elocution to Rome a hundred years after their country was conquered.  

The mixing of the three elements in various combinations can be shown in a few examples. Armenian gypsies speak with an Armenian accent, but also inflect according to Armenian grammar. In Hindustani, whole phrases are made up of Persian expressions used according to the rules of Hindi grammar. In America, Germans speak German with English word-order and syntax. In Switzerland on the linguistic border the French language is retreating in a certain area, where they translate literally from French into German words, so that “ideas are conceived in a French way in German terms.”  

Phraseology reveals no less fascinating phenomena. “Savages” are often adept at the most poetic self-expression, of which we have eloquent instances in the notes of Bronisław Piłsudski on the Ainus. There is real beauty in the expressions of the Malagasy in Madagascar, and in its day, great enthusiasm was aroused by the highly metaphorical language of the Indian Jivaros. But the contemporary missionary sees first of all the lack of general and abstract expressions, and virtual absence of syntax. So that constant metaphors and poetic exaggeration point rather to the poverty of a language which needs allegory to express thought. Jivaro-white half-castes still use diminutives unnecessarily, conducting entire conversations in this manner.  

Only after consideration of the three elements of any language does it become possible to give an answer to questions on the nearness, relationship and similarity of languages. Similarity may be of three kinds. Do we not understand the foreigner who makes a grammatical mistake with every word? But grammar decides the scholarly division. How much accent means in the understanding of speech is generally known — considerably more than grammar.  

It is certain that for history similarity or dissimilarity of grammar is indifferent, since peoples able to understand one another are historically close. The easier mutual understanding, the more easily the influences of civilisation are set in motion. In the reciprocal relations of peoples, vocabulary goes before grammar.  

Consideration of the three elements of language thus makes possible a critical approach to the so-called wealth of languages. Rich in what — in phonology, or vocabulary, or morphology, or syntax? Riches in one element may go with poverty in a second, and a language which is entirely primitive may be rich in one aspect.

IV UNEQUAL CAPACITY

Only now is it possible to consider with advantage the problem of the development of languages. Are all equally capable of this? If a linguistic association develops in categories of communal life to a point where its language cannot keep pace, those concerned must either be

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549 Vendryes, op. cit., pp. 205, 60, 333.
550 Ibid., p. 205. Vendryes does not notice the contradiction with what he had said on page 60 — that we thus have to do with rule and exception.
551 Ibid., p. 334.
552 Ibid., p. 342.
553 "Misje Katolickie", 1924, p. 282; 1925, p. 393; Szyszło, op. cit., II, p. 221.
554 "The Caingangs of Eastern Paraguay have their own language, resembling the speech of the Guaranis, with whom they can, however, only talk with difficulty because of the different accent". Fularski, op. cit., p. 111.
checked in their development or abandon their own language and adopt another, hitherto strange to them, but more apt for development. For the majority of languages have limits to their potential development.

How far can an incorporative language develop — that of the Algonquin, for example, in which, when wishing to express a thought, it is necessary to form an expression so compounded that “it is really whole sentences”?555 And is it certain that there are no languages standing lower than Algonquin?

Who will undertake to find out whether there were and are not still systems for organising language so faulty that they do not allow of any emergence from the primitive? More than one language which had barely begun died and vanished without trace. If the Indians had risen to a level of average education, they would have been obliged to abandon their languages, for the incorporative system would not have taken them far. Everything that a man thinks, says and does, what happens in him and through him outside him, must be expressed according to some system and where that is inauspicious it spoils everything and even the greatest efforts remain fruitless. There may be causes for the disappearance even of a language with a sound system; but a language with a bad system will never stand up to competition from neighbours of superior system.

Scholars puzzle over the pygmies’ lack of any language of their own. They have used negro languages for a very long time, since they now speak the languages not of neighbouring but of distant negroes, and often in forms already archaic, so that the languages must have been adopted in an earlier epoch of their development, before the establishment of current linguistic forms.556 Similar doubts arise about the Vedda in Ceylon.557

These pygmies, the dwarfs of Central and Central-Southern Africa, of the Andaman archipelago, the island of Luzon and the Malaccan peninsula are in all probability one of the primaeval races: it is the “oldest relic and the most ancient monument of the mysterious beginnings of the culture of mankind” (some do not know how to kindle fire, the Africans do not know pottery, do not cook, only bake and roast).558 Despite this arch-primitiveness it is impossible to support the idea that they never had their own language, for we know that without this bond of society it is impossible to achieve and consolidate any kind of advance in social life. Thus we have an instance of the strangely early disappearance of a language (or languages) based, as I suppose, on some system so faulty that it could not meet the needs of even the very lowly level of civilisation which the pygmies reached. They were languages unapt for development.

The highest criterion of creativeness in the development of language is, in my view, the construction of a clear and logically articulated compound sentence, and the highest achievement the so-called period. Here much depends on syntax, which is not developed even in all inflected languages. Some (Hebrew for example) are restricted to so-called parallelism, expressing the relations between two or more thoughts by placing them in separate sentences, entirely severed and without connection with other sentences. This is a feeble method in comparison with the structure of the period, with the system of principal and subordinate clauses.

Let us glance at Japanese syntax: “The basic rule of Japanese syntax is the placing of everything which refers to properties of a given expression before that expression; which means the most detailed definition and description of a thing before it is named. This custom places the hearer somewhat at a disadvantage, in that a whole long story may almost have ended before it is given him to know what the talk is really about; in fact, however, the thing

557 Fischer, op. cit, says that they have lost the'r language.
558 Father Kosibowicz SJ., op. cit, p. 76; Czekanowski, "Rasy i ludy", op. cit, p. 80.
is even more difficult for the speaker, who is forced to construct the whole sentence in his mind before he begins to speak.” 559

But we are more concerned with writing than speech, for it is only from writing that an all-round intellectual tradition is born. Writing may also contribute to greater development of the language or retard, impede its development.

Our alphabet of sounds, clothed in the universal garment of Latin letters, enables every man of Latin civilisation to read what is written in those letters in any language, but he will say it wrongly and will not understand a word. Our alphabet makes necessary the learning of languages and translation from one to the other. We lose much time on this, but on the other hand the alphabet does not limit any language, and since it is a highly mobile form, makes possible unceasing development. Most important, we learn to read and write with such minimal effort and so quickly that a ten-year-old child is already proficient at both. The saving of time and psychical energy achieved thereby outweighs a thousandfold the losses involved in translations and the learning of foreign languages.

Chinese writing is the opposite of this but Arabic and its combinations also rouse doubts on the score of time-saving and psychical energy. Very curious is the impression made on a Pole by Turkish writing:

“It might appear that in every language, in order to learn to read letters must first be recognised, and then put together. This should not be done with Turkish. Turkish writing is a series of abbreviations, really a stenography; it is not possible to read words until one recognises them and knows what they mean”. 560 But in 1928 the Turkish Government introduced the Latin alphabet compulsorily, acting in the matter as true Asians; for the results it will obviously be necessary to wait some time.

In the Far East, the oldest of the literary languages, Korean, has an alphabet of 44 signs, 25 vowels and 19 consonants. According to Sieroszewski a kinship with the Japanese popular alphabets hira-gana and kata-kana may be discerned: “it must be supposed” that the Korean symbols “derive directly from them”. 561 But Japanese writing fell into too close dependence on Chinese, which in time came to the forefront throughout the Far East. It may be that Korean loss of cultural primacy and Chinese winning of first place followed upon the Chinese discovery of a universal writing.

The Chinese are a grouping of multi-lingual peoples. These languages are related in that all possess the monosyllabic character; but the populations of the various provinces do not understand one another, and have no common literary language: a common written language suffices them. It is true that a common official language — Mandarin — was evolved, and novels were even written in it, but knowledge of this language “would probably not be enough for an ordinary dragoman today”. 562

This is an ideographic writing reduced to abbreviations which became subtle calligraphic signs revealing no connection with the original hieroglyphs. There is no alphabet. Of such signs there are more than 40,000, but despite this profusion, the same sign is used for expressions which sound the same as the expression which the sign was originally used to signify (this also occurs in ancient Egyptian writing); in addition, there may be many signs for one sound, each meaning something different. There are for instance 150 signs read as in, each with a distinct meaning. 563 Since the signs signify ideas, they may be read in all the languages of the world, in the same way as mathematical signs. Peoples using Chinese script do not need translations and are joined by the closest cultural tie, having reading and writing in common.

559 Lowell, op. cit, pp. 58, 59.
560 Melcer-Rutkowska, op. cit., p. 19.
Learning is gauged by the number of ideograms a man knows, which is of course like an examination in the number of his ideas. But scholars also need long years for this, and the man who goes on learning without pause, who devotes himself to study, is learning the art of reading and writing all his life, trying himself to develop the language further. And so it is that Chinese scholars have no time for true study.

Adopted from Tibet to Japan, this script was adapted to agglutination, a process involving real contortions. The Japanese language is itself poor in sound, disposing of only 54 basic syllables, but combinations are plentiful for it is not a monosyllabic language. Since agglutinative affixes fit with difficulty into purely Chinese script, known in Japan as Kanji, to write these down the Japanese invented another script called hira-gana, composed of 54 signs for their 54 syllables — and these signs are added below the Chinese signs. For example the expression *tabemasu* (I eat) is composed of the main expression *tube*, which is written in Kanji, but *ma-su*, the addition for present time, is written below by two signs in hira-gana. Or for example *ai*, the expression denoting love, is written by the Chinese sign and three Japanese signs are added below — *ma-si-fa* — to give the reading “I loved”. Not everything can be written in hira-gana, because of the multiple meanings of syllables.  

For instance the syllable *ko* (spoken in an entirely uniform manner) may denote several entirely different things: woman, powder, child, etc. In the same way the syllable *san* may mean gentleman, mountain, three, etc., according to the Chinese ideogram employed. This is why it is possible to see Japanese who are discussing simple subjects rapidly sketching with a finger of their right hand on the palm of the left those ideograms whose pronunciation might be a cause of misunderstanding. So unable to use only hira-gana in the printing of popular books and papers, and wanting to make it possible for uneducated people to read them, alongside the less-known, more difficult Chinese characters the corresponding hira-gana signs are often added in small print (one or several, according to the number of syllables indicated by the hieroglyph).

“For this same reason, that is the multiple meaning of certain syllables and expressions, it is impracticable to introduce our Latin letters (called roman in Japanese), particularly where it is a question of complicated and unusual sentences and words. Thus for example to make possible the use of the typewriter, in Japanese business correspondence English is generally used. It is true that there is in existence a machine with 3,000 Chinese ideograms attached to a special roller device, but the searching out and transferring (by means of a handle) of so many signs takes too long (longer than writing by hand), and requires great proficiency. This machine is therefore mostly used for duplicating, clear copies, etc.”.

Thus, Japanese writing is even more difficult than Chinese. Sister Zaborowska writes on this: “There are three kinds of writing. Of these I already know the two easier, but with the large characters it is a difficult matter. There are some 30,000 of them! Even born Japanese learn them to their dying day!”  

The third kind of Japanese writing, kata-kana or hata-gana, also composed of 54 signs, more pointed, is used in elementary schools and by foreigners. A grown-up Japanese would be ashamed to use writing regarded as clumsy because less suited to artistic calligraphy; for the Japanese draws when writing. With a language and script of this capacity, the twelve-page Tokio daily “Asa-hi” needs about 150 type-setters, although its “vocabulary” does not exceed 3,000 signs.

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564 Lubieński, op. cit., pp. 131, 137, and interesting writing tables. The author, without linguistic knowledge, often expresses himself inaccurately, and provides more than one false explanation — nevertheless much may be learned from it.

565 "Misje Katolickie", 1926. p. 68.

566 Le Bon, "Lois psychologiques", op. cit., p. 139.

567 Ibid., p. 138.
Realising the unfavourable sides of its universal script, on November 3, 1919, the Chinese Ministry of Education issued an order for the use of phonetic script. Opinion in China and Japan is divided, and the horoscopes cast by Far Eastern experts varied. Some regard it as impossible to carry out, and at best applicable only to ordinary correspondence. If however, this reform is accepted, will it not be the beginning of the end of Chinese civilisation on its present vast territory? Phonetic transcriptions are never of general application. All will depend on whether China develops at least a common literary language — that is whether one of the Chinese languages succeeds in obtaining hegemony in China.

Thus having reached a high level of civilisation the road is nevertheless barred to others still higher because the written language — to a certain degree the language itself — fails, breaks down. There is no doubt that languages are far from uniformly capable of development. We see that the highest possible development of an ideographic script has in one place brought stagnation with it. But have the incorporative languages managed to rise to the heights at which Chinese got stuck? Is it possible to imagine the development of human thought in languages lacking express distinctions between nouns and verbs?

V RELATIONSHIP TO COMMUNAL MENTALITY

There was a time when language served scholars as a guide in the labyrinth of communal life. Herder, Wilhelm Humboldt and Steinthal elaborated on the basis of language a psychology of human associations. Then there arose the sub-division of languages into philosophical and unphilosophical, abstract and ultra-concrete. Stray survivals of this are found to the present day. How many fantasies were invented in the time of Jan Nepomucen Kamiński, who made Polish into a hyper-philosophical language not to be outdistanced by the vocabulary of Hegelianism.568

There developed an etymology of dilettantes who seized upon external resemblances between expressions in various languages in order to draw from them even historical conclusions: as if today somebody were to advance ideas on the relations of Polish culture to Chinese and Icelandic on the basis that nanny [niania in Polish] is na-nia569 in Chinese, and in Icelandic pad sama570 meaning almost like in Polish [to samo] “the same”. There was a period when volume-long disputes were conducted on exactly such linguistic-historical questions.

It was already a great advance when in 1907 Dr. E. Chalupny deduced the whole national character of the Czechs from the fact that they place the accent on the first syllable.571 But even for example such a serious scholar as Paul Barth saw a causal connection between the poverty of the Hebrew conjugation and what he regarded as the Hebrew tendency to underrate the particular fact or the individual object in favour of general ideas.572 This he announced in 1915. Barth explains the unchanging word-order in Asiatic languages by the fact that Asiatics are inclined to permanent habits, to conservative forms.573

And yet in his Voelkerpsychologie Wundt considered to the last (1917) that language was one of the three main factors in communal psychology. Why in that case is the psychology of the Rhinelander nearer than that of the Prussian to the psychology of the Pole

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568 “Is our language philosophical?” in "Haliczanin", 1830.
569 Karol Prycz. "W środku świata". (In "Rzeczpospolita", Warsaw, first week of July 1921).
571 E. Chalupny. "Narodni povaha česká". Prague 1907.
572 Barth, op. cit., p. 567.
573 Ibid, pp. 567, 568.
— and the psychology of a man from Great Poland more like that of a Czech than a Mazovian?

A priori assertion that language mirrors communal mentality has its logical basis in the conviction that language is the work of this communal mentality. A language which is to come into prominence spreads from smaller associations to increasingly large ones for various reasons connected with economics, politics and communications, but with linguistics as such only when the language concerned possesses a better system of organisation than other neighbouring languages; but it is rare for reflection, decisions taken in advance, to play any part in this process. A language which has mastered several peoples was not previously a reflection of the mentality of all those peoples; or is literary French a reflection of the mentality of the Vendée, Normandy and (simultaneously) Marseilles and for that reason accepted as the leading language? Was it a reflection from the beginning and did the Vendée only fail through some misunderstanding to use in writing the language of the Île de France — or did it only become so later, and if so when?

Attachment to language as to a national characteristic, love of language as we know it, can only exist where there exists the idea of the nation — that is exclusively in Latin civilisation.

The only languages which may incontestably be regarded as the product of a certain communal mentality are occupational dialects. There are not a few of them, from the criminal (there is already an international variety) to the technical and on to the sacred-hieratic. The more primitive the people, the further these dialects will be from the main language, and the more many-sided their elaboration. In ethnological works one may read about “secret languages”, — the jargon of camphor- or gold-gatherers in Indonesia for example — which ethnologists make into a feature of “savage” peoples. But we have fishing, hunting, sailing and military dialects; and if it were possible to collect camphor here, we should also have the dialect of the camphor-gatherers, just as we have the dialect of wild honey-gatherers.

These dialects would be a study of the first importance if we were able to investigate how they develop from generation to generation; or if it were possible to develop a comparative study of them in order for instance to answer the question what is common to the criminal mentality in China, in Germany, in Portugal, in Canada, etc. There is no doubt that such a general, universal criminal mentality exists; let philology describe it for us! But probably it will allow itself to be anticipated here by every other branch of learning prepared to engage in the matter.

Let us also consider the question of special trade languages. Broken-English in Sierra Leone and pidgin-English in China both adopt English terms, leaving the syntax and order of the local languages, while sabir, the language of the Mediterranean ports, is on the contrary, a lexicographic mixture of French, Spanish, Italian, Greek and Arabic. Is this to be treated from the point of view of “communal mentality” (perhaps of the League of Nations)? Artificial languages — volapuk, esperanto, ido etc. must presumably remain a reflection of the mentality of their creators?

Languages also have no connection with kinds of economic culture; for example the Bantu languages are widespread among the shepherds of Eastern and Southern Africa, but also among the hoe agriculturalists of the Congo. Moszyński recently asserted that “in matters of cultural ties and connections linguistic frontiers are as nothing”.

It is thus impossible to admit the idea that language reflects communal mentality; no conclusions should be drawn from language about the nature of this mentality. But (as there is some truth in every fairy-tale), language may in fact teach us about the level of communal mentality regardless of its nature. Attainment of a higher level must tend to promote the

574 Graebner, op. cit, p. 462.
575 Moszyński, op. cit, vol. 1, in Preface IV.
development of language. All progress in communal life, in any department of it, calls for communication of new ideas or at least new combinations of ideas; for otherwise the progress achieved will not be maintained. And fresh communication requires new linguistic means, so that language must become richer, develop with every such favourable opportunity. I do not doubt that some time there will appear a history of the Polish language considered from this point of view.

If at such an historic moment the language is incapable of adequate development, the new achievement cannot be popularised and will not become general property but will pass like a meteor on the horizon of society as an exceptional event, unassimilated and rejected. Then the authors of that advance will either fall into oblivion or — if they want intellectual life — they will go to others in search of a society where they will not be a foreign body.

It might happen that those responsible for an advance did not lack understanding within their own society, but that their language was incapable of adequate response. Then penetration by a foreign language will begin, in greater or lesser degree, in one field or in the whole of life; it may even happen that higher intellectual development will take place altogether in the foreign tongue, which will gradually oust the native tongue from communal life. Even the disappearance of the native tongue is possible, so that after a time what was once foreign becomes native.

Not all languages are capable of keeping pace with intellectual development in their own linguistic association, but it does not follow that such a society cannot develop further. For instance, the Chinese have outgrown their language, and can only develop further in the English language. The Japanese are threatened with the same situation. Now attempts are being made to push these languages on to higher development — the encouragement of phonetic writing has no other cause. Whether they succeed in raising the capacity of one of them will only be known in the next generation.

Meanwhile the concrete, the non-abstract is generally regarded as a feature of the Chinese and Japanese languages and so, arguing from language to communal mentality, the Far East is denied capacity for abstract thought — and higher intelligence. Lowell goes so far as to write: “The Japanese spirit does not give a penny for powers of abstraction”. And yet Catholic catechisms have existed since 1600, and the translation of the De imitatione Christi into Japanese dates from 1610.

It is said of the Chinese language that it is surprisingly concrete, because the Chinese has the overriding need to particularise, specify, distinguish parts, as Berr argues. But it may be added that Latin is both concrete and at the same time splendid in abstraction. And is French not concrete enough, and not excellent for the expression of abstractions? Let us, therefore, cease pontificating about concrete and abstract languages and be content with the statement that there are languages which are strong or weak in the one and the other. Some express abstractions inadequately, but are also in general less apt for development.

Care must also be taken not to mistake for lack of abstraction what may only be another method of abstraction, so different from ours as to be incomprehensible to us. For instance, “exact rendering of Indian philosophical terms in European languages will always cause great difficulties” — as Rhys Davids says. M. Barth, a leading authority on the Hindus, also regards a good translation of the Vedda as impossible. And yet neither the Hindus nor their ancient language have been reproached with lack of capacity for abstraction.

576 Lowell, op. cit., pp. 56-62, a number of attractive observations.
577 "Misje Katolickie” 1925. p. 538.
578 In Vendryes, op. cit., in Preface XV.
580 By Le Bon, "Lois psychologiques”, op. cit., p. 74.
In any case a distinction must be made here between the language itself and the society speaking it. Returning once more to the Chinese: it happens that when a conversation enters upon abstract scientic paths, instead of verbal arguments, the speakers take tablets, and brushes and draw symbols. This is a moment when the language does not suffice the intellect; but it also shows that these Chinese speakers do abstract, for it is precisely because of this that the language fails them.

Vendryes is the last to have concerned himself with the relation of language to communal mentality. He is very emphatically opposed to deducing language from the mentality of those speaking it, or *vice versa*. He merely suggests that not deriving one from the other they may perhaps possess certain common features. Certain connections may therefore occur, but there is no department of language which would authorise definition of the spirit of a nation from linguistic features; in any case, with research at its present stage it would be a “chimerical” undertaking.

Language is thus neither the creator nor the creation of communal mentality.

If a language or even linguistic stock constituted civilisation, there would be as many civilisations as languages! Again the system on which language is organised does not determine the system on which communal life is organised, since in Chinese civilisation there are monosyllabic as well as agglutinative languages. Incorporative languages have had several civilisations, inflective also several: Slav languages serve three civilisations and nine cultures. Similarities and differences in civilisation do not follow linguistic similarities and differences. Where is there even the slightest, trace of spiritual resemblance between the Russian moujik and the Silesian villager?

Let us consider the same question again from the point of view of a change of language. Such change does not necessarily contain within itself a change of mentality. In the middle of the nineteenth century the most eminent Czechs were unable to speak Czech properly, and the Irish have only recently begun to speak their own language again. From the Jews it can be seen how language alone does not decide communal mentality; a Jew may not know a word of either of his “native” languages, and yet be in the strictest sense a Jew.

For a Jew, choice of language is a matter of circumstance; he remains a Jew in all languages equally. Only individuals abandon the link with the communal mentality to which they originally belonged when they change their language; in the case of associations, such change has no importance — and under the cloak of linguistic differences, the same communal mentality is found; The opposite also happens: differences in psyche and national consciousness under the cloak of the same language (Serbs, Croats).

Between communal mentality and language the relationship is not permanent, but may vary — so one has nothing to do with the other.

**VI CONCLUSIONS**

Language is the most effective and in its effects the most farreaching of the tools of civilisation. As the knowability of the sky depended on the perfection of lenses, so the level of

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582 Vendryes, op. ct., pp. 277-289.
583 See “Różnolitość cywilizacyjna Słowiańszczyzny” (by Koneczny) in "Przegląd Powszechny", 1926.
584 In Poland Jews always give two native languages: Hebrew (modern Hebrew) and Yiddish, and the authorities also regard both as Jewish native languages. Hence the quotation marks; according to Latin ideas a man can only have one native language.
civilisation depends on the perfection of language. Yet the lens alone does not decide the state of astronomy, nor does language determine civilisation. So it is a mistaken view that every linguistic association is at the same time a separate association of civilisation. The idea of national civilisations existing according to language cannot be scientifically maintained.

Astronomy would not have reached its present heights without suitable telescopes, and if the art of providing the necessary lenses were lost, astronomy would not remain for long on its present level. Tools decide the success of work. Level of civilisation depends on the state of the language. Is a language incapable of forming a fairly involved compound sentence a suitable tool for the expression of abstractions? For where abstractions cannot be exactly and conveniently formulated, how is discussion in the field of abstraction and the drawing of increasingly subtle abstract distinctions possible at all — in other words how can the higher reaches of knowledge be cultivated in such a language? In the absence of an instrument the work is not done, even if there is the desire and perhaps talent for it.

Unfortunately, languages cannot be improved. E. Majewski has justly observed that the effects of the drawbacks of a given language and “the inconvenience are cumulative and grow, so that barely visible in one generation they become of great importance to the nation, sometimes deciding its fate. From small grains of sand accumulating over centuries, broad shoals grow up.” ... “While the better languages became increasingly precious instruments, the less good often deteriorated further, weighed down by the burden of failings becoming increasingly harmful at higher stages of development. And yet to alter anything in a language radically and deliberately is as impossible as to change one’s features, even though we feel their imperfection and faults.”

Societies which have been endowed by fate with a faulty system of speech become victims of their own language. But until such time as, in the development of civilisation, they outgrow their language, they move from level to level with a sure step, methodically, according to their own system. Then when certain individuals reach out above the capacity of their own tongue, provided they do not drown in the bog of general inferiority and the number of such individuals grows, in the end the matter becomes of general concern and disturbances must result which may produce anarchic conditions in a given civilisation. In a society in this position, the flower of the intelligentsia will begin to introduce a foreign language, and bilingualism may prove to be a transitional stage in a general change of language. A newly adopted language carries forward an old civilisation.

If, for example, the English language were to become the real language of the Chinese or Japanese intelligentsia, and then were to become general, while Chinese and Japanese became dead languages — then (after centuries!) Anglo-Saxon culture would not have been extended to the Chinese and Japanese, but the English language would be serving two civilisations, Latin and Chinese, the latter proceeding to higher levels thanks to an English dress.

If a sufficient number of people fluent in a well-chosen foreign language are not available, stagnation must follow, amid general discontent, and a haphazard grasping at reforms, a confusion of insufficiently thought-out experiments, a chaotic state involving the ruin of the old civilisation and a retreat back through several generations to the level at which the native language suffices. The process would take the form of a recurring series of upheavals, always followed by another halt. I doubt if there can be revolutions more dangerous than linguistic ones.

The historical importance of languages is thus extreme, and their influence incomparably greater than that of race. And what was out of place in the case of race is entirely in order in referring to languages: there exists a hierarchy of languages, according

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585 Majewski, vol. IV, pp. 201, 203.
to the degree of their capacity for development. Philology will one day list this hierarchy — a list of the stronger and blunter tools of civilisation. But this will not be a table, of different civilisations since the same language may serve two civilisations.

Civilisations are not formed, established and differentiated according to language. Kinds of civilisation do not depend on kinds of language, but levels in all kinds do. Although language is a spiritual element, it does not determine kinds of civilisation.

Let us now take up the most spiritual factor — religion.
CHAPTER VII

CIVILISATION AND RELIGION

I INTRODUCTORY REMARKS

If a system of communal life is to be comprehensive, it must embrace religion. Life without religion cannot be complete — however many-sided, it will fall short of universalism. On the other hand, anti-religious life is opposed to the development of civilisation and must have an immediately unfortunate effect on ethics as well as on the fine arts, and after a short period, on other categories of being. Because of the links between the physical and spiritual categories, any crippling of the latter brings in its train deficiencies and even abnormalities in material categories also. A civilisation which makes light of religion will begin to creak everywhere.

In the present consideration of the relationship arising between civilisation and religion it is not intended to examine civilisation from the point of view of religion, nor religion from the point of view of civilisation, but only to prepare material which will help the solution of the following problem: do the resemblances and differences between civilisations result from resemblances and differences of religion; if so is differentiation in civilisation the result of the variety of religions, and are religions therefore the creators of civilisations, i.e. of systems for the organisation of communal life?

For the sake of precision, I define what I mean by religion, which is a system embracing the relation of the natural to the supernatural world. Until recently stereotyped methods were employed for the investigation of religions in the belief that it was possible to deal with them all at once. This produced fantastic theories. Today nobody believes that religions emerged from ancestor-worship, and “astral” religion and the “Babylonian outlook” are treated as nonsense by serious scholars.

The relation of every religion to civilisation ought to be investigated separately, so that it is the more necessary to distinguish between them. Religions are of three kinds — local, tribal and universal in membership; three also in essence — with monolatry alongside with polytheism and monotheism.

After proto-historic monotheism, religions became local and so fell into monolatry, for no monotheist religion can be local; by the logic of things monotheism is linked with universality. Monolatry is something basically different. If it had obtained among the majority of peoples, each would honour its own separate god and none of these gods would be the god of even two peoples. From the total of monolatries polytheism would then have developed — a team of tribal gods not even making up a mythology because all totally alien to each other.

In classical times, the Romans discovered one of the ways of ruling Italy permanently was to centre on Rome the cults of numerous local religions. Local and tribal religions were

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586 The original sketch of this chapter appeared in "Ateneum Kaplanskie" in 1926.
587 So for example Meyer, op. cit., pp. 105, 112.
also associated with the expeditions of Alexander the Great, who offered sacrifice to all the
gods along his route.

A local religion is attached to territory; in the event of a change of population, it is
transferred from one people to another, from one race to another. The opposite is true of a
tribal religion, which is attached to a people regardless of its place of abode. Tribal religions
arose among nomads who, being fed up of constantly changing gods, realised that in fact they
had none of their own. Not distinguishing monolatry but mistakenly reckoning it as
monotheism, a whole series of scholars reached the fantastic conclusion that monotheism was
the prerogative of nomads.

Evidently neither a local nor a tribal religion can be true. True monotheism proclaims
only one God common to all peoples, and to each of them separately, identical for all:
monotheism and universal religion go together. Brahminism, universal in principle, never
lived up to itself, never went outside India, but deteriorated into a polytheistic religion, local
even although the locality is a vast region. Unquestionably universal are Islam, Buddhism and
Christianity.

If local and tribal are lower than universal, do adherents of universal religions
automatically belong to higher civilisations? What has historical induction to teach us on the
matter?

Through monotheism the Arabs and (to a point) the Jews attained a superior level of
civilisation, but it is also certain that the pagan Scipios stood above them; if the Scipios had
possessed belief in the One True God, they would have risen to a still higher level of
civilisation. It is equally beyond doubt that monotheists would be falling to a lower level if
they returned to polytheism. But such movement, whether lower or higher, takes place within
the frame of the civilisation to which those concerned already belong. A monotheist Roman
would never have become Jewish by civilisation, since it would have meant a lowering of his
cultural level. In this matter there can be discussion only of levels, not of kinds of civilisation.

In following links with civilisations, conclusions from external resemblances between
religions are to be guarded against. For example, there have always been processions, prayer-
strings, etc. There were processions to Eleusis, and today flocks of pilgrims cross the Tibetan
mountains, while in China a “fleet of junk” sails to the sacred island Pu-Tu, and
“processional boats” are no rarity. In Constantinople rosaries are to be seen “wound round the
hand of a fashionable gentleman distinguishable from the average European only by his fez,
and round the hand of the hamal who carries loads in the port”. In Japan “every sect has
different prayerstrings, as St. Francis Xavier noticed”.588 All this has no connection with the
relationship of religions to civilisations.

In the Old Testament external resemblances can be found with the religion of old
Persia, while “the later Mithraism, through the medium of the Persian religion, borrowed very
many of the religious beliefs and practices of monotheism”.589 But it would be necessary to
investigate separately whether influences on the organisation of communal life followed the
same paths.

588 Melcer-Rutkowska, op. cit., p. 28 (in 1924), „Misje Katolickie” 1925, pp. 469, 470.
589 Father Jozef Kruszynski. ”Studia nad porównawczą historią religii”. Poznań, 1926, pp. 194, 195. Recent
information points to strong influence of the religion of Fire on other contemporary religions, including Judaism,
a point on which there is much learned literature. These views are opposed by Eduard Meyer. At the beginning
of our era, when Buddhism was the ruling religion in North-West India, the local Kings Huwishka and Kanishka
nevertheless remained fire-worshippers. Recent research has shown that Gotama also had among his pupils
worshippers of the holy fire Agna. See Rhys-Davids, pp. 55, 234. There are references here and there to the
Parsees in the works of travellers, but of such a kind (quantitatively and qualitatively) that the sole result is
curiosity. In Polish valuable information about the Parsees of Bombay is provided from personal observation in
We face a great problem — the extent to which religion creates civilisation or civilisation religion. Buckle asserted that “religion is the consequence of the perfecting of humanity and not the cause of it”.\(^{590}\) On the other hand, Fustel de Coulanges argued that social always follows religious progress, and is evoked by it.\(^{591}\) The recently deceased Durkheim held that religion is the mother of all institutions. The contemporary P. J. Andre is of opinion that “the birth of a new religion means the birth of a new civilisation”.\(^{592}\) Le Bon went furthest in this direction, emphasising that even the slightest change in religious beliefs brings a whole series of changes in the life of a people.\(^{593}\)

And yet the religious changes in sixteenth century England certainly did not effect changes in the five categories of being. The Englishman who is converted to Catholicism at the present day does not change his civilisation; he belonged to Latin civilisation as an Anglican and continues to do so as a Catholic. Undoubtedly a man who passes from paganism to Christianity changes a great deal; which is also the case if he rejects it by passing over to Islam — very important changes took place on such occasions in North Africa and later in the Balkans. But against this may be set facts from the decline of the Roman Empire, when the flower of the Roman intelligentsia, in accepting baptism, remained within Roman civilisation and strove to carry it on. Thus there is no general rule; the matter must be investigated in the case of each religion separately.

Religion creates civilisation only when it draws under its social legislation the five categories of being, when it is the determining factor not only for morals but also in categories of health, the struggle for existence, art and learning.

### II JUDAISM

Because of its age and record, it is with Judaism that we should begin. It is a mistaken idea that the Jewish religion has no history, but represents something constant and unchanging in the procession of the centuries. Like all the peoples of the world, at first the Jews too were monotheist, but we have no information about them from that epoch. It is impossible to know whether any differentiation at all had then taken place between the Hebrews and the proto-Semitic ethnic mass. The epoch is open to guesses which here are indifferent to us.

From the time they entered history in Palestine the Jews always had several systems embracing the relation of the natural to the supernatural world. Instead of speaking of Jewish religion, the plural, Jewish religions should be used. They adopted various idolatries up to Hellenistic times. The evidence is in a mass of Biblical texts, particularly the Prophets. Moreover revealed monotheism survived only among few people, while the true tradition of the Covenant with the Lord flowed in a narrow stream. What did they do with revealed monotheism?

Catholic Biblical scholars long ago discovered the religious duality of the Jews of old, and refer to a loose monotheism, a materialist conception of the Covenant; but they tend to go round in circles and employ long drawn-out descriptive terms. Scientific accuracy clearly suffers because of the lack of an exact terminology. Since, however, the majority of Jews regarded Israel’s relationship to Jehovah as contractual (on this scholars are generally agreed), and the condition of the contract that Jehovah should protect Israel from all other peoples destined to be its “footstool” — and since only a co-religionist was a neighbour — it is plain


\(^{593}\) Le Bon, "Lois psychologiques", op. cit., p. 144.
that this Jehovah is only a Jewish god and not the universal God. So here too is a distinct tribal monolatry. The Jews very quickly threw off their mission as elect, abandoning monotheism and adopting monolatry with their materialistic Messianism — in so far as they did not sink into polytheism.

Bloody sacrifices continued until the destruction of Jerusalem. Having destroyed the Jewish Temple, the Romans did not transfer the cult of Jehovah to Rome, the sole exception to this Roman practice. They despised the cult, and left not a stone upon a stone of the Temple (also contrary to their custom) because in their eyes it was a centre of barbarism unworthy of the age of Titus and Vespasian. In it the blood of victims flowed ankle-deep. Official parish sacrifices alone accounted every year for 1093 lambs, 113 calves, 37 grown rams and 32 goats. Adding as many again for private offerings, we reach a total of 2550, so that on the average seven animals were slaughtered daily on the altar. There were surely milder days, but how blood gushed on solemn festivals — and this was still done, although they knew bloodless sacrifices and offered them also.

History distinguishes several levels of sacrifice. At the beginning there is human sacrifice, then comes the period of bloody animal offerings, followed by symbolical offerings limited in the end to fruit and flowers. Thus Israel remained at a low level and was unable to rise above it until forced to do so by the Romans.

The extent of the confusion in religious concepts in Palestine is witnessed by the second royal public temple, of the State of Israel at Betel, the present Betin, three hours’ journey north of Jerusalem. For Samaria was only the secular capital of this State, the religious was Betel. This was a temple equipped with extreme splendour, with a complicated system of sacrifice. It is typical that doubts can exist about exactly what religion was served there. On one occasion the “cult of the calf” is mentioned, on another “the ritual which the law of Moses prescribed”, and the cult of Jehovah, although differently named; but a text of the Prophet Amos suggests the conclusion that local gods were in question. 594

After the destruction of the Temple in Jerusalem there was an end to all sacrifices, so that prayer only remained. The break came suddenly and radically, as if the leaders of Israel were glad at last to be able to extricate themselves. The principle was proclaimed that sacrifice could only be offered in the Temple at Jerusalem — which by no means followed from the sacred books. The renewal of sacrifice was therefore postponed until the restoration of the Temple in Jerusalem, which has never been and is not now attempted.

The priestly status of the tribe of Aaron is still recognised, and its members have certain privileges in the synagogues, but are without occupation. They were never religious guides, only men who made offerings; the guides were and are those learned in the Scriptures, the rabbis, who are legal advisers in a contractual religion, but entirely without priestly character. A priest had to be born, a rabbi had to learn. Moreover synagogues do not have the character of temples and are not houses of God. A house of prayer may be founded by anyone, but the founder remains the owner and enjoys all the rights of ownership and may even take payment. The Jews do not regard any synagogue as God’s sanctuary. A religion without temples and without a priesthood developed (the same is true of Islam).

This was a basic break with the past, particularly as Palestine played a decreasingly important part in Jewish lives. Outside Palestine they freed themselves of many of the demands of the Law, on the strength of a new doctrine that the whole Law was only binding in the Promised Land, and outside it only in so far as this was feasible. A factor unknown to any other religion — geographical relativity — had appeared.

The Law of Moses, written down in the Pentateuch as the commandments of Jehovah, embraces family, marriage, inheritance, property, and contract law, in a word the whole of

civil and penal law, the organisation of the judicature, legal procedure, genealogy and all social institutions, rules for farming and cattle-rearing, ploughing, reaping, vintage-gathering, orchards, even birds’ nests; attitudes to art and learning are defined and rules of hygiene included; neither international and political law nor State institutions are overlooked. And so the whole of community life — the whole structure of Jewish civilisation with a mass of detail — is contained in the rules of the Old Testament. It is a sacral civilisation.

The Old Testament is poor in passages relating to the sciences and arts. We encounter only liturgical music, singing to the lute and hieraic dancing. Sculpture was forbidden; nothing is known about the existence of painting. Of the sciences, Jehovah’s followers recognised law and as much mathematics and astronomy as was needed to observe the moon; medicine was condemned. Thus it was a defective civilisation, with the tiniest provision of the intellectual categories of being.

To this was added in time a second source-book of Jewish religion and civilisation — the Talmud. This vast collective work was produced by two thousand rabbis between the second and the sixth centuries A.D. It may safely be said that there is nothing in heaven or earth which is not debated there, but always exclusively from the sacral angle. The Talmud is a commentary on the Old Testament with added detail. Not a corner of life escapes the restraint of rules allegedly coming from Jehovah. Jewish civilisation would become even more strongly sacral.

But the Jews scattered over the wide world before the Talmud was written. The Jews of the oldest forced settlements — Assyrian, Persian, certain branches of the emigration in the Diadochian States, also in Arabia, India. Abyssinia, the Caucasus and on certain African coasts — knew nothing of its appearance. Absence of knowledge of the Talmud is the surest evidence of the antiquity of a settlement. There existed an extensive non-Talmud, because pre-Talmud diaspora.

In addition, others who do in fact know the Talmud, do not acknowledge its authority. These are the so-called Karaites, who had their origin in the mid-eight century in Babylon itself, where the Talmud itself emerged. Until the end of the ninth century the authority of the Talmud was under heavy attack, then came hesitations increasingly favourable to the Talmudists. The fight for the Talmud took place mainly under the aegis of Arab-Jewish universalism. The Karaites were the first Jews to begin writing in Arabic, the Talmudists were obliged to copy them in this, and in assimilating secular knowledge from Arab culture. From the middle of the twelfth century, the pillars of Jewish learning were already in the Talmudist camp.

The Karaites were the first to agree to equal rights for women in family law. The resulting monogamy — proposed and already practised by the Karaites — was in the eleventh century enjoined upon the Talmudists of Alsace, where the Rabbi of Metz, Gerson, laid a curse on Jews who forced a divorce upon their wives against the latters’ will.

Is not monogamous civilisation different from polygamous? And yet Jewish civilisation did not split up. The Law only permitted polygamy, but did not impose it, and did not ban monogamy; and so the Law remained untouched and there was no derogation from the sacral character of Jewish civilisation.

Meanwhile a third source of religion and civilisation, still sacral, had made its appearance, the cabbala. It began in the eighth or ninth century A.D. with study of the secret powers of the letters of the sacred Hebrew alphabet; gematria, consisting in specific operations with numbers expressed by letters of the alphabet — a Greek game which the cabbalists took seriously — was added; then came the doctrine of systematic manifestations
of divine attributes from which “caballistic philosophy” (oddly close to the avatars of the Brahmins)\textsuperscript{595} developed.

The cabballa helped to uphold the Talmud, covering over the absurdities with cabballistic interpretation, so that all proved comprehensible and holy. Rabbi Nachman (1195-1270) undertook this task proclaiming cabballa to be the most sacred science. The basic book of Jewish cabballa is the Sohar of Moses ben Shemtob from the, Spanish province of Leon (1250-1305).

Cabballistic methods were at ones adopted in small circles-of scholars as an attractive “philosophy” leading to control of nature, and the issue, of commands to her. And when belief in the possibility of influence on the external world by secret but religious means became popular, and moreover accessible only to Jews, to what end would a Jew use this power if not to hasten the coming of the Messiah? The cabballa also won hearts and minds by alleged partial realisations of the Messiah with the help of Messianic men, local Messiahs.

Cabballistic fantasies adapted to Messianism were to acquire practical significance; but before this happened, a beginning was made with the adaption of the Talmud to the new conditions of the diaspora. From the thirteenth century the vastness of these books was reduced, what could only concern Palestine and what could in no wise be carried out omitted, and the learned arguments cut almost to the conclusions alone, the commands and prohibitions. These labours, which began with the famous Maimonides (1135-1204), who dealt karaism the final blows, lasted to the middle of the sixteenth century. In the year 1565 the Rabbi of Jerusalem, Jacob Karo, completed an edition of the Talmud entitled Shulchan-Aruch, with supplementary remarks by the contemporary Cracow Rabbi Isserles (1525-1572). This book is still binding; all Talmudic works of the more recent period are based on it. A thousand years divided the big Talmud from the small, from Shulchan-Aruch. Today it is still required in the name of religion that the whole course of life be ordered in accordance with rules nearly fifteen hundred years old, where sacral power is held to be inexhaustible.

It should be noted that the Shulchan consistently proclaims monolatry. Jehovah appears as the enemy of all mankind, and protector of the Jewish people alone; one’s neighbour is a Jew only. The resulting double ethic is blatant in the Shulchan. Is this monotheism?

But in cabballa the concept of God was reduced even further. Fantastic speculation is mingled with practice of the crudest superstition. And simultaneously with Shulchan-Aruch appeared the so-called “practical” (mashiit) cabballa, drawn up in Palestine, by a certain Isaac Luria (1534-1572). Ways were devised of discovering when the Messiah would appear, and with him Jewish hegemony, over the whole world. On several occasions a date was expressly indicated (1525, 1568, and most important, 1648).

Meanwhile at the turn of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries came a discovery which was to hasten the Messiah. The most famous of Isserles’s pupils. Rabbi Jacob, later on in Prague called “the Pole”, worked out a new method of study and prayer known as pylpul. This consists in constant movements of the whol body, but in particular of waving of the right hand with fist clenched and thumb extended obliquely. The significance, of this movement was and is variously explained to the uninitiated. The truth is that pylpul is associated with the branch of cabballa which explains even the supernatural world by differences of sex.

Among cabballists in Poland the old doctrine about Shechin, the female element among the divine attributes, became dominant, and in Volhynia at the time of King Augustus III Rabbi Eliezer, founder of Hassidism, based himself on it. In doing so he created a cheerful

\textsuperscript{595} Jewish philosophy of the divine attributes served as a bridge between India and Orthodoxy. It would be to depart too far from our theme to discuss this here. On Jewish influences on Orthodoxy, see “Dzieje Rosji” (History of Russia, by Koneczny), vol. I and II.
religion, for what more agreeable to Jehovah than the cheerfulness, of his chosen-people; cheerful prayers were even brought into the synagogue, origin of the proverbial commotion there. Scandalised Talmudist *misnagdim* put them under interdict, but were afterwards compelled to retreat from whole provinces. Only in Vilno the Hassidim were refused entry by the famous Elias, creator of a new school and spiritual father of Lithuanian Jewry. To tsadyk, the divinely elect of Hassidism, was ascribed a definite influence on human affairs and on nature. A tsadyk is a wonder-worker and a local Messianic man. It is the Messianic concept fragmented.

By this tune, however, the eastern Sephardim (descendants of the old exiles from Spain) already had their Messiah. His arrival had been forecast for the year 1648, and on this occasion he appeared. For the eastern cabbalists he was Sabbatay Zwi, who proclaimed himself the “incarnation” of the Torah and was already winning adherents in Poland by the year 1666. Incarnation of the Torah became hereditary, passing to the son, and grandson of Sabbatay (to the year 1740). Blood descendants then failing the idea passed to Jacob ben Jehuda ben Leib of Czerniowce (Cemauti), known to history as Frank. He was active in Turkey for fifteen years, then in 1755 moved to Poland.

Sabbatay and all his successors enjoined monogamy.

In Poland Frank found a fierce struggle between Talmud and Sohar in progress. The Frankists went so far as publicly to accuse the Talmudists of ritual murder. Frank used all means to win the favour of court and higher clergy, in 1759 accepting baptism with 24,000 of his followers. At stake was a grant of administration over a considerable area in Podolia, a grant which would enable the Messiah to rule somewhere at last. This first project of Judaeo-Polonia might have succeeded had not Frank broken with the Talmudists, who avenged themselves by causing Frank to be interned in the fortress of Czestochowa, whence he succeeded in leaving for Germany only in 1773.

But cabbalistic speculations continued to spread among Talmudists, and after Rabbi Bynem of Przysucha (died 1817), study of the cabbala and of the Talmud became one, against a background of Hassidism. There arose in Poland a kind of synthesis of Jewry.

In principle, recognition of the Torah does not bring with it recognition of the Talmud, and a man who recognises the Talmud need not recognise the cabbala, and not every cabbalist need be a Hassid. In the outer world also, four divisions of Jews developed, on the following plan:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Torah</th>
<th>I without Talmud and without cabbala</th>
<th>II without cabbala</th>
<th>III old cabbala</th>
<th>IV Chassidism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>with Talmud</td>
<td>with cabala</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

The line from I to IV on this table may be regarded in two ways: as representing progress or retreat, one religion or four. If, despite everything, the verdict is one religion, what is the common bond? Only Messianism — faith that all must end with the Jews ruling the world. There is no other commonwealth here. Incidentally, where is the common ground between Hassidism or even the cabbala and the Pentateuch? All recognise the Torah, but they do not have foundations in it; and if they turn to it, that also has a Messianic basis. There lies the source of the sacral argument for Messianism.

Across all the centuries, and through all changes and vicissitudes, Jewish civilisation has never ceased to be sacral — Kosher rules for slaughtering and cooking are in force unchanged, and so is the double ethic.
It is sometimes heard that “Neo-Judaism” represents a break with this. But the founder of so-called Neo-Judaism, Mendelssohn (1729-86), clothed Judaism with the forms of modern life and nothing more. He was an excellent Talmudist, and his handbook of Jewish law (1778) keeps to the Talmud in everything, not even hesitating over the double ethic. So-called Neo-Judaism only provided new forms for the old Talmudist spirit.

In 1855 it was claimed in Germany that “only he is a Jew who scrupulously fulfils the rules of the mediaeval rabbis, of Shulchan-Aruch and its commentators”. Those who made this pronouncement were dressed in frockcoats and had organs in their synagogues. Similarly in 1870 the learned lawyer Auerbach acknowledged the law of the Talmud to be the law of God. And in our days Jewish literature in the German language has even pronounced in favour of Hassidism (Buber, 1908), and feelers of Hassidism already reach out to England, where old Jewish families, English by language, are turning again to Jewish sacralism.

Jewish civilisation was and is sacral.596

III

BRAHMINISM

Brahminism is often confused with Buddhism, but these are distinct religions, and it is only historically that their affairs have become linked: Buddhism derives from Brahminism, but represents a reaction against it. Both religions regard life as basically evil, both believe in reincarnation and the transmigration of souls, but Buddhism rejects the sacred books, the Veddas, and does not recognise castes, whereas Brahminism is in fact a religion of castes. Brahminism developed in India and has never spread outside India. Buddhism also arose in India, where it was long the dominant religion. Now it barely holds out in Nepal, and that in a veritable caricature. The two religions have in common a kind of begging clergy, which often confuses travellers. In Brahminism a third of the Brahmins really beg, but a Brahmin is born a Brahmin and is not obliged to beg, since he belongs always and absolutely to the supreme caste, and may be even a government minister — whereas the Buddhist monk may come from any caste and is obliged to beg.

The holy books of the Vedda do not contain a strictly defined religion: “The Aryan hymns oscillate among the most varied concepts of religion. Everything is found there: adoration of the forces of nature, pantheism, polytheism, monotheism”.597 “The expression religion has an entirely different meaning for a Hindu and for a European”.598 If it were to be said that every caste has its religion, this would not be far from the truth. The higher the caste, the more the metaphysical side of Brahminism reveals itself.

The law of Manu (of the second, third or even eighth century B.C.) lays down in detail the duties and reciprocal relations of the castes, regulating daily life under the sanction of religion. The Brahmins interpret the sacred books and watch over the organisation of society. The fact is that of the religion of the Vedda generally speaking nothing remains, but a whole range of faiths arose, from monotheism to the cult of animals.599 Polytheism was shaped during long centuries, as it were a pictorial-popular allegory of real religion. Brahma himself, the proplast of all transformed into the supreme god, has never been and is not the

596 I have not in general provided references in this section, because I expect to publish shortly a full-scale work on the Jewish civilisation.
598 Ibid, p. 605.
599 Ibid, pp. 68, 69.
object of a cult because he has no “special followers”, and “in the whole of India there are perhaps no more than one or two temples dedicated to him”.  

Incarnations of divine attributes, avatars, became in time separate deities. Since their number is unlimited, the number of Hindu deities may also multiply without end. Brahmins accept polytheism, with the reservation that the actual images of the gods must not be deified.  

The adherent of Brahminism is surrounded by countless religious and caste regulations, to such an extent that the most scrupulous cannot be sure that they have not fallen into sin. Constant unceasing fear of sin, of “uncleanness”, is a feature of Brahminism. These regulations cover family and property law, ritual ceremonial and prayers, penances and purgations, and in addition all the customs of daily life, laid down in the most minute detail for each caste separately. All the legislative side of the Vedda was retained, and supplemented by thousands of tiny details: sacral legislation embraces the whole of life and every moment of it.

There is a way of getting outside caste — by renouncing the world and becoming a sannyasee, homeless, possessing nothing and wanting nothing. Such a man is raised absolutely above all the requirements and duties of cult and caste. There obviously cannot be many of these sannyasee philosophers, but the popular and quite unintelligent yogas are numerous. And anybody may become a full sannyasee or yoga, since it is open to everyone at any time to leave family or office for this sacred purpose. In Brahminism it is permissible at any time to revolt against the duties of a life in which nothing is sacred, which is no more than a conglomeration of evil. Anybody who rejects the world is not bound by any duty previously undertaken. Put simply, the road to sanctity leads through rejection of all duty.

In all the observances of religion, in every caste there reigns an absolutely terrifying formalism. Magical power superior to that of the gods is attributed to rites. The smallest external aspect of the cult is carried out with extreme scrupulosity. “No people has shown itself as strict in the carrying out of its religious duties as the Hindu.”

But nor has any people so entirely separated religion from morality. These “most religious” Hindus are at the same time the least moral. The professing Brahmin does not forget the gods in his trifling activities, and is occupied without cease in endeavours to win their favour for himself — but “he would be extremely surprised if it were suggested to him that the gods are interested even slightly in the uprightness of his dealings with his neighbours, in the purity of his life, the integrity of his speech and conduct, or that these all-powerful beings have even the slightest wish to frown on a Hindu who seizes his neighbour’s goods or commits child-murder. Of course, their revenge might seriously affect a man who omits to say a prayer, to read the sacred books, to take part in religious ceremonies or to carry out the required acts of purification, if for example he does not wash his hands before eating or his lips after a meal. These are sins which rouse the anger of the gods”. Provided the thousands of external rites are observed at every turn, they pay no heed to the rest. The rest is a matter for men, is the material, utilitarian, practical side of life, far below the concern of the gods”. For that matter the Hindu pantheon is not composed of moralists.

In Manu legislation, tortures and even the death penalty are provided for neglect of ritual, whereas only light punishments follow robberies and murders. And irregularities in sexual life call for punishment only in so far as they are dangerous to the purity of the race — and this is for the Hindu the sole serious sin. Killing is a serious sin when a Brahmin or a cow

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600 Ibid., p. 606.
601 Marcinkowska, op. cit, p. 159.
603 Ibid., p. 638.
604 Ibid., p. 638.
is concerned, otherwise it is a peccadillo, while the killing of daughters is no sin at all.  

“The Hindu walks, sits, drinks and eats, works and sleeps religiously” — but “morality has not yet 
been born in India” Every step of a Hindu is formalistically sacred. Thus Brahminism 
contains within itself the whole external side of civilisation, and of the internal side 
defines family and property law (in the Vedda and finally in the laws of Manu).

Le Bon describes this state of affairs accurately: “In India religious beliefs are the 
basis of all social institutions; they are in reality nothing but religious institutions.”

Of the categories of being controlled and exactly defined by Brahminism there are the 
bodily categories of health and the struggle for material existence, also art (limited to 
architecture and sculpture for the temple). The Brahmin religion does not know the category 
of moral good, nor does Brahminism cultivate learning outside the study of the sacred books 
and — here is a significant phenomenon — Brahmin civilisation does not know these 
categories either. What is lacking in Brahminism is lacking in Hindu civilisation which, 
positive and negative, consists in Brahminism and derives from it. What is not sacral is not 
accessible to the professing Brahmin. In Brahminism civilisation and religion are one.

But there is a certain aspect under which the relation of Brahminism to civilisation 
deserves separate investigation. Brahmins themselves have noticed the contradiction between 
Brahmin theory and practice. This is explained by the system, known as vedanta, which 
asserts that all the variety of life is a simple illusion. The wide world of appearances and 
ilusions is under the power of the extremely fickle goddess Maya, who is able to conceal 
truth from minds without the necessary training. The whole Hindu pantheon belongs to this 
domain of Maya; how much the professing vedantist chooses to take from it and accepts is his 
personal affair.

This system (propagated among Christians) is clearly not a religion, since it permits 
the rejection of all religion — and as a philosophical system it is simply nihilism. The more 
vedanta, the less civilisation, since the vedanta kills all civilisation.

“The vedantist synthesis has caused and causes stagnation in whole departments of 
life. A man realising the identity of his being with the supreme, sole and absolute Being, 
attains in time interiorly and as an individual the highest possible goal of all existence. It is 
the peak, but at the same time a halt, for it excludes for the future any factor of striving and 
effort.”

IV   BUDDHISM

In the middle of the sixth century before Christ appeared Goutama Buddha, a prince of 
one of the peoples of North-East India. Long a pupil of the Brahmins, he abandoned position 
and family, became a sannyassee and wandered through a large part of India. His teaching 
was not revolutionary in Brahmin metaphysics, since he retained the two chief doctrines of 
Brahminism — life treated as an evil and the transmigration of souls. The difference was that 
he did not concern himself with the question of the first beginnings of things; he was not 
concerned with God or gods and did not accept the immortality of the soul. Belief in the soul

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605 Ibid., p. 640.
606 Ibid., p. 642.
607 Ibid., p. 248.
608 Ibid., p. 608; Marcinkowska, op. cit, p. 229.
was early condemned in pure Buddhism as the “heresy of individuality”. Similarly pure Buddhism does not accept the efficacy of prayer.

All this would not have caused a religious revolution in Asia. The fundamental difference for communal life lies in the fact that Buddha overthrew the principle of Brahmin ethics, according to which spiritual victories are only to be attained through bodily renunciations. Buddhism also attaches no importance to castes, does not fill life with penances, even abolishes sacrifice. So at least Prince Sakyamuni, Gautama Buddha taught.

Neither Brahminism nor Buddhism strives to remove evil. The constant migration of the soul, the wandering of the human individual forced to adopt a new body and to live (and so suffer) again without end, is an unceasingly moving “circle of desires and anxieties”, a hunting for non-existent happiness. The nature of the reincarnation is decided by karma, that is a reckoning of moral pluses and minuses in the previous life. The transmigration of souls lasts until moral excellence, consisting in complete annihilation of all attachment to being, is achieved. At this point the karma of the individual concerned is exhausted and a new one is not formed. Then follows the divine state of nirvana, which accompanies the last life of the perfect man. This is “a sinless, peaceful state of soul”. It is possible to reach this state relatively quickly, but it may also take thousands of years. Approach to nirvana or increasing distance from it is determined by the degree of morality of the last karma.

Gautama Buddha opposed Brahminism decisively by creating a morality. A true Buddhist must be a good man and be victorious over himself. A Buddhist is not allowed to reject his responsibilities. The example of Sakyamuni, still based on Brahminism, did not survive in face of the morality which he himself later preached. The begging order, in which from the beginning caste was not recognised, became the characteristic feature of Buddhism. Begging and constant wandering are obligatory. Monks are in addition bound by special moral regulation. The begging of the Buddhist order is not, however, intended to honour poverty, but to show that the beggar aims at nothing in external life, that he really does not possess this life, and so cannot attach himself to anything. This state approaches the perfection of nirvana.

It is a state of complete a-civilisation. Pure Buddhism remained indifferent to the five categories of life: the human quincunx means Evil. Buddhism cannot of itself create any civilisation. It builds nothing because it is not allowed to want anything. An active attitude to life is ruled out. Perfection consists in the disappearance of the categories of life.

For the generality Buddhism contains only five rules: do not kill (not even animals!), do not steal, do not lie, do not get drunk and keep clean. There are other rules for monks only. Sacral law is non-existent; pure Buddhism contains nothing sacral.

Despite everything Buddhism could have created its own civilisation in India if it had continued to take the firm stand for the abolition of the caste system to which its rapid initial spread was due. But in time Buddhism grew reconciled to castes. The history of Buddhism in India covers a whole millenium from the fifth century before Christ to the seventh after Christ. When it accepted the caste system, other breaches followed and it began again to resemble Brahminism. Buddhism then ceased to act as a leaven, ceased to operate creatively in the history of India. Ceasing to reform, it became unnecessary to the Indians. Brahminism was better suited to castes, and castes to Brahminism. About the beginning of the Christian era, India was again divided between the two religions; from the seventh century there was a renewed predominance of Brahminism, until finally Buddhism disappeared. In the eleventh century some Indian rulers still supported it, but by the twelfth century, when the Moslems conquered Kashmir, there were hardly any Buddhists left. Yet Brahminism held its own even against Islam.

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610 The teaching of Buddha according to Rhys-Davids, op. cit.
Exterminated in its homeland, Buddhism nevertheless became a universal religion. In the fifth century it reached Ceylon and thence spread to Burma, Siam, Java and on to Sumatra. By the road leading from India through Eastern Turkestan it reached beyond the Himalayan crests, and on the other side as far as China, where Buddhism became the State religion in the fourth century, and Korea, which adopted Buddhism at the same time. In 552 Buddhism reached Japan, and then penetrated back across the Himalayas to conquer Nepal and Tibet.

But what kind of Buddhism was it? It spread by compromises, and increasingly serious ones, until in the end for the mass of believers whole mythologies arose, and under the appearance of Buddhism the forces of nature were honoured, evil spirits worshipped and sorcery, incantation and witchcraft practised. Compromises entered into even the monasteries. True Buddhism, the Buddhism of Gautama-Buddha, is almost without adherents. Some sects, the polytheist Jains, for example, reject even a genetic link with it. In China also, Buddhism has changed so much that scholars long regarded it not as Buddhism but as a separate religion.

And so there is Buddhism and Buddhism — a plurality of Buddhisms.

Lamaism would wish to be regarded as the most legitimate Buddhism, but its characteristic feature, overgrown monasticism, is organised in open violation of Buddhism, because hierarchically, and in Tibet is coupled with the exercise of theocratic government. In lamaism the sacral principle has grown to such an extent that it extends to the whole of life, which it is hard even to glimpse apart from the sacral.

Among peoples of a low standard of civilisation monasticism has become a caricature. The Mongolians, for example, are divided into two rites, red and yellow, with the red not regarding celibacy as a condition of their estate. And in Nepal the Tantra system “poor in form, repulsive and unworthy in content” belongs to the worship paid the god Shiva. In these lands Buddhism has certainly not raised the standard of civilisation.

Buddhism adapted itself to every civilisation it encountered, not excluding the lowest levels. It is possible with and without castes, and so under diametrically opposed systems of community life: evidently it contains within itself no system. Buddhism is as the civilisation is. Civilisations do not adapt themselves to Buddhism, but it to them. Theoretically, from the point of view of civilisation it contains nothing, in practice everything.

The religious thread is so weak, so barely visible that it needs to be supported and supplemented by other beliefs if Buddhism is to become a positive religion. These additions give adherents of Buddhism organisation and form the base of civilisation: frequently also an existing base is taken over, as it were the outer Buddhist garment cut to the local civilisation.

V ISLAM

In Islam there is strangely little theology, a minimal amount. “It reduced theology to basic elements and lowers it to the level of the coarsest natures.” Islam does not permit the offering of sacrifice, while the “Turkish mosque is a great prayer hall without an altar”. There is also no clergy, only prayer-leaders, the imams. Mahomet himself was an imam, and so are

611 Le Bon, "Les civilisations de l'Inde", op. cit.
all caliphs on behalf of all the faithfull, and someone in every mosque who knows how to read. An ornamental niche in the mosque indicates the direction of Mecca — close to the pulpit. The preacher may be anyone who knows how to read and interpret the Koran, for which it is however necessary to know the Arabic tongue; for the Koran may not be translated. In the larger mosques there is a permanent preacher, khatib, generally the local judge, kadi, who is invited (there is no obligation) to undertake the task. A mosque is not God’s sanctuary; God is not present through prayer in the mosque.

The sources of belief are the Koran and tradition, called Sunna. In the composition of the Koran there is no slightest order or arrangement: any plan among its 114 chapters (sunna) comes from the commentators. The style and exposition of the Koran are the opposite of the simplicity and clarity of the Gospels; and beside them of an unbridled loquacity. The Sunna is composed of the oldest commentators and various notes. The Sunnites are orthodox, while the Shiites reject tradition and do not recognise the three first Caliphs. Shiite territory is Persia, India, Mongolia and the oases of the Algerian Sahara.

It is not easy to find dogmatic principles in the Koran. God has ninety-nine epithets, the hundredth is the invocation Allah! The greatest of the prophets before Mahomet is Jesus. He was conceived by divine inspiration; Mary is a Virgin. But Jesus is not recognised as the Son of God, for if God could have sons, there would be more gods. At first even Christians were not forced into Islam, intolerance against them appearing only in Turkish times. The old historic link with Judaism is shown by the sacral killing of cattle and the ban on pork. Angelology was adopted from the Persians and Talmudists. The immortality of the soul and future life after the Last Judgment are also accepted. The physical pleasures of the saved will be without number, but Mahomet regarded as the greatest grace of God the possibility of seeing Him for all eternity face to face.613

In the Koran the concepts of free will or predestination are unclear. There is much exaggeration of the absolute fatalism of Islam. It is possible to doubt whether the idea of banning representations of living beings is original, whether it did not reach the Koran from elsewhere. It appears to have been the Prophet’s own idea to ban intoxicating drinks and games of hazard.614

As a result of its rudimentary dogmatic side, the whole of Moslem religion derives from the five basic duties of the moral life: prayers, alms, pilgrimages, fasts and participation in holy wars. Various ablutions accompany the prayers; for Mahomet often gave rules of hygiene sacral sanction. There are many pilgrimages and in Moslem countries a proliferation of graves of the most varied “saints”. A new religious current, the Wahabi, would like to restore to pilgrimages the high religious inspiration they once had.615

The bond of Islam is the religious brotherhood. Almost every grown-up belongs to one. Some are in the nature of our Third Orders. The oldest of the “orders”, Sufism, practises an ascetic of poverty, prolonged prayer, mortification and ecstasy. Since it is impossible to approach God without a mediator, the elder and director of the brotherhood — sheik, sufi, dervish or marabout — becomes the deputy of God on earth. The result has been the appearance in the forefront of Moslem life of “obedience to the sheik instead of the cult of Allah”. “Orders born of the divisions of Sufite teaching cover the whole Moslem world.616

Mahomet really only added the monotheist idea to what he found in Arabia. Hence the permission for slavery and polygamy. Now slavery is officially abolished, but what are slaves

613 André, op. cit., pp. 73-75, 96; Melcer Rutkowska, op. cit., p. 17:”Misje Katolickie”, 1925, p. 320.
614 André, op. cit, vol I, pp. 47-55.
to do who sometimes for hundreds of years, generation by generation, have lived in the same household, and have never earned their livelihood outside it? Incidentally, the Koran recognises several ways in which slaves may gain liberty, but what to live on once free?

It is extremely difficult to improve the institutions of community life under Islam, since the Koran has served to perpetuate and popularise low-grade institutions as if they had been rooted in it. Let us bear in mind that as a rule a Moslem does not know the Koran at all. Thus polygamy is not really an essential feature of Islam, but it was accepted as such, so that Moslems themselves almost until yesterday considered it an essential matter. Marriage is not a religious act, but a civil contract. The imam repeats a prayer with a blessing, but neither he nor the mosque are necessary for the contraction of marriage. It is permissible legally to possess four wives: slaves are bound to submissiveness. An adulterous wife may be punished by death. Woman is not man’s equal, and does not even stand beside him in the mosque. Only the husband may divorce his wife. The veil and the sack dress are not prescribed by the Koran. Countrywomen do not know them at all, and neither the nomadic Turkmen and Kurd women nor the Kabyle women hide their faces. Nowadays the great majority of Moslems live in monogamy, while in Turkey polygamy has been banned for several years. Islam found slavery and polygamy, and would not have been accepted if it had not recognised these institutions. It thus adapted itself to the civilisation it found.

On the other hand, it cannot be claimed that in the Koran there are no injunctions influencing the organisation of communal life. The Koran is full of regulations in the field of hygiene, and contains an exact family and property law, entering into even minor details; it also contains an ethical system. The use of the fine arts is assessed precisely, although for the most part negatively.

And so the Koran touches upon the categories of health, prosperity, beauty, goodness. In the category of Truth, it is little concerned with the supernatural (theology negligible beyond expression!) and with the natural hardly at all — only to the extent that family and property law constitute the whole of jurisprudence. But the Koran’s shortcomings from the angle of civilisation go deeper. All its injunctions are concerned with family life alone, at most with that of the clan, and it knows only private law.

There is no law of government in the Koran, so how could government be based on the Koran? Government is left to the will and pleasure of authority, so that the arbitrary will of the ruler becomes an indispensable part of the law. From this it is one step, and an inevitable one, to the arbitrary will of every official. It also becomes necessary to stretch the Koran to meet the needs of the State. Military service was kept up in the name of the holy war. Taxation came under the duty of almsgiving. Obligatory alms for the poor was made a State concern, and later, under Caliph Omar, five kinds of such alms taxes were fixed.

Of Moslem government it may be said that it was patched with the Koran and lined with self-will, and accordingly unable to dispense with terror. Such Government consisted in the application of private law (magnified) to public affairs. A separate public law could not emerge until a break was made with the principle that the Koran is the source of all law. Two schools developed, one for which only what is contained in Koran or Sunna is worthy, the other claiming that everything which is not condemned by the Koran is allowed. In this way as far back as the eighth century a philosophy of law emerged (Abu-Hanif died 772). Against the background of these two basic trends numerous sects have emerged.

619 Bystroń, op. cit., p. 122.
620 Zygmunt Stefański. "Stosunki agrarne w Bośni i Hercegowinie”. In "Świat Słowiański”. April 1905.
622 Ibid., vol. I, p. 120.
No Moslem country is without sects, in some the orthodox Sunnites are entirely absent. There is yet another reason for the differentiation of Islam: Arabic Islam is not the same as Persian or Indian Islam. In India Islam has become polytheist; for fifty million Indian Moslems, Mahomet and the Islamic saints are new gods added to the thousand older ones. Elsewhere Islam spread because it preached equality; but in India it has retained the castes. Islam displays individual features in the Sultanates of the Indian Ocean, in Zanzibar and Madagascar, in Indo-China and in Japan (where there are three million Moslems) and to an even greater extent in Abyssinia and China (all Chinese Jews were converted to Islam).

It has been said with truth that “every race adapted an Islam according to its own character.”

Where Islam encountered ground fertile from the point of view of civilisation, and where the upper hand was taken by that interpretation of the Koran according to which everything is permissible which is not expressly forbidden — Islam quickened civilisations into abundant growth. It was thus that the flower of Islam, Arabic civilisation arose, so-called after the Arabic language and not after the Arabic ethnic element with which it was in no way linked. Recent research into the role of the Arabs in spreading Islam is negative.

But their language, thanks to the Koran, became the language of a brilliant civilisation of an intellectual splendour extended considerably beyond the frame of the Koran.

The scholarliness of Arabic civilisation (they rescued Aristotle) is often erroneously extended to Islam as such. Some even regard Islam as a religion (and civilisation) which is specifically intellectual, “directed exclusively to pure reason.” But not everything “Arab” belongs to the whole of Islam, and not all that is Moslem to Arabic civilisation! It is also necessary to distinguish peoples who received the Koran from Arabs and from Turanians. These are two worlds as far as civilisation goes. For example, Arab scholars regard Turks as something worse than gaiouros, as the barbarians of Islam. And between them there is a whole range of Islamic cultures: Baghdad, Persian, Hindu, Kipchak and Dzungari (in China). In Islam such great shifts and changes are permissible that it is not possible to speak of a necessary identity between religion and civilisation as is the case with Jews and Brahmins. The fully sacral civilisation seems to appear only in the most extreme of the Shiite sects, among the Mozabites of the oases in the Algerian Sahara. Ethnically these are Berbers. They are indissolubly bound to their holy cities; emigrating temporarily for business reasons they must return, because it is not permitted their women to leave. Here too the face is covered as closely as possible. In their towns there are no cafes, it is not permitted to smoke tobacco. The supreme authority, to be appealed to in all matters, is the college of men learned in the Koran (tolba) existing in every town.

Apart from this single example, Islam is not in itself a distinct civilisation, but is compatible with various civilisations. Whenever a trend emerges in Islam which would make of it a civilisation, the latter is always defective.

**VI ORIENTAL CHRISTIANITY**

A beginning has barely been made with the research which would make it possible to say what influence the eastern Christian sects had on Brahmin, Buddhist and later Islamic sects, and in return what in these religions influenced the sectarianism of the eastern Christians.

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624 For example the incursion of the Arab ethnic element into North Africa occurred only in the eleventh century.
625 Psichari, op. cit. pp. 44, 47.
626 Bystroń, op. cit, pp. 22, 134, 213, 236, 239.
On eastern ground Christianity loses immeasurably much, in particular its positiveness and organised character, the single exception being Catholicism, which did not, however, organise itself in the East and remains an imported plant there.

From the point of view of civilisation the very interesting Monophysite sect (which historically became African) acquired in the course of centuries numerous Byzantine, Coptic, Jewish and even pagan superstitions, including fetishism from half-wild Ethiopian and neighbouring nomads. Hierarchically the Ethiopian Church is dependent on the Coptic in Egypt, and as late as 1864 Coptic monasteries were furnishing eunuchs for Moslem harems. We shall not be surprised that in the course of their seven centuries’ rule these Copts reduced Ethiopia to a waste. The result was an amalgam of several different civilisations, mechanically superimposed on survivals of ancient Egypt, and all on the lowest possible level. 627 In Africa, too, appeared the Donatist sect, laying the foundation of a fatal social revolution, which undermined Roman civilisation and made easier the Vandals’ work of destruction.

Asiatic Christianity was characterised by a submissiveness towards local civilisations which resulted in a strange Christianity, defective, truly crippled. Historically the most considerable sect in Asia was the Nestorian. In the eighth century it reached China, but did not last long; sinking culturally ever lower, it fell below the level of the Chinese intellect. Nestorians were of incomparably greater importance among the Turanians, in the Oygur culture and in the Mongol State of the Genghis Khans, several of whom were Nestorian. There were Nestorian as well as Catholic crusades for the recovery of the Holy Land. These same Christians were the most ardent supporters of the expansion of the Mongol Empire (they decided the battle of Legnica). 628 In Kipchak there were also Nestorian rulers, and the great Tartar Khanate fell because of the rivalry of Islam, Yassak (Mongolian) and Nestorianism; finally Buddhism was victorious in Mongolia and Islam in Kipchak. The Nestorians were imbued in Turanian civilisation and the Oygur culture, adopted from the “blue” Mongols. 629

At the Khan’s court, nomadic in summer, in winter at Saray, resided the permanent representative of Slavonic-Greek Orthodoxy, of the Metropolitan of “Kiev and all Ruthenia”, the so-called Bishop of Saray. It is a fact that at the Khan’s court Orthodoxy was not distinguished from Nestorianism and on the Orthodoxy side the error was never corrected. Nestorianism exerted considerable influence on this branch of Orthodoxy. Both faiths delight in the cult of St. Nicholas and points in the Orthodox marriage law for priests, the veal and other issues derive from Nestorianism.

Orthodoxy also stands from the point of view of civilisation close to Asiatic Christianity, 630 and historically is not Ruthenian and Russian culture closely associated with Mongol and Turanian civilisations in general? Moscow adopted her ideas of the State from the Mongols, her administration from the Tartars and from Kazan the customs of her upper classes (the tyremen, etc.). Orthodox building derives from the Asiatic East.

On the other hand, Byzantine influences on Ruthenian-Russian Orthodoxy were weak, and on its concepts of State and spiritual life more tenuous still. It is an error to include Muscovy in Byzantine civilisation. In Turkey there was incomparably more of Byzantium than in Russia.

The nest of Byzantine influences was Mount Athos, with all its monkish anarchy. Lavra Petcherska in Kiev, from which at the beginning of the twelfth century came the so-

628 In Poland in 1241. (Translator).
630 Associations going back to Gnosticism and Manichaecism, see Bogumił Jasinowski. “Wschodnie chrześcijaństwo a Rosja na tle rozboru pierwiastków cywilizacyjnych Wschodu a Zachodu”. Wilno 1933.
called Chronical of Nestor, was a daughter-house. This Chronicle played a decisive role in the breaking-off of relations with Rome and the spreading of an elemental hatred to Latinity. From Athos came the skoptsy [castrates]; the first appeared in Kiev in 1004, and afterwards there were skoptsy who were bishops.631

Everywhere in the East the moral element is subordinated to material strength. In Byzantium, this is linked with the attribution of superiority to form over content, and accompanied by a strong impulse to uniformity; Byzantinism does not understand unity without uniformity. The Eastern Church quite lost the ability to understand trends towards differentiation within the framework of unity (hence only one religious order, the Basilian). The universality of Christianity is also differently understood: Catholicism aims at it in the name of a basic objective, despite variety in details, whereas the Byzantines understand all universality only as uniformity, as the absolute dominance of a certain type which may even employ force to strengthen its ascendancy.

Uniformity cannot be maintained without compulsion, and compulsion belongs to the State. In consequence everything is permissible to the State. A man was a free citizen under the Byzantine Emperor in so far as the authority of the State allowed. Society had no say in face of the authority of the State.

The Byzantine schism was affected by all this. The Church adapted itself slavishly to Byzantine civilisation after it broke unity with Rome, after it ceased to be Catholic.

There was a time when Byzantine civilisation covered Europe, reaching as far as Spain. Then came a return wave washing away the traces (mainly thanks to the Cluniac reforms), but a considerable part of Germany remained under Byzantine influences and a Byzantine-German culture was formed. A manifestation of this was the attitude of the Emperors to the Pope, particularly in the Italian campaigns, the struggle over investiture and most of all the so-called “Reformation”. Protestantism introduced a Byzantine hegemony of the State over the Church, even to proclamation of the principle cuius regio illius religio. A further consequence was Josephinism. Even German Catholicism was infected. A stage was reached when the State was openly deified.632

The history of Protestantism is at several points bound up with the history of Orthodoxy. On several occasions they stood together against Catholicism. The influence of the Reformation reached deep into Metropolitan Kiev and Orthodoxy was thoroughly confused by the “novelties”. When later the wave of the Reformation ebbed, the gentry of the Ruthenian territories did not return to schism, but were converted to Catholicism. After this came the grafting of Latin civilisation on to Ruthenia, a process which stopped at the Lithuanian-Muscovite frontier. On the other side of the frontier, a printing-press was destroyed in Moscow as “a work of Satan”. The clergy exerted themselves to this end through “popular” disturbances, out of fear that they might be compelled to read printed books. And then raskol633 with the purpose not to correct errors in texts hitherto used by the Church, to cross oneself with two fingers, to write Isus instead of Jisus, and lastly to be or not to be clean-shaven.

A new period of Protestant influences on Orthodoxy began in 1698, with the germanization of official Russia. The Tsar proclaimed himself head of the Church, secularised much and introduced the German “Synod” with Oberprokurator. A Protestant form of

632 "Bizantynizm niemiecki" ("German Byzantinism" by Koneczny) in "Przegląd Powszechny", 1927.
633 A schism in the Russian Church in the 17th century which created a group of sects called Raskolniki, or Old-Believers. (Translators).
organisation was introduced into Orthodoxy, which theologically had nothing in common with Protestantism. An incurable dissonance necessarily developed.  

This series of facts shows that similarities and differences of faith even inside Christianity itself by no means bring in their train similarities or differences in civilisation. Theologically so close to Catholicism, Orthodoxy is, under the aspect of civilisation, even further from it than German Byzantinism. Nor does religious union mean a change in civilisation; religion is one thing and civilisation another.

Thus we see that Christianity does not constitute a kind of civilisation. If we compare the method of communal life of the Mongolian Nestorians, the Byzantines, the English and the French, we shall be hard put to it to find anything common to their civilisations.

The Byzantine Church determines civilisation to no small extent. In its canons there are fundamental ideas on the State and art. Byzantine Orthodoxy is from the point of view of civilisation closer to the Asiatic Churches than to the Catholic Church. From the point of view of religion how much closer to Catholicism is the Byzantine than the Calvinist, and yet if religion were as one with civilisation, the *katsap* from Tula gubernya must be closer to us in civilisation than the Vilno Calvinist.

In the branches of Oriental Christianity there are confessions, but there is no Monophysite, Nestorian, schismatic civilisation. Nestorianism shares the fate of Oygur, the Constantinople schism goes with Byzantine civilisation, and the Muscovy schism is rooted in Turanian civilisation. Eastern Christianity adapts itself to every kind of civilisation: the Christianity is as the civilisation is.

And now let us pass to Catholicism.

VII CATHOLICISM

The Gospels do not provide directives for the arrangement of communal life, and yet there is no department of existence in which appeal to them would be impossible. There is a complete absence in the New Testament of any prescription for the cultivation of learning and art, for the administration of a State, for safeguarding health or for setting about the struggle for prosperity; nor are there any rules for ordering one’s day, directives on food or drink or clothing and not a single directive on conduct in conjugal life. Of the quincunx of earthly being only one category is referred to in the Gospels, but this suffices for all, from the management of daily life to State institutions. As with a cloak, the Gospel wraps and protects everything in the category of the Good, in morality, ethics. In this category the New Testament provides plain signposts.

Almost at the end of the Middle Ages the theory of social economy was taken up in the Church against a background of search for the *justum pretium*, but as a supplement to scholastic philosophy as a whole and to the Church’s only indirectly, because cultivated by clergymen in the absence at that time of lay spokesmen. However no opinions put forward on the just price were derived from dogma nor were regarded as part of religion. When later Oresmius and Copernicus, both clergymen, produced their economic theses, neither made any claim to shelter behind the power of the Church. Something of these old discussions survived in tradition until modern times, when the issue between just profit and exploitation has involved all the pillars of the social structure. A number of recent Papal encyclicals crown

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634 "Dzieje Rosji od najdawniejszych do najnowszych czasów". (Shortened edition of a History of Russia, by Koneczny). Warsaw 1921.
this search for the just price. It is a fruit which has ripened in silence, but so wholly and
entirely that it may and even should be linked with the Papacy and so with the Church. All
these Papal pronouncements rest exclusively on Catholic ethics derived from the Gospels and
do not go beyond them. The rest is left to reason supported by the ethics of the Gospel.

Even the truths of the faith may be examined in the light of reason. The Church herself
founded those theological faculties where religious issues are examined. With reasoning
permissible in matters of a supernatural order, a free hand is accorded investigators of the
natural world.

Without establishing a sacral civilisation, Catholicism does nevertheless contain
within itself strong all-round civilising influences. The evidence of this is everywhere, in the
history of art, in the history of philosophy and of so many branches of learning, in the
consideration of everything that is human; everywhere and in everything Catholicism
implants ethical elements.

The most important thing is that the Church derives law from ethics. In the Gospels
there is no law at all, whether private or public. In the Church there has never been a shortage
of lawyers, but canon law is limited to matters pertaining to and strictly connected with the
Church, and moreover law must develop beside, but not in the Church. This is expressed in
the time-honoured technical term according to which law was not and is not sacral among
Catholics, is not possessed of a religious character. There is a link with Roman civilisation,
for it was among the Romans that law first ceased to be sacral. The Church accepted this state
of affairs, giving the faithful a free hand in the secular development of law.

There exists, it is true, the Catholic question *de civitate Dei*, and Catholic philosophy
has devoted much labour to the investigation of what a Christian society and State should be
— but the Church has never selected the forms of any State or community in order to identify
herself with them and to condemn others. And such investigation is always based on ethics
and not directly on dogmatics.

On ethical grounds the Church rejected the old Roman State system, although it
adopted much from Roman and in general from classical civilisation. Scholastic and neo-
scholastic philosophy was based on Aristotle. The classical world from Aristotle to Boethius
looked out through Catholicism as if restored. This Church saved this civilisation — on what a
scale may be observed by walking through the Vatican Museum. She tended or allowed to
be tended various of its features on the sole condition that not a crumb of her religious matter
was thereby lost. Neither in doctrine nor ethics did she ever adapt herself to the classical
world, nor did she provide occasion for any *dvoyevyerye* [double faith]; and she has never
taken part in efforts at so-called religious syntheses.635 Very many Roman concepts and
institutions suffered rejection.

Nevertheless the Church herself created the civilisation of Catholic Europe, and all
admit that she “brought up the nations”. She evolved a Christian-classical civilisation. She
saved at Vivarium and Monte Cassino whatever of the classical spirit could be reconciled
with the ethics of the Gospels, and a very strong civilisational combination emerged; but it
was the combination of a Catholicism unreduced and uncompromising with a classicism cut
according to Catholic ideas. Thus arose the Christian-classical civilisation which we may call
briefly Latin. The Church created this civilisation, and yet is not identified with it, is not
confined to it. She does not press it upon any of the newly-converted peoples.

Let us take as an example a civilisation which is outstanding and entirely distinct, the
Chinese, as it were the opposite pole to the Latin. Learned missionaries have long laboured in
China for the intellectual benefit not of Latin but emphatically of Chinese civilisation. In the,
catalogue of Chinese books published in Chinese by the Jesuit Fathers in the years 1584-1684

635 "Rzekome syntezy religijne" ("So-called religious syntheses", by Koneczny) in "Przegląd Powszechny",
1930.
there are more than fifty treatises on astronomy and philosophy. The Jesuit Adam Schall (died 1669) reformed the Chinese calendar.\textsuperscript{636} And now there is a summons to China for “a master of one of the art schools, so that he may become acquainted on the spot with the art of Eastern Asia and create a suitable Eastern-Asiatic church style”,\textsuperscript{637}

It is known that there exists a Chinese and Japanese and even an Annamite indigenous Catholic hierarchy; there are even local Trappists.\textsuperscript{638} Do these converts abandon the civilisation to which they belonged before? Is Latin civilisation imposed on them? On the contrary, as the Church once treated classical civilisation, so she treats all, ready to take under her wings everything which can be reconciled with the demands of Catholic ethics. How characteristic in this regard are some remarks by Father Peter Charles S.J., in which we read the following words, both wise and lofty:

“It is possible that there near Mandalay (in Upper Burma) or in Ku-ling (in the Chinese province of Kiangsi) you have prepared for us, Lord, a great Christian theologian, who will give us a spiritual exposition of the Sermon on the Mount and teach us the most elevated method of prayer. After all, was it not once very improbable that Tagasta would produce Saint Augustine? Could anyone have imagined that to translate the Holy Bible you would summon a Dalmatian (Saint Jerome) or that an unprepossessing little Jew from Tarsus in Qlicia would be the apostle of the nations? Was Plato closer to You than Sakyamuni? And yet Plato was useful to Christianity and the Catholic philosophy of St. Thomas rests on Aristotle”.\textsuperscript{639}

Catholicism is also the most philosophical of religions; to understand it adequately no slight degree of philosophical training is necessary. It is the only learned religion. The high standing of Catholicism grew out of the cultivation of learning, as the decline of Eastern Christianity came from its ignorance. Catholicism is the religion of the intellect.

In recent year (1925) the worthy Dr. Aleksander Żychliński, made this point in plain terms: “True Catholic culture does not consist in a certain sum of information from the catechism, nor in certain religious practices, not even in the reading of religious books. Catholic culture is rather the firmly grounded and thoroughly thought-out Catholic view of the world, giving effective orientation to the whole moral life of a man”.\textsuperscript{640}

Is Catholicism a religion of the intellect only? What of feeling? But I am not in favour of emotional discussion of emotion, and I pass at once to the place of emotion in religion. There is no doubt that, the simpleton sometimes understands — and better than the wise man — the reality of Christianity. We explain this by feeling, thus explaining one unknown by another. We shall be helped by a comparison of Catholicism with religions of a lower type, by an examination of ordinary life against religious background. The history of Catholicism is a history of the constant curtailment of ritual and formality; formalism retreats into an increasingly distant background and diminishes steadily in quantity. According to our ideas, the religious life is an inner life. In view of this, ethics is based in the first place not on the act itself but on the intention behind the act. This subtlety is not found except in Western Christianity. It may very well be that this concept of intention will bring new “barbarians” to the Church without the least loss to her.

**Catholicism is a religion of intellect and intention.** Here are two capital means of “sanctification” — both possible in more than one civilisation, but neither themselves constituting one.

\textsuperscript{636} "Misje Katolickie’. 1925, p. 504.
\textsuperscript{637} "Misje Katolickie’, 1927, p. 187.
\textsuperscript{638} "Misje Katolickie’, 1927, pp. 52, 54, 55.
\textsuperscript{639} „Misje Katolickie”, 1927, pp. 6-8.
Catholic ethics have been mentioned here several times. Let us consider concretely and from a strictly secular viewpoint what that ethic means for all the civilisations summoned alike to place themselves in the common sheep-fold. Collecting and critically examining facts from the history of societies as well as of the Church itself and from missionary memoirs of various countries of the world, I have become convinced that this question can be put briefly, clearly and also with complete accuracy, thus:

In communal life Catholic ethics everywhere introduce four postulates, always the same and from the beginnings to the present day identical for all kinds and levels of civilisation. Four wedges are driven into every civilisation: life-long monogamous marriage; pressure for the abolition of slavery; abolition of revenge which is entrusted to a public judicature; finally, the Church’s independence of the State, to prevent dependence by the spiritual factor on physical power. The thesis of the basic superiority of spiritual over material power was enriched, thanks to the Cluniac school, by an ethical superstructure, according to which in certain cases material power must be resisted in the name of spiritual. Is not this the climax of Latin civilisation, the thought of greatest genius to which man has attained?

These four postulates exert an enormous influence on every civilisation. Life-long monogamy raises the position of woman to such an extent that the aim of equal rights is a simple consequence, strongly supported by the Church. This brings changes in family and inheritance law, different views on family and home. And the Church insists on this postulate firmly and radically: she does not give baptism to anybody who refuses consent to it. Monogamy is introduced at once, without delay.

But no missionary abolishes slavery at once. Long tolerated — right into the Middle Ages — it was nevertheless subjected to increasing restriction, so that in Catholic Europe by the ninth century slaves had to be brought from a distance, the trade being confined to Jews, until finally it was not permissible for a Christian to acquire a slave from a Jew. A slow and gradual process was indicated out of concern for the good of the slaves. We have seen the social disorder created by the Young Turks when they abolished slavery radically and at once. It had to remain “on paper”, for where would the slave get his daily bread if he were exposed to expulsion from the family in which his father and grandfather had found their keep?

The endeavour to abolish slavery lies in nuce in St. Paul’s declaration “If any man will not work, neither let him eat”. Not everybody is capable of intellectual work, and equally, not everybody of physical; but the ancients despised the physical. The pronouncement by the apostle of the nations implies a moral obligation to work; it enriches ethics with a new postulate, since work — obligatory in the interest of public morality — becomes an ethical ordinance. A man unsuited to work with his intellect fulfils the ethical requirement by physical work. And since such work has entered the field of ethics, since it has become an ethical activity, it accordingly becomes worthy of respect. Not only the slave may devote himself to it; physical work no longer shames a free man.

It is worth reflecting whether we do not have here the secret of the development of handicrafts, and subsequently of all that we call technique. And did not the classical world remain at a low level of technical development — although it did not lack scientific inventions — because it loaded with contempt the physical labour from which techniques could have emerged? It appears to me that St. Paul is the father of invention. There would have been no “epoch of great discoveries” without respect for the manual worker.

The missionary is as heavily engaged in the struggle against revenge as in the struggle against polygamy. Here is neither the place nor time to raise doubts on the advisability of this radicalism; I only allow myself the observation that missionaries do not realise that what is involved is not normal killing and murder but the fulfilment of a serious ethical postulate — according to the reasoning of the peoples concerned.
Abolishing revenge, the Church must aim at a public judicature and so at the beginnings of government. There is thus no factor more creative of States than the Catholic Church, while the princely court of law is fundamental to State-making. But do not let us imagine that it is easy to convince a chieftain that he ought to become a judge. Everywhere — and in Europe — the position was surely much the same as in Kiev in 996.

The Bishops wanted Prince Vladimir to introduce the office of criminal judge. For the Byzantine Greeks and Bulgarians occupying Church offices in the newly-converted country it was a barbarity that murders, husband-murder and even robberies were left to the private law krivina. They represented, therefore, to Vladimir that it was his duty to pursue and punish criminals simply by the strength of his authority, on behalf of the State, and that they ought to be punished even if only by outlawry. The theory of State courts was, however, quite incomprehensible to the baptised Kiev kagan. Having just taught him “Thou shalt not kill” now they were ordering him to do just that. He did not feel injured, why then was he to revenge himself? He did not feel himself to be a representative of the people’s interests, in this case of the safety of their lives and property, and so did not feel any obligations. Generations were needed before this was understood. Tradition puts into Vladimir’s mouth a significant reply to the bishops’ proposition: “I fear a sin”. And when the bishops decided for the time being to stop, provided at least brigandage was made punishable in court, the prince agreed, but immediately incurred the disfavour of the elders. He therefore summoned a joint conference of ecclesiastical and lay notabilities, at which a compromise resolution was passed. For robbery there was to be vira (a fine, which the Vargengians brought from Scandinavia), but since it was to be a princely court, the vira would be due not to the injured party but to the princely treasury. In this way the bishops saved the principle that the State imposes punishment for crime — for the time being at least for robbery, as the worst of crimes. But this compromise theoretical position was only a cover for the bishops’ defeat. For as the prince did not pursue robbers and did not even appoint any servant for the purpose, how could he extract vira! Practice also followed the old road — “and Vladimir acted according to the customs of his father and grandfather” — as the Chronicle of Nestor assures us.641

Exaction of revenge by the clan was a duty, decisive for its honour; clans do not easily allow themselves to be deprived of the right to honour. Corsica and the Balkans have enjoyed this expression of natural ethics for a very long time. So let us not be surprised that among coloured neophytes opposition is customarily the more determined the more it comes from a big misunderstanding. The Church combats this radically, and thereby impels converted communities towards statehood, that is, to devise institutions of government. In more than one part of the globe, the genesis of a State is attributable to Christian missions.

The fourth point of Catholic ethics, regularly inculcated by the Church throughout the world, is her independence of the secular power. This enters deep into issues of public law; I shall therefore leave it for the place in the next chapter where it will be proper to speak of the relation of various civilisations to private and public law. In the questions which have been raised so far, only private law has been involved; the question of revenge also has a root in private law, whence there are efforts to pull it into the public sphere.

VIII SUMMARY

If religion were simultaneously civilisation, there would be as many civilisations as there are religions. But history shows how a certain religion, being universal, may spread to

various civilisations and how, on the contrary, a certain civilisation may contain adherents of various religions. The terms Christian, Moslem, Buddhist civilisation are simple expressions of current speech without importance for science — as is also the expression European civilisation (there are four civilisations in Europe).

Civilisations are not ordered according to religion, but it cannot be doubted that religion is everywhere the most important part of civilisation, since it exerts an enormous influence on abstract concepts. How significant it is that the Chinese (and the Japanese) are commonly reproached with a lack of capacity for abstraction! It may be related with the fact that the whole of Chinese civilisation is a-religious.

Even the lowest of religions has an abstract side, since it contains a system embracing the attitude of the natural to the supernatural world. The very recognition of a supernatural world must lead to the formation of abstract concepts. Every religion, even Shamanism, is concerned with the action of spiritual forces among material forces, and with the exercise of influence on matter in the name of spirit. This tendency may appear in caricature, as among the Shamans, the Jains and Tantrists, but some rudiment of it exists. Implicitly it also contains a conviction of the superiority of the supernatural world. Every religion wants to bring something from that world to earth, in order to perfect earthly life by instilling into it something of the other-worldly. In every religion there is an impulse towards the spiritualisation of life.

But examining this common characteristic more closely, we notice enormous differences in methods of formulation, and in consequence a very dissimilar relation between religions and civilisations. Here the inequality of religions becomes glaringly apparent. The thesis of the equality of religions was born under “enlightened absolutism”, and then became a fundamental tenet of liberalism; it has permeated almost all legislation since the middle of the nineteenth century, and to the present day constitutes one of the certainties of the average “intellectual”. It is a crowning error, and perhaps nowhere more forcibly felt than in the study of civilisation. If religions were in principle equal to each other, they would in principle influence civilisations identically; differences of quantity, not quality would arise.

The ideal of a religion calling forth the fulness of life was the dream of Egyptian priests, and then of the strongest heads in Hellenistic civilisation. They dreamed of a synthesis of two or even of several religions, they tried an artificial religion to help in the attainment of higher levels of civilisation and to unite peoples. But the experiment of Ptolemy I of Egypt and of his son-in-law Lysimach of Thrace, then also ruling in Phrygia, failed. Tymoteus Eumolpida of Eleusis, reformer of the cults of Isida and Attis, was summoned from Greece. Serapis was transformed into Zeus and there was an attempted synthesis of Hellenistic and Asiatic beliefs, the Asiatic element being reduced where opportunity offered. The subjects of the Diadochs were said to accept this synthesis, and outwardly it was accepted, but constant additions drawn from all hands in the interest of the development of the synthesis resulted in unworthy and debasing absurdities. Ptolemy and Timoteus of Eleusis wanted to provide a ready developed civilisation with a religion “suitable” to perpetuate and elevate it — but the result was the opposite. They supposed that as civilisation is stronger than religion, the latter would lend itself to adjustment — which in reality does happen; but religion can never be artificially created.

Then the first Ghengis Khan, Temuchin, tried to found a political religion for the generality of his State. The title Sutu Bogdo adopted by him in 1189 means no less than incarnation of god. Nestorian and Buddhist influences mingled in this religion of the “luminous hind”. But the idea was a failure, and the universal Mongol State disintegrated later.

642 The continuity of certain abstractions from Gnosticism and Manichacism to Dostoyevsky is affirmed by Jasinowski, op. cit
precisely for religious reasons, on account of the struggle between Islam, Mongol Yassak and Nestorianism. In the end even Kipchak (Eurasia from the Yenisei to the Don) fell because of Islamic, Mongolian “Yassak” and Nestorian rivalry. On this occasion religions proved stronger than civilisations.

Dreams of a synthesis of religions have not been lacking down to contemporary Hitlerism’s testing of its strength in the workshop of artificial religion. The question thus arises whether religion creates civilisation, or civilisation religion.

We have seen how certain civilisations developed Buddhism — and Islam also — entirely after their own fashion, and adapted to their needs; we have seen how Buddhism may even become polytheist, and Islam in India contribute to an increase in the number of gods; we have learned that Coptic and Abyssinian Christianity shamed the Cross. And alongside these is Catholicism, creating the splendid Latin civilisation and raising all those with which it comes in contact by its four ethical postulates for the organisation of communal life.

Religions are thus most unequal in their relation — passive and active — to civilisations. Religions close to one another theologically may be in opposite camps where civilisation is concerned, for instance Catholicism and the Byzantine schism; but, on the other hand, adherents of religions theologically foreign to each other may belong to the same civilisation. If religion were one with civilisation then a katsap from Tula would of necessity be closer to us in civilisation than the Vilno Calvinist. Between Orthodox and Catholic on Polish territory the division in civilisation amounted to a precipice, but has anybody noticed a division in civilisation between the Catholic and the Evangelical in the Duchy of Cieszyn?

On the subject of religious interference in civilisation, Islam interferes more than Christianity as a whole, and incomparably more than Catholicism; but this is true only of the old school which considers that a true believer is allowed only what the Koran explicitly permits. On the other hand, a second school, asserting that everything which the Koran does not explicitly forbid is permitted, gives to communal life an almost Christian freedom, at least in principle. Such men were always in a minority in the Moslem world, but there were and are such. In either case the Moslem receives considerably more numerous religious directives in the sphere of civilisation than the Catholic.

If a test of religion were to be religious legislation in matters of health, the struggle for existence, learning, art, government, if that were to constitute the ideal of religion, then the Brahmin and the Jewish would stand highest, for both create whole civilisations on an exclusively religious basis.

There are thus sacral, semi-sacral, and non-sacral civilisations. Since “by their fruits you shall know them”, let us consider the consequences of massive interference by religion in civilisation. State institutions among Jews and Hindus came to a standstill at a very elementary level, and the two peoples have revealed a total incapacity to create States of any size. Even their material culture was acquired by Jews from the Gentiles, and among adherents of Brahmins to this day only a few in every thousand are not beggars. In their thousands of years of history the Jews have written few pages in the intellectual development of the nations, and those thanks to a retreat from sacralism “among the nations”. It is only in the last generation that Hindus have taken up educational work.

In sacral civilisations religion acts as a brake on progress. A religion which defines everything in categories of being must at the same time petrify everything, and in consequence its adherents are often helpless in face of new currents emerging in the process of time. Where everything is established a priori, where there is no doubt and no inquiry, progress is excluded and instead there is danger of stagnation. The Jews saved their civilisation thanks only to their departure from Palestine and the introduction into religion of a

geographical relativity. The Hindus, on the other hand, constitute a classic example of complete helplessness.

Of the considerable civilisations, I regard two only as certainly sacral. The Tibetan is doubtful. We know that it is a theocracy, but not its departments or scale of operation. The ruling class is the clergy, but does the social organisation possess no autonomy? What kind of clan is there, and what kind of clan law do they have with their polyandry? And what of the triple law, concepts of property, and the property and inheritance law? These are unknowns, and until the gaps are filled, it is not possible to discuss this civilisation. Unfortunately, travellers and missionaries prefer to specialise in accounts of wedding and funeral rites, and in the externals of life generally, in the belief that they are engaged in serious study: it is a rare bird among them who pays attention to the fundamental matters I have mentioned. It may be that Tibetan civilisation is semi-sacral, like the Arabic.

The magnitude of the fall of the Moslem peoples, which rouses the astonishment of scholars, was due to the cramping effect of an Islam unequal to the problems of historical development; for the Moslem, at the most involved moments of his history, religion ceased to be the lever of life. The highest cultures in Arabic civilisation, the Baghdad and the Cordoban, sometimes leant outside Islam, whence came a split between the higher and lower classes, which often developed into a conflict dividing society and destroying State institutions. In Turanian civilisation, on the other hand, Islam encouraged Turanian camp-mindedness but nothing else and the wild remained wild.

It amounts to this, that sacral-type civilisations do arise, but the type is inferior. Identity of civilisation and religion leads to under-development of civilisation; in such over-close association standstill must be reached. Thus the power of religion’s influence on civilisation is apparent; power no less than that of language. As an imperfect language in the end checks the development of a civilisation, in the same way — but to an even greater extent — religion of an inferior order will help to bring civilisation to a standstill. Significantly, only inferior religions produce out of themselves sacral civilisations. The higher the level of a religion the less of the sacral it imposes on communal life.
CHAPTER VIII

ATTEMPTED SYSTEMATIZATION

I PROVISO

We have followed numerous lines of investigation using very various materials. With what result? To what extent have these inquiries served to uncover the causes of the variety of civilisations? We have, so far only investigated those manifestations of life resulting from blood relationship and the triple law bound up with it. It is true we have valuable pointers where the thread of the matter must next be sought: examination of the problem of relation of religion to civilisation has just brought us to the question of public law and so to a new theme, the relation of society and State. But let us first sum up.

We have seen how the attitude of man to fire became the differentiating factor par excellence. Who can say whether more peoples will not be discovered who are unable even to kindle fire, or among whom the keeping of a fire is the exclusive privilege of authority? After all we do not know the interior of Borneo or of Australia, and many peoples are known simply “by sight”. Information even on the triple law is extremely inexact in the case of the great majority of the peoples of the earth. Our knowledge in this field resembles a sieve, of which it can be said that it is made of holes. It is thus not easy to decide upon a systematization of civilisations, the more so that a second element of difficulty inherent in the very nature of the subject enters in.

For does the triple law develop in straight lines? In reality the outlines are often less distinct, with one feature sometimes obscuring another, as in a mixture. Life has more combinations than learning can digest schemes. But wishing to keep to the paths of science, we must arrange the material under certain heads, striving to systematize, and that despite complete awareness that the result can only be a sketch requiring constant correction which will surely be forthcoming as monographs on the various detailed problems begin to appear.

It is impossible to avoid the questions: what civilisations there are, how many there are and in what their essential differences consist. But as with races, the inquirer must answer the question “when?”.

Every epoch has its civilisations — some older, dating from the previous epoch and some newly emerging. For example, Chinese civilisation still flourishes, ancient Egyptian has completely disappeared. Nor is the number of civilisations constant — they can only be counted in a chronological framework. The question thus arises whether the number of civilisations is increasing or decreasing as a majority of the peoples of the earth attain higher levels.

As with races and languages, once there were more civilisations than today. The more primitive conditions, the narrower the territory which suffices for a separate system of communal life, but also the less permanent they are. How many civilisations have been lost because their systems proved unsuited to wider development we shall never know. There are
unsuccessful, choked civilisations incapable of reaching higher levels, lacking the conditions
to evolve any tradition or to get round the feature which forces them to a standstill. There are
also those which are condemned from the first to stagnate in their primitiveness: it is not easy
to describe them, particularly as among primitive peoples there is no uniformity in either
situation or opinions.

But it is not possible to achieve definition even of undoubtedly historic civilisations of
which only fragments remain. Here and there one finds survivals of the great dark civilisation
of ancient Egypt, which reach to the Pamir and are for us today a real revelation. But the
discovery of a stray fragmentary survival cannot tell us even approximately to what extent the
influence of ancient Egyptian civilisation was felt in Central Asia. Did there exist an entire
culture of this civilisation, or have we only caught hold of an imported item without real
significance? What is to be said of the disjecta membra of Etruscan civilisation? Or of the
Phoenician? Or the Tokharian, recently dug out of the desert sands of Eastern Turkestan?
Could anyone, in the present state of our knowledge, describe Tokharian triple law or even
explain whether it was a distinct civilisation or perhaps only a culture of the Turanian
(although their language was apparently Indo-European)? Does Turanian thus go back to
distant times or was it created only towards the end of the classical centuries, or perhaps even
later? How much is known of the civilisation called Minusinsk, a civilisation of an
agricultural people in the Altai-Sayan region? And it is only now that we are beginning to get
our bearings in the redskin’s civilisations of Peru and Mexico.

There is thus a great probability that further archaeological discoveries will add to the
question marks. Numerous and considerable gaps in our knowledge mean that the time has
not yet come for definitive systematization. But a modest sketch may be undertaken on a
limited scale. For it would of course be impossible to bring in every civilisation, since so
much in them is unknown territory. The unavoidable necessity of limiting oneself to the few
better known may be a useful lesson in humility.

It should be borne in mind that this sketch is made because the advance of knowledge
requires that some kind of order should be introduced into the material of the scientific
heritage at this time. In the history of every science there are these stages of systematization.
Although the process is never finally complete and settled, there is no plainer criterion of the
state of a given science than the systematization of its branches. It is impossible to argue
whether such systematization is an essential part of science or only a means of getting one’s
bearings; but it is certain that without systematization no science is capable of emerging from
swaddling clothes.

It is indeed a fact that in all manifestations of life reality is rarely in complete harmony
with the scientific account of it, but nobody draws the conclusion that there should be an end
to the cultivation of science. The margin of disagreement between the scientific account and
the reality is increased because science always inclines to simplify its arguments, to generalise
on the least possible number of types, scientifically described and classified and allegedly of a
superior order. The higher the science climbs, the fewer such types it counts. There is always
incomparably more diversity in life than in a book. And yet... And yet although we know that
(classical) mechanics requires numerous and sometimes considerable corrections in practical
application — when, for example, it is a question of building a boat or a power-station,
nevertheless we also know for certain that the best sailor or fitter will not build them, because
they are not familiar with the theory.

Scientific systems do not necessarily give an entirely adequate picture of life, but
despite this they are indispensable for a proper sense of direction, knowledge of where one is
going — and in order that life may be controlled and directed according to human
possibilities. For although the system is rarely exactly identical with the reality, reality
without system is even more rarely comprehensible.
With these reservations, I proceed to tentative systematization. I can only deal with the best known civilisations, but in all likelihood these civilisations, great and more studied, offer a sufficient basis for argument, useful *mutatis mutandis* for the smaller and secondary also. Provided we can reach certain guiding principles, the basic features of a systematization, it will be easier for us afterwards to correct and supplement it. Basic lines always keep their value for the continued development of the study of civilisation.

We shall thus chiefly consider features of the systems for the organisation of communal life which are contemporary to us. I exclude Tibetan civilisation from further argument, because it is too little investigated. An experimental field is provided by the seven main civilisations in existence today — Jewish, Brahmin, Chinese, Turanian, Arabic, Byzantine and Latin; others will serve here and there to supplement conclusions arising in the course of discussion.

## II CONTROL OF TIME

Examination of the relation of religions to civilisations did not produce only negative results. While it proved that religions do not cause the variety of civilisations, at the same time a bridge appeared between associations of a higher order and supra-tribal associations. Suddenly the horizon of our observations broadened far beyond the triple law and high above it. And we reached higher because raised by the abstract inherent in the very problem of religion, from whatever angle it is examined. It was sufficient to touch the theme to be forced into the land of abstractions. For the first time in the argument of this book appeared the concepts of society, State, nation. Let us use the bridge and continue on the path indicated.

In the opening chapters it at once fell to be stated that progress is more dependent on abstractions than on material factors; moreover it proved that abstract ideas direct matter. Without abstract ideas physical matters would often come to a standstill. For man educated himself on abstractions, and as this can already be seen in prehistory, as prehistory escapes in this way from the materialist presentation of history, its application to historical time and moreover to high levels of development remains to be shown.

The progress of abstract ideas may be said to begin with the development of the concept of time. We touched upon the question of time in Chapter II, at the end of the section devoted to prehistoric economy. There we stopped at measurements of time based on phenomena of nature. Even the cycle may subsist at a very low level of civilisation, like the burning of the tacuara in the Brazilian forests, which leads the cabocio to observe cycles of approximately thirty years. The cycle most widespread in the world — of sixty years — emerged theoretically in China long ages ago, at a still relatively low level in the development of Chinese civilisation, and thence it spread to Korea, Mongolia and Tibet. Among the Mongols it was still known in the old form as late as the seventeenth century.645

Measures of time resting on deliberate inquiry, and so on scientific foundations, lead to the calendar. But actual possession of a calendar does not constitute proof that the people concerned acquired a superior grasp of time, and so increased their ability for abstraction. It might have seemed that the calendar, creating awareness of the growth of the years, must by simple logic lead to the era. But it was not so — neither the ancient Egyptians nor the Chinese possessed or possess the era. Indication of the passage of time by dynasties is after all child’s play. But the Hindus have no idea of any chronology, and European scholars regard themselves as “orientated” when they can limit their chronological doubts on things Hindu to

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between five and eight centuries — and that in the epoch contemporary with our Middle Ages, not in dark ages. How careful about the calendar were (and are) the Jews — what careful and subtle calculations when the “new moon” will appear in Jerusalem over the Temple and when on the neighbouring hills; but they did not invent the era for themselves, and Biblical scholars have perhaps no less difficulty with chronology than the Hindu scholars. The Fifty-year jubilee sacral cycle was not adopted, while they only invented the era of the creation of the world in Roman times, in order to show how much more ancient they were than those for whom it was sufficient to reckon “from the foundation of the city”. The Maya peoples were also outstanding as calendologists, and employed an exact chronological order; but in the present state of research it is hard to say whether they knew the era.

As the calendar does not everywhere lead to the era, so the era does not necessarily lead to historical awareness. It is impossible to do without these rungs, but it is possible not to make use of them and to go no higher. Invention of the era (even if by imitation) did not provide the Jews with the historical instinct, did not and still has not made them even historically aware. Similarly deprived of the sense of history is Arabic civilisation, although it has the era (hedżhra). Adoption of Islam (together with the hedżhra) by a considerable sector of Turanian civilisation did nothing to bring these peoples closer to history; for instance Turkey was always without the historical instinct. For this the memory of certain events is not enough. Even the Malagasy can indicate time according to “when Queen Rasuherin travelled among the Betsile” or “when the French came here”,646 but he has no means of telling when Rasuherin ruled, when the French appeared. The tradition of facts without chronology is nothing; even chronology itself is only a distant prelude.

Historic consciousness in a society and the drawing by it of the conclusions which follow, is a peak in the development of the relation of man to time. Only one of the ancient civilisations attained this peak, namely the Roman, and it handed on this heritage to those societies which are the heirs of Roman civilisation. And so even the era may be no more than a measurement of time, differing from the day or month only quantitatively, not qualitatively. It is some other factor which introduces the qualitative difference.

The issue is control of time, as nature and space are controlled. Does not the measurement of distance by time, practised even at very primitive levels, contain a “fourth measure of space”? It is an excellent auxiliary means for the control of space; but a given area can only be regarded as under control when a man may go in any direction according to a decision taken beforehand, and return from any point by a road determined in advance. Here the crude empiricism is not enough; there must be an awareness of directions, and that requires that a certain place be regarded as a starting point; the relation of the sectors of a given area to every point within it must be known. But with the increased control of space resulting from man’s inventions, muscle-power counts for less, and spiritual forces gain increasing preponderance — and command of the physical. However, control of nature or space never represents reinforcement for ethics; of the spiritual forces in this field only the intellect derives advantage. In all intellectual activity morality is raised only indirectly, in so far as “all is connected with all”. It is in any case not difficult but increasingly easy to recognise in the development of control over space the development of abstract concepts also.

Control of space has more than one point in common with control of time. As one consists in being able freely and deliberately to move about a fixed space through places fixed in advance, so control of time consists in something which can be dependent on human will happening in accordance with one’s intention, in the fraction of time fixed for it. The ruler of time divides and spaces it along the paths of his life as he wills. A date is to time what a goal is in space, and is the criterion of the degree of control over time. For it is this which becomes

646 Father Beyzym, "Letters", op. cit, p. 94
the scaffolding of tradition, through which development of the historical sense takes place. But we must understand that it is possible to know how to forecast an eclipse of the sun and not to know how to control time and to remain entirely passive in face of it.

By fixing a date man limits his freedom and marks a stage in his self-control. Control of time thus exercises the will, fertilises the intellect and develops creative spiritual power. It is the road along which to become master of one’s life. The fixing of a date must lead to efforts to save time. Thus the more intelligently fixed dates there are in a man’s scheme of life, the easier it is to achieve multiple use of time through constant saving of it. Such a person comes to capitalise time (I believe the expression will be accepted).

The number of degrees in the control of time is uncounted, but in failure to control it relatively not so large. If we could discover some measuring instrument on the model of the thermometer, below zero there would be few degrees, but above zero many. Let us look for examples below zero in various parts of the world. Passing over “savages” like the Malagasys among whom time cannot be lost because for them it has the value of last year’s snow for us, let us look higher, to the Arabs, the Hindus and to Kamchatka. Colonel Lawrence, the famous English agent of the First World War, says interestingly of the Arabs, whom he knew well. “They seemed to have no unit of time smaller than the half-day, or of distance between the span and the stage; and a stage might be from six to sixteen hours according to the man’s will and camel.”

It is no better in India, where Le Bon satisfied himself of the complete insensitivity of the Hindu to time. After the building of the railways they would arrive at the station two or three hours after the train had left, and now they arrive the same amount too early. Even those educated at European universities are never punctual; nobody ever presents himself exactly on time, whereas there is not an unpunctual Englishman in India. And it has been said of Petropavlovsk, capital of Kamchatka, that it is “surrounded as it were by a curtain of disorder, sloth and muddle. Time has no value. What a man does today he could do equally well tomorrow, the day after tomorrow or in a year’s time. And herein lies the greatest danger for a European. Slowly, inexorably, in course of time he grows muddled — and in my opinion somebody who has spent ten years here is lost to civilisation and is incapable of any real work.” The Chinese scholar Ku-Hung-Ming, speaking of the turgidity of Chinese historical tales, uses these words: “Only Chinese mentality, which entirely ignores time, can compose and remember such stories”. And for an example of the opposite case, let us take a country with a very highly developed control of time, Sweden, where “throughout the land the cult of the watch reigns”.

Between these countries do there not arise diametrical differences in absolutely everything, with Sweden on one side and China, Russia, India, Arabia on the other? For these are differences in civilisation, and very great ones, differences confirmed by consideration of time.

The degree to which opinions may differ on the relation of man to time may be learned from the Argentine Creole who declared in the presence of a Polish traveller: “People from Europe are very strange, it is never possible to understand them. Even the simple Polish and German colonists who come here are very strange; they work a dozen or more hours a day in

651 Ku-Hung-Ming, op. cit, p. 149.
order, as they often repeat, that their children may have property. We do not understand that. Our children manage for themselves”. 653

This example leads us to the fundamental difference in the consequences between control of space and of time. Despite many analogies, the basic difference lies in the fact that ethics develops only with control of time, which provides it with new departments — evidence that morality is by no means without the capacity for development and progress. Entire ethical spheres are incomprehensible to people not knowing how to control time. In the interests of time-saving there emerge diligence, resource, thrift, circumspection, thought for the future and finally, consciousness of duly towards the succeeding generation. People looking further than their own deaths, and carrying out the duties of life quicker than others, make progress possible, for they permit their descendants to begin at the point they have themselves managed to reach in their lives. The result is a willing readiness for sacrifice in the interest of persons dear to the heart, growth of feeling, ennoblement of thought and deed.

After the historical sense, altruism is the other crown of the work of conquering time, bringing forth new flowers in this ground. There is a wide field of application for controlled time in sociology, in economics, in pedagogy, in almost all branches of existence — which is, however, outside our immediate theme. On the relation of human affairs to time and their dependence on the degree to which it is controlled a large book could be written.

A man content to measure time is quite different from one who does not know how to control it and both are different from one who does. These are not degrees but different kinds of civilisation. The abstract concept of time is higher than that of space, has a deeper influence on systems of communal life and the power of differentiating civilisations.

But how is this accomplished? What do we know about the question of time in relation to human existence? In recent years at least a considerable philosophical movement has developed round the idea of time, but it has not yet entered the awareness of scholars of other professions, and no other branch of knowledge draws conclusions from it. I consider that in this problem lies one of the deepest secrets of being — perhaps even the deepest, but at present it cannot be used to learn about civilisation, which would require a considerably higher development of our knowledge of time. For the moment it is only possible to indicate the connection between the subjects, admitting that in fact the present section is really a continuation of the preceding, and making all the necessary reservations.

If one were to summon up one’s courage and allow oneself to be, led into a draft systematisation of civilisations according to the time issue, it would prove that Latin civilisation alone possesses the historical sense.

Let us add the curious observation of the philologists that in languages of the higher levels of civilisation more space is devoted in the dictionaries than at lower levels to the concept of time. Thus since the Japanese language does not possess temporal conjunctions, 654 it carries within it the germ of stagnation. Have European experts on the language anything to say?

### III PRIVATE AND PUBLIC LAW

Searching for features which differentiate civilisations, we shall keep to the procession of abstract ideas, watching to see which of them possess most influence on supra-tribal human associations. The road to large associations opened before us when we were considering the

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654 Berr in Vendryes, op. cit. Preface XXVI.
relation of religions to civilisations, and so in contact with the abstract — and we shall not now leave this road.

I have raised this question of time at the beginning because, for want of appropriate research and information, it stands as it were on one side (like the question of polyandry in discussion of family law) and cannot be used in further argument. It is to be hoped that this gap will be remedied as quickly as possible, but for the moment there is no help for it; so it seemed to me the most sensible way out to treat time entirely separately.

And now let us return to the matter of the kinds of relation between religion and civilisation. There are cases in which it is possible to describe a civilisation exactly through religion and through religion alone; for there are those which consist entirely in religious rules. Undoubtedly civilisations divide primarily into sacral and non-sacral. In the case of the sacral, acquaintance with the religion suffices to reveal the civilisation by force of logic. On the other hand, the matter is highly complicated in non-sacral civilisations, and must be considered ab ovo.

Let us remind ourselves once more of the oldest factors in the differentiation of civilisations. In communities already completely in control of fire these factors are varying clan systems and variety in the triple law, particularly marriage law.

Although the issue of monogamy or polygamy causes great differences in communal life, a systematization cannot be based on that criterion. Polygamy exists in the Turanian and Arab civilisations, and half-heartedly in the Brahmin and Chinese, but this does not make the Chinese as one with the Brahmin, the Arab with the Turanian. Some further differentiating factor is required, and none will be found in the sphere of the triple law.

But let us look again, in connection with another matter. Four civilisations still preserve the clan system, the Turanian, Chinese, Brahmin and Arabic — the same four who practice polygamy or semipolygamy. Polygamous or semi-polygamous societies have thus not gone beyond the clan system. Monogamists who rise above a very primitive level (let us say above the level of pygmies) always try at the same time to abolish this system, whereas polygamists do not succeed in extricating themselves from the chains of their primitive social structure. Although in certain respects they may achieve higher levels, in certain others (as we shall see), the lowness of the structure acts as a brake. In particular, they do not achieve separate public law.

For the great majority of the peoples of the earth manage without a separate system of public law, applying private law in public life. In these cases public law rests on private law, so that the State employs private law. This means that quantitative employment of private law increases with the increase of clans in the tribe, in the tribal duchy, the State, while qualitatively nothing is changed. Not a few States rest on the private law of the ruler, as owner of the State and all its inhabitants and their every possession, entirely in accordance with the norms set by clan founders or despotic clan elders.

With this is connected the question of the mutual relation of society and State. For such a mutual relation to exist, a social organisation must exist alongside the State organisation. Not every community is a society; it becomes so only through suitable-differentiation. This does not take place in Turanian civilisation, among the regiment-peoples organised exclusively in camping style or sunk in disorganisation. These are simply communities which sometimes turn into an army, but never (at least until now) into a society. For them the State is all, although in miniature and caricature. Even in its best periods — in the Oighur culture, in the universal State of Genghis Khan, and later at Kipchak among the Tartar hordes — this civilisation always practised the camp system of communal life. The leader is a demi-god, lord of life and death for every man without exception, and his rights suffer no kind of diminution in peacetime. The community, however, experiences stagnation and disorder, for peoples of this civilisation rot if they are not waging war. The cult of the
leader, that is of the man who in the event of war would be their commander, continues
uninterrupted. The whims of his bad or good humour replace all public law. The sphere of his
authority was characterised in splendid Turanian style by the Khan of Kandzhut in Central
Asia, Safder-Alie, in a letter to General Grabczewski. “Know that you are in a land where
even the birds begin to have power in their wings only when they have received my
command”.

Turanian civilisation reached Ruthenia and Muscovy through Mongolian and Tartar
influences. The military camp organisation which finally crystallised in obligatory State
service under Ivan III, began with the Khazar centuries. In Russia a mixed civilisation
developed, but with a background which always remained Turanian. The Turanian mark lasts
to this day. When after the naval defeat at Tsushima the temper of the press over the loss of
the fleet was represented to Nicholas II, he exclaimed: “What does that rabble want, why does
it interfere? It is my fleet!”

In Brahmin civilisation social organisation ends with the clan system in a caste
framework. States emerging against the background of this civilisation have always been
despotic, but State authority was and is limited (authority of maharajas) to matters outside
clan-caste organisation, for the latter has complete autonomy. In State affairs society has no
say, while the State has none in social matters. Unfortunately, in Brahmin civilisation both are
under-developed. Whenever States of any size have come into existence in India, they have
belonged to civilisations brought in from outside.

In Arab civilisation public law is also derived from private, with the complication that
it must somehow be deduced from the Koran which contains only private law. In a preceding
chapter it has already been said that military service was deduced from the obligation of the
holy war, and taxes placed under the duty of almsgiving. Then there was the rulers’ will, that
is the arbitrary will of every official. This was a civilisation which, with its luxuriance of State
forms, did not permit the spontaneous development of societies. The authority of the State
might intervene at any time in any social matter. In smaller organisations, the sheik still
decides everything; and the same authority served the rulers of the great historic States. An
exception is the Moorish culture in Spain, where the free development of society was
permitted and carried to the point of basing State on society; but there too a breach occurred
in civilisation and State with the appearance of inequality in the categories of being.

In Chinese civilisation State law is based on clan law. The Emperor was the clan elder
of the entire population. China used quite rightly to be spoken of as one vast family obeying
its archpatriarch the Emperor. Applying private law to everything, cases were settled
“paternally”. As often happens in families, nobody may breathe until the head of the family
allows. Not for nothing did Ku-Hung-Ming call the Confucian system a “religion of faithful
servility”. But in fact Chinese civilisation gives complete autonomy to social organisations,
only precluding all influence by them on State affairs. The State and society — each to their
own. The State is also based not on society but on bureaucracy (Mandarinism). From long
ages of such conditions there results a complete incapacity on the part of society to support
State institutions; such societies, coming into contact with affairs of State, know only how to
make revolutions.

So in these four civilisations a man-worshipping conception emerged of the State as
under personal, exclusive control by one man or deputies authorized by him, and often as
object of somebody’s personal property; in any event the State is the plaything of authority,
and all are convinced that it should be so and nobody supposes that it could be otherwise. Let
us now point to the curious fact that these civilisations are polygamous or semi-polygamous,
and remain at the clan system level.

In looking for societies with a separate public law we shall discover that they all
belong to one and the same civilisation, namely the Latin, and are at the same time strictly
monogamous. And this civilisation is composed entirely of societies which the Church brought up.

Here we miss Byzantine civilisation. In order to explain this, we must return to classical antiquity. It is entirely erroneous to speak of a synthesis of Hellas and Rome in Roman civilisation, when what is in question is Rome’s acceptance from Greece of the Beautiful and of some Hellenistic learning. Athenian civilisation, decisive here, is an example of the over-development of the intellect, and that dazzles us — us, the modern intellectuals. But these matters constitute a very small part of man’s being. For the greater part Hellas and Rome are not materials for synthesis, but opposites which cannot be reconciled.

The Greeks possessed several kinds of public and even of private law, particularly on property. Every few miles there was a different form of organisation, a different social structure — a plethora of systems of communal life, systems which were mutually exclusive. Burdened with their wavering triple law, the Greeks were unable to create an over-all association, since it would have lacked commensurable development of the categories of being.

In Greece everything which requires maximum stability, constantly wavered. The only thing which was permanent was revolution. In property law, for example, system followed system to the point of complete chaos. At the same time the mutual relation of society and State also varied, with Sparta and Athens as two poles. In face of such differences, how is it possible to speak of Hellenic civilisation? It is only possible to do so in the plural, for how are Athens and Sparta to be fitted into one civilisation? That is, unless we are prepared to restrict civilisation to sculpture and books.

Rome did not want any synthesis with the chronic state of revolution in Greece, and did not attempt any compromise. She suppressed Greek disorder, imposing her own triple and public law. The Roman Empire spread thanks to the Roman triple law. All over the world Roman citizenship was sought for the sake of Roman private law; men readily submitted to Roman public law in order to acquire for themselves the rights and privileges of Roman private law, guaranteed by the Roman State to every man who became civis romanus. Did the pax romana not involve the spread of absolute personal property, even including the right of testamentary disposal? Hands reached out towards this beneficial law to win freedom from laws of a lower type. And were there no Greeks who longed for the coming of the Roman legions?

The Romans possessed only one kind of triple law and one kind of public law. Not all Greeks were reconciled to it. The traditions of their own systems remained, so that learning knows “Greek law” besides the already codified Roman law. In Byzantium a tendency to synthesis developed, with the most varied results. The Roman concepts never became part of the Greek mind, and reaction soon set in.

Many other — and well-known — factors also contributed to the fact that in Byzantium a separate civilisation developed which certainly did not become a continuation of the Roman. It was a compromise creation between Rome, Greece and the Asiatic Orient with Syrian influences weighing increasingly in the scales. Eastern ideas affected even Rome, causing her downfall. Asiatic public law, not drawing back from man-worship, reached as far as Rome.

The Empire transferred to Byzantium, and the Italic branch passed under the influence of the Papacy. The Church began the creation of Latin civilisation, based on the Roman of the preceding era, before Rome had yet succumbed to Syrian gods and the arbitrary will of praetorian Caesars. The Church collected the remains of authentic Roman civilisation; as all know. It may be said of the civilising activity of the Church in Italy and further to the West.

Poehlmann, op. cit.
that she washed away Asiatic and Byzantine accretions. But Byzantium continued to become more Oriental, and the identification of the State with the person of each succeeding ruler was maintained.

Western ideas on State and society developed in one way, Byzantine in another. In Byzantium society was only permitted to organise under the control of the State, in so far as the State, which prescribed both the competence and the form of the organisation, allowed. Either society carried out the instructions of the State authorities or the organisation concerned was regarded as anti-State and crushed by the State. The Byzantine State rested not on society but on bureaucracy, and in the first centuries of the Middle Ages Byzantine civilisation created etatisme. It is the fatherland of etatisme, taxation by officials and the whole omnipresent State.

This is the reason why Byzantine civilisation cannot really be included in the number of those in which public law emerges from private — but why it also cannot be placed alongside the Latin, which distinguished public from private law. Byzantium is something intermediate, leaning in different matters sometimes to one side sometimes to the other. Basically, what happened was a strange over-development of public law, but with its expression in one man. He might be overthrown, exiled, even killed, yet by whatever means somebody else succeeded him and continued as the supreme expression of all Byzantium. So it was in Rome under praetorian rule, and in Byzantium so it remained. Already in the time of Constantine the Great it was ordained that Emperors be painted with the nimbus round their heads.656

And so it is that in this systematization, which we have based on the distinction between private and public law, Byzantium, theoretically closer to Latin civilisation, in practice must be placed alongside Turanian.

### IV ETHICS AND LAW

In order to arrive at the causes of the phenomena to which the preceding section was devoted, we must go higher in the track of abstract ideas, and this we shall do unexpectedly simply by going back in mind to the oldest abstract ideas, namely to ethics. Mention has already been made of natural ethics and it has been explained in what the difference between ethics and law consists, how under compulsion ethical obligations change into obligations before the law. But this is *a posteriori* law, while artifical, *a priori* law sanctions not for developing conditions but projected conditions.

So much we discovered when considering ethics among primitive peoples, and natural ethics in general. This same theme nevertheless reveals new sides in new circumstances, and consideration of questions of ethics and law among societies at a level of development which enables them to create considerable States and to debate questions concerning the relation of private to public law, will necessarily reveal new sides of the problem of ethics and law, and sides of a higher order. To achieve a clarification of the ensuing inevitable complexities, a new issue, that of the sources of law, must be examined.

Primitive ethics tend to have reference only to one’s own people (kinsfolk, members of the same tribe, among Jews to co-religionists), and the peculiarity of enjoining careful observance of many details, while permitting things which are repulsive, like the right to

murder one’s own children in order for instance that their bodies may become the cornerstone of a new building. In a review of the history of natural ethics once again it falls to be recorded that the Romans must be allowed not only the first, but also an entirely separate place, in many instances close to Christianity. After them, second place in the hierarchy of natural ethics is held by the Japanese, who are, however, very far from Christian ethics. They are similar to the Romans only in possessing a posteriori law, providing sanctions for the postulates which follow from their ethics. In these two cases the source of law is undoubtedly ethics.

There were and are differing views as to whence law was born and who created it. In sacral civilisations, the sacred books and the opinion of priests or those learned in the texts decide every detail. But there is one case — the Wedda — where apparently nothing remains of the sacred books, and only a few shibboleths continued to develop against a background of beliefs ranging from monotheism to the cult of animals; out of this grew the extremely strong Brahmin sacralism. Each caste has its particular sacralism. Where a thing exceeds sacral norms, the source of law is the will of the maharaja.

Jewish sacralism is more comprehensive. Interpretation of the law belongs to the rabbis. In the event of a difference of opinion, or where a problem is basically capable of differing solutions, there is no higher authority, but each rabbi has a free choice of interpretation. The source of law is the rabbi, the tsadyk — and the ruler, in so far only as the rabbi recognises his competence.

It was the Romans who discovered and perfected a lofty legislation completely separate from the sacral. The source of law was the free voice of the free citizen in councils and comitiae. For whole centuries the State as such did not create laws, but was obliged to obey laws passed by associations of citizens. Nobody could be above the law, not consul nor pontifex maximus. The power of office consisted only in the devising of ways to implement the law.

In the East of the same period the State was all-powerful and sole source of law, personified in the person of the ruler. These influences so far affected Rome that the principle came to be accepted that law is quod principi placuit. The struggle between the two attitudes is evident in the Pandecta and in the Codex. From it two ethics, Western and Eastern, emerged, although both were presented in Roman dress.

In Turanian civilisation the head of the State was always the sole source of law; this has survived even among Islamic members of the civilisation. The whole of Arabic civilisation enjoys non-sacral law as well; but Moslems of other civilisations recognise only sacral law, whose interpretation is for the ruler. In Arabic civilisation the fount of law is in principle learning, popularised with the aid of special schools of a superior type. Some recognise that law can exist outside the Koran, provided it is not in conflict with it.

In Chinese civilisation the fount of law is every father of a family, the clan elder, the superior of a trade union — and so up to the Emperor (now transferred by the Japanese to the Manchurian State). But the Emperor alone — supreme authority in everything — has the right to interfere with custom; he alone is allowed to devise new laws. The discrepancy between unparalleled conservatism of custom and the right granted State authority to destroy it has turned into a struggle of two outlooks on the world and life, in which there is also inherent something of the struggle of the two ethics — and which in the history of China has always turned into violent revolution.

In Turanian civilisation public life is in general non-ethical, so that there occurs a constant ethical divergence between the practice of the State, and private affairs which always need some kind of ethic. It was this feature of the East which, on its arrival in Rome with the Syrian gods, devastated Roman civilisation.
In Rome the two sets of ethics resulted in a state of affairs where *summum ius* could become *summa iniuria*. The fall of Rome began with the appearance of people who regarded as moral everything which was legal. On the one hand a Caesarist State with a praetorian programme, on the other consciousness that violence was being done to Rome. Honest people were obliged to withdraw to private life, since public had become non-ethical. As a result persons holding public positions dispensed with ethics in their private lives also, the immoral type of people becoming prevailing among them. When the principle finally emerged in public life that a man who kept the right side of the law by the very fact has a clear conscience, there was not long to wait for the conclusion that anyone knowing how to manage the law could forget about his conscience. It was then a case not of two ethics, but of the nonethical against any kind of ethic. In this way Rome grew easternised and fell into the ethical division between State and private life — which seems to be a feature of the development of natural ethics.

The Gospel arrived, Christian ethics shone out, the Church created Latin civilisation in the West. A return was made to the old Roman principle that the source of law is society, that is each estate for itself, with the royal authority exercising control in the event of dispute between estates. The aim of legislation was to approach ever closer to Catholic ethics, and for that reason the Church was granted a say in legislation.

It was different in Byzantium, in Orthodoxy. There traditions dating from the epoch of the decline of Rome were preserved, and the eastern despotisms copied. The worst of the tyrants of Rome were content to nominate a horse senator and to found some exotic (for example Syrian) temple in which it pleased Caesar to become a priest; only the Byzantine Emperor considered himself ruler of the Church also, as supreme interpreter of conciliar canons. Only the Byzantine Emperors decided dogmatic disputes.

What was the origin of this? Orthodoxy did not acknowledge Catholic ethics as a whole, namely the fourth basic postulate (discussed in the section on Catholicism in the Chapter “Civilisation and Religion”), that the authority of the Church should be independent of that of the State. It was too contrary to the spirit of the East.

Thus in the West two kinds of power were distinguished, following from the distinction of physical and spiritual forces. On their mutual relation, and on which should have priority in the event of active opposition between them — on all this a Catholic could have no doubts. The answer inherent in Catholic ethics is that priority belongs to the moral force.

If Byzantine civilisation had not penetrated deep into the West (in the tenth and eleventh centuries reaching Spain) there would have been no struggle between Empire and Papacy, nor later, Protestantism. Both would have been impossible had it not been for Byzantine ethics, implanted in the very centre of Europe together with Byzantine ideas of the State. The question of the superiority of Papacy or Empire was ethical, of the ethics of public life. But meanwhile from the end of the fifteenth century it had been proclaimed that politics could not be ethical, and in the seventeenth it was added that it ought not to be. The Partitions of Poland put the seal on this “progress”. Later in Prussia this issue of issues was dubbed the struggle of force against law, for by force it was already only physical force that was understood. In the end it was discovered that law itself was nothing but a manifestation of force, all law being the law of the stronger. Law was thus acknowledged the plaything of material forces, of violence, and so of what in Catholic ethics is regarded as lawlessness. The

657 Compare "Bizantynizm niemiecki" ("German Byzantinism" by Koneczny) in "Przegląd Powszechny", October 1927.
first was the only real authority, and the abstract idea of law was to disappear. Mention of ethics in public life was regarded almost as a sign of mental illness.658

The progress of these differing outlooks and the struggle between them took place at the same time as the relation of society and State was being settled. A close connection arose between the two. Society creates ethics, but law comes from the State. The State must use force, and accordingly for it ethics is not sufficient; in the sphere of the State, physical, material power must accompany spiritual power. Between these two systems of power, harmony should reign. If, however, this is not the case in the State and in public life generally, then which system is to have supremacy? In other words, which organisation is to lead — society or State, and in the given case, Church or State? From this emerges a second question: since ethics are not enough for the State, are they necessary to it at all? Can, perhaps even should, public life not do without ethics? And so the question with ethics or without is raised on many sides.

All those civilisations in which the State is not based on society, and in which the will of the ruler is the source of law, declared in favour of public life without ethics. More-over physical forces are everywhere supreme, outside the one Latin civilisation. For where the State only preys on society, the expulsion of morality from the life of the State is a logical step, something extremely simple and highly desirable for the supporters of such States. And physical forces have so many ways of making sure of supremacy for themselves! In all civilisations except the Latin the aim is also the complete subjection of spiritual forces by material. Such is the actual state of this great matter, regardless of the theoretical argument put forward here and there.

These arguments continue and even develop in more than one country where deeds consistently belie all the arguments. In China and in Korea incomparably more time and paper has been devoted to discussion of moral themes than in Western Europe. From distant ages they have known that virtue and wisdom are worth more than riches. In Korea the virtue of officials has been a beloved subject of meditations in the field of practical philosophy. But in China and Korea these are empty words, only in Japan have certain institutions of a moral order been created. But in Japan also no consideration is given to the relation of the two fundamental systems of power, physical and spiritual, as a component in social or State institutions.

Nowhere in Turanian, Arabic or Chinese civilisation is there any question at all about the supremacy of physical or spiritual forces. In so far as account is taken of them, they are not segregated; it is taken as self-evident that the spiritual accompany the physical in public life: for the orders of the State are always moral and wise — the immorality would be to doubt it. Thus in fact there is an enduring supremacy of physical forces, as a result of which the authority of the State decides what is reasonable and moral. In Chinese civilisation for centuries governments have arranged revolutions: society never.

Emancipation of spiritual forces from the ascendancy of the physical has occurred nowhere where the emancipation of the family has not been completed; so far and high reach the consequences of monogamy. When the Spanish Moors began to adopt monogamy, immediately spiritual forces organised separately, outside the State organisation. Where that happens, a new opportunity is born for public life: the possibility of what in our language is called opposition; legal opposition, morally permissible, not constituting anything improper, and being a manifestation of the emancipation of spiritual forces.

Spiritual forces have never emancipated themselves where the State is based on private law. Such emancipation is closely linked — as the course of history and the present

state of affairs teach — with the separate character of public law. And it is thus an outcome of Roman civilisation.

Only an inconsiderable minority of humanity knows of the existence of these problems. For if the average lama or Brahmin were to learn that it is possible for us to hesitate in anything and about anything, he would only draw a conclusion about the inadequacy of our sacred books. On the other hand, Brahmins like Rabindranath Tagore, with a European education, would retort that for them everything is always decided a priori in favour of the spirit, for it is decided religiously, and so spiritually; thus we are evidently materialists! An orthodox Jewish rabbi would rejoice in the same way that there are no similar dissensions in his civilisation because there is not that kind of problem. The question itself is really possible only in non-sacral civilisations, since they alone make possible the emergence of doubt.

Out of doubt all progress is born. Thus amid the hard intellectual struggles of the Middle Ages and against a background of physical struggle for the supremacy of an ideal, a thought was born, the loftiest so far in the whole of history: that circumstances may arise in which resistance must be offered to material forces for the good of the spiritual, resistance to the State in the name of society, resistance to law based on lawlessness in the name of ethics, resistance to secular authority in the name of the Church. The supremacy of the spiritual system of forces must be absolute.

Byzantinism developed differently on the ruins of Latin civilisation: and brings with it disappearances of social and spiritual forces, disappearance of creativity and inevitable downfall for the State, which may sink to the level of a Kandzut. No Byzantine State was ever strong.

We have thus found the feature which above all others differentiates civilisations, possession of spiritual forces, and their emancipation from the physical.

V NATIONAL CONSCIOUSNESS

Let us go further along the not very broad road on which the relation of society and State is settled. Has the reader not been struck by the fact that when speaking of these large associations I have so far not once mentioned the nation?

I do not consider that the nation here constitutes a kind of third factor beside the other two. Instead I assume that where the State is based on society, the latter constitutes the basis both of the State and the nation. These are the superstructures of society; the State is the legal superstructure and the nation the ethical. Where ethics are absent, national consciousness weakens, in so far as it exists; the more a man fears ethics in public life the lower he rates ideas of nationality.

Unlike the State, which may be seen and experienced physically, national consciousness is an abstraction, and national allegiance can only be recognised voluntarily; thus this issue belongs to the category not of law but of ethics. A man voluntarily accepts the yoke of obligations towards his nation, obligations incomparably more complicated than obligations towards the State.

Nationality is not a ready-made force, natural or anthropological, inborn in a certain ethnographical element, but an a posteriori acquired force, created by man and created only at a certain level of culture. There are peoples among whom no nationality has taken shape. It is impossible to foresee whether from given peoples one, two or more nationalities will take shape, for in this field no inborn factors, no a priori data decide, but historical development, to which certain natural factors contribute, and the free human will which cannot be
calculated. In the whole of Europe there is not a land of whose inhabitants it could be said that they were from the dawn of history destined to belong to one nationality and not to another. Thus for example it is not possible to draw any conclusions about how far to the west Polish nationality might have reached if the Polabians had held out. It may be that Poland would have been on the Elbe, but it may equally well be that Great Poland would have belonged to one of the Polabian nations. It was not settled in advance that in the whole Vistula-Warta space one nation would emerge.

Ethnography and anthropology do not know associations larger than peoples; history provides the nations. And this is why nationality is so dear to us, as the incarnation of ideals of living, for it is the product of labour, the prize of progress, the evidence of the improvement achieved by the hard toil of generations amidst struggle, pain and disappointment, but with the guiding intention of carrying to ever greater perfection the ethnological material which history and the dignity of cultural achievement assembled into nation.

I do not know a case where a nation is composed of a single people.

The nation is an association above the people, an association of peoples, and so it only appears where tribal life and the joining together (usually in a State) of tribes to form a people belong to the past. From this it follows that societies still at the clan or even at the tribal stage cannot constitute a nation. Nationality can only appear after the total emancipation of the family. This circumstance of itself excludes from the idea of nationality the Turanian, Arabic, Brahmin and Chinese civilisation.

It is not possible to identify nationalities with separate languages. It was shown in the Chapter on languages that entirely distinct languages are the lot of associations smaller and lowlier than the nation composed of peoples. Anyone defining nations according to language ought to claim that nationality is an a priori force, given to man from above for the ways of developing civilisation; that nations have existed from the beginning of the world, that there was a multitude of them, but that in the pre-ages of proto-history the weaker nations began to be destroyed by the stronger, these by the still stronger until the present number was reached — in other words, that nationalities shared the fortunes of languages. In view of this identification, the separate character of Provençal nationality (langue d’oc) would have to be recognised although not because of any request by men regarding themselves as French, and on the other hand North Americans would have to be included in the English nation. But what could be done about the fact that Croats and Serbs have the same language, while the population round Zagreb speaks not Croat but Slovenian?

Nor is nationality identical with the idea of the State, for one nation may create two or more States, while several nations may belong to one State. A certain connection occurs between these ideas, however, of which there are evidences in history.

Our Polish concept of the nation has passed through significant changes. It was understood in one way in the fourteenth century when, under Ladislas the Steadfast, a nation was created in Poland, and in another under Sigismund Augustus, when the ideology of the “two nations”, Poland and Lithuania, was developed. Peter Skarga gave warning that Poles were in danger of losing their nationality (“you will turn into another nation”). Immediately after the Partitions there were widespread complaints that “we have ceased to be a nation”. Napoleonic times restored to us our awareness, of continued national existence (in precisely this lies the significance of the “Napoleonic epic” in its Polish edition), and we have not lost that consciousness; we have even created a hitherto unknown notion of nationality outside the State, even without the State. It is indeed true that our modern Polish notion of the nation dates only from the nineteenth century.

Today it is one of the so-called generally known facts that the English or French nation is not at all synonymous with our naród. In the West they do not understand nation
without State, because they have not observed the phenomenon in their own history and have not studied Polish. By “nation” they understand simply the national State; to their way of thinking the nation is the association which creates a State.

Nationality is not traced to the State either in the English language or anywhere else. An idea of the sort sometimes appears in German literature, under the influence of Prussian ideology, but nowhere else. And Prussianism holds a separate place among collective mentalities, on which I cannot and do not see any need to dilate here.659

Beyond question nationality is not of State but exclusively of social origin. It is not States which change into nations, but societies — or those of them which have completed the emancipation of the family and achieved a separate public law. But these conditions are not enough; something more is necessary.

Since societies produced out of themselves the concept of the national State, they must have been societies with the power, drive and opportunity to create associations of a new and higher type which determined or at least enormously influenced the character of the State. A concept may be formed by a philosopher in isolation (and this is even usually the case), but it can only be given body if the educated public accepts it, and is itself already sufficiently numerous and influential. For the concept of the nation to be accepted and produce effect, the elite of the society must have been for it and moreover in a position to ensure the existence of the nation alongside the State. This could be accomplished only by societies with influence on the State, where the State did not swallow up society, but left it freedom of development. Thus the concept of the nation could not have arisen in Egyptian civilisation, nor later in Byzantine. The Jewish concept of the chosen race as a means of indicating co-religionists has nothing at all to do with the question occupying us here.

There remain Greece and Rome. The classical Greeks, at variance on the triple law, were by the same token incapable of creating a general association. Individuals arrived at the idea of a Hellenic nation (for instance the famous passage in Herodotus), but it was never generally accepted.

The concept was born in Roman, and then fostered by Latin civilisation. I do not know an example of a nation outside that civilisation. They reach only as far as classical antiquity reached. Peoples who remained historically outside the limits of Roman influences become nations as soon as they accept Latin civilisation; this has been the case with peoples of completely different background, the Finns and Magyars for example, as soon as they joined the Latin family.

I state the fact that history has not so far pointed to national consciousness outside Latin civilisation.

Many things have radiated and radiate from one civilisation to others, for mutual influences arise. In this way the concept of the nation has sometimes reached out from the Latin sphere — but has it anywhere been adopted lastingly and effectively? For the nation is an association, so that its essence must consist in the system of communal life shared within that association. In other words: A nation must belong in its entirety without the slightest reservations to the same civilisation. A national association is a civilisational association.

If it were not this, it would be nothing. For the nation is a voluntary association, in contrast to the State which is a compulsory association and could not develop without compulsion; even a national State must have the power to use force towards its citizens, towards the people who created it. But the very suggestion of force in national affairs would be an absurdity. We were by force Russian or Prussian citizens, but remained Poles. Is it possible to be a member of any nation compulsorily?

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659 More fully in "Bizantynizm niemiecki" ("German Byzantinism" by Koneczny) in "Przegląd Powszechny". October 1927.
Civilisation proceeds from good, unforced will; conversely, a society exposed to compulsion in civilisation would be in danger of a state of a-civilisation (prolonged captivity contains this danger).

The will of a society ripe for the shaping of a nation cannot be divided in the direction of two civilisations; something of the kind is possible only in the case of people who do not themselves yet know what they want. Moreover without homogeneity in civilisation no voluntary and at the same time extensive association will take shape. For these reasons a lively national consciousness in two civilisations is a Utopian idea.

Let us now look for other features of nationality. There will be agreement that the nation is a civilisational association possessing a homeland and a native tongue. It is time for a definition of these concepts.

It is often heard that the homeland is not only the earth of the country one is born in, but a whole, series of considerations of a spiritual nature. I believe I am released from examination of this question, since I have incorporated into the definition of nation the expression “civilisational” (association) — and so regard that point as dealt with. Nevertheless I maintain that all civilisational aspects of the nation must be connected with some area, that is with the settlements of the peoples forming the common nation, and so there will be no misunderstanding if we call this particular area the homeland. This way of thinking, popularised throughout the world, is entirely justified. The homeland is the compact territory forming the permanent abode of the nation and stage of its history. It follows indirectly that there is no nation without an historical sense — and so it is in fact.

A man who possesses a homeland also possesses a native tongue. As every man has only one homeland in the same way he cannot have two native tongues. The Swiss regards as his native tongue the language of his canton, and that alone.

Clearly the homeland is not a concept from the sphere of private law, but emphatically from public; moreover homeland and patriotism have nothing in common with private law, and so are not compatible with the kind of public law which bases itself on private law. Thus a nation can only emerge in societies which possess a separate public law and where the State is based on society. And so only in Latin civilisation.

Again there forms before our eyes the same order of civilisations which has already faced us on several occasions. There is no polygamous nation, no nation exists before the emancipation of the family, nor without liberties for society nor without a separate public law. And the various systems for organising the way of life of the community still fall into the same order.

A word on “supra-national” associations. It is an enormous misunderstanding to suppose that there belong here those mediaeval dreams about the “family of rulers and Christian peoples” and the several later forms, largely theoretical, down to the Prussian programme for a pax germanica and the contemporary misfit and great falsification of universal history which is the so-called League of Nations. These were and are supra-State associations, or attempts at such associations. Confusion of the concepts of State and nation leads here to unnecessary complications and immensely increased difficulties. Until the misunderstanding is removed no step forward will be made towards the creation of an effective supra-State association.

A supra-national association is an absurdity, because of the inescapable differences in homeland and native tongue. It is possible to imagine a universal State, but will some kind of universal language be native to everybody? Is it possible to have one’s homeland everywhere and anywhere? These are blatantly anti-national suppositions. Anybody who plans a supra-national association aims at the abolition of nationality, and so at the abolition of Latin civilisation.
National consciousness represents great progress in the history of the societies of Latin civilisation; without it that civilisation would be incomplete. For its highest criterion is the supremacy of spiritual forces. On what is this supremacy to rest, where to find its guarantees? The State offers compulsory means but this supremacy can only be acknowledged voluntarily, from conviction, to which nobody forces or will force a man. So it also can rest only on a large and voluntary association, and such is the nation.

Only through the nations does Latin civilisation reach its heights.

VI TENTATIVE SYSTEMATIZATION

I have ended what I had to say in the matter of a tentative systematization of civilisations, and shall not advance beyond that question. I have been concerned only with their differences, wishing to bring out their multiplicity and systematize it. I have not described any of them. A description of any given civilisation requires a separate volume — a large work entering into details. A description of the seven civilisations I have worked with here would need seven volumes. 660

The results of this book can be expressed in the small table below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Civilisations</th>
<th>Sacral</th>
<th>Non-sacral with supremacy for:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>physical forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Public life based on:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>private law</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jewish</td>
<td></td>
<td>public law</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brahmin</td>
<td>Camp system</td>
<td>Social system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>polygamy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turanian</td>
<td></td>
<td>quasi-polygamy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arabic</td>
<td></td>
<td>Chinese</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Byzantine</td>
<td></td>
<td>Latin</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In this plan Latin civilisation immediately stands out; but does so only at the end if we make a table by the opposite method, progressing from features of less weight to the greatest:

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660 Obviously it is only in such a “description” that it will appear whether my method is the right one. Aware of this, I did not prepare the present work for printing until I had myself checked its content in a detailed investigation: I have now almost completed descriptions of the Jewish and Byzantine civilizations. Having convinced myself that the method works, this treatise appears in print first, as a foundation. (Koneczny's "Byzantine Civilisation" and "Jewish Civilization", works larger than the present volume, have in fact been finally completed only after the 1939/45 war. They have not been printed yet and are known to a limited circle of friends only in typescripted copies. Transl). [They have been first printed (in Polish) in 1973 and 1974 respectively].
Let us sketch out one more table showing the time relationship:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Clan System</th>
<th>Family Emancipation</th>
<th>Separate public law</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Turanian, Brahmin, Chinese</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arabic civilisations</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Society oppressed</td>
<td>Society free</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Byzantine</td>
<td>Emancipation of spiritual forces</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Let us sketch out one more table showing the time relationship:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Measurement of Time</th>
<th>Control of Time</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Calendar</td>
<td>Date</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brahmin</td>
<td>Historical consciousness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cycles</td>
<td>Latin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinese</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turanian</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Era</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arabic</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Byzantine</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

From whatever, angle we have attempted a systematization, Latin civilisation always holds a place apart, never in line with any other.

I repeat that I regard these tables as “provisional with reservations”. To complete the problem there is need of a more exact study of the variations occurring in the relation of man to time, as well as more detailed information about the clan systems (of which in Chapter III I enumerated five, for I only have data for five, but we cannot exclude the possibility that there are more). It may be that absolutely all higher and highest forms up to the supremacy of spiritual forces are inherent in nuce in a certain system of clan organisation; it may be that the halting of development somewhere below the highest level depends on the kind of clan organisation from which a society came; it may be that in the same way as certain peoples are victims of a language unsuited to development beyond a certain level, there may enter into the matter a kind of predestination depending on the clan element; but it may also be that none of these suppositions is correct; and equally it may be that some are correct and others not; we must wait until the science of civilisation develops — that science to which the present treatise is intended as an initial contribution.

As a conclusion to this tentative systematization, let us take the features which link or divide the chief civilisations. (Jewish civilisation, which is variable, will be discussed in the next section.)

Brahmin civilisation is sacral, with its clan and caste organisation, its measurement of time confined to the calendar, with a tendency to polygamy, autonomous in social matters, despotic and without ethics in State affairs.

Turanian civilisation has the clan organisation, is polygamous, measures time up to the cycle, is composed of communities which have not become differentiated into societies, organises public life on camp lines with anthropolatry of the leader-ruler, is without ethics in public life.
Chinese civilisation with its clan organisation loosening up in the towns, knowns the cycle, is polygamous, autonomous in social matters, anthropolatrous and without ethics in those of the State.

Arabic civilisation with its clan organisation achieving emancipation of the family in the Cordovan culture, knowns the era but has no historical awareness, is polygamous, despotic in public life, but subjects the ruler to the supreme authority of the Koran.

Byzantine civilisation with its emancipation of the family is monogamous, knows the era but is not historically conscious, subjects society to bureaucracy, creates étatisme, is anthropolatrous, worshipping the person of the ruler in the name of the omnipotence of the State although — unlike all the civilisations already mentioned — it possesses a separate public law; in public life without ethics. It does not produce nationality (resembling in this all the preceding civilisations).

Latin civilisation has family emancipation and monogamy, historical and national consciousness, rests the State on society, demands ethics in public life and recognises the supremacy of spiritual forces.

VII CHANCES AND SYNTHESIS

How splendidly the last sentence of the previous section sounds. — but who has seen the reality? Where in Latin civilisation is the magic land where ethics are demanded in public life as part of a full acknowledgement of the supremacy of spiritual forces? In the territories of this civilisation it might be easier to point to the kind of country in which the principle of “enlightened” absolutism holds: Steuer zahlen und Maul halten, where spying and informing flourish, raised to the dignity of State institutions, where censorship creates its ravages but is never employed against pornography, where the independence of judges is suspended. Where then is this Latin civilisation hiding while in more than one place in her territories sprouts something which looks rather like a variation on Turanian, or even on Chinese civilisation?

Let us remind ourselves of what has already been said on the relationship of learned schemes to life, and let us try to bring into focus this apparent arbitrariness of reality. It will prove that alongside the plan, without which we could not argue at all, certain historic laws exist which in no small measure explain our confusion and doubts.

Let us bear in mind first of all that everything which is living is changing, and so civilisation is neither a brittle bone nor an immobile clod. While it lives it is subject to changes; sometimes for the better, because it perfects itself, and sometimes for the worse, for it declines; periods of development and decline may set in unexpectedly for hidden but deep reasons. Changes may be quantitative but also qualitative. These must be carefully distinguished; a change in the levels through which every civilisation passes is one thing, and a basic change in civilisation something quite different. The number of levels is unlimited, but has nothing to do with the actual kind of civilisation, which may remain the same from the most primitive to the highest stages of development. These are exclusively quantitative changes. Qualitative, basic changes in civilisation may have a varied range: some fit into the frame of the civilisation concerned, others do not and get expelled. The first are born naturally of the vital force of the civilisation, the second may derive from the influences of foreign civilisations. The result of the meeting of various currents of civilisation may be a novelty that is positive, but also one which is negative, and even a caricature; progress is possible but also degeneration. It seems to me that the science of civilisation offers means to enable us to recognise the one from the other; and occasionally a table of characteristic
features may be a help. A table is only a label, but it is sometimes a desirable key for distinguishing things and problems.

As was shown in the fourth section of Chapter IV, civilisations are divided into cultures which are variations on them. Here even considerable differences may arise. For example Latin civilisation based itself on feudalism, but Poland accepted that civilisation without feudalism, which was of no use to us. Thus a distinct culture of Latin civilisation developed in Poland. Rejection of feudalism did not infringe the unity of our civilisation, any more than the downfall of feudalism infringed it in the West. In our table, feudalism does not occur; it is a secondary, not a basic feature. And all the basic features of Latin civilisation can appear as well under feudalism as without it, since the same system of organising communal life may be preserved. Feudalism obtained in Mecklenburg until 1918, but there are few who know it; even among the German intelligentsia at the time this knowledge was rare.

Many changes may occur which do not involve changes of civilisation. Have the Turks, for example, changed their (Turanian) civilisation because they have abandoned the lunar year and adopted the solar? Once the lunar year was used everywhere — including Poland. Perhaps traces could still be found of lunar time-measurements? On this we have curious information from the village of Zalasowa, between Tarnów and Tuchów, for the year 1896:

“The oldest generation does not know our way of reckoning time; it is true that it knows the names of the twelve months, but it indicates their length not by number of days but from new moon to new moon; and since the lunar year is shorter than the solar, in order to make it equal to the ordinary year beginning with the New Year, every second year they count a thirteenth month, which they insert between February and March and call podmarczyk (“nearMarch”), and then the new moon of the new year will fall at New Year, that is on December 31 or January I.”661

A change of calendar means nothing, nor does even the variety of calendar possible within the same civilisation; only historical awareness belongs to our table. Not a few similar changes and variations could be quoted. Every civilisation, every culture even has features which are exclusively, characteristically its own, but do not affect the principle itself in any way.

Nevertheless among civilisations there is one which has passed through changes which in any other would certainly be regarded as basic, and which despite this has nevertheless remained itself. This is the more singular in that Jewish civilisation is sacral, and so not prone to change. In the field of marriage law, no existing religious law forbids polygamy and there are polygamous Jews. In Europe Jews nevertheless adopted monogamy — in the West from the middle of the eleventh century under the influence of Rabbi Gerson of Metz, in the Balkans in the middle of the seventeenth century on the orders of “Messias” Sabatay Zwi (the “Frankists” belonged to this school). For polygamy became impossible in the European diaspora, and moreover caused scandal among Christians, but under Napoleon I there was a Government inquiry into the question whether Jews were polygamists. But do we know of any society — apart from the Roman — which was never polygamist? As a rule such a change brings about considerable changes in civilisation, and it must have caused them among the Jews also, but nevertheless they have kept their civilisation, although passing subsequently through still other changes. They have kept it precisely because it was and is sacral, and changes have taken place without touching the supreme principle that they are a

privileged nation, called to rule over the whole earth (Jewish Messianism). If this feature were to collapse, Jewish civilisation would collapse: but while they believe this everything may change. In the same way, no change in Brahmin civilisation means anything as long as the caste system and the doctrine of avatars survive.

The Jews passed through changes in civilisation as a result of their dispersal among other civilisations. Civilisations obviously exercise a reciprocal influence on one another, and the Jewish has left its imprint on societies of Latin civilisation.

Every civilisation, while it remains vital, aims at expansion: so that wherever two vital civilisations meet they must fight each other. Every vital civilisation which is not dying is aggressive. The struggle lasts until one of the fighting civilisations is destroyed; actual acquisition of the position of ruling civilisation does not end it. If civilisations existing side by side sit side by side in peaceful indifference, evidently both are without vital force. A case of this kind often ends in some compromise mechanical mixture, stagnation ensues on both hands, and in time a real swamp of a-civilisation develops.

It was thus that the civilisation of mighty Persia fell, unable to remove the Hellenic wedge driven into her. Soon Syria, having collected brief laurels in the category of semi-corporeal Beauty, but otherwise achieving absolutely nothing under Hellenistic civilisation, began to revert to the wild. On the other hand, Pergamon and Alexandria were long combined, for there Greek civilisation overlaid and suppressed all others.

In antiquity we also have instances of many kinds of civilisation subsisting in the same place. The first instance should be Antioch. But every single piece of information about her is unfavourable, expressive of indignation and disgust at local ideas and customs. In our own times there are places in the East where various civilisations live together without conflict, in “complete agreement”. About one of them, Port Said, a traveller has written:

“The external aspect of the town is international; it recalls a whore who has been given each item of her wardrobe by a different guest and has only a chemise of her own, and that dirty.”

Where then is the field for syntheses of civilisations? If the thing were possible it would necessarily occur everywhere differing civilisations meet. A synthesis of syntheses has had time to emerge in India out of the six local civilisations, and in Poland a tolerable one should likewise have arisen. But instead four civilisations — Jewish, Byzantine, Turanian and Latin — fight one another with all their strength; the three first-named commonly join together in wartime alliance to attack the Latin with joint forces, but apart from that they too struggle and wrestle with one another.

Synthesis is possible only between cultures of the same civilisation, not between civilisations. While Rome honoured various Italic gods, it grew strong; it began to decline when Syrian gods were admitted into the City. In Italy one civilisation held sway, dividing into local variants, small Italic cultures whose synthesis was in Roman civilisation; but when the attempt was made to repeat the process with different civilisations, it proved death-dealing. Between civilisations, only a mechanical mixture is possible. This happens rarely, but always leads to the lowering of the civilisation, sometimes to its downfall, to a state directly a-civilisational.

Whenever a “synthesis between West and East” has been sought in Poland, the East has always emerged the victor. In the upshot we turned from the West and under the Saxon kings devoted ourselves to spreading Turanian civilisation westwards. Sunk in oriental ignorance we could not keep public law separate from private. By hard effort we have returned to Latin civilisation, having lost our independence in the struggle.

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662 Goetel, op. cit., p. 251.
663 Graebner in his "Ethnologie" came near this law when he wrote: "Aber der weitaus stärkere Kulturausgleich liegt bei den einander näher stehen Kulturen". "Anthropologie", op. cit. p. 578.
A typical experimental field for so-called syntheses of civilisations was Russia, Rus as a whole. Since the dawn of Kievan history Latin and Byzantine civilisation have been in combat there, with the victory going to — Turanian. The upper hand was taken by those who served Polovtians, then Mongols and Tartars, until in the end towards the close of the reign of Ivan III the struggle ceased for a long period, for Turanian civilisation had won complete victory. In the seventeenth century there was a new wave of Latin, Polish influences — and at the same time total ruin of Lithuania. There even emerged a “Latin learning” in Russia, while the introduction of compulsory Latin for candidates for leading position in the State (1682) was an event more far-reaching than all the subsequent reforms of Peter the Great. The latter introduced a strong current of Byzantinism from Germany, and soon the Partitions of Poland strengthened Latin influences to such extent that something of national consciousness strayed in. European science also penetrated to Russia. Who will deny the presence there of truly European types, but was not a genuinely Turanian type common besides? Byzantinism entered into all this from two directions: Oriental in the case of Turkish-Byzantine culture and Western in that of German-Byzantine. In the last two generations the heads of educated Russians were furnished, to paraphrase Bishop Krasicki, with pieces in all styles. A synthesis? It was a highroad to nihilism of every kind.

There are no syntheses, but only poisonous mixtures. All Europe is now ill of the mixing of civilisations; here lies the cause of all “crises”. For how is it possible to look in two ways, in three ways (and in Poland even in four ways) on good and evil, on beauty and ugliness, on loss and gain, on the relation of society and State, of State and Church; how is it possible to have at the same time a four-fold ethic, four-fold pedagogy? Down this road the only possibility is decline into an a-civilisational state, which holds within itself incapacity for a culture of action. The sequel is the going round in circles, preying upon one another which is a picture of Europe today.

And if in a given society the victor among fighting civilisations is not the one which has hitherto held sway, and a change of civilisation follows, as a rule the society collapses into an a-civilisational state. The Magyars passed through this, the Finns passed through it (from Turanian to Latin) and emerged victorious. And we? Stumbling in the opposite direction, we were a-civilisational under the Saxon Augustus III, and are in a very similar position at the present day. Do not let us suppose that Latin civilisation will fall; we shall fall. Do not let us suppose that a new civilisation will arise; barbarism will follow.

I do not know a greater absurdity than the doctrine of the fall of civilisations as a result of old age: the Jewish and Chinese go on. The introduction into history of a biological point of view is a very gross philosophical error. Yet we have seen even level heads reckoning how long a given civilisation can go on flourishing, after what period it must yield the field to a “new” one. No civilisation need either decline or die of old age, but it may poison itself with a mixture of civilisations at any time. All the theories about historical cycles also depend on the error of historical biology, and all are false.

Nor is it at all necessary for the decline of a civilisation to be preceded by a period of high development (“masculine age”) since a fall is possible from every level. Sometimes unripe fruit rots on the tree. And the argument that civilisations fall “having completed their task” is a literary cliche which sounds well but is scientifically void.

Civilisations fall for the same reason as all associations: when their structure is spoiled. This structure consists in a uniform system of association ruled by certain co-ordinated norms in such a way that one does not exclude the other. In a word, civilisation declines when it comes to lack the condition of commensurability. Civilisation is an association and so is subject to this law of associations.

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664 See Chapter I
Civilisation would be the only possible supra-national association. It will not be created artificially, nor the outcome of any a priori theory. But also precisely because it is an association of a higher order than the nation, it is impossible to suppose that every nation has its civilisation. Are there to be as many civilisations as nations? The “national” civilisation of a given nation is the one in which the nation was formed and grew — Poland’s national civilisation, for example, is Latin. Within it Poles have created a separate Latin-Polish culture, but they might have lacked this originality and would still have belonged to Latin civilisation. The emergence of a culture is not to be explained by distinctions of nationality. There are nations which have created no separate culture but this does not derogate in the least from their separateness as nations; national characteristics are one thing, those of civilisations another.

I can barely touch here upon the various problems which arise, and on which adequate light could only be cast in the course of a description of a particular civilisation. But it seems to me that I have nevertheless indicated several historical truths — and I should like to underline the highest of them.

If it is true, as I have argued throughout this book, that the success of an association depends on the suitability and uniformity of its system, that no lasting and strong association can be organised on conflicting systems, then what I regard in history as the law of laws — for me the achievement and outcome of the labours of an entire life — must also be true:

**It is not possible to be civilised in two ways.**

### VIII CONCLUSION

The study of civilisation is a superior level of history. In 1921 I allowed myself to assert that “it will only be possible to draw up universal history against a background of conflicts of civilisations and unlucky attempts at syntheses of civilisations”, and that in place of a turgid, wishy-washy so-called history of culture “there will appear a clear science of civilisations, fruit of every sort of variety of historical investigation, the highest rung in historical science”. I had, however, begun work connected with the present book four years previously, in 1917, in that year of severest trials and restrictions when, despite everything, belief in the restoration of Poland did not lose actuality even for a moment. The starting point was reflection on our relation to Europe, our value for civilisation in general. The area of investigation then widened from year to year, the theme expanded and deepened at once. I owe much to my ten-year stay in Vilno, whose narrow streets may be said to be full of broad problems of universal history. There too, in Vilno, the original version of this work formed the subject of lectures at the university during the academic year 1927-28.

In fact a methodical science of civilisation is yet to be. I myself am helping towards it considerably less than I would wish and (as I believe) might have done. (Let the smallness of the harvest be explained by the circumstance that throughout life I have been isolated in Polish science. I worked without any help).

Scientific research advances in two ways: now through specialisation, now by generalisation; but if the latter were to be impossible, the other would in my view be

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665 "Polskie Logos i Ethos" ("The Polish Logos and Ethos" by Koneczny), Poznań 1921, vol. I, p. 28. (Inaugural lecture in, the University of Vilno.)

666 "Polska w kulturze powszechnej. Dzieło zbiorowe pod redakcją Feliksa Konecznego". ("Poland in Universal Culture". Symposium under the editorship of Feliks Koneczny). Two vols., Cracow 1917. (With Preface by Franciszek Stefczyk, through whose efforts the work appeared).
superfluous. The relation of these two procedures in science is for me the relation of means and end. It is necessary first to be well provided with means, and anyone who has not worked long and hard on the analysis of a specialised topic has no access to the structure of synthesis.

I would ardently wish that the views of one of the masters of European science, Fustel de Coulanges, might become known in Poland. He said three things. First, the basic pattern of all scientific work: *pour un jour de synthèse il faut des années d’analyse*. However at the same time he had no faith in the depth of knowledge of specialists who restrict their studies over-much in time and place; he claimed that an historian must base his investigations on a period of time of some length. In his view a man who limits himself to only one sector of history exposes himself to errors even in the only section open to him, even though he has devoted his whole life to his minor ultra-speciality, because the age in which a thing blossoms is hardly ever the age in which it takes its rise. And in yet another place he warns historians that *l’histoire n’étudie pas seulement les faits matériels et les institutions; son véritable objet d’étude est l’âme humaine*.

I do not disparage any point of view, for all observation undertaken from a new vantage-point may provide results most worthy of note; in consequence I also defend myself against exclusive claims for any field of observation. If it were possible to embrace all of them, may be that from a critical review a synthesis might somehow automatically be born. The sum of all points of observation would undoubtedly give exact sight of the whole, but only on condition that one looked from all simultaneously, to avoid the effects of change caused by time. This is unfortunately impossible, but we do approach adequate coverage of the whole by employing differing points of observation. The results of such observation must be reduced to a common denominator by the historical method well fitted for the task, since created amid diversity for the purpose of investigating it.

Success in elucidating the problem of the difference of civilisations would result in a new view of universal history, which must define the mutual relations of civilisations. Universal history should be treated as the history of the struggles of civilisations and of attempted syntheses of civilisations, the history of their expansion and disappearance, the history of the emergence of cultures and of their interaction within the same civilisation or submission to a foreign civilisation, and so the history of the reciprocal positive and negative influences of civilisations. Universal history will become the history of systems for the organisation of communal living — and in that event will certainly include all manifestations of historical life, the whole fullness of that life.

Then a basis will also have been acquired for the comparison of historical phenomena and the critical examination of causes and effects, means and ends, possibilities and impossibilities. We shall learn at last what is at stake in the millenniums of mankind’s good and evil fortunes. We shall know the use of those laborious searches after trifling details on the lower rungs of History — which at present are presumably an end to themselves, for nobody is yet able to connect them into a whole otherwise than mechanically, and then always restricted within the limits of a single department of being. The history of every category of being now vegetates in isolation; linked by a general idea emerging from the science of civilisation, they will give a synthesis.

Generalisation becomes an irresistible impulse for the investigator who discerns that in science everything has a connection with everything else. Of this the true scholar must be aware. It is of course and old thesis, known to Buckle, and high time that it at last became generally known. For me there is no doubt that knowledge is the sum of the connections arising between sciences, and that the highest level of the structure is a general view on

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everything, an outlook on the world. It is possible to climb to this height wherever one begins; there is no science which cannot be selected as a starting-point. Let me add that to climb towards the heights is a duty; and if a man is too weak himself, let him at least not hinder others who are stronger.

For long the formulation of outlooks on the world has been as it were the monopoly of naturalists. Historical life has been subjected to biological laws. Clio herself is not a little to blame for her degradation to a fifth wheel in Nature’s chariot. The decline of the humanist sciences has also given and gives ever-increasing scope to every kind of charlatanism in public life. Yet these sciences are now provided with highly perfected methods; why, therefore, not make good what has been neglected and venture an outlook on the world based on humanist investigations?

Thus I proclaim a renaissance of the humanist sciences. I believe they will no longer yield in anything to the “exact knowledge” of the natural sciences. History is capable of discovering and demonstrating her “axioms” and “laws” by her own method. I part company with those who would make of history something in the likeness of the natural sciences. The adoption of this attitude I should regard as an aberration threatening continued degeneration. But the efforts made by some historians to perfect History by modelling her in this way on the natural sciences are due to a misunderstanding which will surely be short-lived. Naturalist and humanist, each to his own, each must work in his way, by his own methods. Only then shall we find ourselves on a fair way to those uplands where everything fits together, where the connections binding all things together are known.

I believe I have succeeded in indicating the direction of a new road for those on the pilgrimage to Truth. The issue is one of finding the method of the science of civilisation. I wish that the book may prove worthy of being corrected, and provide a thread for further discussions. I know that here I am offering only a sketch. I console myself with the hope that the questions raised will become familiar in Polish learning. With such a result I should be more than content, regardless how much of my work survives, or is invalidated by the more exact investigations of my successors. And there is the word to express my dreams — I would wish to have successors.

But when the time comes for synthesis leading to effective investigation of historical laws, then the individual departments of history will also acquire the features of exact knowledge, and the question whether history is a science will no longer be heard.

And History in its further development will serve the creative discussion of the great problems of man and humanity, climbing by the rungs of abstract ideas to the ante-room of the supernatural, debating by its own method the relation of Thought and Being.

Ending, I permit myself to turn once more to the shade of Kółłątaj, and finish in his words:

“Let us begin without looking round to see who will correct us afterwards”.

Cracow, September, 1934.
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